War, Strategy and History: Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O’Neill by Marston, Daniel & Leahy, Tamara
WAR, STRATEGY 
& HISTORY





ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
PROFESSOR ROBERT O’NEILL
EDITED BY DANIEL MARSTON 
AND TAMARA LEAHY
Published by ANU Press 
The Australian National University 
Acton ACT 2601, Australia 
Email: anupress@anu.edu.au 
This title is also available online at press.anu.edu.au
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry 
Title: War, strategy and history : essays in honour of professor
 Robert O’Neill / editors: Daniel
 Marston, Tamara Leahy.
ISBN: 9781760460235 (paperback) 9781760460242 (ebook)






 Marston, Daniel, editor.
 Leahy, Tamara, editor.
Dewey Number: 355.02
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
Cover design and layout by ANU Press. 
Cover photograph: THE XUYEN MOC BATON. This hand-carved baton was presented 
to Captain Bob O’Neill by the commander of Xuyen Moc District, Phuoc Tuy Province, 
Vietnam, Captain Duc, on 4 October 1966. O’Neill made the first visit to this isolated 
outpost by allied personnel after the arrival of the 1st Australian Task Force in the 
province. Bob, his interpreter and assistant, and RAAF helicopter pilot and co-pilot, 
had no confirmation that they were flying into and landing in a secure area. All went 
well and Captain Duc showed his gratitude by presenting O’Neill with this baton just 
before departure. Photograph: Stuart Hay.
This edition © 2016 ANU Press
Contents
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . vii
Foreword  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . ix
Michael Howard
1 . Exploring Political–Military Relations: Nazi Germany  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1
Gaines Post
2 . Vietnam: A Winnable War?  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .15
Ashley Ekins
3 . The Vietnam Chapter  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .31
Tony White
4 . A Strategic Career   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .39
Desmond Ball
5 . Robert O’Neill and Australian Security Policy   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .47
Paul Dibb
6 . Robert O’Neill and the Australian Official War Histories: 
Policy and Diplomacy  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .61
Peter Edwards
7 . The Evolution of Australian Official War Histories  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .73
David Horner
8 . The Postwar Evolution of the Field of Strategic Studies: 
Robert O’Neill in Context   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .91
Catherine McArdle Kelleher
9 . Strategic Studies in Britain and the Cold War’s Last Decade  .  .  .107
Lawrence Freedman
10 . The Uncomfortable Wars of the 1990s  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .127
John Nagl and Octavian Manea
11 . A Mission Too Far? NATO and Afghanistan, 2001–2014  .  .  .  .  .  .155
Mats Berdal
12 . Theory and Practice, Art and Science in Warfare: 
An Etymological Note  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .179
Beatrice Heuser
13 . A Pivotal Moment for Global Nuclear Arms 
Control and Disarmament Policies: The Contribution 
of Robert O’Neill  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .197
Marianne Hanson
14 . Robert O’Neill’s Institutional Leadership: The End of the 
Cold War and the Re-emergence of a Global World Order  .  .  .  .217
John Hillen
15 . Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .235
Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston
16 . Robert O’Neill and the Birth of ASPI  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .251
Hugh White
17 . The Rumble of Think Tanks: National Security and Public 
Policy Contestability in Australia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .265
Allan Gyngell
18 . Australian Thinking About Asia  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .285
Michael Wesley
Contributors  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .301
Index   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .309
vii
List of Acronyms 
and Abbreviations
1ATF 1st Australian Task Force
1RAR 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
2IC Second-in-Command
AAA American Australian Association
ACRI Australia–China Relations Institute
ADF Australian Defence Force
AIIA Australian Institute of International Affairs
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute
AUMF Authorization for Use of Military Force
CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
COIN Counter-insurgency
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ICNND International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation 
and Disarmament
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JIO Joint Intelligence Organisation
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
viii
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NFZ No Fly Zone
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NLF National Liberation Front (National Front for the 
Liberation of South Vietnam)
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PGM Precision Guided Munition
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
QIP Quick Impact Project
R2P Responsibility to Protect
RMC Royal Military College
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
SA Sturmabteilung
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SDSC Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SS Schutzstaffeln




Fifty years ago, I compiled a Festschrift for Sir Basil Liddell Hart. 
Naturally, a key contribution had to be something about his influence 
on German military doctrine, which I had lined up a distinguished 
German scholar to provide. At the critical moment, he fell ill. 
I desperately asked Basil’s advice about a replacement, and he made 
rather a surprising suggestion. There was a very able young Australian 
Rhodes scholar, he said, who had been consulting him about the thesis 
he was writing on the German Army and the Nazi Party. Why not 
try him? I did, and Captain Robert O’Neill produced, bang on time, 
a superb contribution that more than held its own in the company of 
those by, among others, Andre Beaufre, Henry Kissinger, Yigal Allon, 
and Alastair Buchan.
A few months later I found myself acting as an examiner for Bob’s 
PhD thesis. In order to write it Bob had taught himself German well 
enough not only to read the relevant documents, but to seek out and 
interview many of the German officers and their relations who figured 
in his pages. It was a path-breaking piece of scholarship that could 
have led him straight into a distinguished academic career, had he not 
decided to remain in the Australian Army for long enough to serve in 
Vietnam and gain some first-hand experience of war. Had he remained 
in the army, he would certainly have gone straight to the top of his 
profession. As it was, after publishing another path-breaking work 
on General Giap, he reverted to academic life, where he was rapidly 
snapped up to undertake the thankless but essential task of writing 
the official history of Australia’s role in the Korean War, a  work 
that remains an indispensable — and highly readable — source for 
historians.
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Military history remained a major interest for Bob, but it was rapidly 
overtaken — as it was for many other historians of his generation — 
by the broader field of strategic studies. He had been in England in the 
1960s when we were getting the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS) under way, and he became one of our earliest members. 
After he joined the staff of The Australian National University, we kept 
closely in touch with his activities, and he with ours. When we were 
seeking a new director in 1982, the experience Bob had gained and the 
contacts he had made while running the Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre in Canberra made him the obvious choice. All his predecessors 
had been European and their interests focused on the Cold War. 
Bob’s Antipodean background and contacts enabled him to make the 
institute truly global at a moment when the Atlantic was ceasing to 
be the storm-centre of the world, and Japan, Korea, India, Pakistan, 
and Southeast Asia were becoming major actors on the strategic stage.
The five years that Bob spent at the institute gave him an international 
reputation. When the Oxford Chair of the History of War fell vacant 
in 1987, he chose to don the gown again and returned to the parochial 
world of academe. As his predecessor in that chair, I had eased 
his path by instituting the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 as a special 
subject for undergraduates, which he taught with all the enthusiasm 
and expertise to be expected from his background. He strengthened 
the strategic elements in the international relations courses already 
established by his fellow countryman Hedley Bull in the previous 
decade, and he brought new vigour to the extension of postgraduate 
studies throughout the university. At the same time, his extra-mural 
activities established him as a national figure. He became a member 
of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Governor of the 
Ditchley Foundation, a Rhodes Trustee, a trustee and later Chairman 
of the Imperial War Museum, and — not least — Chairman of the 
Council of the IISS, in which capacity he steered the institute through 
a constitutional crisis that had threatened to wreck it, and laid the 
foundations for the enormous expansion it has undergone over the past 
two decades. Then, at the dawn of the new millennium, he returned 
to Australia to pick up the threads that he had temporarily dropped 
19 years before, and to begin a further, but by no means final, stage in 
a remarkable career. 
xi
FOREWORD
How did Bob do it? There have been, of course, costs. After his 
return to academic life he wrote little. But his record of publication 
already spoke for itself, and he inspired plenty of his pupils to take 
up the challenge. But basically the key to his success has been his 
personality. He has an air of easy authority that immediately inspires 
confidence and marks him out as the obvious person to take charge 
of any enterprise to which he has set his hand. I have watched Bob’s 
career for over half a century, and have seen how in every field in 
which he has been involved, he has won not only the respect of his 
colleagues, but their deep affection. He is a chairman made in heaven.
It is impossible not to like Bob. He is not just exceptionally able, but is 
an extraordinarily nice man. And he has had one supreme advantage: 








I met Bob O’Neill at Oxford University in October 1961. We were 
lieutenants. He was on temporary leave from what he presumed would 
be a career in the Australian Army. I had just finished my tour of 
active duty in Germany with the US Army, delighted to return to 
civilian life shortly after the Berlin Crisis had threatened to ignite the 
Cold War and extend my service for at least another year. We were 
Rhodes scholars: he at Brasenose College, I at New College. And we 
were oarsmen, members of our colleges’ first eights, mine bumping 
his during Eights Week in June 1962, the only bump in our long 
friendship.
For our generation, ‘the war’ meant the Second World War. We had 
memories of that war, and mentors who had fought in it, among them 
the Warden of Rhodes House, E. T. (Bill) Williams, Field Marshal 
Montgomery’s Chief of Intelligence in North Africa and Europe. In 
my conversations with Bob about military history, the Second World 
War was usually the central reference point, and soon our scholarly 
interests converged on Germany before and during the conflict.
In the English-speaking world, anti-German sentiment had waned 
since Germany joined NATO in 1955, six years after the establishment 
of the German Federal Republic, 10 years after American occupation 
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forces posted signs in their sector of Germany saying, ‘Ihr seid schuldig’ 
(‘You are guilty’). In 1946, while the Nuremberg trials were under way, 
philosopher Karl Jaspers had written compellingly about individual 
and collective guilt (Die Schuldfrage — translated into English as 
The  Question of German Guilt),1 but more than a decade passed 
before West Germans began earnestly confronting their Nazi past. 
Two indicting novels published in 1959 were widely read: Heinrich 
Böll’s Billard um halbzehn (Billiards at Half-Past Nine), and Günter 
Grass’s Die Blechtrommel (The Tin Drum).2 When the trial of Adolph 
Eichmann opened in Jerusalem in April 1961, West German television 
followed it, and the city of Frankfurt published a booklet refuting 
claims that most Germans knew nothing about Nazi brutality against 
the Jews. Later that year, large audiences watched the appallingly 
explicit television series Das Dritte Reich.
At the same time, postwar historiography had been shaped in part 
by authors who found the origins of Nazism in German autocracy, 
militarism, and anti-Semitism dating back to the Middle Ages and 
Reformation. William Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich3 was 
a bestselling example of this ‘Luther to Hitler’ thesis, in which long 
distances of German history are marked by signposts of continuity 
and inevitability. This was a far cry from Alan Bullock’s measured 
biography of Hitler as opportunist, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny.4 Many 
academic historians criticized Shirer, but even some of these applied 
inevitability to the fall of the Weimar Republic: it was doomed to 
fail by inherent flaws, irreparably wounded by the civil unrest and 
devastating inflation of the early 1920s, and (never mind the relatively 
stable years of 1924–1929) knocked off by Nazis and their sympathisers 
during the Great Depression.
For recent German military history, Oxford students in the early 1960s 
read B. H. Liddell Hart’s The German Generals Talk, John Wheeler-
Bennett’s The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–
1945, Gordon Craig’s The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945, 
and, among the few German works in translation, Walter Görlitz’s 
1  Jaspers, Karl (1947) Die Schuldfrag [The Question of German Guilt], Munchen: Verlag.
2  Böll, Heinrich (1959) Billard um halbzehn [Billiards at Half-Past Nine], Munchen: Verlag; 
Grass, Günter (1959) Die Blechtrommel [The Tin Drum], Munchen: Verlag.
3  Shirer, William L. (1960) The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York: Simon and Schuster.
4  Bullock, Alan (1952) Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, London: Harper & Row.
3
1 . ExPLORING POLITICAL–MILITARy RELATIONS
History of the German General Staff.5 Liddell Hart had interviewed 
captured generals, among whom he found three types: old style 
Prussians, younger ‘blustering and boorish’ officers favoured by 
the regime, and, in the majority, ‘essentially technicians, intent on 
their professional job, and with little idea of things outside it’. There 
was broad consensus among Anglo-American historians on several 
themes regarding the army in the 1930s: the continuity of Prussian 
influence on the values of the officer corps (obedience, loyalty, duty, 
bravery); the broad support among officers for reviving Germany’s 
military power and regaining territories lost in the Treaty of Versailles; 
the overlapping jurisdictions of military and Nazi organisations; the 
High Command’s readiness for the armed forces to swear allegiance 
to Hitler (instead of the constitution) after the death of President 
von Hindenburg in August 1934; and the major changes in the High 
Command’s leadership and organisation in early 1938 that strengthened 
Hitler’s authority over military planning.
When I left Oxford in the summer of 1963 to begin graduate studies 
under Gordon Craig at Stanford, Bob had received permission from the 
Australian Army to stay on for an advanced degree. Having observed 
his keen and resolute mind at work, I was certain he would find his 
own way. He did so, albeit with guidance from Williams, Liddell Hart, 
Wheeler-Bennett, and, above all, Norman Gibbs, who supervised the 
doctoral thesis that became The German Army and the Nazi Party, 
1933–1939.6 In his acknowledgments, Bob also thanked Michael 
Howard, Professor of War Studies (and founder of that department) 
at King’s College London. No one would have guessed the continuity 
imbedded in that roster: Howard succeeded Gibbs as Oxford’s Chichele 
Professor of the History of War in 1977, and O’Neill followed Howard 
in 1987.
Bob’s book was the first on this subject to be written by a member 
of our generation. It offered a fresh approach in several ways — 
sources, judgments, ambiguities. It remains a fine example of how 
skilled apprentices can equal or surpass distinguished masters. In this 
case, I’m certain that generation was decisive. Bob was old enough to 
5  Hart, B. H. Liddell (1948) The German Generals Talk, New York: William Morrow; Wheeler-
Bennett, John (1953) The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945, London: 
Macmillan; Craig, Gordon (1956) The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; Görlitz, Walter (1953) History of the German General Staff, London: Hollis and Carter.
6  O’Neill, Robert J. (1966) The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939, London: Cassell.
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remember the Second World War, and to have chosen a military career 
before the Vietnam conflict eroded the ideals of patriotism and service 
that the ‘last good war’ had inspired. He was a young enough military 
professional, with enough self-confidence and ambition, to wonder 
how seasoned generals of any country (US intervention in South 
Vietnam had begun to escalate) could get themselves into a war they 
were likely to lose. Nazi Germany provided a test case, and Oxford 
preferred history to political science. Bob set out not to condemn or 
exonerate anyone, but to see whether new material would help him 
answer the question as objectively as possible.
He found a lot of new material, and he had good command of German 
after studying the language for six years in school. He relied heavily 
on documents, most of which had been seized by the Allies after the 
war and were later returned to West German authorities, housed at the 
Bundesarchiv in Koblenz, the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt 
in Freiburg, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, and the 
Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte in Stuttgart. He read published diaries 
and memoirs, and his list of secondary sources remains one of the best 
in the field.
A ‘major piece of good fortune’, as he now puts it, was his discovery 
in the Bundesarchiv of an account written after the war by General 
Freiherr Maximilian von Weichs. The Weichs paper, based on detailed 
notes he took at the meeting, documented Hitler’s meeting with leaders 
of the armed forces and SA (Sturmabteilung) in late February 1934. It is 
one of several unpublished documents whose broader significance 
Bob  was the first to reveal (more on this below). What made Bob’s 
research unique, however, were his interviews with nearly 20 former 
generals and admirals of the Wehrmacht. These included Field-
Marshal Erich von Manstein, Generals Franz Halder and Gotthard 
Heinrici, and Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz. Much less famous but far 
more instructive was General Hermann Flörke, to whom I introduced 
Bob by letter as he prepared to leave for Germany.
It was my good fortune to meet Flörke early in 1961 while I was 
stationed in Giessen, a small university city of little historical interest 
about 40 miles north of Frankfurt. Born in 1893 in Hanover, he served 
as a junior officer on the Western Front in the First World War and 
remained in the Reichswehr during the Weimar Republic. He fought 
on western and eastern fronts in the next war, rising to the rank 
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of  lieutenant general and in command of a corps that resisted the 
American First Army as it pressed north eastward from the Remagen 
bridgehead in April 1945. Flörke considered himself ‘lucky to have 
surrendered to an American and a nice one too’. Released from 
detention in 1947, he soon became head of an organisation of German 
civilians who were employed by the American supply depot on the 
north east side of town. He had retired by the time I arrived in Giessen, 
but remained active in German–American organisations and was head 
of the local chapter of the Verband deutscher Soldaten (Association of 
German Soldiers).
In time, Flörke, his wife and step-daughter invited me to their 
apartment on Sundays, and conversation easily turned to history, 
usually with Schubert in the background and Mosel in the glass. 
The general always wore a bow tie and prefaced many of his remarks 
with ‘one must consider’ and ‘one should not forget’. There was 
nothing militaristic about the man, whose modesty understated 
the distinguished record that I gradually pieced together with help 
from his family, from men who had fought under his command, and, 
during my own research a few years later, from German archives. 
He had received one of Germany’s highest decorations, the Ritterkreuz 
mit Eichenlaub (Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves), awarded to him 
personally by Hitler in August 1944 for exceptional valour during 
the unrelenting Soviet offensive of that summer. He had allowed his 
officers and men more initiative in combat than was the norm, and 
had shown them more respect as individuals. Among superiors and 
subordinates, he was known as a fine commander who cared for his 
men, and they remembered him with affection.
Widely read in military history, Flörke could sketch Lee’s gamble at 
Gettysburg and Grant’s subsequent strategy of attrition. He reminded 
me that Germany and Europe had much longer histories with powerful 
symbols. ‘One should not forget’, he said about Germany’s strategic 
position in the centre of Europe, that the Romans configured their line 
of fortifications (Limes Germanicus) so as to guard against a ‘barbarian’ 
invasion of their empire through the ‘Fulda Gap’ (where my artillery 
battalion would try to block the most likely route of a Warsaw Pact 
offensive into West Germany), or that Louis XIV burned Heidelberg.
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We talked about the Weimar Republic, anti-Semitism, Hitler’s 
popularity, genocide, and resistance. Flörke defined Freiheit (freedom) 
and Geltung (worth) as political assets that Germany lacked during 
the Weimar period. He justified Nazi foreign policy up to the invasion 
of Poland, which, he warned his battalion officers, marked the 
beginning of a long war that Germany would surely lose. We began 
disagreeing over topics that we would debate until his death in 1979. 
He emphasised a nation’s freedom from international pressures, claimed 
that his units in Poland and Russia had no connection with the Final 
Solution, blamed Hitler for bad military decisions, and reproached 
the opposition movement for betraying the state while it was at war. 
I dwelt on personal freedoms, indirect connections, military advisers, 
and higher moral laws of insubordination.
Compassionate, cultivated, principled, and a gentleman in every sense 
of the word, General Flörke led me to reconsider the German Army as 
if I were serving under him. I would have respected and trusted him 
as my commander. In him I saw an example of loyalty and courage that 
did not suggest arrogance, blind obedience, or apolitical indifference. 
I could not have learned this from books.
Flörke had much the same effect on Bob. Bill Williams had told Bob 
that his wartime experience in intelligence taught him to be sceptical 
toward generalisations about the Wehrmacht. Flörke reinforced the 
point in his own way. In doing so, and in lending stature to Bob’s 
inquiries, the German general enabled the Australian lieutenant to 
maximise the usefulness of his interviews.
While preparing to write this chapter, I interviewed Bob. He recalled 
being determined not to appear naïve or hostile, as had many Anglo-
American interrogators since the war. ‘Being a German-speaking 
Australian — not British — army officer helped a great deal’, he added. 
He carefully prepared for each interview and began the conversation 
by putting the subject at ease. For example, he asked Manstein how he 
had managed to persuade Hitler to replace the High Command’s plan 
for invading France and the Low Countries in 1940 (Operation Yellow) 
with his own ‘sickle-slice’ strategy of pushing through the Ardennes. 
Manstein happily obliged, Bob soon manoeuvred to the 1930s, and the 
interview lasted three hours.
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Thanks to meeting Flörke shortly after arriving in Germany, Bob knew 
there must have been other ‘relatively liberal and sensible’ men who 
defied the stereotype of the German general. In the course of his 
interviews, he found some of them and evidence of others who, in the 
1930s, were in the ‘mid-level military class’ — colonels and (brigadier) 
generals who had served in the Great War, many of them later hand-
picked for the small officer corps of the Weimar Republic. Among 
these were sons of educated families in the middle or upper-middle 
class. Bob and I agreed that such officers fit none of Liddell Hart’s three 
types, but constituted a fourth that Liddell Hart had either not found 
or wrongly included among ‘essentially technicians’. Bob’s interviews 
helped him augment documentary material while sharpening his eye 
for signs of this fourth type.
In The German Army and the Nazi Party, Bob describes three stages in 
which the small Reichswehr, which could hardly defend the Weimar 
Republic, was transformed into a large modernised force intended 
for conquest by the Third Reich: Hitler’s immediate and positive 
impression on the entire army; the Nazi Party’s skilful intervention 
in military affairs to increase the army’s obedience to Hitler; and the 
High Command’s eventual willingness to wage a war of aggression. 
Bob’s research increased our understanding of these stages.
On 28 February 1934, 13 months after the Nazis seized power, Hitler 
called a conference of leaders of the army, SA, and SS (Schutzstaffeln). 
Everyone there knew that Hitler would address the conflict between 
army and SA over control of the ‘people’s army’ that he would raise 
for national defence. To the relief of the officers, he announced 
that the army would exercise command, that the militia proposed 
by Ernst Röhm would be insufficient, that the Wehrmacht was the 
sole bearer of arms for national policy, and that the SA would be 
restricted to ‘internal political tasks’, although it could be used for 
pre-military training and protecting borders during the rearmament 
period. According to the account of General von Weichs, however, 
and corroborated by Manstein and Heinrici in interviews, Hitler 
unexpectedly ‘set forth his complete foreign policy programme and 
… intimated the probability of aggressive war’. In about eight years, 
in order to counteract economic recession, Germany would need to 
create additional living space, ‘the Western Powers would not let us 
do this’, and thus ‘short, decisive blows to the West and then to the 
East could be necessary’. Looking back after the war, Weichs regretted 
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that the army’s representatives ‘did not take at face value these warlike 
prophecies … The soldier was accustomed never to take the words 
of politicians too seriously.’
As Bob points out, Hitler had alluded to Mein Kampf and the need 
for living space when he met with army leaders only a few days after 
taking power. Since then, however, Hitler’s successes had given the 
High Command more reason to take him at his word. Indeed, they did 
so when he said the SA would be limited to political tasks. In Bob’s 
view, this would have been an opportune time for the generals to ask 
Hitler hard questions about long-term aims. Instead, they remained 
silent, thus postponing a reckoning over the mission of the armed 
forces. At that moment, they were gratified by Hitler’s determination 
to rearm, and confident they had achieved victory against the SA. 
If any of them thought they could ward off Nazi ideology, they were 
deluding themselves.
Bob was one of the first historians (another was Wolfgang Sauer) to 
examine German Army–Nazi Party relations at the local level. He sifted 
the records of military districts (Wehrkreise) into which Germany was 
divided, and again interviews provided anecdotal substantiation. 
Nazi propaganda spread steadily into military commands and 
communities, from top down and bottom up. At the highest level were 
pro-Nazi generals such as Werner von Blomberg (Defence Minister 
1933–1935, War Minister 1935–1938), Walther von Brauchitsch, and 
Wilhelm Keitel. Speeches and directives from the High Command to 
military districts contained this sort of language: since the ‘Seizure of 
Power’, it is clear that ‘the change concerns not only [a new] political 
arrangement, but a fundamental transformation of the mind and will 
of the entire people, and the realization of a new philosophy’;7 National 
Socialism ‘embraces the idea of the fellowship of blood … and anyone 
today who does not completely adopt the idea of national partnership, 
excludes himself’;8 ‘I make it the urgent duty of all Commanders to 
ensure, by example and by education, that the conduct of every single 
officer, in every case becomes positively National-Socialist’.9
7  Werner von Blomberg, September 1933.
8  Werner von Blomberg, May 1934.
9  General Friedrich Dollmann, Commander of the Ninth Military District, January 1936.
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Political indoctrination steadily increased through officer training 
and unit instruction. Moreover, the High Command accepted the 
encroachment of Nazism at all levels of military life, affecting families 
and social relations through ideological materials in post reading rooms; 
prohibitions against shopping in stores owned by Jews; warnings to 
Christian churches not to appear disloyal to the state or the Nazi Party; 
requirements to invite local party leaders to dances and other social 
functions; and affirmations of the government’s dividing Germany 
into ‘Blocks’ in which party officials could spread doctrine and ensure 
loyalty among neighbourhoods and households.
By 1938, the army had become enmeshed in the Nazi state, adapting 
to its structure, ideology, and rearmament for war. The SS had gained 
enormous political clout, expanding the Gestapo and political police, 
and forming its own volunteer fighting units, a threat to the army’s 
role as sole bearer of arms. In February 1938, Hitler ordered major 
changes in the High Command, arrogating to himself the duties of War 
Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, establishing 
the Armed Forces High Command or OKW (Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht) as his own staff for military planning, and appointing as its 
chief the pliable and sycophantic General Keitel. Any faint remaining 
chance of limiting or postponing war until Germany had completely 
rearmed was lost when General Ludwig Beck resigned as Chief of the 
General Staff in August 1938. Beck argued that using force against 
Czechoslovakia would lead to a European war that Germany was not 
strong enough to win. He also had this to say about the responsibilities 
of the army’s leaders (taken from his notes for talks with Brauchitsch, 
Army Commander-in-Chief since February): 
Their military obedience has a limit where their knowledge, their 
conscience and their sense of responsibility forbid the execution of 
a command. If their warnings and counsel receive no hearing in such 
a situation, then they have the right and the duty to resign from their 
offices. If they all act with resolution, the execution of a policy of war 
is impossible.
They did not so act, as Beck had hoped some would when he resigned. 
Why not? For any historian, especially one who has served in 
uniform, that question lies at the heart of political–military relations. 
Friction is inevitable between professional soldiers, who have their 
particular goals, and politicians, who have theirs. Both camps must 
decide where and when to compromise. Bob recounts the accelerating 
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preponderance of the political over the military in a particular case: 
during peacetime, in a one-party dictatorial state whose leader and 
ideology envisaged an offensive war of expansion. The German Army 
was neither totally subservient nor willing to stop the momentum. 
In the High Command and military district commands, old-school 
and largely apolitical conservatives welcomed the end of Germany’s 
instability and military weakness, yet they also resented the increasing 
sway of pro-Nazi generals at the very top. We shall never know how 
many of these officers, or divisional and regimental commanders, 
actually skirted directives from Blomberg, nor how many might have 
been heartened by stronger examples of professional leadership when 
Hitler repeatedly defied the army’s advice on the pace and purpose 
of rearmament. There were certainly more than Wheeler-Bennett or 
Craig surmised, perhaps more than Bob might have estimated from his 
interviews. On the other hand, military expansion brought in large 
numbers of junior officers and enlisted men whose views had been 
shaped by the Hitler Youth and Nazi propaganda. In February 1934, 
before the still small army had sworn allegiance to Hitler, its leaders 
were impressed by Hitler’s resolve to rearm. In August 1938, with 
rearmament in full swing, the army acquiescent to Nazi propaganda, 
and war on the horizon, it was too late for all but Beck to act with 
resolution of their own before Hitler’s stunning triumph at the Munich 
Conference in September.
Bob’s book is still praised for its thorough research, detailed 
appendices, cogent personality sketches, and fair judgments of 
competing theses about the German Army. Although he did not 
overturn the established interpretation of a conservative military elite, 
he complicated it by finding a prudent and thoughtful type of officer, 
especially at the middle professional level, that Wheeler-Bennett 
and others had missed. Bob’s work weathered the Historikerstreit 
(historians’ quarrel) of the 1980s between those German scholars who 
believed the Third Reich was uniquely German and incomparably 
evil, and those who considered it but one — perhaps not even the 
worst — example of a dictatorship that committed mass murder. He 
is cited in both intentionalist and structuralist explanations of Hitler’s 
preparations for war and genocide. The German Army and the Nazi 
Party remains an exemplar in the field, and its analytical framework 
of political–military friction, compromise, and imbalance provides a 
model for both history and political science. I would expand Bob’s 
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notion of  ‘political–military’ so as to include career civil servants 
and heads of government departments, who can affect the balance 
of national policy one way or another, even in a dictatorship. Still, 
his general model certainly applies, with eerie echoes, to the ‘revolt 
of the generals’ in the spring of 2006, when six retired American 
generals publicly criticised Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for 
mishandling the Iraq War. A few of the six held that the war was 
unnecessary in the first place, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should 
have warned forcefully against undertaking it.
One can claim that studying the German Army in peacetime spared 
Bob’s having to grapple with military complicity in the Final Solution, 
which later scholarship has shown to have been more widespread than 
he or I guessed, or with how wartime virtually sanctifies the soldier’s 
duty to obey orders. I would argue that there is much to be gained 
by concentrating on what, in retrospect, are considered interludes or 
calms before storms. Such periods give us a chance to suspend our 
knowledge of their futures, to recognise anomalies, admit ambiguities, 
and consider alternative outcomes. They enable us to ask ‘what if?’ 
right up to the brink of what historians later mark as both an end and 
a beginning.
That is one reason why I became interested in the Weimar Republic. 
Certain that it was not doomed to fail, I devoted one book10 and countless 
lectures to showing why, always subconsciously hoping that this time 
it would not collapse. I argued that, in its calmest years, 1924–1929, 
Weimar Germany combined democracy with authoritarian tendencies 
that might have endured even without the Great Depression and the 
rise of Hitler. The republic also mixed international cooperation with 
the pursuit of national objectives — particularly rearmament and 
recovery of territories lost to Poland and Czechoslovakia at Versailles 
— that would have shaken the European status quo, through war if 
peaceful means failed, as soon as the government deemed the strategic 
situation favourable. This was a Germany poised somewhere between 
the inevitability of Nazism and the likelihood of democracy and peace 
over the long term.
10  Post, Gaines (1973) The Civil-Military Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
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I described to my students the thrill of archival treasure hunts, on 
one of which I had found military documents that had neither been 
confiscated by the Allies nor cited by other historians. I told them 
about General Flörke, and about my correspondence and interviews 
— inspired by Bob’s interviews that took place two years earlier — 
with other Wehrmacht generals and admirals who had served in the 
Reichswehr during the Weimar Republic. I had used chronological 
and factual filters to determine the accuracy of oral testimony. 
Although I trusted documents more than memories, I soon found the 
latter valuable for recapturing attitudes and weighing possibilities. 
I encouraged students to put themselves in other shoes: how could 
members of the Reichswehr, Defence Ministry, Foreign Office, 
Reichstag, and president’s staff have collaborated so as to save the 
republic, with all of its ambiguities? In the conclusion to his book, Bob 
implicitly raises a similar counterfactual question: how could officers 
such as Flörke and Beck have restrained their superiors? Bob and I can 
imagine what we might have done in their place. But imagination can 
lead anywhere, and interviews can shock.
The reminiscences I heard sometimes drifted from Weimar into the 
Third Reich, testing my diplomatic skills. Heinrich Hausser, who joined 
the Waffen-SS in the 1930s and commanded one of its divisions during 
the war tested me the most. Toward the end of our conversation in his 
drab apartment in Ludwigsburg in May 1966, Hausser denied that the 
Waffen-SS was a racial elite: ‘If you take the cream of the volunteers, 
you are bound to get many tall, fair men.’ I held my tongue. Even taller 
than the men in his division, he continued as we stood up before I took 
my leave, were those in General Josef (‘Sepp’) Dietrich’s Leibstandarte 
Adolf Hitler. (This unit had begun as a small bodyguard for the Führer 
in 1933, and during the war it became the most decorated division 
— and Dietrich the most popular commander — in the Waffen-SS. 
Dietrich died in Ludwigsburg a few weeks before my interview with 
Hausser, and around 7,000 Waffen-SS veterans attended the funeral.) 
Looking me up and down and nodding approvingly, Hausser said, 
‘Herr Post, you could have been in Sepp Dietrich’s division’. That 
casual recruitment so rattled my nerves that, on the way back to my 
lodgings in Stuttgart, I stopped my VW and took a long walk.
I still look at German history through subjective and subjunctive 
lenses. So does Bob, although he left the field for a varied career that 
required detachment and pragmatism. As combat officer, scholar, 
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teacher, and policy wonk, Bob has been at home in the expanding 
realm of university departments, research institutes, think tanks, and 
media panels dealing with political–military relations and strategy. 
Grounded in history, he can wrestle with causes and consequences. 
He can visualise Flörke and other generals at work. He can recognise 





Vietnam: A Winnable War?
Ashley Ekins1
In late 1966, Australia’s military intervention in the Vietnam War 
reached a watershed. As soldiers of the 1st Australian Task Force 
(1ATF) completed the first six months of their deployment to South 
Vietnam, their commanders took stock. During a brief lull in the 
tempo of operations, Captain Robert O’Neill, intelligence officer with 
the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), prepared a paper 
at the request of his commanding officer. He examined the operational 
experiences of the battalion during the previous six months in Phuoc 
Tuy province and assessed the likely effectiveness of alternative 
approaches to operations in the future.2
In his rigorous analysis, Captain O’Neill made a number of observations, 
forecasts, and conclusions, many of which would prove prescient. 
‘The final outcome of this war’, he wrote, ‘will be determined by the 
feelings of the Vietnamese people. No purely military victory, however 
overwhelming, can provide a permanent solution unless the victory is 
won by the side whom the people favour.’ Time was also a crucial factor, 
he noted, and clearly was on the side of the communist forces, not the 
1  On behalf of my late colleague, Dr Ian McNeill, joint author of the volumes of official history 
of Australian Army ground operations in Vietnam, I acknowledge our debt to the scholarship, 
counsel, and inspiration of Professor Robert J. O’Neill, whose outstanding work has illuminated 
understanding of the Vietnam War and its complexities for a generation of historians.
2  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 
1966–67, Sydney: Cassell, chapter 13.
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United States and its allies. In a protracted war with little indication 
of a conclusive outcome, mounting casualties would inevitably erode 
domestic political support, and lead to war weariness and dissent 
among home front populations. Above all, O’Neill concluded: ‘Control 
over the villages is the key to the war.’ He conceded the necessity 
of conventional operations aimed at eliminating Viet Cong main force 
units, or at least restricting them to areas far from the centres of 
population. But the Vietnamese village, he maintained, ‘is the closest 
equivalent to a front line in this war’, and ‘without victory in the 
villages the war can drag on’.3
These were mature and astute assessments by the 30-year-old 
army captain. They were based on his personal observations and 
experiences on operations, and informed by his military and academic 
training. In one of his first appointments after graduating from the 
Royal Military College, Duntroon, in 1958, O’Neill worked as assistant 
to Colonel F. P. Serong, then Chief of Staff at Southern Command 
Headquarters in Melbourne. ‘Ted’ Serong had acquired a legendary 
reputation as an authority on counter-insurgency, and his ideas made 
an impression on the young officer, who would continue to develop 
his own thinking on approaches to the war as his career developed 
and the conflict in Vietnam evolved. After completing an engineering 
degree at the University of Melbourne, O’Neill continued his studies 
at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar in 1961. He returned to 
Australia in 1965 with a doctorate in modern history for his thesis on 
the changing relationship between the German Army and the Nazi 
Party prior to the Second World War.4
In May 1966, he commenced a 12-month tour of duty in Vietnam. 
Serving initially as second-in-command of a rifle company of 5RAR, 
in August he was appointed intelligence officer and took over the 
intelligence section on battalion headquarters. This role involved 
him in the planning and command of operations. It also demanded, 
in  addition to his knowledge and experience as a soldier, the 
application of his scholarly skills of research in gathering information 
from multiple sources, and analysis and interpretation to compile 
3  O’Neill, Captain R. J. (1967) Memorandum: ‘An analysis of the operational experience 
of 5RAR in Vietnam, May–Dec 1966’, 5RAR, Ap An Phu, South Vietnam, 4 January 1967, 
paragraphs 2, 6–9, 11, 25, 26, personal papers of Robert J. O’Neill, OW90/4, Box 2, Australian 
War Memorial (hereafter AWM); copy in Official Historian’s Collection, E/2/18, AWM 257.
4  O’Neill, Robert (1966) The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939, London: Cassell.
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authoritative dossiers on the composition, activities, command 
structures, and probable plans and movements of the communist forces 
in the task force area of responsibility. The enemy formations present 
at that time comprised two strong Viet Cong main force regiments, 
a mobile Viet Cong provincial battalion, and local district guerrilla 
units, totalling over 5,000 troops and outnumbering the Australian 
Task Force of some 4,000 men. O’Neill’s work was vital for the success 
of operations and required a deep understanding of the local situation. 
He became a keen observer with genuine empathy for the problems of 
the local South Vietnamese people, and an interest in their social and 
political structures, culture and economy, and military and civilian 
leaders. Most importantly for posterity, he recorded and published 
his impressions.
In early 1967, as he delivered his formal army memorandum analysing 
battalion operations, O’Neill also published — apparently without 
censorship or reproach by senior military authorities — a frank and 
enlightening article in the Australian journal Quadrant. He recounted 
the pattern of Australian military interactions with the local people of 
three typical Vietnamese villages over the previous six months, as the 
task force strove to force the Viet Cong away from the populated areas 
and assisted in the restoration of security and government control. 
He vividly described the dilemmas of the villagers, caught in a web 
of their own apathy and distrust, and stranded between the harsh 
realities of intimidation and the brutal exercise of terror by Viet Cong 
guerrillas, the anti-government propaganda and activism of local 
cadres, and forced recruitment, taxation, and persuasion through 
‘re-education’ by hard-core communist sympathisers. Amid this 
constant turbulence, Australian clashes with enemy units — including 
6RAR’s publicised victory in August at the battle of Long Tan — and 
the limited successes of various civil aid projects offered little more 
to the people than the promises of the remote government regime in 
Saigon. In his guardedly optimistic evaluation of the impact of the 
task force presence on the local population and the continuing war 
in Phuoc Tuy, O’Neill maintained that support for the people should 
be the primary focus of military intervention: ‘the essence of victory 
in Vietnam’, he wrote, ‘is the battle for the hearts and minds of the 
millions of peasants who make up the country’.5
5  O’Neill, Robert (1967) ‘Three Villages of Phuoc Tuy’, Quadrant 11(1), pp. 4–10.
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While on active service in Vietnam, O’Neill also compiled a 
comprehensive chronicle and commentary on the war. As a battalion 
intelligence officer, he was daily engaged in arduous and sometimes 
dangerous work. He was mentioned in despatches for ‘his skill and 
industry in collecting and interpreting’ intelligence sources while 
displaying ‘high personal courage in seeking out and confirming 
information both by ground and air reconnaissance’.6 Yet he somehow 
found the time and energy, often working from late at night into the 
early hours of the following day, to write regular, detailed accounts of 
the daily activities on operations of his infantry battalion and its 800 
soldiers. These informal despatches he mailed home every few days to 
his wife, Sally, who typed and filed copies. During his leave on return 
from Vietnam, O’Neill wove them into an invaluable record of an 
Australian battalion at war. It was published in 1968 as Vietnam Task, 
a book that remains a seminal work as one of the first Australian unit 
histories from Vietnam and for its unique perspective as a soldier’s 
personal account. In this and subsequent writings on Vietnam, Robert 
O’Neill was to pave the way for a generation of Vietnam War scholars 
by providing valuable observations, insights, and inspiration for later 
researchers.7
The war Captain O’Neill encountered on his arrival in South Vietnam 
in May 1966 had already become a focus of world attention. The conflict 
had increased in intensity since 1961, when the communist National 
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), supported and 
directed by the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, began an 
armed insurrection aimed at destabilising and overthrowing the shaky 
government of the Republic of (South) Vietnam. 
As Cold War tensions increased during the 1960s, the conflict in 
Vietnam assumed a disproportionate strategic significance. Vietnam 
became the focal point for a supreme struggle between the communist 
6  Citation for Captain R. J. O’Neill, recommendation for Mention in Despatches (MID), 
10 January 1967, Governor-General’s file 5/5/29, CRS A2880, National Archives of Australia (NAA).
7  See numerous index references to Robert O’Neill in the three volumes on army operations 
of the nine-volume series, The Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian 
Conflicts  1948–1975: McNeill, Ian (1993) To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam 
War 1950–1966, Sydney, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial; 
McNeill, Ian and Ashley Ekins (2003) On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 
1967–1968, Sydney, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial; Ekins, 
Ashley with Ian McNeill (2012) Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 
1968–1975, Sydney Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial.
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bloc, and the United States and allied nations. The Hanoi leadership 
and their communist allies proclaimed their struggle to unify Vietnam 
under communist rule as part of an inevitable global transition 
from capitalism to communism, and a test case for the international 
solidarity of ‘true communism’. Leaders in Washington promoted the 
war as a test case in the ‘Free World’s’ struggle against communist 
wars of national liberation and as part of America’s wider mission of 
containment of communism.
The commitment of Australian military forces to Vietnam was 
a process  of gradual escalation against the backdrop of Cold 
War concerns over regional security and communist expansion. 
The Australian Government’s rationale for the commitment embraced 
two objectives. Firstly, the government claimed, it sent forces to help 
support the emergence of an independent state in South Vietnam as 
a barrier to communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Versions of the 
domino theory were invoked, although the tenet that the survival of 
an independent Vietnam was crucial to Australia’s strategic security 
was widely challenged. A second objective, arising from the first, was 
to remove the threat of oppression and terror which was believed to be 
the destiny of the 15 million people of South Vietnam if they fell under 
communist domination from the North. These aims were consistent 
with the strategy of forward defence, the cornerstone of Australian 
defence planning in the 1960s and a concept which meshed with the 
American strategy of containment of communism in Southeast Asia. 
By supporting the United States in Vietnam, Australia also sought both 
to maintain an American presence in Asia and to secure a guarantee of 
American assistance in the event of Australia’s own security being in 
jeopardy. A Defence Committee Report of the time considered it ‘vital 
to Australia’s strategic interests to have a strong United States military 
presence in South East Asia [and] to show a willingness to assist the 
United States to achieve her aims in South Vietnam’.8
In 1962, Australia made its first military commitment to Vietnam by 
deploying a team of 30 military advisers to assist in training South 
Vietnamese forces. By 1965, this team had expanded to 100 soldiers, 
working within a huge American advisory structure of some 16,000 
8  Defence Committee Report, ‘Further military assistance to South Vietnam’, 6 April 1965, 
p. 4, para. 10, attached to DCA No. 13/1965, 6 April 1965, DMO&P file 161/A/3, AWM 121.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
20
advisers. But it was becoming apparent that the communist insurgency 
in South Vietnam could not be stemmed solely with advisory and 
training assistance. The Viet Cong were continuing to grow in support 
and strength, and the tide of the war was turning against the South. 
In March 1965, the US began to escalate American military involvement 
through the first commitment of combat troops and the commencement 
of a massive aerial bombing campaign of North Vietnam. In late April, 
following America’s lead, the Australian Government committed the 
first Australian combat troops to South Vietnam.
At each stage of involvement in the war, Australia’s military 
commitment to Vietnam shadowed that of the United States. The first 
battalion of Australian ground combat forces entered the war in tandem 
with American forces and was integrated within an American brigade. 
Australian combat forces were progressively built up to maintain pace 
with the massive increase in American forces; both reached their peak 
in 1969. By late 1970 a wind-down and withdrawal of American forces 
was underway, with Australia awkwardly attempting to keep pace 
through a parallel wind-down, and the withdrawal of all forces was 
finally completed by mid-1973.
Australia’s commitment, although substantial in terms of its 
military capabilities, was minuscule in comparison with the military 
contribution of the United States. Over three million Americans 
served in the war and the total number of American personnel in 
Vietnam reached a peak of over 542,000. Some 60,000 Australians 
served in the war, and at its peak strength of over 8,300 personnel in 
mid-1969, the Australian force in Vietnam comprised elements from 
all three services: an army task force of three infantry battalions with 
combat and logistic support, along with a separate army advisory 
team; air force helicopters, medium bombers, and transport aircraft; 
and navy support vessels, guided missile destroyers, and helicopters. 
For Australia, however, Vietnam was predominantly a ground war. 
The Australian Army conducted 85 per cent of operations and did most 
of the fighting — and most of the dying: soldiers suffered 96 per cent 
of Australian fatal casualties in Vietnam. Moreover, the nature and 
intensity of operations in Vietnam placed Australian soldiers into 
longer periods of contact, or imminent risk of contact, with the enemy 
than perhaps any time since the Gallipoli campaign of 1915.
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As a minor partner in a large coalition force, Australia could exert 
little influence over the higher strategic direction of the war or 
the strategy employed in Vietnam. As in previous major conflicts, 
Australian ground forces came under operational control of an allied 
field commander. In making what amounted to an unqualified and 
open-ended commitment of combat forces in 1965, the Australian 
Government and its advisers forfeited their opportunity to negotiate 
wider war aims with those in the United States directing the war effort. 
They failed to evaluate the risks inherent in military involvement, and 
to assess the likelihood of victory or defeat. As historian Ian McNeill 
later wrote: ‘The lack of a defined, clear aim at the highest level, or 
an agreed notion of what constituted success, prevented the adoption 
of a coherent strategy and bedevilled the whole conduct of the war.’9
Over time, it would become clear that the Americans too had not 
adequately considered and resolved many of these issues. Former US 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara later admitted that he and 
other defence advisers failed to ask the ‘most basic questions’ before 
deciding to commit troops. Would the fall of South Vietnam trigger 
the fall of all Southeast Asia? Would that constitute a grave threat to 
the West’s security? What kind of war — conventional or guerrilla — 
was likely to develop, and could US troops win it, fighting alongside 
the South Vietnamese?10 The latter unresolved questions, in particular, 
were to prove crucial to the tactical approaches adopted by Australian 
forces and their joint involvement in operations with American forces.
In May 1965, the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR) 
and support forces, totalling 1,100 men, arrived in Vietnam and 
were placed under American operational command, joining the elite 
US 173rd Airborne Brigade as its third battalion. Initially confined 
to protecting the large American air base at Bien Hoa, 25 kilometres 
north east of Saigon, the battalion’s role was later extended to include 
offensive operations in nearby regions dominated by the Viet Cong. 
The  Australian unit performed outstandingly with the American 
brigade, notably during Operation Crimp in the Iron Triangle, 
9  McNeill, Ian (1993) To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966, 
Sydney, Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, pp. 64–5; Ekins, 
Ashley with Ian McNeill (2012) Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 
1968–1975, Sydney Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, p. 691.
10  McNamara, Robert S. (1996) In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, New York: 
Vintage Books, p. 39.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
22
breaching the vast Cu Chi tunnel network and discovering an important 
Viet Cong headquarters complex. However, Australian soldiers soon 
found themselves at odds with the very different American doctrine 
and tactical principles.
The Australians had come to Vietnam through their experience of 
counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya and Borneo, and training in low 
level, counter-insurgency warfare techniques. Their methods involved 
pacification, the restoration of government control, separating 
insurgents from the population, searching, patrolling, and ambushing, 
all concepts emphasising patience and stealth.
The Americans intended to fight a very different war. They had 
come to Vietnam through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
preparations for land warfare in Europe, and their experience in 
Korea. They favoured the direct approach, in which they could bring 
their numbers, mobility, and firepower to bear in order to kill large 
numbers of the enemy. The search and destroy operation evolved 
as the principal tactic of American ground forces, and body counts 
became the measure of success. In 1965, this strategy was probably 
the only way in which an impending communist victory could be 
thwarted in Vietnam. But the American attrition warfare approach 
often randomly destroyed Vietnamese lives and property, giving rise to 
the new military euphemism — ‘collateral damage’ — and alienating 
Vietnamese support. This approach also involved US willingness to 
risk high casualties to their own forces. Australian senior commanders 
firmly resisted American overtures to deploy the single Australian 
battalion on hazardous operations with an American mobile reserve 
force.
In mid-1966, as 1RAR’s tour ended, the Australian commitment was 
expanded to an independent task force of two battalions with combat 
and logistic support. The increase in Australian ground forces was 
made primarily for diplomatic and strategic reasons, to meet American 
expectations, but it also had a sound military basis. Although the task 
force was still under American operational control, this arrangement 
enabled the Australians to operate more independently and to practise 
their own doctrine of counter-insurgency operations. The 1ATF 
established its base at Nui Dat, in the heart of the southern province 
of Phuoc Tuy, and quickly made impressive gains. By the end of 1966, 
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as Robert O’Neill observed, the Australians were expanding their area 
of operations and consolidating government control over areas of the 
province.11
Throughout 1967, however, the limitations of the two-battalion task 
force became increasingly apparent. Despite the pressing need for 
tanks and a third infantry battalion, it took over 15 months before the 
government decided to commit the required forces — and then the 
decision was made, not on the basis of military necessity, but with a 
view to its impact upon the American alliance. It took a further three 
to five months before the third battalion and tanks finally arrived in 
Vietnam and joined the task force.
In the meantime, the under-strength Australian force struggled, with 
its limited manpower and combat resources, to pursue the elusive and 
aggressive Viet Cong forces which outnumbered the Australians in 
Phuoc Tuy province. For the want of tanks, in particular, numbers of 
Australian soldiers were killed and wounded during assaults against 
enemy bunkers and on operations around the Viet Cong stronghold in 
the Long Hai hills.
The lack of a third manoeuvre battalion and tanks mirrored wider 
weaknesses in the Australian force structure in Vietnam. This was 
to be a recurring problem throughout the Australian commitment. 
After years of neglect, the Australian Army was depleted in numbers 
and plagued by shortages of weapons and equipment; it lacked 
flexibility and was over-stretched in meeting its obligations under 
the government’s strategic policy of forward defence. To compensate 
for manpower shortages, the task force included soldiers conscripted 
under the National Service Scheme introduced in late 1964. Over the 
course of the war, almost 64,000 20-year-old males were called up 
by a selective ballot system and enlisted in the army; over 15,000 of 
them served in Vietnam. The issue of conscription for Vietnam would 
become a principal source of dissent and opposition to the war, and 
a political millstone for the government, particularly as Australian 
casualties mounted.
11  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 
1966–67, Sydney: Cassell, chapters 13 and 17.
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To compensate for the limitations of his under-strength force, one task 
force commander attempted an innovative approach. In mid-1967, 
the task force laid a 12-kilometre-long barrier minefield to deny the 
Viet Cong access to the populated area in the southeast of the province, 
and to separate the guerrillas from their popular bases in the villages. 
The minefield contained some 21,000 anti-personnel mines; but it was 
not adequately secured by both Australian and South Vietnamese 
forces. Before long, the Viet Cong learned to remove large numbers 
of the mines and re-laid them, with disastrous effects on Australian 
patrols.
By mid-1969, the enemy mine campaign had produced the heaviest 
Australian casualties of the war, and the barrier minefield was widely 
viewed as the biggest blunder of the war. The enemy-laid mines 
inflicted an average of six Australian casualties per mine, with peaks of 
up to 18 casualties from a single mine incident. Occasionally, so many 
soldiers of a platoon were killed or wounded that the entire platoon 
became ineffective, forcing the curtailing of operations.
In early 1968, the task force increased in size and effectiveness with 
the addition of a third manoeuvre battalion and a tank squadron, 
becoming in the process a more balanced, brigade-sized force with 
enhanced flexibility and firepower. These additions were timely, 
coming just prior to the communist Tet Offensive. The tanks proved 
to be the decisive factor in several heavy enemy engagements. But the 
continuing limitations of the task force, even at its peak with three 
infantry battalions, armour, and other support elements, made it 
extremely difficult for commanders to mount protracted operations 
in depth into remote, enemy-held base areas without substantial US 
Army armour, artillery, air, and logistical support.
In response to the continuously changing nature and intensity of the 
war, successive task force commanders evolved their own concepts 
of operations and approaches to the war. But all faced the same 
operational dilemma: the requirement to simultaneously conduct 
conventional operations in depth to destroy the enemy’s main forces, 
while also conducting pacification operations around the populated 
centres. The former involved the task force in operations in the 
remote, enemy-dominated areas of the province. Several commanders 
took the view that this was the most effective use of the task force. 
On the counter side, by keeping the enemy main forces at bay and on 
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the move through operations in depth, the task force risked falling 
into an enemy strategic trap, as the communists could effectively use 
their main forces to keep the Australian troops occupied and far away 
from the unprotected villages, which were the real target for both 
sides.
The task force was required to conduct pacification and reconstruction 
operations to eliminate the influence of communist local forces, 
cadres, and infrastructure in the towns and villages. But it lacked the 
manpower, resources, and time to maintain a continuous presence in 
the pacified areas. Once it moved on, the Viet Cong quickly returned, 
and the communist infrastructure remained intact.
Many nevertheless believed the war in the villages was the main role 
for the task force and was of much greater importance than operations 
to pursue the enemy main forces. O’Neill was one such advocate. The 
12-month experience of his battalion, he wrote in April 1969, had 
reinforced many of the lessons for conducting counter-insurgency 
warfare. He and many of his fellow officers were convinced that 
‘the solution to the Vietnam crisis lay in the villages rather than in 
the jungles’, although there remained a need for Australian forces to 
pursue and defeat the communist main forces who were the enforcing 
arm of the North Vietnamese government in subjugating the South.
‘But these actions will not win the war for either side’, O’Neill wrote, 
‘they will simply help to prevent the winner from losing’.12 With 
these words, he echoed the much quoted statement by US National 
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger: ‘the guerrilla wins if he does not 
lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.’ Kissinger’s full 
statement gives the aphorism its context: 
We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We 
sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological 
exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims 
of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional 
army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their armed 
forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape — to keep us lunging in 
areas of marginal political importance.13
12  O’Neill, Robert (1969) ‘Australian Military Problems in Vietnam’, Australian Outlook 23(1), 
pp. 46–57; O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task, p. 247.
13  Kissinger, Henry (1969) ‘The Vietnam Negotiations’, Foreign Affairs 48(2), p. 214.
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By mid-1970, the influence of the communist forces was waning. 
Main roads had been opened, markets and trade were flourishing, 
local government in villages was more effective, and civic action had 
produced improved local roads, schools, market places, water supplies, 
and medical services. The task force had kept the enemy main force 
units from the populated areas and reduced Viet Cong influence over 
the population. As the Australians began a phased withdrawal from 
Phuoc Tuy, government control had been restored to large areas. 
But  continuing success was dependent on the presence of the task 
force. The Viet Cong had the ability to withdraw into sanctuary and 
base areas, reform and recruit, and their infrastructure in the villages 
was not eradicated. After the task force withdrew in late 1971, the 
Viet Cong influence was expected to increase and erode government 
control.
After visiting Phuoc Tuy province and the task force headquarters 
in June 1971, Robert O’Neill, now a strategic analyst and head of 
the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National 
University, concluded that the outcome of the war in Indochina still 
lay in the balance. The main role of the Australian Task Force was 
now to secure the northern part of Phuoc Tuy province where there 
were an estimated 600 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army troops. 
If South Vietnamese territorial forces, numbering 6,000 in Phuoc 
Tuy, were unable to cope with that number of enemy forces once the 
Australians withdrew, ‘then their whole situation is hopeless’, O’Neill 
concluded. The South Vietnamese would need to develop experience 
in operating in the remote regions against the enemy, and they would 
lack the air support and mobility available to 1ATF. The quality of 
some of the local South Vietnamese forces was ‘indifferent’, but they 
were better equipped and armed than the communists. Security in the 
province would slip backwards once the local forces took over, but by 
how much remained unknown.14
Two months later, O’Neill again cautioned that although the task force 
had worn down the communist main force regiments and provincial 
force units over the past five years, the Viet Cong infrastructure had 
‘survived the Australian presence largely intact’, and was able to 
14  O’Neill, R. J. (1971) ‘The War in Indo-China: A Conflict Still in the Balance’, Canberra 
Times, 12 July. O’Neill visited 1ATF in June 1971 during a tour of Indochina. HQ 1ATF, message 
SD0988, 30 May 1971, 1ATF Commander’s Diary, June 1971, [1/4/224], AWM 95.
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observe, plan, and report on Australian movements. While the enemy 
was unable to eject the task force from Phuoc Tuy, he believed they 
‘can still do us a powerful amount of damage in a few short encounters, 
as recent events have shown’. The withdrawal could offer tempting 
opportunity targets to the enemy, and ‘one must not forget D445 
Battalion which must be ready for the fray again’.15
As the task force prepared to come home in November 1971, Creighton 
Burns, Assistant Editor of the Melbourne Age, assessed the Australian 
military effort in Phuoc Tuy. Burns noted that the Australians had 
kept substantial Viet Cong forces off balance, disrupted their supply 
systems, and occasionally inflicted heavy casualties on them; but they 
were never able to make Phuoc Tuy ‘the model of counter-insurgency 
security’ that the government maintained had been achieved. They 
were never properly equipped for that, and lacked the strength in 
numbers and supporting arms; any security provided by the task 
force instantly evaporated after the Australians moved on. After the 
Australians left Vietnam, Burns believed, the province would ‘slowly 
revert to apathetic acceptance of Viet Cong control’.16 In fact, the 
collapse came much quicker and more violently than he anticipated. 
Four months later, the communist Easter Offensive of March/April 
1972 swept over Phuoc Tuy like a tsunami. An Australian officer 
who observed the security situation deteriorate to the levels he had 
experienced at the start of the commitment in 1966, observed in some 
amazement that it seemed ‘as if we had never really been there’.17
In what would become a familiar pattern in later conflicts, there was a 
gulf between the claims made by politicians and diplomats vaunting 
the successful completion of the mission, and the more realistic 
assessments of soldiers with experience on the ground.
The United States had entered the war with laudable ambitions: 
to resist communist aggression and subversion, and to secure the 
independence of an emergent, democratic Republic of South Vietnam. 
15  O’Neill, Robert (1971) ‘Vietnam Departure Risks: While Packing Up — A Sitting Duck?’, 
Financial Review, 27 September.
16  Burns, Creighton (1971) ‘The War we Didn’t Win’, The Age, 15 November; Ekins, Ashley 
with Ian McNeill (2012) Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968–
1975, Sydney Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, p. 632.
17  Major F. A. Roberts, AATTV, 1971–1972, Interview, Canberra 2, 3, 10 February 1978, 
Part II, p. 75, Canberra, AHQ file 707/R2/39 folder 11, AWM 107.
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But frustration ensued as the war dragged on into a stalemate, followed 
by disillusionment and despair as it became a costly quagmire from 
which the US could neither withdraw honourably nor achieve 
a decisive victory.
When Saigon fell to a massive assault by conventional communist 
forces in April 1975, the damage to US prestige was profound. It was 
widely claimed that the world’s greatest superpower had been defeated 
by a barefoot army of peasant guerrillas. This was a fallacy, but the 
failure of US military intervention in Vietnam continued to linger in 
American popular memory.
Military strategists and historians have long argued over the mistakes 
and lessons of the Vietnam War. Many of these arguments mirror 
the debates that took place during the war: how the conflict arose 
and developed, and the origin of American involvement; whether 
Vietnam was a civil war between nationalist and imperialist factions, 
or the focal point of a wider struggle between expansionist forces of 
communism and their containment by democratic capitalism; whether 
an enormous American military commitment to a geographically 
remote conflict was justified on the grounds of morality or national 
security; and whether the United States might have won the war 
through a different application of its military power.
The key to the American and allied defeat in Vietnam, however, 
lay in the failure of the political aims of the war, rather than the 
military struggle. From March 1965, when the first American combat 
forces arrived in Vietnam and the collapse of South Vietnam seemed 
imminent, the South Vietnamese Government could claim little real 
legitimacy to rule Vietnam. As former North Vietnamese Army Colonel 
Bui Tin argued, American military involvement managed to delay the 
communist defeat of South Vietnam, but the Americans and their allies 
were never able to establish the national consensus they had hoped to 
create: ‘Rather they eroded it.’
Australia came out of the Vietnam War as awkwardly as it went in 
— still striving to gain access to American intentions and policy 
decisions, and vainly trying to influence the US to retain a strong 
military presence in the region.
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By the most optimistic estimates, the intervention in Vietnam might 
be viewed merely as a holding action which may have bought time 
for neighbouring, emergent nations in Southeast Asia, allowing them 
to achieve political stability and economic security. For the nations 
of Indochina, however — Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam — the 
war resulted in enormous human loss, ecological devastation, and 
economic ruin.
Australia’s senior military leaders later drew definite lessons from 
the Vietnam War. Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, Chief of the 
General Staff, and the senior soldier responsible for the Australian 
Army during the Vietnam conflict, argued: ‘The major lesson is that 
we should never allow ourselves to become involved in a war that we 
don’t intend to win. Holding campaigns are fruitless. They result in a 
loss of life which is incommensurate with the results achieved.’
Daly’s judgments were echoed by the former Chairman, Chiefs of 
Staff Committee, General Sir John Wilton. The principal lesson of the 
war, said Wilton, was, ‘don’t go into a war unless you are prepared 
to win’. With that understanding, he said, ‘you’ve got to employ all 
the resources at your disposal or which can be made at your disposal’ 
in order to win. Combat operations against enemy forces are ‘not 
something that you can just put one foot in and feel the temperature’, 
Wilton argued, ‘you’ve got to jump right in’. He believed the 
Americans ‘greatly underestimated what the war would involve, right 
from the start. They came into it piecemeal and didn’t fully appreciate 
the nature of the war in which they had become involved.’18
Debate continues over the reasons for failure, and whether different 
approaches and applications of military force may have succeeded. 
Proponents of conventional warfare claim that military force offered 
a rapid solution, while others maintain only an unconventional, 
counterinsurgency strategy could have been effective. Some argue 
that the war exposed the limits of American military power; others 
that the US misapplied its military power or failed to use it decisively 
and without limit. Some believe the US exaggerated the strategic 
significance of Vietnam, others that it misjudged the issues at stake. 
18  Daly and Wilton quoted in Ekins, Ashley with Ian McNeill (2012) Fighting to the Finish: 
The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968–1975, Sydney Allen & Unwin in association 
with the Australian War Memorial, pp. 705–6.
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But many of these may even be the wrong lessons to draw. Most 
analysts agree that a more decisive use of conventional military force 
in Vietnam may have been counter-productive, or even have led to 
disastrous global escalation. 
For Australia, the Vietnam War stands as a reminder that open-
ended military commitments carry unforeseeable risks, even when 
based on perceived national self-interest and strategic advantages, or 
conducted for altruistic or humanitarian reasons. The costs can never 
be accurately foreseen, and the end result is rarely what was intended.
In what has become a timeless, pessimistic observation, the nineteenth 
century German philosopher Hegel said experience and history teach 
us that ‘nations and governments have never learned anything from 
history, or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from it’.19
The lessons from Vietnam are clear for those who will read them, 
as Robert O’Neill has amply demonstrated in his writings. He has 
also drawn insights from the parallels between Britain’s enthusiastic 
commitment to the ill-considered Gallipoli campaign in 1915 and the 
more recent rush to war by the Bush Administration in the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. He wrote in 2013:
The lessons from history’s page are obvious, but do we have politicians 
who are prepared to take the time necessary, and do the hard studying, 
to develop real expertise in the management of international security 
policy? The experience of the past decade suggests that we are as far 
away from that goal as were the national leaders of 1914–15.20
If political leaders fail to grasp the lessons then, hopefully, historians, 
strategic analysts, and veterans will perceive them and prove more 
persuasive. The experience of Vietnam shows that the costs can be too 
great to ignore the lessons of history.
19  Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1975 [1830]) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: 
Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 21.
20  O’Neill, Robert (2015) ‘Gallipoli: Foreshadowing Future Conflicts’ in Ashley Ekins (ed.), 





Between 1966 and 1967, Bob O’Neill saw 12 months of combat duty 
with an Australian army infantry battalion in Vietnam. It is not widely 
known that Australia was one of a number of countries — including 
Thailand, the Philippines, the Republics of China (Taiwan) and Korea, 
Spain, and New Zealand — which, alongside the US, constituted the 
so-called Free World Military Forces in the Second Indochina War 
(1961–1975). These allies supported the Government of the Republic 
of (South) Vietnam against insurgents of the National Liberation Front 
(NLF), which, in turn, was sustained by the communist regime of 
North Vietnam. As in the United States, in Australia there would later 
be bitter opposition to involvement in the Vietnam War. However, 
what is less well known is that, at the outset, the war had widespread 
popular support. The domino theory, whereby Southeast Asian 
countries would — one after another — fall to the southern thrust of 
communism, was entirely credible in this era of Cold War.
In 1962, Australia made a modest contribution to the Saigon-based 
anti-communist alliance by dispatching 30 military advisers to bolster 
South Vietnamese army units in the field. In a major escalation, combat 
troops from the US and Australia arrived in 1965, with an Australian 
battalion under US command. The following year, the Australian 
Government decided to send an expanded and autonomous task force 
under Australian command and operating in its own area.
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In January 1966, Captain Robert J. O’Neill of the Royal Australian 
Corps of Signals joined the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment 
(5RAR) at its Holsworthy base on the outskirts of Sydney. 5RAR 
and a second battalion and supporting arms (artillery, armour, etc.) 
would constitute the task force. Bob’s initial posting was as regimental 
signals officer commanding the signals platoon, but he was almost 
immediately transferred to the infantry corps and appointed second-
in-command (2IC) in the battalion’s B Company. Here his immediate 
superior was Major Bruce McQualter. Bruce had been a year ahead 
of Bob at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, and they knew each 
other well. Bruce was delighted to know that Bob would be joining 
the battalion, particularly as his 2IC. The job of a company 2IC is to 
understudy his commander. He is to be fully prepared to step into 
the role should the situation demand it, whether this be due to the 
absence, death, or disablement of his commander. In the meantime, 
the 2IC relieves his commander of many of the routine administrative 
and house-keeping chores associated with the lives of the 100 or so 
troops under their control.
The rationale behind the posting of a high-flying academic into 
such a prosaic job was undoubtedly to bring him down to earth and 
reacquaint him with the nuts and bolts of soldiering. Bob was soon to 
be seen involved in such tasks as overseeing the pouring of concrete 
slabs, and discussing soldiers’ equipment and rations. 
5RAR was a brand new battalion, founded on 1 March 1965, only 
14 months before its deployment to Vietnam. Preparing a military 
unit for war is a considerable undertaking, involving prolonged, 
arduous training, and the development of leadership and teamwork 
at all levels to produce an effective fighting force. This preparation 
was complicated by the fact the battalion was the first to be made up 
of both conscripts and career soldiers — roughly 50 per cent of each. 
There was a degree of apprehension as to how the conscripts would 
adjust to the constraints of army life, but this soon proved groundless. 
Although there was always a widespread assumption that — sooner 
or later — the battalion would be sent to Vietnam, a formal order 
was not issued until less than three months before its departure to 
the war zone. This lack of certainty was something of an additional 
encumbrance to the preparations. Fresh reinforcements were still 
arriving in the final weeks and there was an atmosphere of haste and 
improvisation just short of chaos.
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Bob did not slip into the battalion unnoticed. Here was a newcomer 
not only with an engineering degree from Melbourne University, but 
a Rhodes Scholarship and an Oxford doctorate. It was known that his 
doctoral thesis was shortly to be published as The German Army and 
the Nazi Party, 1933–1939. Such a stellar academic record certainly 
attracted widespread and intense interest in the battalion. Within 
military culture, however, deeds are generally valued more highly 
than words, and such a background could well have invited comments 
about ivory towers and detachment from reality. It was soon evident 
that Bob had his feet well and truly on the ground, and would be 
readily and warmly accepted by all ranks. He was, from the start, 
friendly and approachable. In conversation, it was apparent that he 
had an unfeigned interest in the other person’s views. Bob’s affability 
and early identification with the battalion contributed in no small way 
to the development of esprit de corps in this new unit. It also stood 
him in good stead when, a few months later, he was appointed to the 
post of the battalion’s intelligence officer, where informal contacts are 
invaluable. Time was found for Bob to deliver a series of pre-departure 
presentations to the troops on the history and culture of Vietnam as 
well as the strategic situation, a task for which he was well equipped.
The battalion left Sydney for Vietnam in late May 1966. Vehicles and 
equipment sailed together with one company to the Vietnam port of 
Vung Tau aboard an aircraft carrier converted to a troopship. The rest 
of the troops flew into Saigon in a series of civilian flights.
Their first home in Vietnam was in tents on sand dunes above a beach 
on the South China Sea, close to Vung Tau and some 130 kilometres 
from Saigon. Here, in the relentless sweltering heat, the battalion 
sorted itself out, preparing for its first operation.
The Australian Task Force, of which 5RAR formed a part, had been 
allocated its own area of operations, the province of Phuoc Tuy, 
which lay on the coast to the east of Saigon. With a population of 
103,000, the main industries of Phuoc Tuy were rice-growing, fishing, 
and charcoal burning. There were also extensive French owned and 
operated plantations of rubber trees. These had been established by 
the French colonists after World War I, and were still operating to a 
limited extent despite their situation in the midst of the communist 
insurgency. It was understood that there was a mutually beneficial 
financial arrangement in place between the French owners and the 
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NLF that enabled production to continue despite the war. Another 
main feature of Phuoc Tuy Province was the port of Vung Tau, 
through which passed a considerable volume of supplies for Saigon 
and beyond, thereby taking the pressure off Saigon’s river port. With 
the exception of the port, the province capital (Baria) and scattered 
outposts, Phuoc Tuy was entirely in enemy hands at the time of the 
Australian Task Force’s arrival in 1966. Road traffic, even in convoys, 
was subject to attack, road blocks, and NLF tax collectors. Movement 
at night was impossible.
On 24 May 1966, the battalion left the temporary beach camp and 
set forth on its first operation. Bob was one of 800 soldiers aboard an 
armada of four flights of 30 helicopters, clattering 30 kilometres inland 
over jungle and rice paddies, to land close to an abandoned rubber 
plantation. Their mission was to establish a permanent base (Nui Dat) 
from which the task force would operate. This would be their home for 
the next 12 months. No time was lost in erecting defences. Noise was 
minimised and no lights were to be seen after sundown. A program of 
active patrolling and ambushing commenced immediately. 
The wet season in South Vietnam runs from May to October. The heat 
and humidity were oppressive and the common daily pattern was for 
torrential rain to fall for an hour or two each afternoon. Clothing and 
equipment would be saturated. The rich red soil soon turned to deep 
mud. Latrines in the early weeks were simply shallow trenches which 
would be progressively covered up by successive users. Anyone who 
has experienced camping in the rain would understand the practical 
difficulties of daily life, quite apart from the threat of enemy attack. 
Mosquitos, scorpions and snakes abounded, and chomper ants could 
eat their way through the soldiers’ webbing and nylon ground sheets. 
For the first two months, the troops slept on the ground in bivouacs. 
Later, tents were erected, with a floor of sand trucked up from the 
beach, and life in the base area improved.
It was on day one of this first operation that Bob O’Neill began writing 
a journal. He used a small, loose leaf pocket book, and every few days 
for the next 12 months would mail the completed, often mud-stained 
pages to his wife, Sally, back in Sydney. Sally — herself a historian 
— typed up and edited these notes, which provided the material 
that Bob would use on his return to Australia to write an account of 
5RAR’s experience in Vietnam. This was published as Vietnam Task 
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in 1968, and constitutes the battalion’s official history. Being the first 
such account in Australia’s 10 year involvement in the Vietnam War, 
the book attracted considerable attention and has remained a valuable 
reference. 
During the year, 5RAR carried out a total of 17 operations in the 
province. Each lasted between two days and two weeks, after which 
the troops — tired, ragged, and filthy — would return to the Nui 
Dat base for a week or two to debrief, re-equip, and prepare for the 
next excursion. Many of the tasks consisted of cordon and search 
operations. Under cover of darkness, the battalion would creep up 
on a village overnight, to have it surrounded by first light, thus 
preventing the escape of potential enemy. During the following 
day, South Vietnamese army personnel would search the village and 
interrogate the inhabitants. While this was proceeding, the battalion 
conducted a medical clinic, food was distributed, and, on occasion, 
the battalion band entertained the villagers. These operations proved 
to be very cost effective at recovering weapons and documents, as well 
as apprehending Viet Cong suspects.
Bob was tasked with conducting the reconnaissance of the village 
of Duc My as preparation for the battalion’s first such cordon and 
search operation. Moving hundreds of troops at night through enemy 
territory, silently and without lights, was highly hazardous, and a 
sound knowledge of the terrain on the approaches was essential to 
lessen the chance of disaster. Bob led his patrol of 30 men out of the 
base in the late afternoon. Monsoonal downpours and the need to skirt 
impenetrable clumps of bamboo and swampy terrain made navigation 
extremely difficult. His plan to use a creek leading to the village as a 
reliable guide proved impracticable — even for this small patrol — 
owing to the tangled undergrowth. To attempt to move the whole 
battalion along this route could have been calamitous. The patrol 
was nevertheless able to probe the perimeter of the village closely, 
to the extent of being able to hear a snoring sleeper, and returned 
safely to the base by sunrise. The information gained from this night 
reconnaissance was invaluable. The approach route was changed and 
the operation was carried out successfully shortly afterwards.
Illness resulted in the loss of 5RAR’s Intelligence Officer and led to 
Bob’s appointment to this position three months into his Vietnam tour 
of duty. This involved a move to battalion headquarters and brought 
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him into close association with the senior officers, in particular 
Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, the Commanding Officer. Warr had 
seen service as a platoon commander in Korea and had been wounded. 
He was a perceptive leader who had a sound grasp of the nature of 
counter-insurgency warfare. This understanding was shared by the 
battalion’s company commanders, most of whom had seen service in 
the Malayan Emergency in the 1950s, combatting communist guerrillas. 
The principles of this type of warfare were to separate the insurgents 
from the support of the civilian population, and to win the hearts 
and minds of the latter. This ‘softly, softly’ approach was backed by a 
program of quiet but relentless patrolling and ambush. This strategy 
was at variance with the US military higher command, who favoured 
search and destroy sweeps conducted by large forces, set-piece battles, 
and who attached greater importance to body counts. Bob was firmly 
in the Warr camp.
He immediately took to his intelligence officer duties with relish. 
To  quote Major Max Carroll, 5RAR’s Chief Staff Officer and Battle 
Second-in-Command: 
[H]e assumed the position the day before we commenced a major 
operation, the cordon and search of Binh Ba on 7/8 August 1966, for 
which all of the planning and orders had been completed. On his first 
day, on his own initiative, he produced an operational contingency 
plan, from the enemy Viet Cong viewpoint, to counter our actions 
against Binh Ba. His assessment was so accurate that it was taken to 
be a captured plan, which initially caused considerable alarm amongst 
some of our US allies! There is no doubt in my mind that as Intelligence 
Officer Bob found his true military metier. With his keen, analytical 
mind he was a natural; and his assessments were always well found, 
accurate and invariably accepted.1 
Xuyen Moc, an isolated government outpost and district headquarters 
in the east of the province, attracted Bob’s attention. The village had 
been cut off for five years. Farmers wanting to sell their produce in the 
province capital had to travel on a road dominated by the Viet Cong, 
who extorted a heavy burden of tax. Bob devised a risky plan to drop in 
on the village compound by helicopter to meet the district commander 
and gain an appreciation of the tactical situation. Communications 
were poor, and there was no way of knowing how secure the landing 
1  O.M. Carroll, 5RAR S3 (Battle Second-in-Command), personal communication.
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zone was. Accompanied only by his Vietnamese interpreter and his 
batman (a commissioned officer’s personal assistant/bodyguard/
general gopher), Bob was dropped into the compound by a helicopter 
which immediately departed to avoid presenting an attractive target to 
the enemy. It was a fruitful visit, and Bob was able to pass on valuable 
intelligence to the Australian Task Force commander, resulting in 
an expansion of government control in this part of the province and 
a reopening of the road.
On several occasions, Bob managed to inveigle his way into the US 
headquarters known as HQ 2 Field Force Vietnam at Long Binh to find 
out what was in the big picture. This was an act involving a high level 
of chutzpah. As a rule, these mid-level American staff officers would 
never have allowed a humble captain from one of their own battalions 
to walk into their headquarters asking all kinds of probing questions 
about what they knew about Viet Cong strengths and intentions. 
As it happened, they were intrigued by the irregular approach from 
this representative of their unfamiliar ally, and they opened up and 
gave him serious answers. Bob was able to pass the gist of it to the 
Australian Task Force intelligence people, which kept them tolerant of 
his unusual initiatives.
Bob was a strong supporter of the battalion’s civil action program. 
This included the provision — whenever practicable — of medical 
care to Vietnamese civilians by the battalion doctor, performances by 
the brass band, and football matches and combined church services 
attended by villagers and soldiers. He would always make an effort 
to engage the locals in friendly conversation. A pleasant break from 
army rations — accompanied by the commanding officer and medical 
officer — was an occasional lunch in the colonial splendour of the 
residence of the French manager of the nearby rubber plantation.
Throughout the year, Bob continued to re-evaluate strategy in the 
light of the battalion’s experience and intelligence gathered. He 
paid particular attention to the views of junior commanders and 
ordinary soldiers. Michael von Berg, who was decorated for his 
actions as commander of the reconnaissance platoon (the brainchild 
of the commanding officer and Bob), observed that Bob’s debriefing 
sessions were always searching and thorough, but also helpful and 
encouraging: ‘Bob’s knowledge of the enemy and potential movements 
was pretty accurate and this helped me enormously as to what type 
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of enemy you were likely to engage … When talking to Bob it’s like 
you are the only person in the world because he is giving you his total 
attention.’2 
Twelve months of dangerous living in spartan conditions in the 
oppressive tropical climate of Vietnam placed huge demands on 
everyone’s mental and physical resources. However, Bob never seemed 
to flag, and maintained his cheerful and professional demeanour 
throughout. It was not unknown for him to be seen up on a table in 
the officers’ mess, singing German beer-hall songs. In the half century 
since that year, he has continued to keep up with his former comrades 
in arms and participate fully in the 5RAR Association. He made a 
return visit to Vietnam in 1971 — which included visits to Laos and 
Cambodia — towards the end of Australia’s military involvement, in 
order to compile a survey of the war as a whole and collect material 
as a first step towards the writing of the eventual official history 
of Australia’s part in the war in Vietnam. 
For his services in Vietnam, Bob received the award of a mention 
in despatches. The citation for this award reads as follows:
Captain R. J. O’Neill was the Intelligence Officer of the 5th Battalion, 
The Royal Australian Regiment during the greater part of the tour of 
duty of the unit in South Vietnam. His skill and industry in collecting 
and interpreting available information regarding the enemy enabled 
the Battalion to undertake operations with the greatest possible 
knowledge of the Viet Cong. On numerous occasions Captain O’Neill 
displayed high personal courage in seeking out and confirming 
information both by ground and air reconnaissance. His conduct 
was at all times an inspiration to those who worked with him and the 
leadership displayed by him was of the highest possible order.





Bob O’Neill rose to the pinnacle of his chosen profession — the 
academic study of arguably the most critical subject of public policy, 
that of war and peace, strategy and defence policy. His route took him 
to be Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
in London from 1982–1987, Chairman of the Council of IISS from 1986–
2001, and the Chichele Professor of the History of War at All Souls 
College at Oxford University from 1987 until his retirement in 2001. 
These posts were fiercely competitive and required navigating the 
complex shoals at the confluence of the academic and policy worlds. 
He needed to be internationally recognised for his scholarship, but 
he also needed to demonstrate extraordinary project management and 
fund-raising propensities, to have a dedication to institution-building 
and a steadfast commitment to the strategic studies profession, and 
ultimately to be comfortable in the corridors of power to which he 
enjoyed access in many places around the world. But he did it in his 
stride — as purposefully as he strides out in front in his walks with 
family and friends in the Australian bush or the English countryside.
1  This chapter was previously published as Ball, Desmond (2006) ‘Robert O’Neill: A Strategic 
Career, Australian Journal of International Affairs 60(1), pp. 7–11, and is reproduced here with 
the support of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Minor edits have been made to 
update the concluding paragraphs.
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I worked most closely with Bob from 1974, when I joined the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at The Australian National 
University as a research fellow, to 1982, when he moved to London, 
eventually becoming his deputy head and often serving during 
his absences as acting head of the centre. We continued to consult 
frequently after he moved to the IISS and I became Head of SDSC, and 
we worked together when he was Chairman of the Council of the IISS, 
of which I was then a member. I saw him functioning at close quarters 
in his many different capacities.
I first met Bob around 1970. He had come to ANU as a Senior Fellow in 
the Department of International Relations, where I was a PhD student, 
in 1969. He became Head of SDSC in 1971, although he remained in 
International Relations. The centre had been set up by Dr T. B. Millar, 
another former army officer, in 1966, when he was also a Senior 
Fellow in International Relations, to ‘advance the study of Australian, 
regional, and global strategic and defence issues’. It was initially 
funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation, and was organisationally 
an independent offshoot of International Relations. Bob presided over 
the centre’s expansion and rise to international recognition through 
the 1970s and early 1980s.
He was a former Australian Army officer who had served in Vietnam 
as an infantry captain from 1966–1967 and had been mentioned in 
dispatches; he had been a lecturer in military history at the Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, from 1967–1969; and he was already the 
author of three books. His first was The German Army and the Nazi 
Party, 1933–1939,2 the classic text on civil–military relations in Nazi 
Germany, based on the thesis he wrote as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford 
in the early 1960s. It had an introduction by Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 
who had befriended the young Australian soldier-scholar, and who 
had the greatest intellectual influence on Bob’s approach to military 
history and strategic thinking. His second book, Vietnam Task,3 was 
based on his experiences in Vietnam. His third book was General 
Giap: Politician and Strategist,4 a biography of the North Vietnamese 
military leader, the architect of the Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien 
2  O’Neill, Robert (1966) The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939, London: Cassell.
3  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 
1966–67, Sydney: Cassell
4  O’Neill, Robert J. (1969) General Giap: Politician and Strategist, London: Cassell.
41
4 . A STRATEGIC CAREER
Phu in 1954 and, two decades later, of the defeat of the US in South 
Vietnam. He was, by 1971, regarded as Australia’s leading soldier-
historian and one of its best military historians ever.
Bob’s major research project during his 11 years at SDSC was his 
two-volume, 1,300-page official history of Australia in the Korean 
War 1950–53 — Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy was published 
by the Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government 
Publishing Service in 1981, and Volume II: Combat Operations 
followed in 1985.5 Reviewers said that the twin works ‘will always 
be the indispensable reference’ on Australia’s role in the Korean War, 
that they had ‘enhanced existing standards of research, authenticity 
and unremitting attention to detail’, and that they revealed ‘enormous 
energy’. The basic politico-strategic assessment that underlay the 
history, that Australia’s deployment of troops to Korea was ‘primarily 
in the interests of Australian-American diplomacy’, an exercise in 
alliance politics, was more telling than might have been expected from 
other official historians.
By 1974, Bob’s talents were already turning to institution-building and 
project leadership. His first task was to build a critical mass of research 
posts in SDSC, based on a core staff of longer-term appointments. 
He promoted the centre through regular public conferences and by 
developing contacts with the media. The conferences were usually 
products of extensive research projects, and usually addressed the 
subjects for the first time in Australia.
Through the mid-1970s he obtained financial support for several core 
posts. In 1974, when Lance Barnard was Defence Minister in the Labor 
Government, he secured funding from the Department of Defence 
for two academic posts, and was later able to obtain two to three 
University-funded posts. He also forged a strong relationship with the 
Ford Foundation and, later, the McArthur Foundation.
He recognised that viable institutions require continuous regeneration. 
He encouraged promising honours and masters graduates from around 
the country to undertake PhDs in international relations at ANU, and 
5  O’Neill, Robert J. (1981) Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, Volume I: Strategy and 
Diplomacy, Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service; 
O’Neill, Robert J. (1985) Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, Volume II: Combat Operations, 
Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service.
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he closely attended their subsequent progress. His former students 
invariably recall the prompt and meticulous comments they received 
on their drafts. Some of them, including David Horner, Ross Babbage, 
and later Ron Huisken, took up senior positions in SDSC after Bob’s 
departure. Tim Huxley is the Senior Fellow in charge of Asia-Pacific 
security matters at IISS.
Bob was the editor or co-editor of seven books from 1975–1982. 
The first of these was The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Australian 
Perspective,6 consisting of papers prepared for a conference held in 
July  1974. It  was the first serious examination of US, Soviet, and 
Chinese  strategic nuclear policies and capabilities, nuclear arms 
control and non-proliferation, in this country. Later volumes covered 
The Strategic Environment in the 1980s,7 weapons proliferation in 
the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific regions, and New Directions 
in Strategic Thinking8 (1981), as well as aspects of Australian defence 
policy.
The edited books were products of his collegiate style of leadership, 
whereby small and fairly loose teams worked on large issues with 
himself as the team leader and resource diviner. The largest proportion 
of the centre’s work under Bob’s tenure concerned the defence of 
Australia. The centre was at the forefront of the conceptual revolution 
in Australian defence policy, from ‘dependence on great and powerful 
friends’ to ‘greater self-reliance’, and from ‘forward defence’ to 
‘defence of Australia’, which occurred during this period. The core 
people involved in this work on Australian defence were Bob, myself, 
Ross Babbage, then a PhD student, and J. O. Langtry, who was the 
SDSC Executive Officer from August 1976 to December 1988. Langtry 
was a former army officer who had worked in the Joint Intelligence 
Organisation and army combat development areas, and whose ability 
to think of novel strategic and operational concepts was inspirational.
6  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1975) The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Australian Perspective, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
7  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1980) The Strategic Environment in the 1980s, Canberra: Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
8  O’Neill, Robert J. and D. M. Horner (eds) (1981) New Directions in Strategic Thinking, 
Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
43
4 . A STRATEGIC CAREER
Bob’s second edited book was on The Defence of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects.9 It consisted of papers from a conference 
in October 1976, and was designed to assist policy-makers struggling 
with the transformation of Australia’s defence posture. It included 
papers by leading overseas experts on the concept of ‘total defence’, 
and on the strategic and tactical implications of new conventional 
weapons technologies, by a recent defence minister (Bill Morrison) 
on the role of the minister in policy-making since the reorganisation 
of the Defence Department from 1973–1975, on force structure 
and equipment acquisition matters, and Bob’s own paper on the 
development of operational doctrine for the Australian Defence 
Force (ADF).
Bob produced the formative studies of the requisite command and 
control structure for a joint ADF in defence of Australia contingencies, 
including the establishment of functional command arrangements. 
His Dyason House Paper on ‘Structural Changes for a More Self-Reliant 
National Defence’,10 was the first coherent statement of the need for 
functional commands, adopted a decade later. He also contributed to 
the development of new ideas concerning the reorganisation of the 
defence portfolio; greater utilisation of the civilian infrastructure, 
especially in defence of Australia contingencies; greater appreciation 
of the challenges of lower-level contingencies in northern Australia; 
regular officer education and training; and particular force structure 
issues. Members of the centre were credited with an influential role 
in the government’s decision in 1981 to acquire the F/A-18 as RAAF’s 
tactical fighter aircraft. Costing $4 billion, this was the largest capital 
program in Australia’s history.
The second large area of work in the centre under Bob’s tenure, 
which brought it to international attention, concerned the strategic 
nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
related issues of nuclear proliferation. This had been the subject of 
the first centre conference he had organised in 1974, and he returned 
to it frequently over the next couple of decades. From 1995–1996 he 
served as a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination 
9  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1977) The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
10  O’Neill, Robert J. (1976) ‘Structural Changes for a More Self-reliant National Defence’, 
Dyason House Working Paper 3, Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
The Australian National University.
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of Nuclear Weapons, which recommended the complete elimination 
of these weapons. He was a very active player in the commission, 
and worked energetically on the final drafts of the report.
The third broad area of centre research during this period concerned 
security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Bob organised a succession 
of two- to three-year appointments on various aspects of regional 
security, funded variously by the Department of Defence, ANU, and 
the Ford Foundation. The appointments included Peter Hastings, 
the pungent, waggish and quarrelsome journalist, who worked on 
political and security issues concerning Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea; Lee Ngok and Don McMillan who worked on China; Paul Keal 
on Japan; and R. Subramanian, S. D. Muni, Sreedhara Rao, and Pervaiz 
Iqbal Cheema on South Asia. Their names are associated with standard 
reference works in their respective areas.
I saw Bob display not only superb diplomatic skills, but also an 
immense personal integrity and a commitment to academic values. 
Some of the centre’s work was intensely controversial, as befitting 
path-breaking scholarship on major national and international issues. 
Some senior defence and intelligence officials regarded my own work 
on US installations in Australia, such as Pine Gap, with great suspicion. 
While I argued that in a democracy it was necessary for the public to 
know the purposes and implications of these facilities, a proposition 
now taken for granted, Sir Arthur Tange complained that I was 
dangerous and irresponsible, opening up matters which ‘successive 
American and Australian governments have deemed it a national 
interest’ to keep secret. He was especially upset since my post was 
then funded by the Department of Defence. Bob defended the right 
of academics to pursue unfettered research. Only when I later became 
Head of SDSC and inherited the files of correspondence between Bob 
and Sir Arthur did I fully appreciate the extent of his discourse and 
the solidity of his refusal to countenance any hint of infringement on 
the principle of academic independence.
When Bob moved to London to head the IISS in 1982, he took his 
leadership qualities and adeptness at collegiate and foundation politics 
to a higher plane. He initiated the planning for the fund-raising 
campaign to acquire new and much larger premises for the institute, 
consummated by John Chipman, his successor as director and by then 
his closest working colleague, with the purchase of Arundel House in 
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1997. He greatly expanded the number of young research associates 
in the institute. He broadened the work of the institute to cover Asia 
as well as Africa and Latin America, making it a really international 
institute rather than an Atlanticist organisation with some regional 
appendages. His magisterial summings-up of IISS conferences on 
such broad, complex, and different themes as ‘The Conduct of East–
West Relations in the 1980s’ in Ottawa in 1983, ‘New Technology 
and Western Security Policy’ in Avignon in 1984, and ‘East Asia 
and International Security’ in Kyoto in 1986, evinced his complete 
intellectual mastery of the ever-changing strategic landscape.
The Chichele Professorship at Oxford allowed him to return to 
thinking as much about military history, always his first love, as about 
current strategic developments. But he did not resile from a myriad 
of boards and councils which allowed him continued oversight of his 
domain. In addition to the demanding position of Chairman of the 
Council of the IISS, he was Chairman of the Trustees of the Imperial 
War Museum in London from 1998–2001; Chairman of the Council 
of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College, London, from 
1991–1996; Chairman of the Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian 
Studies in the University of London from 1990–1996; and a Governor 
of the International Peace Academy in New York and of the Ditchley 
Foundation in Oxfordshire. He also served as the Armed Services 
Editor of the Australian Dictionary of Biography until his retirement 
in 2001.
At the same time, he relished fostering and encouraging good, young 
PhD students at Oxford. Many of his stable are already widely 
recognised, including Daniel Marston, the war historian of the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and strategic analyst 
of counter-insurgency today; Carter Malkasian, who has published on 
the strategy of attrition, and after spending several years on the ground 
in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, has published War Comes to 
Garmser;11 John Hillen, the author of a critically acclaimed book on 
UN military operations and former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Political Military Affairs, Washington DC; the late Paul Collier, who 
has published on the North African and Mediterranean theatres 
during the Second World War; Elsina Wainwright, known for her 
11  Malkasian, Carter (2013) War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan 
Frontier, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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work on post-conflict governance issues and, more specifically, for her 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute paper on ‘Our Failing Neighbour’,12 
commonly regarded as the blueprint for the multinational intervention 
in Solomon Islands soon after; and John Nagl, a retired US Army 
officer who served in the First Gulf War and the Iraq conflict, who has 
published a comparative study on the Vietnam War and the Malayan 
Insurgency, and Knife Fights,13 on the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
As Bob has supervised over 50 doctoral students, I shall not go on further 
through the list. It is sufficient to say that he has developed a multinational 
group of critical thinkers on strategy who are now hard at work on the 
world’s current security problems. They share an unabashed loyalty to 
him. They effectively comprise a personal regiment, deployed around 
the globe, committed by profession to the promotion of the intellectual 
institution he valued most, the independent and rigorous study of military 
history, strategy, and security policy.
12  Wainwright, Elsina (2003) Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon 
Islands, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.




Robert O’Neill and 
Australian Security Policy
Paul Dibb
I have known Bob O’Neill for over 40 years and, as is well known, he is 
a highly distinguished scholar both nationally and internationally. 
He is also a man of many parts, as a former army officer, official war 
historian, the Head of SDSC for almost 12 years, the Director of the 
highly prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
in London, and Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford. 
This is truly a stellar career that very few Australian academics have 
been able to match, and much of this book will examine his academic 
achievements. My contribution will be to focus on his interest in the 
broader issues of Australia’s national security policy and, in particular, 
our cooperative endeavours in seeking to understand the policies of 
the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the roles of China and Japan in 
regional security policy in the 1970s, and his early work on Australian 
defence policy and how it assisted my own endeavours in coming to 
grips with working for the Minister for Defence Kim Beazley in the 
late 1980s. I will also address the challenges I faced as head of SDSC 
for almost 13 years, from 1991 to 2004, and how much I owed to the 
strong basis he had established for its intellectual reputation, both in 
Australia and internationally. However, the most important part of this 
chapter is to record the huge debt I owe to Bob O’Neill for supporting 
and publishing my controversial views on the Soviet Union.
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Intelligence and National Security Issues
I first met Bob O’Neill in the mid-1970s when I was a newly minted 
Head of the National Assessments Staff, which prepared draft 
intelligence assessments for the consideration of the National 
Intelligence Committee. It was a considerable challenge for me, because 
my previous career had been primarily as an economist dealing with 
Australia’s overseas trade, analysing Soviet agriculture, and writing a 
book whilst at ANU in the late 1960s with the obscure title, Siberia 
and the Pacific: A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects.1 
The world of strategy, military capabilities, and technical issues to do 
with the central nuclear balance between the US and the USSR were 
completely foreign to me. It was a very steep learning curve at the age 
of 34, and I owe a great deal to the guidance and generous mentoring 
Bob gave me. His background in the Australian Army in the Vietnam 
War, the fact that he was writing the official history of the Korean War, 
and his headship of SDSC gave me unique insights into the arcane 
world (or so it then seemed) of strategic and defence studies. He was 
able to direct me to others at ANU, such as Harry Rigby, Geoffrey 
Jukes, and Bob Miller, who were deeply knowledgeable about the 
USSR’s political leadership, military capabilities, and economy, as well 
as scholars such as Amin Saikal, who was invaluable to me when the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 — a country I knew absolutely 
nothing about.
Through Bob O’Neill, I also got to know Hedley Bull, Tom Millar, 
J. D. B. Miller and Des Ball. They were a formidable intellectual asset 
for me to consult as I struggled with formulating multidisciplinary and 
long-range intelligence national assessments. It is hard to imagine a 
more fortuitous and helpful set of individuals who were so prominent 
not only in strategic studies but also international relations practice.
I was also extremely fortunate because Bob — unlike many scholars 
— clearly understood that intelligence analysis is quite different from 
academic work. Intelligence analysis as a profession does not afford the 
time to focus on international relations theory and footnoting sources; 
rather, it must conform to national intelligence priorities, be relevant 
1  Dibb, Paul (1972) Siberia and the Pacific: A Study of Economic Development and Trade 
Prospects, New York: Praeger.
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to policy, and is rarely the product of an individual as distinct from 
a team. I was able to share these different  approaches intellectually 
with Bob, and obtain guidance about how to present them in formal 
intelligence committee meetings — which, for example, rejected my 
attempts to introduce ideas such as Robert Jervis’s ‘perceptions 
and misperceptions in international relations’ in my analysis of foreign 
countries.
In return, I was able to offer Bob some modest assistance regarding the 
problems of an academic research unit working in the sensitive area 
of defence policy. SDSC’s relations with the Department of Defence 
bureaucracy and its suspicious attitude toward academics needed 
to be handled with great diplomacy, which Bob had no problem 
demonstrating. On several occasions, there were particular issues to 
do with Des Ball and the focus of his research on the highly sensitive 
issue of the purpose and operations of the joint US–Australia facility 
at Pine Gap. Extremely few Australian intelligence or defence policy 
officers were briefed on the highly classified compartment dealing with 
Pine Gap. (I retained that clearance for 30 years, including 13 years as 
professor at ANU.) I was O’Neill’s closest contact in the Department of 
Defence in the 1970s and early 1980s. We kept in close touch during 
those years, and Bob says I gave him valuable guidance on how to 
handle problems when they arose — such as the formidable Secretary 
of the Department of Defence, Sir Arthur Tange, bearing down on 
SDSC over Des Ball’s Pine Gap revelations. I was also able to introduce 
Bob to people I worked with in the Joint Intelligence Organisation 
(JIO), including its Director and Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Committee, Gordon Jockel, and Bob Mathams, the Director of 
Scientific and Technical Intelligence who, with the CIA’s Carl Duckett, 
chose the site for Pine Gap. Mathams was the resident technical and 
scientific expert regarding the role of the joint facilities in monitoring 
the USSR’s strategic nuclear capabilities and evidence about whether 
it was conforming to strategic nuclear arms control agreements. 
The other key person that I facilitated contact with for Bob was the 
Deputy Secretary for Defence, Bill Pritchett, who became Secretary 
in 1979 after Tange retired. These were all people who essentially 
wanted to be helpful to SDSC, but sometimes faced difficulties because 
of SDSC’s need to address salient, and therefore sensitive, issues in 
public comment.
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The Soviet Union, China, and Japan
I had a particular interest in the Soviet Union and China, but for 
different reasons: I was the resident defence intelligence expert on the 
Soviet Union, which in the 1970s was seen as posing a fundamental 
military challenge to America. Our intelligence interest was in China’s 
growing opposition to the USSR and its opening up of relations 
with the US and Australia. Sir Arthur Tange instructed me to go to 
Moscow in 1976 and hold detailed discussions with the USSR about 
their naval operations in the Indian Ocean, which were of particular 
concern to the then Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser. In 1978, Tange 
also agreed to an invitation by the Chinese Embassy, and I was the 
first Australian  senior defence intelligence officer to visit China. 
I was  invited to inspect  the Chinese submarine building yards in 
Shanghai and go on board a Chinese Romeo class submarine. 
I was able to assist Bob in developing his knowledge of these 
important countries. Bob made a few visits to Moscow in the 1970s, 
and I was able to give him a list of very valuable contacts in the think 
tanks and the foreign ministry. From that experience, he was able 
to invite some well-suited specialists to Canberra, especially those 
from Soviet think tanks specialising in our region. I also helped Bob 
to open up a workable and sensible relationship with key people 
in the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, including the Deputy Chief of 
Mission Yuri Pavlov and the Counsellor Igor Saprykin. These were 
both highly intelligent and active Soviet diplomats who enjoyed a 
vast array of contacts in Canberra and ASIO had concerns about their 
real intelligence functions. Pavlov and Saprykin were accomplished 
public speakers and were quite comfortable participating in vigorous 
ANU public conferences about such subjects as nuclear arms control, 
Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean, and the US–USSR strategic 
relationship. I tried to do my bit for SDSC as a discreet participant in 
opening up a less hostile relationship with the Soviet diplomats in 
Canberra. Bob has told me that I made a big difference indirectly to the 
expertise of SDSC’s output and understanding of the USSR, even while 
I was in the Department of Defence.
I was also able to assist Bob in developing relations with government 
departments and research institutes in China. When he first visited 
China, shortly after my 1978 visit, I was able to give him a long 
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list of contacts across the defence and foreign ministries and think 
tanks, from which he was able to make contacts which he tells me 
were still useful to him 20 years later. He says they were especially 
valuable when he was at the IISS, trying to broaden its outreach with 
Asia, which had not traditionally been a key interest of the institute, 
which was heavily focused on Europe and North America. Bob has 
told me that as he was travelling around in China on that first visit, 
he became used to hearing my name spoken in discussion groups 
that he attended. Certainly, Bob had my strong support in visiting 
China, because we were keenly interested in developing a relationship 
and opening up Beijing to a more transparent exchange of views on 
strategic and military matters.
Bob and I were also interested in the issue of developing our strategic 
relationships with Japan. The first Japanese official to attend the IISS 
was the Foreign Ministry’s experienced Asianist Yukio Sato who 
later organised — with Bob’s strong support — the first IISS Annual 
Conference in Asia in 1986 in the Japanese city of Kyoto. It was a 
resounding success due to Bob’s imaginative management. Later, in 
1990 when I was Deputy Secretary for Defence, Sato and I held Japan’s 
first strategic bilateral discussions with any country other than the US. 
Sato went on to be Japan’s Ambassador in Canberra in the mid-1990s, 
and I maintained a close relationship with him. The IISS established 
progressively deeper relationships with Japan and was responsible for 
nurturing an entire generation of Japanese strategic thinkers.
Managing the IISS
Bob O’Neill was the Director of the IISS from 1982 to 1987, and 
these were crucial years in the formulation of my own career, which 
would not have occurred without his generous support. When I was 
in intelligence during the 1970s, I began to formulate ideas about 
the USSR that I knew would become controversial. Toeing the party 
line on the Soviet Union in Canberra was de rigueur and there was 
an unspoken requirement to conform, which was a reflection of the 
belief that the views of the US intelligence community should not be 
challenged. As already mentioned, in 1976 Sir Arthur Tange sent me 
to Moscow, stating that he wanted an Australian — not a US or UK — 
point of view. I stopped at London on my way to Moscow and talked 
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in detail with the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff, which I found to 
be much more nuanced than the CIA. By 1979, an idea was beginning 
to formulate in my mind that the Soviet Union had real weaknesses 
and problems, and I began to think of it as the incomplete superpower. 
I discussed this with O’Neill, who suggested that I join him at ANU, 
which I did in 1981. This involved resigning from my position in 
defence, and I left with the warning of the then Secretary for Defence, 
Bill Pritchett, ringing in my ears: ‘You’ll be working down the corridor 
from that Desmond Ball and we’ll be watching you, Dibb.’
I worked in the Department of International Relations in 1982 and 
then transferred to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. By this 
time, Bob had gone to run the IISS in London. He quickly arranged 
for me to agree to write a book about the USSR for the institute, which 
became The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower.2 Bob  strongly 
encouraged me in the writing task over the next three years and 
I  made several visits to Moscow and Washington. The book was 
published in 1986 by the IISS, reprinted in 1987, and a second edition 
in 1988. In  America, it was published by the University of Illinois 
Press. It caused quite a stir, particularly in the United States, and most 
especially in the American intelligence community. In 1987, I  had 
returned to defence and was Director of the JIO. In that role, I had 
a meeting in Washington with Robert Gates, who was then Deputy 
Director of the CIA. I well remember him giving me a little lecture 
about how the agency disagreed with my book and that the CIA’s view 
was that ‘the USSR was poised to outstrip the US in military power’.
I well understood that, without Bob O’Neill’s continuing 
encouragement, my book would never have been published, and 
I owe him an enormous debt for having stuck his neck out on such a 
controversial subject. This was especially the case in those days when 
the institute very much relied on its transatlantic connections with 
America. I strongly believe to this day that, without Bob’s support for 
this project, it may never have seen the light of day. Most academics 
these days have no idea of the harsh pressure that existed in the 1980s 
to conform to the US official views about the Soviet threat. All this 
was deeply seared into my mind when I was called over to the office 
of the new Secretary for Defence, Sir William Cole, who told me that 
2  Dibb, Paul (1986) The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower, Champaign: University 
of Illinois Press.
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he could not give me the job of Director JIO because of my views on 
the Soviet Union. My retaliation came a few months later when I was 
made ministerial consultant to Minister for Defence Kim Beazley to 
write the Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities.3 I remember Sir 
William saying to me, in the same office where he had rejected my 
appointment as Director JIO just a few months earlier: ‘Well, Paul, 
this is a turn up for the books.’ It was, and I made sure that Cole’s 
performance as secretary was scrutinised by the Dibb Review. I don’t 
think Bob ever realised these threats to my career were going on at 
the time, but I have never forgotten his unwavering support for the 
publication of The Incomplete Superpower.
While I am addressing the issue of Bob’s leadership of the institute, 
I would be remiss if I didn’t record that he was an outstanding manager 
of that body, and the only Australian to have ever done so. I watched 
him at the institute’s annual conferences, masterfully undertaking a 
role that was completely beyond me. Over two full days of a large 
international conference, he would be busy listening and analysing 
what the key points were, and at the end of the conference he would 
make the final address, which would draw together what invariably 
were very complex and competing ideas. That is a role that very few 
people can do, but Bob O’Neill did it with great aplomb.
Australia’s Defence Policy
As the Head of SDSC, Bob O’Neill took important steps to bolster 
the centre’s academic research into Australian defence policy. 
His  predecessor, Tom Millar, had pioneered university work in 
Australia on defence policy issues, including his book Australia’s 
Defence, which observed that ‘[s]uccessive governments have not 
been especially interested in defence as a subject’4 and his 1967 
ANU booklet Australia’s Defence Policies 1945–65.5 O’Neill himself 
had edited another early publication called The Defence of Australia: 
3  Dibb, Paul (1986) Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia.
4  Millar, T.B. (1965) Australia’s Defence, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, p. 163.
5  Millar, T.B. (1967) Australia’s Defence Policies 1945–65, Canberra: The Australian National 
University.
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Fundamental New Aspects, which was published by SDSC in 1977 
and ranks among the centre’s first publications on detailed Australian 
defence policy matters. 6
In the foreword to that publication, O’Neill observes that he had long 
wanted to organise a conference on the defence of Australia, but had 
been deterred by it being such an ambitious undertaking:
[It] would be a pioneering effort in terms of the assembly of expertise 
and the availability of relevant scholarly literature. It would also 
involve public entry into a field in which the numbers of those in 
Government service with real expertise must inevitably outweigh 
heavily the numbers of academic participants, thereby raising the 
very real question of by what right was the Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre venturing to hold such a conference.7
Bob went on to state that, ‘until approximately 1975, the Centre lacked 
the people around whom such a conference could be built’.8 He went 
on to note that, in 1974, with the establishment by Mr Lance Barnard, 
then Minister for Defence, of the two posts in the centre occupied by 
Mr Peter Hastings and Dr Desmond Ball, and Mr Ross Babbage’s arrival 
to work for a PhD on Australian defence policy, ‘the Centre now had 
a team around which a conference on the Defence of Australia could 
be built’.9 Bob proceeded to build on that remarkable team, and later 
recruited Jol Langtry as executive officer. Under Bob’s guidance until 
he left the centre in 1982 to go to London, this team was responsible 
for producing a substantial output of publications concerning defence 
policy in Australia, particularly pioneering academic work on the 
north of Australia and its central relevance to the defence of Australia 
concept. This included such books as:
• The Future of Tactical Air Power in the Defence of Australia10
• Australia’s Defence Resources: a Compendium of Data11
6  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1977) The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
7  Ibid., p. v. 
8  Ibid.
9  Ibid., pp. v–vi.
10  Ball, Desmond (ed.) (1977) The Future of Tactical Air Power in the Defence of Australia, 
Canberra: The Australian National University.
11  O’Neill, Robert, J. O. Langtry and Jolika Tie (eds) (1978) Australia’s Defence Resources: 
A Compendium of Data, Canberra: The Australian National University.
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• Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment: a Methodology for 
Planning Australia’s Defence Force Development12
• Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia13
• Options for an Australian Defence Technological Strategy14
• Rethinking Australia’s Defence15
• New Directions in Strategic Thinking16
• Strategy and Defence: Australian Essays.17
In addition to his administrative and conference management 
responsibilities and writing forewords and conclusions to various 
books, Bob O’Neill had time to write SDSC Working Papers with titles 
such as: The Defence of Continental Australia, Structural Changes for 
a More Self-reliant National Defence, and The Structure of Australia’s 
Defence Force.18 I mention this because many of the publications I cite 
above, as well as later centre publications, became important to me 
when I was writing the Dibb Review for Minister for Defence Kim 
Beazley. I probably never got around to mentioning that to Bob, but 
I do so here. When I combined the output of the centre, together with 
over a decade’s worth of hard work on defence of Australia concepts 
in the Department of Defence, they made my task immeasurably easier 
in 1985. 
12  Langtry, J. O. and Desmond Ball (eds) (1979) Controlling Australia’s Threat Environment: 
a  Methodology for Planning Australia’s Defence Force Development, Canberra: The Australian 
National University.
13  Ball, Desmond and J. O. Langtry (eds) (1980) Problems of Mobilisation in Defence of Australia, 
Canberra: Phoenix Defence Publications.
14  Gower, S. N. (1982) Options for an Australian Defence Technological Strategy, Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
15  Babbage, Ross (1980) Rethinking Australia’s Defence, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
16  O’Neill, Robert J. and D. M. Horner (eds) (1981) New Directions in Strategic Thinking, 
London: Allen & Unwin.
17  Ball, Desmond (ed.) (1982) Strategy and Defence: Australian Essays, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
18  O’Neill, Robert J. (1978) The Defence of Continental Australia, SDSC Working Paper, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University; O’Neill, 
Robert J. (1978) Structural Changes for a More Self-reliant National Defence, SDSC Working Paper, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University; O’Neill, 
Robert J. (1979) The Structure of  Australia’s Defence Force, SDSC Working Paper, Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
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Bob had the strategic perspicacity to observe in the final chapter 
of The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects: 
The acceptance by recent Australian Governments that Australia’s 
defence policy should be concerned primarily with the defence of 
Australian territory rather than that of non-communist South-east 
Asian states is perhaps the change of greatest significance. It means 
that we must conceive policies for the defence of the nation at large 
and accept prime responsibility for conducting military functions to 
carry those policies into effect … The change in posture requires that 
the services develop techniques for operating in and around Australia, 
rather than Southeast Asia — obviously creating a major task for the 
Army in particular.19 
With great foresight, he argued: ‘Primacy must be given to our 
operational doctrines to the defence of Australia.’20 He strongly 
supported ‘a nationwide, functional joint service command structure’, 
which he believed would ‘be the ultimate answer to our requirements’.21 
In this seminal work, he concluded that 
military history suggests that we have little experience on which 
to draw in the area of shaping nationwide response capacities and 
strategies. It is in this area principally that our attempt to develop 
doctrines will be most crucial. It promises to be many years before the 
intellectual challenge has gone out of the field of Australian defence 
studies.22 
As I tussled with the Dibb Review, I constantly kept this key 
intellectual guidance in my mind.
Managing SDSC: From O’Neill to Dibb 
Bob O’Neill and I were the two longest serving heads of the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre: together, we managed the centre for almost 
a quarter of a century. We both experienced the problems of running 
a small centre with inadequate finances, and we were discriminated 
against in The Australian National University’s allocation of funds 
19  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1977) The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, p. 126.
20  Ibid., p. 131.
21  Ibid., p. 134.
22  Ibid., p. 143.
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because we were a centre and not a department. However, we managed 
the centre in entirely different geopolitical circumstances. Bob’s reign 
was effectively after Australia’s commitment to the Vietnam War had 
ended, but at the height of the Cold War and the USSR’s military 
strength. My management of the centre from 1991 coincided with the 
end of the Cold War, Fukuyama’s end of world history thesis, and the 
need to retool traditional strategic studies to our own region. As I 
said in the book commemorating the 40th anniversary of the centre, 
the reorientation of the centre after the Cold War was a difficult 
transition.23 Both Bob O’Neill and his successor, Des Ball, grew the 
centre to international repute during the 1970s and 1980s. But with 
the sudden end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, the centre had to adjust rapidly to an altered international 
strategic environment and to new subjects for strategic analysis. In the 
mid-1990s, the government changed and there was a move away from 
defence ideas which the centre had played a key role in developing 
from the early 1970s. The policy focus shifted away from the defence 
of Australia to Australian expeditionary forces in the Middle East — 
which remains the case to this day.
During my tenure, ANU also experienced significant financial 
difficulties, which had a serious impact on the centre’s budget and its 
ability to fund research on important issues.24 By the late 1990s, we 
were barely a critical mass, with only five academic staff, and the future 
did not look all that promising. I say that noting Bob has expressed a 
view that, ‘I think it has been many years since any head of the Centre 
has needed to worry about whether it would be in existence in one 
or two years’ time’.25 Of course, he was right, and we did indeed turn 
the corner as SDSC entered the new century and its finances improved 
once again. Right now we have by far the largest academic staff 
numbers the centre has ever enjoyed in its 50 year history (and in the 
Hedley Bull Centre we have by far the best accommodation we have 
ever had). Moreover, we have also built on the legacy that Bob O’Neill 
left us in such areas as media appearances, giving evidence before 
23  Dibb, Paul (2006) ‘SDSC in the Nineties: A Difficult Transition‘, in Meredith Thatcher 
and Desmond Ball (eds), A National Asset: Essays Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra: The Australian National University, p. 83.
24  Ibid.
25  O’Neill, Robert (2006) ‘From Childhood to Maturity: The SDSC, 1972–1982‘, in Meredith 
Thatcher and Desmond Ball (eds), A National Asset: Essays Commemorating the 40th Anniversary 
of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra: The Australian National University, p. 55.
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parliamentary committees, massively developing our postgraduate 
and undergraduate programmes, and our teaching commitments at 
the Australian Command and Staff College at Weston Creek under the 
very competent direction of Professor Dan Marston. 
Thanks to Bob’s groundbreaking work in establishing the centre’s 
domestic and international reputation, we are the leading academic 
authority in Australia on strategic and defence problems, and we 
are a  well-recognised entity within the regional and international 
network of research institutions in the field of strategic studies, as Bob 
has pointed out.26 The centre was indeed fortunate that Bob devoted 
more than 11 years of his career to establishing SDSC’s reputation from 
such slim resources. And I am fortunate that as Director of IISS he 
was so willing to undertake the gamble of publishing my work on the 
USSR — for which I remain greatly indebted.
Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, Bob would be more than pleased to read the words 
of the then Secretary for Defence, Tony Ayers, in 1996 to the ANU 
Chancellor when I was head of the centre:
The Centre brings much credit to the University for its contribution 
to the understanding of defence matters in the Australian community 
and in our region … The Centre’s excellent reputation in the region 
has ensured continuing participation in its programs by officers 
and civilian defence planners from regional countries. This helps 
to promote a rational and disciplined approach to defence policy-
making in neighbouring countries. From the perspective of Australian 
Defence personnel development, the Centre’s courses, programs and 
publications have directly benefited Australian Defence Force officers 
and civilian staff.27
This does not mean that SDSC should only focus on practical defence 
policy issues. As I noted in the essays commemorating the 40th 
anniversary of the centre, we must continue to be well-grounded in 
academic scholarship on the security of our region and the contending 
26  Ibid., p. 58.
27  Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (1996) Annual Report, Canberra: The Australian 
National University, pp. 77–8.
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theories of strategic studies.28 These are thoughts I know Bob O’Neill 
would thoroughly endorse. But, unlike in his day and mine, the 
centre faces more competition from a proliferation of well-funded new 
research organisations in Australia, including the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, the Lowy Institute for International Policy, and the 
Institute for Regional Security (formerly the Kokoda Foundation). 
The centre does not receive such lavish private sector or government 
funding, but one of our comparative advantages continues to be 
that we operate within the university system, where there are no 
financial strings attached; we can be frank in what we say on any 
subject without fear of angering our sources of funding. And, for good 
reasons, we do not accept any funding from defence companies — 
except for some small amount of money in the past (but not now), to 
help with supporting the centre’s library.
Our other big competitive advantage is that we have the most 
experienced collection of senior academics (including seven professors) 
and former very senior military officers and defence officials (including 
a former chief of the defence force and three former deputy secretaries 
of defence) in Australia. This lends tremendous prestige to both our 
scholarly and policy-relevant research, and to our postgraduate and 
undergraduate teaching. This is an attainment of which Bob O’Neill 
should be justly proud, having brought the centre from childhood to 
maturity in his tenure from 1971 to 1982.
28  Dibb, Paul (2006) ‘SDSC in the Nineties: A Difficult Transition’, in Meredith Thatcher 
and Desmond Ball (eds), A National Asset: Essays Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the 




Robert O’Neill and the 
Australian Official War Histories: 
Policy and Diplomacy
Peter Edwards
Like the citizens of many nations around the world, Australians are 
marking the centenary of the Great War of 1914–1918. With rather 
less fanfare, Australians are also marking the centenary of the start 
of a tradition of official war histories, which have had a fundamental 
role in shaping the way that Australians have thought about the 
nation’s involvement in war since 1914. Robert O’Neill’s contribution 
to that tradition was a major turning point in the development of that 
tradition, in at least two important respects. 
When war broke out in 1914, Australia was engaged in a general 
election, which brought the Australian Labor Party back to office. 
One of its first decisions was the appointment of an official war 
correspondent. The Labor Government referred this decision to the 
relevant union, the Australian Journalists’ Association, who conducted 
a ballot. The outcome was a victory for the Sydney Morning Herald 
journalist Charles Bean over Keith Murdoch (the father of Rupert) of 
the Melbourne Herald and the Sydney Sun. When the Minister for 
Defence, Senator George F. Pearce, met Bean on 20 September 1914, 
Pearce told Bean that he should not only file newspaper reports but 
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also, after the war, write a history of Australia’s part, which would 
become ‘a permanent record for libraries, schools, and the nation 
generally’.1 
This was the origin of the 12-volume Official History of Australia 
in the War of 1914–18, of which Bean would be the general editor. 
He  would also be the author of the six volumes that form the 
backbone of the series, dealing with the Australian Imperial Force 
on the Gallipoli peninsula and on the western front in France and 
Belgium. Those volumes were based on Bean’s own notebooks, as well 
as the mountains of official records, such as the unit diaries. Bean was 
an extraordinarily dedicated and courageous reporter, who personally 
witnessed virtually every major battle in which the Australians were 
engaged, other than Fromelles.2
At this time, Australian history was practically unknown in Australian 
universities. For decades to come, it would be, at best, a small adjunct 
to British imperial history. Newspapers, by contrast, were thriving. 
Bean, born in Australia but educated at Clifton College and Oxford 
University, was an exemplar of an Anglo-Australian tradition of 
journalism that contributed serious commentary on national affairs. 
By 1914, Bean had published three books based on his own reporting.
The authors appointed to write the other volumes generally had similar 
backgrounds. As far as possible, Bean chose eyewitnesses rather than 
prominent participants, usually correspondents who had no interest 
in defending the reputations of senior officers but who knew at first 
hand what the men in the trenches (literally or metaphorically) had 
endured. Henry Gullett and F. M. Cutlack, who wrote the volumes 
on the Australian Imperial Force in Sinai, Palestine, and Syria, and 
1  Connor, John (2011) Anzac and Empire: George Foster Pearce and the Foundations 
of Australian Defence, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, p. 47.
2  Inglis, K. S. (1979) ’Bean, Charles Edwin (1879–1968)‘, Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
Vol. 7, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Available at: adb.anu.edu.au/biography/
bean-charles-edwin-5166/text8677. See also Coulthart, Ross (2014) Charles Bean, Sydney: 
HarperCollins.
63
6 . ROBERT O’NEILL AND THE AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WAR HISTORIES
the Australian Flying Corps respectively, had similar backgrounds to 
Bean, as did Thomas Heney, who was appointed to write the volume 
on the home front but died before he could complete it.3
The central theme of the 1914–1918 history, especially of Bean’s 
massively detailed volumes, was the character of the men he observed 
under the stress of war. In Bean’s view, the Australians, especially 
those from the bush, had developed the qualities they had inherited 
from their British forebears: the character of the young nation had 
undergone its greatest test and had passed with flying colours. Despite 
the vast scope of the conflict, in which hundreds of thousands of 
Australians served and more than 60,000 were to lose their lives, Bean’s 
approach depended on close attention to the individuals engaged 
in battle. The  descriptions in the narrative and the accompanying 
sketches were supported by footnotes on the individuals named, 
showing that this great citizens’ army comprised ‘a fair cross-section 
of our people … [such that] the company commander was a young 
lawyer and his second in command and most trusted mate a young 
engine driver and so on’.4
It was not an approach that took much interest in, or had much room 
for, questions of strategy, or the involvement of Australians in high 
command, or civil–military relations. The author of the volume on 
the home front, Sir Ernest Scott, did include the exploits of Prime 
Minister W. M. Hughes in London and Paris, but more in the context 
of Australian domestic politics than of anything that might be called 
Australian strategic policy.5
3  See their respective entries in the Australian Dictionary of Biography: Hill, A. J. (1983) 
‘Gullett, Sir Henry Somer (Harry) (1878–1940)‘, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 9, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Available at: adb.anu.edu.au/biography/gullett-sir-
henry-somer-harry-448/text11157; Sweeting, A. J. (1981) ‘Cutlack, Frederic Morley (1886–
1967)‘, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 8, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. 
Available at: adb.anu.edu.au/biography/cutlack-frederic-morley-5859/text9963; Stewart, 
Ken (1983) ‘Heney, Thomas William (1862–1928)‘, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol. 9, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Available at: adb.anu.edu.au/biography/heney-
thomas-william-6635/text11429.
4  Quoted in Inglis, K. S. (1979) ‘Bean, Charles Edwin (1879–1968)’, Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, Vol. 7, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Available at: adb.anu.edu.au/
biography/bean-charles-edwin-5166/text8677.
5  Scott, Ernest (1936) Australia during the War, Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 
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Bean’s volumes, with their covers (as an early reviewer pointed out) 
the colour of dried blood, achieved substantial sales. To have them 
on one’s bookshelves was an act of personal commemoration which 
complemented the nation’s great commemorative institution, the 
Australian War Memorial, in the creation of which Bean was the 
moving force.
In what they omitted almost as much as in what they recorded, 
Bean’s volumes had a major influence on how Australians thought of 
themselves and their young nation, especially its role in war. They 
helped to confirm the notion that Australia’s primary role in conflict 
was to provide expeditionary forces who would fight alongside, and 
in close coordination with, those of Britain and the other Dominions.
By the time Bean finished the last of his six volumes, the world 
was again at war. It was a mark of the respect that he and his 
history had engendered that in 1943 the War Cabinet decided, on 
the recommendation of the Australian War Memorial (and almost 
certainly at the instigation of Bean himself) to appoint an official 
historian of this second global war. The man appointed, Gavin Long, 
had a similar background to Bean, that of a well regarded journalist 
and correspondent. Long was also an eyewitness to several campaigns, 
although it was not possible for one man to cover as many of the 
Australian battlefields as Bean had.
Many of those appointed to write other volumes in what eventually 
became a 23-volume series also had a background in journalism. 
The author of the home front volumes, Paul Hasluck, had experience 
of high-level diplomacy, rare for an Australian of his time, as well as 
the academic credentials of a professor of history or political science, 
but much of his reputation in the 1940s was based on his important 
role as a journalist at the West Australian.6
Although Hasluck would later became Australia’s foreign minister, 
there was little on Australia’s international relations in his two 
volumes on The Government and the People, which were focused on 
Australia’s domestic politics. Australia’s relations with Britain and the 
United States received relatively little attention, and were discreetly 
handled. Substantial — and sometimes controversial — books on the 
6  Bolton, Geoffrey (2014) Paul Hasluck: A Life, Perth: UWA Publishing.
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high politics of war, including such matters as the relations of prime 
ministers Robert Menzies and John Curtin with Winston Churchill, or 
Curtin’s relations with Douglas MacArthur, emerged much later, from 
a new generation of academic historians.7 Gavin Long himself wrote a 
book on Douglas MacArthur, in which he expressed opinions widely 
held by Australian servicemen, but which were probably considered 
inappropriate for an official history.8 It appears that, in the 1950s and 
1960s, there was little appetite in official circles for a detailed account 
of the sometimes fraught relations between Australia and the countries 
that Menzies, in his peacetime term as prime minister from 1949 to 
1966, liked to describe as Australia’s ‘great and powerful friends’.
It was perhaps symbolic that both Bean and Long died within months 
of each other in 1968. In the 1960s, Australian history, which had 
been steadily growing in Australian universities since the 1940s, 
was now flourishing and attracting popular attention outside the 
academy. The first volumes of Manning Clark’s A History of Australia, 
published in 1962 and 1968, generated controversy, while Clark’s 
teaching helped to inspire a new generation of Australian historians.9 
The late 1960s were years of rebellion and dissent, as the postwar 
generation of baby boomers came to adulthood, with many attending 
the burgeoning universities. Having known only peace and prosperity, 
they would probably have been restive in any case, but the Vietnam 
War crystallised their discontent and focused them on questions of 
war and peace. Amid an atmosphere of widespread dissent and anti-
war demonstrations, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre was 
established at The Australian National University in 1966, the nation’s 
first major think tank on strategic policies. 
Also in Canberra, the Australian War Memorial was recovering from 
its post-1945 doldrums and undergoing a major revival in its role as 
not only a museum but also a research centre in Australian military 
history. In his last years, Gavin Long encouraged the memorial’s 
collaboration with the new public and academic interest in Australian 
military history. Long was involved in the award of the memorial’s 
7  See Horner, David (1992) High Command: Australia’s Struggle for an Independent War 
Strategy, 1939–45, Melbourne: Allen & Unwin, and a number of later works by Horner, David 
Day, Anne Henderson, and others. 
8  Gavin Long, MacArthur as Military Commander, Batsford, London, 1969.
9  McKenna, Mark (2011) An Eye for Eternity: The Life of Manning Clark, Melbourne: 
Miegunyah Press.
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first three research grants to ‘a journalist, a soldier and schoolmaster 
turned academic, and a young scholar who would become a historian 
of distinction’, an indication of the new breadth and diversity 
of background and interest in the field.10
This was the social, political and academic environment when Robert 
O’Neill was appointed in 1970 to write an official history of Australia’s 
involvement in the Korean War. In the following year, he became head 
of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the position he held until 
1982. During those 12 years he would dedicate much of his research 
and writing time to the Korean War official history. 
It is deceptively easy today to overlook the significance of O’Neill’s 
appointment. For a start, it was by no means certain that the 
government of the day would undertake an official history of Australian 
involvement in the Korean War. By 1970, it was clear that Korea was the 
first of a series of post-1945 conflicts, which differed in many respects 
from the two world wars. Korea was certainly no minor affair, but 
it was on a markedly different scale from the two world wars. As in 
1914–1918, the land war was much larger than those on the sea or 
in the air, but Australia’s contribution was made not by a vast army of 
citizens who had been recruited ‘for the duration’, but by a relatively 
small, professional army, created only in 1948. Korea was the first of 
what historians would call Australia’s ‘wars of diplomacy’,11 in which 
the initial commitment and its subsequent higher direction would be 
interwoven with an increasingly assertive foreign policy, with alliance 
management and a sharp focus on the region to Australia’s north the 
dominant elements.
To write the official history of Australia’s involvement in this new 
type of war, the government chose a new type of historian. In his 
mid-30s when appointed, Robert O’Neill had not been there as a 
journalist or war correspondent: he was a schoolboy at the time of the 
Korean War. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, who 
had served with distinction as a young officer in the Vietnam War, 
10  Stanley, Peter (2003) ‘Gavin Long and History at the Australian War Memorial’, in Jeffrey 
Grey (ed.) The Last Word?: Essays on Official History in the United States and the British 
Commonwealth, Westport, Conn.: Praeger, pp. 113–14.
11  Grey, Jeffrey (2008) A Military History of Australia, third edition, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 220, uses this term to describe the conflicts in Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam, 
but it is arguably no less applicable to Korea. 
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O’Neill had credibility with the services, but his principal qualification 
was something unknown to earlier generations of Australians — 
a  doctorate in history, which had led to scholarly publications. 
His Oxford PhD thesis, subsequently published as a book, had been 
on the relationship between the German Army and the Nazi Party.12 
In short, he had outstanding credentials in the academic study of the 
high politics and civil–military relations that lay behind a military 
commitment. O’Neill knew the importance of recording and analysing 
not only the experience of those who served, but also the high-
level decision-making that led to service personnel being placed in 
harm’s way.
During the decade and more that O’Neill spent researching and 
writing, he discovered so much important and interesting material at 
this level that he realised that there should be, not just a chapter or 
two, but an entire volume on the strategic and diplomatic aspects of 
the commitment. The War Memorial Council agreed. The projected 
single volume was divided into two, one on strategy and diplomacy, 
and the other on combat operations.
Today it is easy to overlook the innovative character of a major scholarly 
volume of Australian diplomatic and strategic history. Diplomatic 
history was a tender, young shoot in Australian universities, where 
any scholarly interest in the history of Australia’s foreign policy was 
more likely to be found in political science departments than in history 
departments. The gibe that Australia had no foreign policy other than 
slavish subservience to its powerful allies was commonly heard. Few 
works on Australia’s diplomatic history, based on substantial archival 
research, had been published. The first volumes of Documents on 
Australian Foreign Policy began to appear in the mid-1970s, the fruit 
of a program initiated by Paul Hasluck as Minister for External Affairs 
(as Foreign Affairs was then known) from 1964 to 1969. Hasluck’s long 
parliamentary career delayed the publication of the second volume of 
his contribution to the official history of Australia in the 1939–1945 
war, and he subsequently wrote several important books of memoirs. 
Even when serving in high office, he remained essentially a historian 
who believed strongly in the importance of the written record. 
12  O’Neill, Robert (1969) The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–39, London: Cassell. 
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Strategic history was even more neglected. The decade in which 
O’Neill was carrying out his research, the 1970s, was also a time 
of unprecedented scholarly discussion of Australian strategic and 
defence policy. In both academic and policy-making circles, a strong 
view was emerging that the era of forward defence was over, and 
Australia had to look to a new strategic concept, which would become 
known as ‘the self-reliant defence of Australia’. This concept and its 
implications lay at the heart of the first White Paper on Defence to be 
brought down by an Australian government, in 1976. Vigorous debate 
followed on the ramifications and implications of this doctrinal shift 
and the associated reorganisation of Australia’s defence organisation, 
implemented amid considerable controversy following a major review 
in 1974.13
The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, with O’Neill at its head, 
was central to much of this discussion. In 1976, the centre held a 
major conference on ‘The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New 
Aspects’, resulting in a publication under that title, edited by 
O’Neill, the following year.14 While the theme of this conference, 
as of so much discussion in the 1970s, was that Australian strategic 
and defence policies were moving into a new era, this environment 
clearly influenced O’Neill’s research and analysis of the conflict of 
1950–1953. If Australian strategic, defence, and foreign policies were 
about to move into a new era, it was essential that Australians should 
have a good understanding of the era that was passing. The forward 
defence era could be seen as ending with the fall of Saigon in 1975. 
Few events were more important in its initiation than the negotiation 
of the ANZUS Treaty and the commitment to the Korean War. 
O’Neill’s first volume of Australia in the Korean War 1950–53 was 
therefore fundamental to a generation of scholarship on Australian 
strategic and diplomatic history.15 It remains an indispensable account 
of the negotiation of the ANZUS Treaty, a fundamental element of 
Australian policies for decades to come, but its historiographical 
importance did not end there. O’Neill’s detailed analysis of Australia’s 
13  Edwards, Peter (2006) Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
chapters 10, 11, and 13. 
14  O’Neill, R. J. (ed.) (1977) The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University. 
15  O’Neill, Robert (1981) Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, Vol. I: Strategy and Diplomacy, 
Canberra: The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service.
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diplomatic dealings, especially with London and Washington, showed 
that Canberra did not simply knee-jerk in response to directives from 
its allies. There were difficult choices to be made. Winston Churchill’s 
peacetime government in London, for example, strongly opposed the 
idea that Australia (or New Zealand) should sign a security treaty with 
the United States to which Britain was not a party. The commitment 
to the Korean War was deliberately handled in a manner designed 
to show Washington that Canberra made its own decisions on such 
matters, independently of London. In subsequent years, Australia had 
to decide where it stood on matters where the United Kingdom and 
the United States were at odds, such as General MacArthur’s threats of 
using atomic weapons and his ‘push to the Yalu’. 
By his detailed treatment of such matters, O’Neill demonstrated 
that war histories, like wars themselves, are what would now be 
called a whole of government exercise. The service, the sacrifice, the 
experience of those wearing uniform is, of course, central to a war 
history; but so too are the decisions that send those service personnel 
into combat. The roles of the politicians, the diplomats, the civilian 
officials, and the senior military officers are all important parts of the 
story. The careful study of what they did, or failed to do, is essential 
not only to understand what actually happened, but also as the 
foundation for the study of current and future policy. O’Neill’s record 
of the work of P. C. (later Sir Percy) Spender as Minister for External 
Affairs and of young diplomats such as James (later Sir James) Plimsoll 
in Korea, for example, is a major contribution to Australia’s diplomatic 
history.
The second volume of O’Neill’s Korean War history, entitled simply 
Combat Operations, also shows the influence of a different style of 
authorship.16 As in the two world wars, the land, sea, and air theatres are 
treated in three separate parts, as Australian units of the three services 
operated alongside the sister services of allied countries rather than as 
a joint force. But in each case O’Neill devotes considerable attention 
not only to the experiences of Australian units and individuals, but 
also to some of the wider military and diplomatic issues that affected 
the operational experience. The extent to which Australian servicemen 
were able to influence the allied coalition’s tactical and operational 
16  O’Neill, Robert (1985) Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, Vol. II: Combat Operations, 
Canberra: The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service.
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approaches was an enduring theme of O’Neill’s history, as it had been 
of his own experience as the intelligence officer of a battalion serving 
in Vietnam.
The impact of O’Neill’s Korean War history on the Australian 
tradition of official war histories can be seen in the fourth series to be 
commissioned. Originally designated to cover the Malayan Emergency 
of 1948–1960 and the Vietnam War (to which Australian forces were 
committed between 1962 and 1972), it was later extended to include 
the Indonesian Confrontation of 1963–1966. It was then designated the 
Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 
1948–75. These conflicts, like others of the post-1945 era, have been 
referred to both as ‘wars of diplomacy’ and ‘wars of decolonisation’.17 
The international context and Australia’s management of both its major 
alliances and its relations with the new, post-colonial governments 
emerging in the region to Australia’s immediate north were of obvious 
importance and interest.
O’Neill was a member of the selection panel which recommended the 
appointee for this history. In light of what has been recorded above, 
it  is perhaps unsurprising that the selected historian, the present 
writer, had a background in diplomatic rather than operational history. 
I was the principal author of two volumes dealing with the political, 
strategic, and diplomatic aspects of the three conflicts, while other 
authors covered the operational and medical areas. The two strategic–
diplomatic volumes, Crises and Commitments, and A Nation at War, 
were consciously written in the tradition of O’Neill’s first Korean War 
volume.18
At the time of writing, a fifth series of Australian official war histories, 
The Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and 
Post-Cold War Operations, is in the course of publication, with David 
Horner as the official historian and general editor. The government 
has also announced that a sixth series will be commissioned, to cover 
17  See footnote 11 on wars of diplomacy in Anderson, Fay and Richard Trembath (2008) 
Witnesses to War: The History of Australian Conflict Reporting, Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Publishing. 
18  Edwards, Peter with Gregory Pemberton (1992), Crises and Commitments: The Politics and 
Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965, Sydney: Allen 
& Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial; Edwards, Peter (1997) A Nation at 
War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy During the Vietnam War 1965–1975, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial.
71
6 . ROBERT O’NEILL AND THE AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WAR HISTORIES
the commitments to East Timor, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It can be 
anticipated that diplomatic and strategic considerations will be amply 
covered in these works, perhaps more prominently in the sixth series, 
although they are likely to be integrated into the volumes dealing 
with operations rather than as stand-alone volumes on the model 
of the Korean War and Southeast Asian Conflicts series. No official 
war historian today or in the foreseeable future is likely to omit the 
strategic, diplomatic, and civil–military dimensions of a conflict, as 
had been the practice of O’Neill’s predecessors, Charles Bean and 
Gavin Long, and their respective colleagues.
The appointment of Robert O’Neill as the official historian of Australia’s 
involvement in the Korean War, and the way in which he carried out 
that task, marked a major turning point, not only in the tradition of 
Australian official war histories, but also in Australian strategic and 
diplomatic historiography. He was the first of the Australian official 
war historians to have academic qualifications of a high order, whereas 
his predecessors had typically been distinguished journalists and 
war correspondents. Secondly, he pioneered the coverage in official 
histories of the strategic and diplomatic policy-making that led 
Australian forces to be involved in conflicts, with the same precision 
and authority as had always been given to the experience of those 
forces. From the vantage point of the second decade of the twenty-first 
century, it would be easy to overlook the full significance of O’Neill’s 
contribution to an important element in Australians’ understanding of 




The Evolution of Australian 
Official War Histories
David Horner
Robert O’Neill was the third of Australia’s six official war historians, 
and directly or indirectly had a major influence on at least four of 
the official history series — his own and the three succeeding official 
histories. When O’Neill was appointed official historian for the Korean 
War in 1969, Australia had already had two official historians — 
Charles Bean and Gavin Long. O’Neill would need to draw on the 
experiences of his two successors, but also make his own decisions 
about what was needed for this new history. The two previous official 
histories provided much guidance.
The first official historian, Charles Bean, was general editor and 
principal author of the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–
1918, published between 1921 and 1942 in 15 volumes. This official 
history set the benchmark for later Australian official histories. Bean 
believed that his history had at least six objectives. First, it was largely 
a memorial to the men who had served and died. Second, he needed 
to record in detail what the Australians had done, in the belief that 
no other nation would do so. Third, the narrative needed to provide 
sufficient evidence to sustain the arguments presented in it. Fourth, as 
the war had been ‘a plain trial of national character, it was necessary 
to show how the Australian citizen reacted to it’. This meant that Bean 
needed to bring to life the experiences of the men in the front line. 
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Fifth, Bean hoped that his history might ‘furnish a fund of information 
from which military and other students, if they desired, could draw’. 
Finally, if possible, he wanted to tell the story from the Turkish and 
German sides as well as Australia’s.1
By comparison with previous European official histories, Bean’s 
history was unique in that it gave equal weight to the experiences of 
the soldiers and the decisions of commanders, and did not consciously 
try to draw lessons for future officers and commanders. The First 
World War series consisted of seven volumes on army operations, one 
each on the navy, the flying corps, the campaign in New Guinea, and 
the home front, as well as a photographic record. Bean wrote six of 
the army volumes. Only one, the home front volume, was written by 
a university-based historian. Three medical volumes were initiated 
some years later and were brought under Bean’s general editorship. 
There was little coverage of higher strategic issues, partly because the 
Australian Government was only marginally involved in them.
Bean’s history established an expectation that there would be a similar 
series for the Second World War, and he was instrumental in initiating 
it. On his recommendation, in March 1943 the government appointed 
Gavin Long as official historian for the Second World War. Following 
Bean’s lead, Long travelled through the Southwest Pacific conducting 
interviews with officers and soldiers, and recording them in 134 diaries 
and notebooks. The Second World War official history, Australia 
in the War of 1939–1945, published between 1952 and 1977, consisted 
of 22 volumes, including seven on the army, two on the navy, four 
on the air force, two on the government and the people, two on the 
economy, and one on science and industry. Long wrote three of the 
army volumes, and 13 other authors wrote the remaining 19 volumes. 
Only the economic and science and industry volumes were written by 
university-based historians. As Bill Sweeting (one of Long’s research 
assistants) wrote: ‘It was the largest historical project ever undertaken 
in Australia.’2
1  Bean, C. E. W. (1961) Anzac to Amiens, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, p. viii.
2  Sweeting, A. J. (2000) ‘Long, Gavin Merrick (1901–1968)‘, Australian Dictionary 
of Biography, Vol. 157, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. Available at: adb.anu.edu.au/
biography/long-gavin-merrick-10856/text19269.
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While Bean continues to receive recognition for his achievement, 
with the publication of four biographies and discussion in numerous 
books and articles, Long has received less recognition. But his work 
was equally as impressive. His own accounts brought the experience 
of individuals alive in the same manner as Bean, and he raised 
contentious issues that set the agenda for further research, such as 
command problems and whether the final campaigns were necessary.3
The treatment of the home front was groundbreaking research. 
Australia’s involvement in the Second World War was more complex 
than in the First World War. Australia’s role as part of a larger 
allied coalition needed to be described, and the political story was 
fundamental to the history. To a greater extent than Bean, Long faced 
the problem of dealing with intelligence sources, but it is possible that 
he was never informed about the breaking of the German and Japanese 
codes, which only started to be revealed in the 1970s. Further, while 
the Secretary of the Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden, 
who had been secretary of the War Cabinet, provided Long with 
whatever documents he requested, he did not offer Long documents 
that Long did not know existed. Although Long had originally planned 
a separate volume on general defence policy, this did not eventuate. 
No doubt Shedden hoped that his own history of Australian defence 
policy, written after he retired, would fill this gap, but it did not prove 
suitable for publication.4 
Following the precedent of Bean’s history, the government undertook 
to provide Long with ‘reasonable access to official records’, and decided 
that ‘the exercise of censorship by the Government is to be limited to 
the preservation of disclosure of technical secrets of the three services 
which it is necessary to preserve in the post-war period’. Long 
acknowledged that while he and his colleagues had been given access 
to official papers, they were ‘conscious of the special responsibilities 
which rest upon writers of a national history’.5 These were to become 
the guiding principles for the later official histories.
3  See Long, Gavin (1963) The Final Campaigns, Canberra: Australian War Memorial.
4  Horner, David (2000) Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian 
Defence Policy, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, chapter 15.
5  Long, Gavin (1952) To Benghazi, Canberra: Australian War Memorial, pp. x, xi.
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In the decades after the Second World War, the idea of writing official 
histories of Australia’s involvement in the Korean War, the Malayan 
Emergency, Confrontation, and the Vietnam War languished. The First 
and Second World Wars had been great national endeavours involving 
hundreds of thousands of citizens. By contrast, the Korean War and 
the Malayan Emergency were fought by regular servicemen, and the 
nation at large was not closely involved. In the Vietnam War, the 
regulars were supplemented by national servicemen. The contentious 
nature of the war meant that there was no immediate call for an official 
history.
Robert O’Neill played a key role in reviving the idea of writing official 
histories of these more recent conflicts. As a teenager, he had become 
interested in the official histories of the two world wars. He graduated 
from the Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon, in 1958 and from 
1961, as a Rhodes Scholar, he was a graduate student at the University 
of Oxford. His supervisor, Norman Gibbs, the Chichele Professor of the 
History of War, was then working on a volume of the British official 
history of the Second World War. O’Neill met Michael Howard, who 
would also write a volume in the British official history. (Both Howard 
and O’Neill would later become Chichele Professor of the History 
of War.) O’Neill also met Brian Melland, of the Historical Section 
of the British Cabinet Office, and Noble Frankland, the author of a 
volume of the British official history and the Director of the Imperial 
War Museum. O’Neill had close contact with Sir Basil Liddell Hart, a 
professed critic of official histories, based on his own experience of the 
First World War, and the published volumes on that war.
O’Neill returned to Australia in 1966 and served with the 5th Battalion, 
Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR) in South Vietnam in 1966–1967. 
In  1966, his PhD thesis at Oxford was published as The German 
Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939,6 and the success of this book 
encouraged him to write a book about his battalion’s experiences in 
Vietnam. The result was Vietnam Task, published in 1968.7
6  O’Neill, Robert (1966) The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939, London: Cassell.
7  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task: The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, 
1966–67, Sydney: Cassell.
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After Vietnam, O’Neill went to the RMC Duntroon as a lecturer, where 
the History Department of the Faculty of Military Studies was headed 
by Professor L. C. F. (Len) Turner, who had been joint author of three 
volumes of the South African official history of the Second World 
War. (As a cadet at Duntroon at this time, I was taught by Turner and 
O’Neill.) Turner and O’Neill agreed that work needed to start on official 
histories of Australia’s more recent conflicts, and chronologically, the 
first one was the Korean War. In the meantime, the Army’s Director of 
Infantry, Colonel David Thomson, had persuaded O’Neill to begin a 
history of the Royal Australian Regiment.
While in Britain in the early 1960s, O’Neill had met Air Vice-
Marshal Geoff Hartnell, who was at Australia House and on the Board 
of  Trustees of the Imperial War Museum. By 1969, Hartnell was 
a member of the Council of the Australian War Memorial and he took 
up the case for the official history of the Korean War. The Memorial 
Council and Director Bill Lancaster successfully sought funds for 
a Korean War history, and O’Neill and Turner were asked to accept the 
task. Turner withdrew, but O’Neill agreed to continue the task alone 
and was officially appointed in December 1969. He stopped work on 
the history of the Royal Australian Regiment. Eighteen years later, the 
then director of infantry asked me to write the history of the Royal 
Australian Regiment. I enlisted other authors to assist and the book, 
Duty First, was duly published in 1990.8 Early parts of the book were 
based on an unpublished manuscript, ‘History of the Royal Australian 
Regiment, 1945–1950’, written by O’Neill in 1969.
O’Neill had already accepted an appointment in the Department of 
International Relations at The Australian National University. Once he 
arrived in early 1970, he found that Dr Tom Millar was stepping down 
as Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) to become 
Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. The Head 
of International Relations, Professor Hedley Bull, asked O’Neill to take 
over as Head of SDSC. O’Neill then started work on two major tasks, 
headship of SDSC, and the official history of the Korean War.
8  Horner, David (ed.) (1990) Duty First: the Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace, 
North Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
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In anticipation of the appointment of an official historian for the 
Vietnam War, O’Neill also began to agitate for work to begin on 
collecting historical material. This yielded results, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Robin Morison was sent to Vietnam in charge of record 
making and gathering. O’Neill visited him there in 1971 to give a little 
guidance on what would be most valuable for a war historian. O’Neill 
advised the army to set up an oral history project, and over the next 
two years Morison interviewed more than a score of senior officers 
who had served in Vietnam. Morison was joined in this endeavour by 
Major Ian McNeill, who would later write one and part of another of 
the combat volumes of the Vietnam War official history. 
Because the Korean War history was being undertaken on a shoestring 
budget, O’Neill had to proceed alone, although after a few years he 
was joined by a research officer, Darryl McIntyre. O’Neill worked on 
the official history at the Australian War Memorial or government 
offices (where he researched external affairs and defence files) during 
the morning and ran SDSC in the afternoon. Later, on study leave 
in Britain, he worked in the Imperial War Museum and the British 
Ministry of Defence, where he researched British documents, including 
the war diaries of British formations of which the Australian battalions 
were part (and which were not available in Australia).
Bean and Long had first-hand experience of many operations. O’Neill 
had not served in the Korean War, but had operational service in 
Vietnam. Unlike Bean and Long, however, O’Neill had a PhD in history 
and had written books on military history before he was appointed. 
Coming to the task some 20 years after the Korean War and having 
no personal experience of the war, O’Neill drew on his training as 
an academic historian. Clearly, he needed to research the files of the 
various Australian Government departments and also those of the 
United Kingdom, but to supplement the information in the files he 
sought to interview the participants. He was assisted by two former 
secretaries to the Department of External Affairs, Sir James Plimsoll 
and Sir Alan Watt, and especially by the former Minister for External 
Affairs, Sir Percy Spender, who played the key role in committing 
Australian troops to the Korean War and in bringing the ANZUS 
Treaty to fruition.
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As he researched these files, O’Neill realised that the diplomatic 
and strategic aspects were the most important part of the story. 
He observed that ‘there was very little interaction between Australian 
strategic policy and the combat operations of Australian forces in the 
Korean war’, and hence any ‘attempt to produce an integrated history, 
treating Australian policy development and Australian military 
operations as part of a continuous pattern of related activity, would 
have been highly artificial’.9 As a consequence, the first volume of 
Australia in the Korean War 1950–1953, published in 1981, dealt with 
strategy and diplomacy, and the second volume, published in 1985, 
covered combat operations of the three services.
Volume II was divided into four parts — the land, air wars, sea wars, 
and a final part on prisoners, medical aspects, and post-armistice 
operations. It maintained the tradition of telling the story from the 
soldiers’ perspective. As a former army officer who had seen active 
service of his own, O’Neill understood army operations, but he also 
needed to comprehend naval and air operations for those sections of 
his history. Bean had left the writing of the naval and flying corps 
volumes to other authors, just as Long had left the naval and air force 
volumes to those with specialist knowledge. While commanders’ 
diaries and reports of proceedings were vital sources, O’Neill conducted 
interviews or sought advice from more than 70 participants. 
The official history was an outstanding achievement, which not 
only upheld the very high standards of its predecessors, but set new 
standards. For example, the Korean War official history had a detailed 
bibliography and footnotes to documents, which had not generally 
been the case in the earlier official histories. It was important to put 
the experience of the servicemen on record, and in this respect the 
history has become the key source for information on the Australian 
operations — just as the Bean and Long histories have been the 
starting point for future research. But beyond this, the history was a 
major advance in the historiography of Australian diplomacy during 
a time when Australia was developing its own foreign policy. Volume 
I is still the most authoritative account of the establishment of the 
ANZUS alliance. 
9  O‘Neill, Robert (1981) Australia in the Korean War 1950–1953, Vol. I: Strategy and 
Diplomacy, Canberra: The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing 
Service, p. xv.
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Most importantly, the Korean War history revived the concept of 
official histories in a modern setting. It provided a bridge between 
the official histories of the world wars and those of Southeast Asian 
conflicts and beyond. Like the world wars, the Korean War history 
dealt with only one war. But, like subsequent series, the Korean War 
history showed that the political and diplomatic history was just as 
important as recounting what happened on the battlefield.
I received my first glimpse of the challenges of writing an official 
history when O’Neill supervised my master’s thesis from 1974–1975, 
and my PhD thesis from 1978–1980 (the latter undertaken at ANU). 
After Duntroon, I had served as an infantry officer in Vietnam, and 
during those periods of postgraduate study I was still serving in the 
Australian Army. At that time, O’Neill was working on his official 
history. He discussed some of the challenges and at one stage asked 
me to read the army sections of Volume II. I am not sure that I had 
any useful comment to make at that point of my development as a 
historian. My interest in official histories was sparked, however, when 
I found that Gavin Long’s plan to write a volume on strategic and 
defence policy had not been fulfilled, and that he had not been given 
full access to the papers of Sir Frederick Shedden. I determined that 
my PhD thesis on Australian strategic policy-making in the Second 
World War, for which I had access to the Shedden papers, would try 
to fill this gap in the Australian official history. It was published in 
1982 as High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939–1945.10 
My time working with O’Neill helped shape my approach when I later 
became an official historian.
In 1982, Dr Peter Edwards was appointed official historian for the 
Vietnam War, 10 years after the last combat troops withdrew. O’Neill 
was not directly involved in persuading the government to approve the 
history, but he was a member of the selection committee for the official 
historian and provided guidance. The Official History of Australia’s 
Involvement in Southeast Asia Conflicts 1948–1972, marked a further 
step in the development of Australian official histories. Edwards, 
like O’Neill, was a Rhodes Scholar. He had a PhD in history and had 
written or edited books on Australian diplomatic history; but he had 
no military service and had not visited Vietnam during the Vietnam 
10  Horner, David (1982) High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939–1945, Canberra: 
Australian War Memorial.
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War. This was not, however, an impediment to producing a thorough 
history, as he concentrated on strategy, diplomacy, and politics. 
Of his other six principal authors, only Ian McNeill had served in the 
Vietnam War, but all had university training as historians.
Edwards confirmed the model set by O’Neill in emphasising the 
importance of strategy and diplomacy. His history covered three 
conflicts — the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), Confrontation 
(1963–1966), and the Vietnam War (1972–1975) — and his first 
volume on politics and diplomacy dealt with the background to the 
deployments in these conflicts. As with the earlier official histories, 
the Vietnam series dealt separately with the three services in Vietnam. 
The series ran to nine volumes, two on politics and diplomacy, one 
on the Emergency and Confrontation, three on land operations in 
Vietnam, one on air operations in Vietnam, one on naval operations 
in the Southeast Asia region, and one on medical aspects.
Both the O’Neill and Edwards histories suffered from the parsimony 
of governments. Edwards received no direct funding for several of his 
authors, so he persuaded two authors to write volumes as part of their 
university research projects, and the author of the RAAF volume was 
funded by the RAAF. The result was that although the first volume, 
Crises and Commitments, was published in 1992, 10 years after the 
beginning of the project, the last volume, Fighting to the Finish, 
did not appear until 2012, more than 40 years after the last combat 
troops withdrew from Vietnam. By this time, the youngest men who 
served in Vietnam were in their 60s. There was one advantage in this. 
The author, Ashley Ekins, was able to make use of recently available 
Viet Cong histories, deal with the arguments in other books, and tie 
up loose ends. But a long-delayed history should not be a model for 
the future. The series was deeply researched, measured in judgments, 
respectful of the achievement of the Australian service people, and 
superbly presented.
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Successive official historians have sought to persuade governments 
to initiate new histories. Edwards tried to persuade the government 
to  initiate an official history of Australian peacekeeping operations, 
but in 1992 the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs declined to support 
a history while the Vietnam official history was uncompleted.11
As the Vietnam official histories started to appear, some historians 
questioned whether official histories had outlived their usefulness. 
For example, in 1994, the academic historian John Murphy argued 
that Edwards failed to provide a full portrait of Australian society and 
politics, and that his series consisted of books that were divided into 
specialist sub-disciplines of diplomatic and military history. Murphy 
concluded:
Bean and Long were both journalists, writing for a wider audience; 
McNeill and Edwards are writing within more specialised discourses. 
In these senses the tradition of official history seems problematic 
and near to exhaustion. Where before it meant an attempt to explain 
the social experience of war, it has been diverted into the scholarly 
study of war as seen from the commanding heights of the cabinet, 
bureaucracy and armed forces.12
Glen St J. Barclay of the University of Queensland made a similar 
criticism. He acknowledged that the official historians of both world 
wars ‘set a magnificent standard’, but asserted that ‘it could not be 
sustained’. It was possible, he said, ‘to write exclusively and in vast 
detail about Australia’s involvement in the two World Wars because 
Australians had played a significant part in their own right in many 
campaigns in both conflicts’, but, he added, ‘it would not be possible 
to write exclusively about Australian involvement in conflicts in which 
Australian units operated as marginal elements in a vast largely Allied 
operation’ without producing an account for which the audience 
‘would certainly be prone to miss the point’. Thus, while  O’Neill’s 
11  In 1991, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade recommended 
that the Vietnam official historian be commissioned to write the history of Australian 
peacekeeping.
12  Murphy, John (1994) ‘The New Official History’, Australian Historical Studies 26(102), 
pp. 123–4.
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volume Strategy and Diplomacy had been an ‘unqualified success’, 
his  second volume, Combat Operations, although well done, was 
‘precisely a regimental history’ which omitted the larger picture.13 
The argument that Bean and Long were trying primarily to explain 
the social experience of war is hard to sustain, given their detailed 
treatment of operations. It seems that Murphy and Barclay were 
arguing that O’Neill and Edwards failed because they did not exactly 
follow, or more generally because it was no longer possible to follow, 
the model of previous histories. Did that mean that the concept of 
official histories had outlived their usefulness? Or could it be that 
there were new models with their own utility?
This was one of the questions I needed to deal with in 2002 when 
the Australian War Memorial engaged me to conduct a study into the 
feasibility of an official history of Australian peacekeeping. By that 
time I had retired from the Australian Army and was working in SDSC 
at ANU. As part of my feasibility study, I sought advice from both 
O’Neill and Edwards.
The arguments in favour of a new official history seemed persuasive. 
Despite the relatively few casualties — in all less than a dozen deaths 
— the operations were often extremely arduous and dangerous, 
and the absence of heavy casualties could be attributed about 
equally to excellent planning and training, and plain luck. Further, 
while Australia suffered few casualties, the conflicts involved very 
large numbers of deaths, including some of the great tragedies of 
the twentieth century. For example, hundreds of thousands were 
killed in Rwanda. The psychological impact on the Australians was 
considerable and many peacekeepers had been diagnosed with post-
traumatic stress disorder.
The nature of Australian military operations had changed. We  are 
unlikely to again see operations on a scale of the world wars. 
The operations in recent years, however, had played a large part in 
defining Australia’s place in the world, and were similar to those that 
were likely to occur in the future. More broadly, Australia had shown 
that it was a good international citizen, and decisions had not been 
13  Barclay, Glen St John (1995) ‘Australian Historians and the Study of War, 1975–88’, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 41, pp. 240–53.
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taken lightly. For example, there was probably more government 
consideration given to Australia’s commitments to Somalia and 
Cambodia than was given to Australia entering the First World War. 
Many operations required complicated defence planning. An official 
history would need to discuss the reasons for the conflicts and the 
background to Australia’s involvement. On a more personal level, the 
men and women of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had become 
widely admired for their professionalism, reliability, and compassion. 
They had been truly representing Australia abroad. The history 
would therefore need to describe the activities of the Australians in 
the operations, even when relatively small numbers were deployed.
We now live in a society in which people demand more recognition 
than in the past. Service people expect medals and compensation 
for injuries. They feel that they too deserve to be treated as Anzacs. 
The feeling among veterans that service in peacekeeping operations 
was special and had not been recognised sufficiently was illustrated 
by the formation of the Australian Peacekeeping and Peacemakers 
Association in October 1997.
An official history of peacekeeping would face some intellectual 
challenges. By contrast with the first four series, the fifth series would 
need to deal with at least 50 missions in about 27 conflicts (as was 
the case when I did the feasibility study in 2002), many taking place 
at about the same time in a wide range of geographic areas. The fifth 
series would cover a period of more than 60 years — from 1947 to 
2006 — and the authors would need to comprehend the domestic and 
international political environments across this entire period.
One obvious difference was that the first four series dealt with wars 
in which Australia was a participant. Within the bounds of proper 
scholarship, these could be partisan histories. To my knowledge, no-
one suggested that Gavin Long and his authors should go easy on 
describing instances of Japanese barbarism because to do so might 
offend the Japanese. By contrast, the fifth series needed to deal, 
to a large extent, with missions in which the Australians were not 
protagonists in the conflict, but stood between the protagonists. Often 
Australia tried to maintain good relations with both sides of a conflict. 
How was the history to deal with situations in which Australian 
peacekeepers might have reported on the poor behaviour of one of 
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the sides? In a similar vein, all the Australian deployments had been 
part of a multinational force, often composed of strange bed-fellows. 
Should we report on the unsatisfactory conduct of our allies?
One key question to be addressed was whether Australia’s 
contributions actually made a difference. This question was never 
explicitly examined in the previous official histories, although they 
provide sufficient evidence for readers to draw their own conclusions. 
What difference did the Australians make by their presence in, say, the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in the Middle East? 
What was the value of Australia’s contribution in Western Sahara, 
where the deadlock continues to the present day, even though the 
Australians withdrew more than two decades ago? And if the value of 
Australia’s contribution was qualitative, rather than quantitative, who 
is able to make the judgement? Do we rely on the Australian troops’ 
estimation of their own worth?
The first four official histories series described conflicts within 
particular paradigms for the use of force. These paradigms have 
undergone significant changes. The strategic environment since the 
end of the Cold War has seen the emergence of forms of warfare whose 
characteristics include ethnic conflict within countries; the influence 
of international media; the Revolution in Military Affairs and the 
development of network-centric warfare; the use of the precision 
strike; the use of special forces rather than large-scale deployments; 
the campaign against international terrorism; the increasing 
importance of operations other than war; the increasing importance of 
joint and coalition operations; the increasing role of non-government 
organisations (NGOs); and the deployment of women on operations. 
These characteristics were not present in the conflicts described in the 
earlier official histories.
In addition, there were special characteristics of peacekeeping that 
needed explanation, including the problems caused by restrictive 
rules of engagement, with soldiers being required to observe atrocities 
but not being permitted to intervene; the command and management 
problems of operating under United Nations rather than national 
control; the problem of ‘mission creep’ — for example, a humanitarian 
operation that might turn into a peace enforcement operation; 
the political sensitivity of many operations, with the government 
wishing to retain good relations with the protagonists; the problems 
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of operating as part of a coalition that might include countries with 
entirely different political and military cultures; situations in which 
almost every action has political ramifications; and the involvement 
of many agencies, including other UN agencies and NGOs. These 
considerations meant that the old models of the official histories were 
no longer appropriate. A new and innovative approach would be 
needed for a modern official history.
The Australian War Memorial accepted my feasibility study, and 
in March 2004 I was appointed official historian. But government 
parsimony reached an all time high. No government money was 
specifically allocated for the project. The Director of the Australian 
War Memorial, Major General Steve Gower, and I cobbled together 
funds from various sources — the Australian War Memorial (from 
its operating budget), the Department of Defence, ANU, and the 
Australian Research Council — to allow the project to begin. I was 
able to engage authors and research assistants, but for only a limited 
period. As with the Vietnam history, all the authors had university 
training as historians. Dr Bob Breen had been a Regular Army 
officer and had spent considerable time visiting Australian forces 
on various operational deployments. Two other authors had Army 
Reserve service. The final Official History of Australian Peacekeeping, 
Humanitarian and Post-Cold War Operations consisted of:
• Volume I: The Long Search for Peace: Observer Missions and Beyond: 
1947–2006 
• Volume II: Australia and the ‘New World Order’: From Peacekeeping 
to Peace Enforcement: 1988–1991
• Volume III: The Good International Citizen: Australian Peacekeeping 
in Asia, Africa and Europe, 1991–1993
• Volume IV: The Limits of Peacekeeping: Australian Missions in 
Africa and the Americas: 1992–2006
• Volume V: The Good Neighbour: Australian Peace Support Operations 
in the Pacific Islands, 1980–2006
• Volume VI: In Their Time of Need: Australia’s Overseas Emergency 
Relief Operations, 1918–2006. 
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At the time of writing (December 2015), Volumes II and III had been 
published, Volume V was with the publisher, Volume VI was being 
cleared by government departments, and it was hoped that final drafts 
of Volumes I and IV would be completed by 31 March 2016.
This structure revealed substantial differences from earlier series. 
The government’s policy considerations for each mission were included 
as part of the story of each mission, although each volume also had 
several chapters discussing the government’s general approach to 
peacekeeping. There was no separate treatment of the different services. 
Some missions were conducted by mainly army or naval units, but in 
general the ADF now deployed in joint service task groups. There was 
no medical volume or section. Medical units deployed to northern 
Iraq and Rwanda, but they were covered in the same manner as other 
missions — i.e. as part of the general peacekeeping story. There were, 
however, appendices on post-traumatic stress disorder and Gulf War 
syndrome. It might be noted that the Australian operations in East 
Timor which began in 1999 were not included in this series, no doubt 
because of government sensitivities about offending Indonesia. I tried 
to have East Timor included in the series but was unsuccessful.
By the time I was appointed official historian in 2004, I had become 
convinced that work needed to begin on another official history, 
covering Australian military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC on 
11 September 2001, the ADF sent troops into Afghanistan in October 
2001. The troops departed in 2002, but returned to Afghanistan in 
2005 and served there until 2014 when the commitment formally ended 
(although some troops remained). In 2003, Australia joined with the 
United States and the United Kingdom in taking part in the invasion 
of Iraq. Most of the Australian force withdrew soon after the initial 
campaign, but forces returned to Iraq in 2005 and remained there 
until 2009. Due to the political sensitivity of many of the operations, 
the Australian public, and indeed the troops themselves, had no idea 
what operations had actually been conducted, or why.
After agitating for many years, in 2011 I persuaded the Australian 
War Memorial to commission a feasibility study into an official 
history of Iraq and Afghanistan. I undertook the study in 2012 and 
concluded that  an official history could be justified on three broad 
grounds. First, the experience of past official histories re-affirmed the 
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requirement for detailed, authoritative accounts of Australia’s military 
operations — a need strengthened by the increasing importance 
of policy issues and the requirement to provide authority for 
compensation and pension benefits. There was a public expectation 
that Australia’s official history tradition would continue. Second, 
the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, involving perhaps 30,000 
Australians over 10 years, had clearly been of sufficient magnitude and 
complexity to warrant an official history. Third, because of restrictions 
on Australian journalists, the history of these activities had not been 
covered adequately in existing works.
There were compelling reasons why an official history should begin as 
soon as practicable. The operations had been running for more than a 
decade, casualties had been mounting and the Australian public had 
a right to know how and why the operations had been conducted. 
The ADF personnel who served there deserved to have their stories 
told. The operations were complex and long-running, and as each year 
passed it would become increasingly difficult to locate the information 
necessary to write an authoritative history. Most records in government 
departments are now held digitally, and there are particular problems 
in accessing highly classified records on digital systems.
Several reasons were advanced as to why such a history should not 
be written at that time. Some people argued that sufficient time 
needed to pass before past events could be seen in proper historical 
context. Yet  previous governments had approved research for the 
official histories of the First and Second World Wars to begin during 
those wars. If an official history of Iraq and Afghanistan were to be 
authorised in 2013, the events of 2001–2002 would likely be covered 
in the first volume of the history. This volume would be published at 
the earliest in 2020 — some 18 years after the events concluded.
Certain officials argued that the events surrounding the operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan were too sensitive, and might still be sensitive 
in 20 years’ time. Australian operations were conducted as part of an 
allied coalition and it would be too difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
reveal the negotiations with Australia’s coalition partners. More so 
than in the past, recent operations have been driven by intelligence; 
the sources and nature of this intelligence should remain secret. 
If an official history were to be approved there might be problems in 
clearing it for publication. Indeed, the experience of the peacekeeping 
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official history showed that government departments were likely to 
try to censor the history, notwithstanding the cabinet minute stating 
that there was to be no censorship. Although we now live in an era 
of greater government transparency, governments have become even 
more determined to keep their decision-making considerations secret. 
The Council of the Memorial agreed that a history was feasible and 
should begin as soon as possible, but attempts to obtain government 
approval were delayed by two changes of government during 2013 — 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard was replaced by Kevin Rudd in mid-2013 
and in turn he was defeated in a general election by the Coalition, 
led by Tony Abbott. In April 2015 the Abbott Government approved 
and agreed to fund the official history of Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
added funding for a volume on East Timor. At the time of writing, 
the  government had not announced the new official historian. 
The new official history will be a major undertaking — one which 
will bring about a further evolution in the nature of Australian official 
histories.
Robert O’Neill had no direct influence over the official history of 
Iraq and Afghanistan. But there was considerable indirect influence. 
His agitation in 1969 had led to the Australian War Memorial Council 
taking the key role in presenting the case to the government, and that 
approach from the council has persisted through to the present time, 
leading to the Vietnam, peacekeeping and Iraq/Afghanistan official 
history series. As O’Neill’s student, I was strongly influenced by his 
approach to official histories and historical scholarship in general. 
I was able to use that knowledge and experience not only as official 
historian of peacekeeping, but also in setting the ground work for 
the Iraq/Afghanistan series. Robert O’Neill has made an outstanding 
contribution to scholarship and public debate in the field of strategic 
studies (as discussed in other chapters). His major contribution 
in keeping Australian official histories alive, contributing to their 




The Postwar Evolution of the 
Field of Strategic Studies: 
Robert O’Neill in Context
Catherine McArdle Kelleher
Introduction
This chapter views the postwar evolution of strategic studies as an 
academic field to illuminate the intellectual and organisational context 
of Bob O’Neill’s scholarly achievements and organising adventures. 
Bob has been deeply involved in this evolution for over five decades, 
and has enjoyed a truly global view. Quite apart from his own research, 
he has been a significant animateur of research and teaching, with an 
amazing record of attracting and supporting students and colleagues, 
women as well as men, in Australia, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and throughout Asia. Bob is also renowned as the builder and 
organiser of multiple collaborative efforts and numerous institutions 
across disciplines and across continents. It has been a remarkable 
career, but all the more remarkable for the far reaching lessons he has 
drawn, the wise counsel he has given, and the sense of integrity that 
Bob has made the standard for judgment and analysis. 
I — and a number of others in this volume — have had the distinct 
pleasure of being along on the journey at different times and in 
different places. The context in which he has operated has too often 
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been forgotten; he has led or fought many of the critical battles in 
postwar strategic studies, always with the same calm and vision. 
Presenting the evolutionary timeline of the field will time his career, 
detailed in other essays in appropriate measure.
I apologise that what I present here is far too much of an American 
view to do Bob’s career justice. It is also a personal view based on 
experiences that sometimes, but not always, have paralleled his. I hope 
thereby to challenge him to present his version and to write about 
the rest of the story as he sees it. It has not always been a smooth or a 
supportive context, especially given his advocacy for a more open and 
inclusive field, and his embracement of diversity, with emphasis on a 
more than a ‘Europe first’ or ‘great powers’ approach to strategy, and 
arguing for a greater transparency where possible. But for him, it has 
always been a journey of seizing and creating new opportunities, with 
enthusiastic appreciation of the farthest shore ahead. I suspect, too, 
that it has never been dull.
The Focus of Strategic Studies in the 
Postwar Period
Writings in the last decades have usually portrayed strategic studies as 
a child of the 1950s, driven by the almost unimaginable consequences 
of the nuclear revolution, and glowing most brightly in the risks and 
successes of the Cold War. In reality, the neat symmetric package of 
history and ideals is only part of a much longer history.1 Beginning 
in the 1920s and 1930s, the building of strategic studies parallels the 
harnessing of technology, and the recruitment of the best and the 
brightest in the natural sciences to the preservation of the state and 
its interests. It was supported by many of the dominant American 
foundations and Anglo-Saxon scientific societies, those who had 
earlier transformed science and its advancement into a public good 
and a public goal. It was thus largely developed in an Anglo-Saxon 
1  The classic postwar analysis through early Vietnam is Hedley Bull’s masterly (1968) 
‘Strategic Studies and its Critics’, World Politics 20(4), pp. 593–605, extended by Betts, Richard 
(1997) ‘Should Strategic Studies Survive?’, World Politics 50(1), pp. 7–33, and from a different 
perspective Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen (2009) The Evolution of International Security Studies, 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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context, with legacy contributions from Britain, the United States, 
and the Commonwealth countries, all pursuing particular variants 
reflective of their own new or re-drawn roles in the Cold War and after.
Community members themselves differ on the significance of the 
contributions made and the range of the policy successes scored. Is it 
just nuclear policy or a wider domain on the use of any kind of force 
— the state’s natural monopoly — to preserve the state? Is there more 
than a practical limit to how close to government policy one needs to 
be or should be? What are legitimate cost–benefit comparisons for 
social scientists and historians? The long shadow of Vietnam and its 
ideological battles alone highlights the critical and recurring divides 
and debates that have occurred and re-occurred.2
Most scholars agree on a core of tasks and principles, basically a set of 
democratic convictions and optimism about the role of social scientific 
contributions to policy, that has set them apart from continental or 
Asian practices and aspirations.3 The key tenets presented here are in 
their most abstract form:
1. Security writ large is not just the province of the professional 
military but of informed, engaged citizens. It is not just for 
a Cincinnatus who comes to the rescue and then returns to his 
field. In democratic states in particular, it is the responsibility of 
every citizen, and for those who can, it is a right and honourable 
profession. Required is the citizen soldier, the public service 
official, the committed educator, and the impartial policy scientist 
who must take on the task of advisor and critic.
2. Knowledge that is gained or created in the social and behavioural 
sciences (the policy sciences) is to be applied in a constant campaign 
against external threat, experienced at home or abroad. That comes 
in part through government, but it can and in some ways must 
come from the outside through daily operations — the research 
and findings of universities, think tanks, private study groups and 
foundations, and the leadership of informed individuals.
2  The shadows of the ‘wars of choice’ of the twenty-first century are now almost as long, 
given the use of social science expertise in interrogation techniques that crossed into torture, 
and in sanctioning ethnic tensions to extremes. 
3  See here the threads running through Freedman, Lawrence  (2013) Strategy, New York: 
Oxford University Press, and those undergirding Nye, Joseph (1989) ‘The Contribution 
of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges’, Adelphi Paper 29(235), pp. 20–34.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
94
3. The goal is to develop critical thinking and focus attention on the 
important, not just the urgent. Ideally, neither individuals nor 
organisations should surrender the right to speak truth to power. 
Nor should they be tied directly to, or subservient to, present 
government policy, but rather be able to continually stretch toward 
future goals, and to adopt best practices wherever they come from.
4. In the end, policy represents the result of a broad lens and 
informed choice, perhaps involving necessary compromise given 
time and circumstance, but aiming for an optimised solution to 
the degree possible. It almost inevitably has a political frame, and 
costs and consequences to be regularly attributed. Uncertainty is 
to be confronted and narrowed; risk is to be assessed and weighed 
systematically against other options.
At least for those over 40, most of these principles, while impossibly 
abstract, have a familiar ring. In the United States and a somewhat 
more cynical Britain, this corresponds to the aspirations of the civic 
virtue movement of the late nineteenth century and the 1920s and 
1930s. Education and transparency, and sometimes the distance from 
politicians and political games, it was argued, would yield the best 
result for a wise decision-maker. One example may suffice: Robert 
Brooking’s conviction, as a merchant magnate in the Midwest, of 
the need to establish a single institution at the seat of government 
in Washington DC, to offer the best information and advice to 
government, and simultaneously to train successor generations of 
analysts to do the transparent, consistent, scientific analysis needed to 
identify new problems and unanticipated threats.4
Less ethereal perhaps is the tie to the all-out mobilisation against 
the threat to the state posed by the twin demons of communism and 
fascism in the 1930s and the Second World War, and the recruitment 
of many to the cause who had previously seen policy problems as 
someone else’s problem.5 There had always been such a tie, expressed 
often in personal relationships in Britain, but it was now greatly 
expanded and magnified as the war continued. The United States, in 
4  The Brookings Institution was at one period actually a degree-granting university, first as a 
wing of Washington University in St Louis, and then after the institution was founded in 1927 
on its own.
5  See David Ekbladh’s analysis of foundations and individuals in the pre-Second World War 
American stirrings in (2011–2012) ‘Present at the Creation’, International Security 36(3), pp. 107–
41.
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its first golden age, represented a more dramatic shift. A handful of the 
best universities and centres — Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Columbia, 
University of Chicago, MIT, the Hoover Institution, the Princeton 
Institute for Advanced Study and its predecessor — provided eager 
players who were anxious to step nearer to government and to serve. 
Government, but also major philanthropic groups — in the US, 
Carnegie and Rockefeller, joined later by Ford — provided the needed 
funds. University and foundation heads alike acted as talent scouts 
and persuasive disseminators.6 There was analysis and intelligence 
work, but also broader outreach programs of lectures and public 
policy education, integration of refugees with the most parochial of 
Americans in political life, and continuing watch over popular moods 
and tolerance of suffering.7
Evolution of the Field: Students, Subjects, 
and Support
By the time Bob (and I) entered strategic studies as a full-time graduate 
student player in the 1960s, the field and the supporting infrastructure 
had attracted significant stature, as well as infrastructure and funding. 
Some have argued the 1960s and 1970s represented the second golden 
age of strategic analysis. University centres of excellence existed 
in growing numbers on both sides of the Atlantic and throughout 
the Commonwealth. The task was to develop strategic studies as 
a crucial (and most interesting) sector of a broadened discipline of 
global international relations. The Third World, the non-aligned 
movement, nationalism, and terrorism were as valid as issues for study 
as the old standbys of international law, international organisations, 
and the diplomacy of the great powers of Europe. There were new 
curricula, deliberately violating the narrow professionalism of the 
6  Ibid. Ekbladh details the pre-war contributions of, among others, Edward Mead Earle, 
Bernard Brodie, Harold Lasswell, Nicholas Spykman, and William T. R. Fox.
7  At one point, one of the pre-eminent researchers on public opinion, Hadley Cantril of 
Princeton, was actually brought with his team into the White House to provide daily measures 
of popular support.
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more traditional war colleges,8 focused on the military, political, and 
economic challenges to the security of the state, and the options 
available to protect and defend its interests. In the United States, 
the student base was expanded quite decisively with the extensive 
funding available under several national laws, particularly under the 
National Defense Education Act, a piece of legislation designed as a 
response to Sputnik and loss of space superiority in 1958.
Funding was plentiful. Government agencies, especially those related 
to defence and intelligence, saw education as a recruitment tool for 
later employment or mobilisation, and project support as providing 
wider options for decision-makers. Carnegie, Rockefeller, and a host 
of other foundations, with some government prompting, offered funds 
to support study and study-related field work overseas. Ford pursued 
both these goals at a new extensive program of centres to ensure area 
studies of the highest quality — literature, culture, and personalities 
as well as military traditions and strategic arsenals. There were also 
government funds for publishing houses and magazines,9 and regular 
free distribution of relevant analysis for both the governmental sector 
and the informed audiences strategic studies was so anxious to attract.
One new feature was the development of international specialised 
centres for research and policy debate, funded by governments and 
foundations, especially the International Institute of Strategic Studies 
(IISS), which Bob O’Neill led with such skill and grace in the 1980s. 
Founded by Alastair Buchan in 1958, it was originally focused largely 
on Britain, with selected American visitors. But it quickly went global, 
attracting more Americans, those from the dominions, co-optees from 
the Third World, and eventually, the communist sphere.
IISS was not the usual foreign affairs and diplomacy centre, such as 
the Council on Foreign Relations or Chatham House, which had its 
roots in the genteel debates of the 1920s and the somewhat rowdier 
8  The service war colleges were themselves ultimately transformed in the 1970s and the 1980s 
to teach to a broader strategic studies vision, one emphasising history, economics, and political 
science, as well as doctrine and operations management. The ‘Turner revolution‘ at the Naval 
War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in the early 1970s is perhaps the best known in detail. 
See Hattendorf, John B. et al. (1984) Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval 
War College, Newport: Naval War College Press.
9  Perhaps the most dramatic revelation was the discovery in the late 1960s of CIA’s Cold War 
financial support for the arts, especially magazines (Encounter and Der Monat, for example), that 
until then had been viewed as bastions of intellectual commentary and liberal criticism. 
97
8 . THE POSTWAR EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
discussion in the 1930s. It was rather a membership organisation with 
an expert staff, designed to mobilise, educate, inform, and influence 
in strategic studies. The target audience, convened annually, was 
originally the elite who needed to be educated on the external threats 
to the NATO alliance and individual countries. It later expanded to 
working officials, promising students, and young policy hopefuls. 
Most were civilians and men, initially with only the rarest female 
stars, with Coral Bell of Australia, Margaret Gowing of Oxford, and 
Flora Lewis of the New York Times in the regular ranks. There were a 
range of specialist publications, which eventually included Survival, 
a magazine that ranked with Foreign Affairs, and the Adelphi Papers 
on emerging topics or crises, commissioned globally. There were also 
items for the analyst’s right hand: annual tomes of information that 
established ground truth, thus creating a common global data base, 
through Strategic Survey and The Military Balance.
RAND in Santa Monica, California, was and remained something 
quite different, close to government but often standing on its own 
well into the 1980s. There were other specialised shops close to 
particular services — Center for Naval Analyses to the Chief of Naval 
Operations, and Institute for Defense Analyses to the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs — but RAND, even in its earliest incarnations, had a 
commitment to broaden the dialogue and improve analysis. It used its 
openness to draw the best and near-best practitioners, and the most 
innovative applications from economics, game theory, mathematics, 
operations research, and psychology. At a distance well removed from 
Washington DC, its ability was set to range more freely than inside-the-
DC-beltway analysis, and its overall enthusiasm for experimentation, 
gaming, good writing, and effective presentation attracted intellectual 
fans in and outside of the United States. Early on, it was the envy and 
the model for close-to-government think tanks in France, Germany, 
and Japan. Many RAND publications were unclassified and broadly 
circulated.10 Further, the RAND staff was diverse, with notable women 
analysts, such as Roberta Wohlstetter and later Lynn Davis.
RAND also represented a new civil–military model of analytic 
engagement. Led and populated originally by veterans of war-time 
policy analysis and retired military personnel, it drew almost all its 
10  RAND itself became a graduate studies program, gaining accreditation in 1975.
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funding from Project Air Force or other government monies. In some 
divisions there was a marked military presence, although seemingly 
never at the expense of direct analysis. Lunchtime debate at RAND 
was unique, with civilians totally in charge, no uniforms required, 
and no set work hours or effort to coordinate vacation time. 
Divisions were generated by the war in Vietnam and the lingering 
questions it raised. The challenges came from those who vigorously 
opposed the war, reformers within the strategic studies community, 
and protestors within universities generally.11 The charge was what 
they deemed the perversion of strategic studies independence, its 
analytic processes, and the subsequent suppression of dissent and 
challenge.12 
The rifts and splits within and across disciplines over these issues 
went deep. The reformers saw what they defined as the insidious 
militarisation of American intellectual life and the sins of loyalty 
to government dogma and objectives, not the use of science and 
knowledge to the limits of independent inquiry in the service of ethical 
goals. The traditionalists and the operators responded with challenges 
to the loyalty of those who questioned legitimate government goals 
that had been and were still supported by popular majorities. They 
rejected those who set their own ethical preferences and refused to 
acknowledge the critical risks to state interests at stake.
By the mid-1970s, at RAND and elsewhere, it had become too often a 
dialogue of the deaf. The choice of which path to follow, at least in the 
United States, was stark. In public, distinctive subcultures emerged, 
with universities now rejecting centres or projects with government 
funding or the assignment of students to Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps units, and research centres were too superficially divided into 
good non-profits or presumably less good for profits. For the reformers, 
the ironic twist was that much of the government-specific funding and 
11  Daniel Ellsberg had been a contributor at OSD and had initially worked for Nixon in 
1969. Ellsberg tried — at first unsuccessfully, then, in 1971, successfully through the New York 
Times  — to leak the study, against massive opposition from administration. The break-in of 
Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, conducted to gather evidence against Ellsberg, constituted only 
one of Nixon’s efforts to discredit Ellsberg and his colleague, Leslie Gelb.
12  See the analysis of these charges in the critiques published by two younger American 
historians: Rohde, Joy (2013) Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research 
during the Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Bessner, Daniel (forthcoming) Democracy 
in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
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projects critical for strategic studies disappeared from public view, into 
classified realms of compliant contractors, essentially withheld from 
debate, question, or democratic oversight. Traditionalist analysts, on 
the other hand, far too often found themselves held back by those now 
in an instinctive defensive crouch against any change or the new, and 
with a preference for safe subjects or consensual judgements. Some 
of the splits and fights continue in muted tones into the present, as is 
most recently evident in the argument in anthropology and sociology 
over the orientation and uses of the Human Terrain Research projects 
during the war in Afghanistan.
University centres themselves were developing ranges of specialties and 
areas of analytic specialisation. Bob experienced this first in Canberra 
and later when leading his own Oxford program. Student interest and 
recruitment was high, especially transatlantic student interest, at both 
the undergraduate and graduate levels. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
long an IISS rampart, often claimed first place. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
the Harvard complex (Law School, Graduate Faculty, and in the 1970s, 
the JFK School) and the MIT Center for International Studies allowed 
cross registration; the faculties represented a major node of arms 
control study and discussion outside of Washington, which was almost 
unfailingly influential through its alumnae, increasingly not all male, 
in Washington. The relevant officials had often been their classmates 
or their students. A parallel development to the Cambridge clusters 
came with the increasing interest in strategic studies at the Center 
for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford, partnering 
with the growing centres at the University of California campuses at 
Berkeley and San Diego, and within the somewhat more conservative 
view of the Hoover Institution.
The analytic networks spread globally and grew at a steady pace in 
the 1970s, and less so in the early 1980s. International Security, born 
in Cambridge, joined Survival, a journal more academic in focus, 
and a number of smaller journals emerged and flourished. Bob was 
among the creators of a wide-reaching informal Asian group, made up 
of influential players, students, and former students (many who had 
come to Australia for training) that stretched across disciplines and 
borders. It was often a path for influence, or at least for an intellectual 
fellowship that opened doors to collaboration and cooperation. 
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It sometimes even stimulated negotiated outcomes, although without 
the multilateral exchanges and tendencies that NATO and especially 
Bob’s IISS had informally fostered from the early 1960s onward.
In the Reagan era of the 1980s, Washington hosted not just partisan 
or contractor job shops (American Enterprise Institute, Heritage 
Foundation, Cato Institute) or the non-partisan greats (Brookings, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), but for the first time, 
also several university centres. Georgetown and its Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (soon to become independent and more 
engaged in the daily political fray) were at the more conservative pole. 
At the other end, the emerging Center of International and Security 
Studies at Maryland worked closely with the National Academies of 
Sciences in the Soviet Union and in Washington on technical weapons 
and scientific expert exchanges, as well as broader programs within 
the framework of cooperative security.
As the 1980s drew to a close, the strategic studies field began to 
change again. Most programs essentially moved closer to the subfields 
of traditional international relations: arms control and disarmament, 
non-proliferation, or detailed studies of civil unrest and political 
change. Something close to Bob’s first graduate research interests 
engaged us both with increasing significance: the awakening detente 
relations with Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, and the new frictions 
between politicians and military leaders. In critical London meetings, 
Bob highlighted the number of new control agreements in nuclear 
and conventional areas that increased the chance for future change, 
and downplayed the now traditional European security scenarios and 
even the traditional defence budgets. These issues were not new to 
those of us who had been patiently observing and working to deepen 
slow changes over the last two decades. But the big questions had to 
do with new frameworks and new methods of verification, of further 
limits on tests and technologies, and conflicts outside of Europe. 
Would or could Russia enter the European ‘home’? And what was to 
be Eastern Europe’s future?
One driver of change in this was the substantial new funding available 
through the MacArthur Foundation’s Peace and Security Program. 
Under Ruth Adams, MacArthur funded 12 new or renewed university 
programs globally, established an international fellowship competition 
that would eventually award over 140 graduate fellowships over 
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10 years through the Social Science Research Council, and provided 
generous funding for international collaborative research for the next 
20 years. The Carnegie Corporation, under David Hamburg, and Ford, 
under McGeorge Bundy and Enid Schoettle, became co-conspirators, 
highlighting security partnerships and the new security cooperative 
options for Russia and the United States. Bob, first at IISS and then 
Oxford, was a stakeholder and an advisor in these foundation efforts. 
Often in tandem with Lawrence Freedman, he regularly testified to 
intellectual need and to scholarly value, devised new curricula, and 
argued for the analytic standards that should be required. MacArthur’s 
goal was to broaden the basis of security studies to include new 
external global threats: the environmental crisis, resource crises, 
civil security and unrest, and the new chemical and biological risks 
overshadowed for so long by the nuclear threat.
New divisions occurred within strategic studies in response. Some 
found this shift in overall focus to be a turning away from the primary 
threat of avoiding nuclear conflicts and risks. An underground 
controversy in the United States and Europe bubbled for several years 
over whether the true essence of strategic studies was analysis only 
on the use of force and its conditions, or requirements for military 
structures and future planning.13 But the reach of the field clearly 
broadened and the fellowship tracks definitely strengthened the 
efforts at diversity.
One of the many MacArthur initiatives in which Bob and I had a major 
hand, with Ernest May and Uwe Nerlich, was the multi-year Nuclear 
History Program. It joined scholars and some retired military officials 
from the US, France, Britain, and Germany in the attempt to make clear 
each country’s nuclear past and set about training and supporting a 
new generation of scholars in writing original monographs. Bob’s 
students produced three or four of the best theses. Perhaps 15 top flight 
monographs were produced across the four countries, and research 
continues today based on the materials that were declassified or found. 
Energising other foundations to action, MacArthur underwrote the DC 
National Security Archive, a trove of recently declassified documents 
from all four countries, and encouraged younger scholars to write 
theses or books on a range of nuclear topics, some 25 works in all. 
13  A notable scholar and commentator said to me at the time: ‘MacArthur will have us all 
doing embroidery.’
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The Washington effort was gradually reflected in the other capitals as 
well. This was a major shift toward openness, when almost everything 
had been previously closed or hidden behind the 30-year rule.14 
It constituted a true transformation from earlier scattered efforts and 
years-long frustrating attempts to get the declassifications. Bob clearly 
also pursued these lessons in the work he later did with the Imperial 
War Museum in London and on other official historical boards.
From the end of the Cold War until almost the present, strategic studies 
has been in a relatively muted phase, not unusual in times when threat 
of direct conflict is low and defence forces and monies are in relative 
decline. Bob himself remained active in research and outreach, from 
Canberra as founding Chairman of the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, and from Sydney as a Director of the Lowy Institute, as well 
as his role in the prestigious commissions on the future role of nuclear 
weapons (Canberra Commission) and the strategic challenges inherent 
in a multipolar world, especially in Asia. But what conflicts there 
were — the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s, and the ‘wars 
of choice’ in Afghanistan and Iraq under George W. Bush in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century — were, for much of the strategic 
studies community, throwbacks to the expeditionary wars of the 
past, or not worthy of extended analysis. University studies remained 
static or fell away; the career paths into government or independent 
analytic futures were markedly narrower. Funding for anything but 
non-proliferation and arms control was limited. Europe was at the 
‘end of history’ and the only great strategic questions concerned the 
adjustment of a shrunken Russia to its new global status and the rapid 
rise of China, along with the other emergent economic powers.
What has brought renewed interest and growing university 
enrolments in the last several years is the growth of international 
crises and transformative political change, beginning perhaps with 
the seismic shifts of the Arab Spring. Strategic studies has been 
particularly focused on the steady strategic growth of China — always 
close to Bob’s agenda — and the actions of a red-toothed Vladimir 
Putin in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria in challenging or negating the 
framework of cooperative security in Europe. Strategic studies itself 
14  Throughout the George W. Bush Administration, there was, however, a successful effort, 
often led by those close to Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, to reverse 
historical declassification and to reclassify critical documents and files.
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has lost some venues — with the exception of newcomers Stanton, 
Robertson, and long-time stalwart Carnegie, foundations are on the 
whole less interested in funding fellowships or supporting continuing 
surveys and core-building studies. University faculties are generally 
satisfied when there are one or two ‘strategic’ experts on their rolls. 
Yet there are new or renewed institutions — a nuclear boot camp or 
two, new publications and commentaries on the Web and social media 
networks, and a growth in practitioners and students interested in 
re-examining traditional wisdom on the workings of deterrence, the 
impact of new technologies, the possibility of limited nuclear war, or 
the future of formal arms control and disarmament. There seems to be 
deep, continuing interest in strategic studies, and more than enough 
work to be done to understand the challenges of new forms of warfare, 
from cyber to hybrid, and of the new risks but also new responses 
to proliferation through monitoring and formal and informal control. 
And then there are the tasks of re-inventing, for new generations 
of politicians and younger voters, many of the original precepts of 
strategic studies that they have largely forgotten or have never known.
The New Agenda
What is the shape of the new agenda that strategic studies confronts? 
What are the prospects for even partial solutions or resolutions over 
the next decade and beyond? Seven critical areas come easily to mind 
which we can identify here only in telegraphic form. Only one or two 
are areas in which Bob has not already done significant thinking and 
work, or challenged his students and colleagues. Briefly tagged are:
1. Strategic analysis in a multipolar framework: two-sided games are 
no longer enough.
2. Understanding a more complex past — sufficient history?
3. The creation and breaking of taboos, blurring the nuclear/
conventional divide, defining the new nuclear era of congruent 
safety and security.
4. The inclusion paradox — how to ensure and exploit diversity in 
thinkers and operators and the new divisions in civil/military 
roles?
5. Who will fight the next war — the man/machine mix?
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6. Escalation theory and distributed lethality models — will it be 
better or worse in 2025?
7. The rediscovered but un-integrated threat — economic weapons, 
sanctions, and market denial.
To take up only several of these themes sketched in the briefest detail:
Almost from the outset, strategic studies has persisted with models for 
analysis and education that are at their core most appropriate for two-
sided conflict and cooperation. Very little attention has been devoted 
to incorporating insights from multi-layered, multi-player games in 
which there are complex and interactive payoffs for both cooperation 
and competition. These are very hard problems, and not a declared 
arena for solutions by consensus.
But it is hard to see how in the strategic framework of the present we 
can avoid trying to unpack these problems in a more rigorous and 
systematic way. The rise of a maturing ambitious China and the effects 
of a deliberately disruptive Russia pose choices not faced by the United 
States since the early 1970s and the Nixon/Kissinger balancing acts. 
The George W. Bush/Dick Cheney dream of technological dominance 
as the answer seems less relevant in the era of hybrid or cyber warfare 
or the creation of new strategic islands.
In the past two decades there have been valiant efforts to develop 
resources for historical understanding about the use of force in concrete 
situations, particularly in the assessment of risk. But there are fewer 
than there must be in order to systematise and codify lessons about 
nuclear decision-making and its risks. We have also concentrated 
largely on a diagnostic approach — what went wrong, and what must 
be avoided. Little research or teaching has emphasised what must go 
right, the minimum that allows us to create scenarios for the realistic 
avoidance of bad choices or practices. Here we are stuck in Cold War 
protocols and the wisdom of dead strategists, or worse, the results of 
single-outcome gaming, and dogmas from the age of nuclear plenty in 
a bipolar world.
Moreover, historic analyses need time and space, and careful focus 
on interrelationships. Few institutions now exist that can and do 
follow the path of systematic estimate and experimentation — that 
is, assessing the interrelationships between the use of force and 
outcomes — except if led by a resolute leader (for example, the Turner 
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revolution in naval education at Newport) or team (for example, the 
related efforts in diplomatic history of Gaddis and Kennedy at Yale). 
Major themes require continuity and repeated intellectual attacks. 
To  cite only a few: In the wake of the still-untested Iran deal, will 
the tenets of the nuclear revolution still hold? Will deterrence change 
at lower numbers or a slowing pace of proliferation? What are the 
parallels to the tri-polar competition among the major powers in 
the Pacific?
What are the critical technologies for the future — and how will we 
not only control their application but also recognise them?
What efforts can we make now to adjust and adapt, and to understand 
the process for doing so with the framework of strategic studies? 
The  age of mass mobilisation is well behind us, but what of mass 
education and even training on these crucial issues and the choices 
that will have to be made? We test weapons, but not intellectual or 
organisational processes for making choices; we train for consistency, 
but not innovation or confrontation with uncertainty, and we 
leave more than necessary room for muddling through at the point 
of decision.
Concluding Words 
The longer context narrative here should highlight why we must now 
take the time and the best talent to consciously assess the patterns 
and lessons of the past and to define the analytic tasks for the future. 
Change, while it appears to be rapid, occurs rather more slowly than we 
believe. Its assessment requires the best applications of the knowledge 
gained in intellectual research and observation (as well as operational 
practice) wielded by civilian and military analysts. New options and 
new choices may exist; inevitability exists only in literature and 
partisan history. Bob’s career path, and the achievements of the cadre 
of students and colleagues he has brought along with him, assure us 
that there are always informed choices to be made, and options to be 




Strategic Studies in Britain and 
the Cold War’s Last Decade1
Lawrence Freedman
For decades, from 1982, Bob O’Neill played a central role in the British 
strategic studies community, first as Director of the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and then as Chichele Professor of 
the History of War at Oxford. He also served, usually as chair, on the 
boards of numerous other organisations, including IISS, the Imperial 
War Museum, and the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College. 
I have described elsewhere the remarkable qualities Bob brought to 
any organisation in which he had a part to play, and his unique talent 
for leadership:
Bob was always in control and always polite, though occasional signs 
of irritation were allowed to intrude in the face of specious arguments 
or when time was being wasted with mini-speeches. Potential 
objections were anticipated and parochial concerns deflected. He was 
particularly effective at making an organisation feel good about itself 
and its staff pleased with a job well done. At the same time, while 
sustaining morale and boosting the public profile, he would never 
allow an organisation to go into denial and put off addressing its 
problems. About these problems, whether to do with personnel or 
finance, he would stay well informed. Part of Bob’s success was his 
1 Thanks to Jeff Michaels for his comments.
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ability to develop rounded assessments of the people he was working 
with, even to junior levels, aware of their strengths as well as their 
weaknesses and the links between the two.2
This leadership was of particular importance at a time when the 
established framework for thinking about security was undermined, 
and then set aside. This period started with the Cold War, edging 
towards a new and dangerous peak. Then not only did the sense of 
danger start to subside, but the Cold War itself came to an abrupt, 
although fortunately rather graceful, conclusion. This was followed 
by a whole series of new issues bursting on to the agenda, courtesy 
of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, and then Osama bin Laden. 
Leadership in these circumstances required steadiness, so that people 
did not get giddy with the pace of change, yet crucially it also 
depended on appreciating the possibilities and the challenges in the 
new situation.
My aim in this chapter is to convey the state of the strategic studies 
community in Britain as Bob O’Neill arrived to take up his role as 
Director of IISS, with some observations about how it changed over 
the subsequent decade. This community was, and still is, made up 
of the defence specialists and students of international relations in 
universities and think tanks. Bob’s arrival at IISS was coincident with 
my own at King’s College London as Professor of War Studies, and 
for much of this period I was on the Council of IISS. This chapter 
therefore inevitably reflects my perspective as both an observer and 
a participant.
I
At the start of the 1980s, many of the most influential figures in the 
defence debate were retired military officers with distinguished war 
records. Field Marshal Lord Carver, a former Chief of Defence Staff, 
was regularly cited as a critic of nuclear policy.3 General Sir John 
Hackett’s fictional account of The Third World War (which NATO just 
won) was a bestselling vehicle for making the case for higher defence 
2  Freedman, Lawrence (2006) ‘Bob O’Neill and the Art of Academic Leadership’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 60(1), pp. 13–17.
3  Carver, Michael (1982) A Policy for Peace, London: Faber.
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spending.4 Meanwhile, the number of academic specialists in defence 
and strategy was small. The overseas priorities of universities had been 
shaped by the demands of empire more than the threat of war. They 
provided for those with the administrative competence and language 
skills to run the colonies. In many university departments there were 
scholars who had spent time in Africa and Asia and had picked up 
on their languages and cultures. By contrast, chairs — never mind 
whole departments — dedicated to war were rare. Standing out was 
the Chichele Chair of the History of War at Oxford, occupied by Sir 
Michael Howard in 1980. His appointment as Regius Professor of 
History left the post unfilled until it was taken up by Bob O’Neill in 
1987. Howard had also established the other chair with war in its title 
while at King’s College London. Aware of the college’s unsatisfactory 
foray into military studies during the interwar years, he created the 
War Studies Department during the 1950s and became its first chair 
in 1965. Shortly after, it was Howard who after persuaded Defence 
Secretary Denis Healey to get the Ministry of Defence to sponsor a 
number of academic posts in this field. This program continued 
through the 1980s, effectively coming to an end with the seed funding 
for the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College (in collaboration 
with the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)) 
in 1990.5 
By the early 1980s, there were centres of excellence around the 
country in particular areas, including defence economics at Aberdeen, 
arms control at Lancaster, and Soviet studies at Birmingham. 
At  Edinburgh, John Erickson had established himself as a leading 
interpreter of Soviet military history and thought.6 Looking back, it 
is striking how little academic work was under way on the conduct, 
as opposed to the politics, of the conflict which had taken British lives 
and consumed much governmental energy — ‘the Troubles’ (a typical 
British euphemism) in Northern Ireland. The field of terrorism studies, 
now a more crowded field, was dominated by Paul Wilkinson, then at 
Aberdeen before he later set up a centre at St Andrews.7
4  The Third World War, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, was first published in 1978 and then 
in an updated version in 1982.
5  On the background, see Howard, Michael (2006) Captain Professor: The Memoirs of Sir 
Michael Howard, London: Continuum International Publishing Group, p. 195.
6  The Guardian (2002) ‘Humanities: John Erickson’. Available at: www.theguardian.com/
news/2002/feb/12/guardianobituaries.humanities.
7  Wilkinson, Paul (1977) Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: John Wiley.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
110
The Department of War Studies at King’s was then still small, with 
Barrie Paskins, a defence lecturer on the ethics of war, with three 
other colleagues.8 When Howard had become the first defence lecturer 
at All Souls in Oxford in 1968, the Chair of War Studies he had created 
was filled by Laurence Martin. It became vacant when Martin left to 
become Vice Chancellor of Newcastle University in 1978. It was revived 
in 1982 as the personal project of Air Marshal Sir Neil Cameron when 
he became principal of the college. That is how I came to move from 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, better known as Chatham 
House, to King’s.
King’s also had a link with the Royal Naval College Greenwich, the 
only staff college to have a dedicated academic department. The 
Department of History and International Affairs had been led by Brian 
Ranft, who had a part-time position at King’s when I arrived. He was 
followed in this position by Peter Nailor. One of Nailor’s colleagues, 
Geoff Till, a former King’s student, took up the part-time position when 
Ranft retired to ensure that maritime studies were on the curriculum 
(a role later taken up by Andrew Lambert). Till succeeded Nailor at 
Greenwich in 1989 and then became one of the main architects of 
the academic support function at the new Joint Services Command 
and Staff College, which merged all three staff colleges in the late 
1990s. With King’s now responsible for this function, Till became a 
full Professor at King’s, and the first Dean of Defence Studies. Up to 
this point, there was little internal academic support at the other staff 
colleges. Brian Holden Reid was seconded from King’s to the Army 
Staff College at Camberley, where he was resident historian from 1987 
to 1997. The army did have substantial departments at the Royal 
Military College at Sandhurst, teaching cadets. Its staff included the 
leading military historian John Keegan, until he left to join the Daily 
Telegraph in 1986. Another member of the Sandhurst staff, Chris 
Donnelly, was the leading expert on the Soviet military system.9 
The naval equivalent at Dartmouth also had a strong teaching staff, 
including the naval historian Eric Grove. Meanwhile, the RAF relied 
8  Michael Dockrill, Brian Bond, and Wolf Mendl.
9  Donnelly’s influence was considerable. In 1979, he became head of the Soviet Studies 
Research Centre, also based at Sandhurst, and in 1989 became an adviser to the NATO Secretary-
General, helping to manage the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.
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on a series of impressive officers, starting with Tony Mason in 1976 
and later including Andrew Vallance and Tim Garden, who developed 
links with the universities.
While the specialist defence community was small, the wider 
international relations community was growing and starting to 
organise itself as a discipline. The first conference of the British 
International Studies Association was held in 1975 at Lincoln College 
Oxford under the Chairmanship of Alastair Buchan, then at Oxford 
but also the founding director of IISS. The very first Department of 
International Relations had been created at Aberystwyth after the 
First World War. The Montague Burton Chairs at Oxford and the LSE, 
established in the 1930s, were accepted as the leading chairs in the 
profession. The Australian Hedley Bull took over the Oxford chair 
from Buchan after the latter’s untimely death in 1978, only to himself 
die distressingly young from cancer in 1985.10 At LSE, Philip Windsor, 
another IISS alumnus, led on security studies, while the Montague 
Burton Professor, Susan Strange, was creating a new field of internal 
political economy, moving the subject away from its preoccupation 
with states and security. Elsewhere, Joseph Frankel had built up a 
formidable department at Southampton, from which a remarkable 
number of later stars emerged, including Steve Smith.
Outside of academia, the think tank world was small but high 
powered. Chatham House was another product of the aftermath of the 
First World War. It had been set up to help avoid another major war. 
Under the economist Andrew Shonfield, it had broken its focus. Ian 
Smart, a former Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) official who 
had been at IISS before becoming Shonfield’s deputy, was one of the 
most original and articulate commentators on security issues during 
the 1970s. He set up a project on the future of British foreign policy, 
for which I was recruited, and then wrote the project’s most important 
paper, a study of the options for Polaris replacement.11 He could have 
become director, but instead became a consultant on nuclear energy 
matters, and dropped away from the defence world. Instead, journalist 
David Watt, who was well connected and a brilliant writer, but did 
not claim any specialist expertise, became the new director.
10  Ayson, Robert (2012) Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power, London: Palgrave.
11  Smart, Ian (1997) The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent: Technical, Economic, 
and Strategic Issues, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
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IISS had been established in the first place as a result of concern in 
the 1950s that defence policy in the nuclear age required a degree 
of specialist knowledge that was beyond existing institutions. 
Its international reputation was based on published output, notably the 
Military Balance and the Adelphi Papers, while its annual conference 
was the most important gathering of its kind, including senior figures 
from many governments and international organisations, as well as 
academics and think tank members. The directing staff comprised of 
a non-British director (Christoph Bertram of Germany, and then Bob) 
and a British deputy with an army background (Brigadier Kenneth 
Hunt, followed by Colonel Jonathan Alford), supplemented by a series 
of up and coming young Americans (in the first years of the 1980s this 
was Bob Nurick) and an international group of largely young research 
associates. It was an incubator for new faces in the transatlantic 
strategic studies community. In the early 1980s, it moved from its 
spartan accommodation in John Adam Street to smart new premises 
in Tavistock Street, close to both LSE and King’s. It was also, once an 
endowment from the Ford Foundation was agreed, on a more secure 
financial footing than Chatham House, which, unlike its European 
interlocutors, did not get a large government subsidy.12
The other member of the London think tank triumvirate was the 
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). It also lived on a tight 
budget, in this case with life support from the Ministry of Defence. 
In principle, it was the main outlet for military voices. In the 1970s, 
these had often been quite right-wing, especially under the strident 
leadership of Air Marshal Stuart ‘Paddy’ Menaul, who remained 
an active commentator on defence matters.13 By 1982, the institute 
had returned to the more measured tones of the establishment, and 
was directed by another airman, Group Captain David Bolton. Other 
London think tanks, such as the Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
12  From 1978 to 1982, I ran a small policy studies unit that did get a modest grant from 
the FCO.
13  Towards the end of his reign at the RUSI it was perceived that a less individualistic and 
a more collegiate approach was appropriate, and in 1976 he left to continue his work as publicist 
and defence commentator. Air Vice-Marshal SWB Menaul CB CBE DFC AFC (1987) ‘RUSI Director-
General 1968–1976: An Appreciation‘, The RUSI Journal 132(3), pp. 25–6.
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provided a focus for strong anti-communist views,14 but these were 
quite small and considered more as a source of strong opinions than 
independent analysis. 
How influential were the think tanks? At the time I was not sure, 
as I suggested in a seminar on the role of the outsiders in policy-making 
at RUSI at the end of 1981.15 My  experience working at Chatham 
House during the late 1970s was that government was resistant to 
outside influences. This included parliament as well as academics and 
think tank members. On the nuclear issue, for example, there had 
been minimal parliamentary activity since 1965. Civil servants were 
prohibited from participating in the Chatham House study group that 
led to the production of Ian Smart’s paper on the Polaris replacement. 
Even in small private gatherings put together under the aegis of one 
of the institutes, and despite the latitude made possible by invoking 
the Chatham House Rule,16 the burden of official secrecy and political 
caution weighed heavily.
Having done my doctoral research on the United States, I was always 
struck by the ease with which I could get hold of information in 
Washington that would get the highest classification in the UK, as 
well as the ease of movement between the government and think tank 
worlds. In Washington, individuals with real expertise had a reasonable 
expectation of getting a spell in government and returning to the think 
tank world, at which point they could enrich public debate with their 
knowledge of the workings of government. Other than temporary 
appointments to the FCO’s Planning Staff or Arms Control Unit, this 
was rare in the UK. Beyond that, the resources available to institutions 
such as RAND, to take the most famous American example, dwarfed 
those available to the British think tanks. They could not even aspire 
to undertake the sustained number-crunching that made them an 
adjunct to policy-making, or grow large on the basis of government 
14  Michaels, Jeff (2014) ‘Britain’s Cold War Think Tank: Brian Crozier and the Institute 
for the Study of Conflict’, in Luc van Dongen, Stéphanie Roulin and Giles Scott-Smith (eds), 
Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: Agents, Activities, and Networks, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
15  Report  of the Tripartite Seminar held at RUSI on ‘Outsiders’  Influence on  Defence 
Policy: Part I’, 11 November 1981; (1982) RUSI Journal 127(1).
16  ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free 
to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor 
that of any other participant, may be revealed.’ Chatham House, ‘Chatham House Rule’. Available 
at: www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule#sthash.nzqXyGcB.0TSMHZAl.dpuf.
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contracts. I recall being told by a Conservative MP when I was trying 
to arrange a briefing on the Polaris report that our efforts were paltry 
and pointless. We could never compete with RAND.
It is also important to keep in mind that all three institutes 
were membership organisations, who had to spend a lot of time 
providing a steady diet of speakers and seminars, as well as high-
quality publications. IISS’s Military Balance, for example, provided 
authoritative information on the state of the world’s armed forces. 
Chatham House had also played a long role in recording developments 
in foreign policy as much as seeking to influence its conduct. In both 
Chatham House and IISS, the libraries were of immense importance, 
especially when it came to press cuttings. In the pre-Google age, these 
were the first port of call for anyone trying to study contemporary 
affairs. Researchers could not simply sit in their offices and find 
whatever information they wanted online, but had to go out and look 
for what they needed, armed with a note pad and, with luck, access 
to a decent photocopier.
In addition to their value as a safe arena for some interaction between 
independent researchers and policy-makers, the think tanks also 
offered international networks. IISS and Chatham House were linked 
not only to the main American centres, such as RAND and Brookings, 
but also the European institutes, such as the German Council on Foreign 
Relations, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 
and the French Institute for International Relations. The regular visits 
to London by individuals such as Karl Kaiser and Uwe Nehrlich from 
Germany, Thierry de Montbrial and Pierre Hassner from France, and 
Johann Jørgen Holst from Norway (later to become Norwegian Foreign 
Minister) brought a wider European perspective to UK debates on 
security. As I will discuss presently, there were also reasonably regular 
links with the foreign policy institutes in the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
II
By the early 1980s, the academic and policy debate was contained 
within the Cold War framework, which in itself carried the legacy of 
the terrible history of the twentieth century. It was a field of study 
originally animated by the problem of war. That meant exploring 
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how relations between states went wrong. The academic study of 
international relations tended towards a commentary on the great 
powers that was both historically informed and sensitive to recent 
developments. The practitioners might express strong views, but 
their backgrounds were not dissimilar to other members of the 
establishment, and the tradition was donnish. While few academics 
entered government, there was movement in the other direction — 
for example, Peter Nailor had moved from the Ministry of Defence 
to take up a chair at Lancaster. The vocation was to pass on learning 
to the next generation while writing about topics of interest when 
in the mood to do so. Journalism was largely frowned upon as being 
somehow demeaning, although book reviewing was considered a high 
art. Although money was tight, university life was far less pressured. 
This was before the start of the successive research assessment 
exercises.
A shared feature of the senior figures in government and academia 
was the impact of their wartime experiences and the early stages of 
the Cold War on their world views. This was a generation that was, by 
the early 1980s, weary. They had lived through the country’s heroic 
stand against Hitler and a time when British’s international standing 
had not been in question. Many were still dogged by Dean Acheson’s 
1962 jibe about Britain having lost an empire and failed to find a 
role.17 Dependence on the United States for security and influence was 
understood but resented, often manifesting itself in a distrust of the 
latest American intellectual fashion. Above all, there was a dismayed 
sense that the relative decline that the country had known since 
1945, which had seen former enemies overtake Britain in prosperity, 
was bound to continue. 
If there was a dominant disciplinary influence, it was history, with 
the more ambitious using familiar concepts to explore the different 
ways of thinking about the developing international system.18 
The so-called English school, which was only given its name in 1981,19 
was initially associated with Martin Wight, who had died in 1972. 
17  Speech at West Point, 5 December 1962, in Vital Speeches, 1 January 1963, p. 163. On the 
consequences, see Hill, Christopher (1979) ‘Britain’s Elusive Role in World Politics‘, British 
Journal of International Studies 5(3), pp. 248–59.
18  For example, Frankel, Joseph (1970) National Interest, London: Macmillan.
19  By Roy Jones in (1981) ‘The English School of International Relations: A Case 
for Closure’, The Review of International Studies 7(1), pp. 1–13.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
116
It reflected the idea that the international system could be viewed 
as a society with its own norms and conventions, and not just as a 
collection of autonomous states.20 In some ways, it was less a school of 
thought than an intellectual temper, offering a somewhat pragmatic 
middle way between more dogmatic realists and idealists. It was not 
offering a radical new way of looking at international affairs. 
The durability of the established frameworks was evident when it 
came to the analytical support for the critics of mainstream views. 
The idealist strand in British thinking about international affairs was 
sustained largely by two academic outfits, initially with a Quaker 
inspiration. The Richardson Institute for Peace Research, named 
after Lewis Fry Richardson, was established in 1959. It first found a 
home at Lancaster University and eventually went to Kent, where it 
became part of the Conflict Research Centre. Until 1982, its director 
was Michael Nicholson, who very much followed Richardson in his 
belief that quantitative analysis could be used to put the study of war 
and peace on a more scientific basis. In many ways, Nicholson, who 
had a background in economics, was a rare and early representative in 
Britain of the scientific approach that was gradually gaining traction 
in the United States.21 The other component to what became the 
Conflict Research Centre was the more idiosyncratic work of John 
Burton, first at University College London from 1963 and then at Kent. 
Burton, who had been a senior member of the Australian Foreign 
Office, believed that a more holistic view of the world, and a sustained 
focus on basic human needs, could be the basis for new techniques of 
conflict resolution.22 
20  The classic text is normally now seen to be Butterfield, Herbert and Martin Wight (eds)
(1966) Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics,  London: Allen 
& Unwin. See Dunne, Tim (1998) Inventing International Society: A History of the English 
School,  Basingstoke: Macmillan; Linklater, Andrew and Hidemi Suganami (2006) The English 
School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment,  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
21  Nicholson, Michael (1989) Formal Theories in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press; The Guardian (2001) ‘Social Sciences: Michael Nicholson’. Available at: www.
theguardian.com/news/2001/oct/20/guardianobituaries.socialsciences.
22  Burton, John (1979) Deviance, Terrorism and War, London: Macmillan; The Guardian (2010) 
‘John Burton Obituary’. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/22/john-burton-
obituary.
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The main centre of peace research was the Department of Peace 
Studies  at Bradford University, founded by Quakers in 1973, with 
Adam Curle as the first chair. It barely survived its first few years. 
It was caught between its original Quaker inspiration and radicals who 
believed that there could be no peace without justice, and that justice 
could require armed struggle, and also between those who believed 
that the cause of peace could best be advanced through scholarship, 
and those who believed that their scholarship was secondary to 
activism.23 The problem was aggravated by Curle’s relaxed approach to 
the demands of academic life. In 1978, Curle retired and was replaced 
by a tough-minded former missionary, James O’Connell, who restored 
discipline and stressed the importance of scholarship. Without 
O’Connell, it is likely that the department would have survived, 
either because of its internal tensions or because of the hostility of the 
Thatcher Government, which took the view that this was not so much 
peace as appeasement studies. The government demanded that the 
University Grants Commission investigate Bradford to assess whether 
this could possibly be a serious academic department — it was.24 
From Bradford, Paul Rogers was to the fore with the most sustained 
critique of British and NATO nuclear policy.
The King’s Department of War Studies and Bradford’s Department 
of Peace Studies were often set against each other, as if they were 
polar opposites. The Department of War Studies was not activist, and 
contained a range of views. Wolf Mendl, the head of department up to 
my arrival, was a Quaker who shared O’Connell’s combination of strong 
values and deep commitment to rigorous scholarship. Moreover, to the 
extent that nuclear deterrence was at issue, there were a number of 
common reference points. Supporters of deterrence were not arguing 
in favour of nuclear war. The issue was how best to prevent one. Nor 
were the critics opposed to the measures of arms control that helped 
stabilise rather than eliminate the nuclear relationship.
Indeed, arms control was the focal point for younger scholars with 
an interest in what might now be called ‘hard power’. The British 
International Studies Association arms control group was led 
(with some help from me) by John Simpson at Southampton, already 
23  Young, Nigel (1981) ‘Educating the Peace Educators‘, Security Dialogue 12(2), pp. 123–35.
24  The Guardian (2013) ‘James O’Connell Obituary’. Available at: www.theguardian.com/
education/2013/sep/19/james-oconnell-academic-dies-87.
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a leading expert in the non-proliferation field. The focus was telling. 
The intellectual challenge was to be found in managing the arms race 
and east–west relations. This was not a group that entered the arena to 
talk about war, but more to consider how it might best be prevented. 
The vital knowledge was of the properties of nuclear weapons and 
the doctrines of strategic stability, the coherence of alliances and the 
conventions of crisis management. There was little reason to talk of 
the conduct of war itself, because if the one for which we were most 
prepared came about, this would constitute a monumental failure of 
policy and a catastrophe from which there might be no recovery.
III
The sense of decline was reflected in the wider public debates on 
foreign and defence policy. These were still influenced as much by the 
logic of decolonisation as by the ebb and flow of the Cold War. In the 
late 1960s, the contraction of the empire led the Labour Government 
to conclude that it was pointless to sustain military garrisons in the 
Middle East and the Far East. It appeared that the country no longer 
had vital interests beyond Europe worth defending by force of arms. 
The sovereign base area in Akrotiri and Dhekelia would have been 
handed over to the government in Cyprus were it not for the awkward 
situation arising out of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the 
island’s partition. The relentlessly narrow focus on the NATO area was 
confirmed in 1981 by the defence review undertaken by Sir John Nott, 
much to the chagrin of the Royal Navy. This also removed the last 
attempt at a maritime presence in the South Atlantic, HMS Endurance.
The review reflected a prominent theme of the defence debates of 
the 1970s, in which Professor David Greenwood at the University of 
Aberdeen had taken such a prominent role. Looking at the persistent 
pressure on the defence budget, struggling to stay close to the NATO 
norm of 3 per cent of GDP (and with a struggling GDP), he had pointed 
to the need to make hard choices on defence priorities, which were 
reflected in what seemed to be the core missions for the individual 
services — a long-range strike role for the RAF, sustaining the British 
Army of the Rhine, or the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. The 1981 review 
came down against an expansive maritime presence, although this 
was, to a degree, to make way for a role on which the Royal Navy was 
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less keen — responsibility for the national nuclear force.25 In 1980, 
the government decided to replace the ageing SSBN force with Polaris 
missiles, with one carrying new US Trident missiles.26
This decision became bound up with the question of whether Britain 
had really come to terms with its reduced role in world affairs, as if 
Trident was a last defiant gesture in the long retreat from the glories 
of empire. It was also caught up with the revival of an anti-nuclear 
movement in the United Kingdom. At issue here was not only the 
national nuclear force but also the decision taken by the alliance to 
locate US ground-launched cruise missiles at Greenham Common and 
Molesworth bases in the UK, along with other European countries.27 
With President Ronald Reagan’s hawkish administration and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan raising international tensions, the 
nuclear issue soon dominated public debate. It had an immediate 
impact on the Labour Party in opposition, with Michael Foot, a long-
time supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, now leader. 
This, along with the party’s general antipathy towards NATO and the 
EU, was one reason for a number of key figures leaving Labour and 
starting the new Social Democrat Party.28
Although Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Government is credited 
with turning around Britain’s economic position and international 
standing during the 1980s, neither would have been predicted at 
the start of the decade, when the economic policies pursued by her 
government appeared to have worsened the position. 1982 was a 
transitional year. By March the economy had begun to recover and 
with it the Conservative Party’s position in the opinion polls. Then 
in April came the Falklands War. This came out of the blue, with 
a British task force sent to defend a territory few could locate on a map 
25  For his study of the Nott Review, see Greenwood, David (1981) Reshaping Britain’s Defences, 
Aberdeen Studies in Defence Economics, no. 19.
26  For a flavour of the debates on nuclear weapons leading to this decision, see Freedman, 
Lawrence (1980) Britain and Nuclear Weapons, London: Macmillan.
27  The key text for the movement was Thompson, Edward and Dan Smith (1980) Protest and 
Survive, London: Penguin. Thompson was a radical historian. Dan Smith had worked for the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and then at the Richardson Institute. The title was a play on 
the government’s civil defence pamphlet, Protect and Survive, published in May 1980.
28  Some of the ideas that influenced Social Democrat Party defence policy are found in Segal, 
Gerald et al. (1983) Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, London: Macmillan.
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or knew was still owned by Britain. As surprising as the outbreak of 
war was, the task force was able to set sail quickly and was able to 
defeat Argentine forces decisively. 
The Falklands raised issues about the conduct and utility of war well 
below the nuclear threshold, but neither the academic/think tank 
community nor the political class was geared to these issues.29 Although 
important debates about conventional strategy were underway in the 
United States at the time, and despite Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall’s 
long campaign to introduce new operational concepts into the British 
army,30 this was an area that civilian academics were largely content to 
leave to military practitioners. In practice, it was the nuclear debate, 
much more than the Falklands, that stirred up the British strategic 
studies community. Up to this point, the British line was to accept 
the idea that the nuclear age had turned out to be more stable than 
many had dared to hope. If there was a challenge it came from the 
‘neo-cons’, a term already in use to describe the hard-line Democrats 
in the US who were dismayed at their party’s soft line on the Soviet 
Union. Now the challenge came from the anti-nuclear movement. 
Their critique was not just of the policies of government, but of the 
craven intellectuals (such as me) who had turned into cheerleaders 
for deterrence.31 Yet this was still largely a new twist to an established 
debate. It did not really push out the boundaries.
IV
Ten years later, the strategic studies community in Britain looked 
very different. It was much larger and more varied in its interests and 
concerns. Most of this can be put down to the end of the Cold War and 
the emergence of new — or re-emergence of old — types of conflicts, 
29  The media commentators during the campaign were invariably retired officers. See Adams, 
Valerie (1986) The Media and the Falklands Campaign, London: Macmillan.
30  See Shamir, Eitan (2011) Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the 
U.S., British and Israeli Armies, Stanford: Stanford University Press, chapter 5. Those working 
closely with the military, such as Brian Holden Reid and Christopher Donnelly (who illuminated 
Soviet doctrine), were among the exceptions. Among specialists, Richard Simpkins, a retired 
army officer, was influential. See his (1985) Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century 
Warfare, London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers.
31  I noted my alarm that ‘however liberal I might be when compared with American Hawks, 
I was quite reactionary when compared with European doves’, in the introduction to Freedman, 
Lawrence (1986) The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma, New York: Henry Holt, p. 13.
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especially in the Balkans. Before addressing this major transformation 
in the international system, it is worth noting three other factors that 
influenced the community during the course of the 1980s.
The first was a more sceptical and searching approach in the media 
and in parliament. On the nuclear side, this was also helped by the 
readiness of the Conservative Government to defend their views on 
nuclear deterrence. Thus the Trident decision was accompanied in 
1980 by an ‘Open Government’ document which laid out the rationale, 
and the program itself was subjected to an annual report by the Select 
Committee on Defence.32 The confidence with which the case was made 
reflected the role of Michael Quinlan, the key figure in the Ministry 
of Defence, who had also been one of the prime movers behind the 
NATO decisions on cruise missiles.33 There was also support for more 
analytical approaches to these and other policy issues in the flagship 
current affairs program Weekend World, hosted by Brian Walden, 
which drew on academic support as talking heads.34
The second factor was the growth of international relations as a popular 
discipline in its own right. At the start of the 1980s, higher education 
was squeezed hard by the government, and funding remained tight 
until late in the decade when Kenneth Baker, as Secretary of State for 
Education, called for an expansion of student numbers. This led to 
a rapid surge in student places over the next few years, as well as a 
number of former polytechnics acquiring university status. Strategic 
studies and international relations were beneficiaries of this surge. 
To take the example of King’s, it was able to move from a niche master’s 
degree to offer undergraduate courses in war studies, which in turn 
allowed it to expand the range of master’s degrees.35
Third, the anti-nuclear movement pushed figures such as Mary Kaldor 
to the fore, and encouraged others to study defence policy with a 
critical stance. One idea, for example, was to take advantage of new 
32  Defence Open Government Document 80/23 of July 1980.
33  On retirement, Quinlan set out his ideas in Quinlan, Michael (2009) Thinking About Nuclear 
Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, London: Oxford University Press. See also Freedman, 
Lawrence (2011) ‘The Intellectual Legacy of Michael Quinlan’, in Bruno Tetrais, Thinking About 
Strategy: A Tribute to Sir Michael Quinlan, Paris: l’Harmattan.
34  The production team was remarkable for its talent, including Peter Mandelson and David 
Aaronovitch.
35  Oddly, one of the motivations for a move into undergraduate teaching was a concern that 
interest in the MA might drop off with the end of the Cold War. 
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technologies to avoid any appearance of having an offensive capability, 
while making it extremely hard for a would-be attacker to invade — 
so called ‘non-offensive defence’.36 In addition, a very different sort 
of critical security studies began to develop, in some ways akin to the 
one that had developed in the 1960s around the Vietnam War, as those 
opposed to the war questioned how society had become so warlike and 
whose interests were served by the constant resort to military means. 
This turned into a more general critique of the Western political order. 
The difference now was the stress on issues of gender and race as 
factors which shaped power structures.37
One example of this shift was Ken Booth, who had become an 
increasingly critical voice within the mainstream, but then began 
to take an increasingly radical stance.38 Booth was at Aberystwyth, 
which became the centre of critical security studies in the UK.39 
Whereas a previous Head of Department, John Garnett, had praised 
the virtues of common sense and warned against the subject becoming 
too complex and esoteric,40 now postmodernism was used to question 
Western habits of thought, stressing the emancipatory potential of 
international relations in contrast to supporting the status quo.41 One 
of the challenges for this way of thinking was that it was removed 
from the main political parties in its language and concepts. In its 
most Foucault-driven manifestations, it was not always expressed in 
36  See Barnaby, Frank and Egbert Bouker (1982) Defence Without Offence: Non-nuclear Defence 
for Europe, Peace Studies Paper No. 8, Bradford University; The Alternative Defence Commission 
(1983) Defence without the Bomb: The Report of the Alternative Defence Commission, London: 
Taylor and Francis.
37  On the changing character of security studies, see Buzan, Barry and  Lene Hansen 
(2009), The Evolution Of International Security Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan has been an innovative figure in international relations who also contributed to strategic 
studies. See Buzan, Barry (1987) An Introduction To Strategic Studies: Military Technology And 
International Relations, London: Macmillan.
38  Booth, Ken (1991) ‘Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice’, International 
Affairs 67(3), pp. 527–45.
39  For a while, a Welsh School was identified as distinct from an English School, until Booth 
decided there was nothing particularly Welsh about it.
40  Garnett, John (1984) Commonsense and the Theory of International Relations, London: 
Macmillan.
41  Richard Wyn Jones became a leading exponent of the Welsh School. See Jones, Richard 
Wyn (1999) Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
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a form that was intelligible to a lay audience.42 With the growth of 
the universities came new forms of funding, and publications became 
a key indicator of value, whether or not they were actually read. 
If anything, the study of international relations became progressively 
detached from its practice. 
The most important shift was in the nature of international relations. 
After the alarm that accompanied what Fred Halliday called the Second 
Cold War in the early 1980s43 came the second shock of the complete 
end of the Cold War. Whatever may be said about the prescience 
of Western scholars in anticipating this development, there is an 
important story in the role of British academics in helping it along. 
As already noted, one role played by Chatham House and other think 
tanks was in keeping open some sort of dialogue with the Soviet bloc.44 
This was done through the regular round tables organised by Chatham 
House (the first of which had met in 1975), or the form of informal 
diplomacy practiced by John Erickson, who arranged meetings with 
Soviet figures in Edinburgh.45 Some of this was done in response to 
what was seen as an overly hawkish attitude taken by Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher. Yet Thatcher held a number of day-long seminars 
with academics at Chequers on security issues and took note of what 
they said. It was at one of these seminars that Archie Brown of Oxford 
University expressed the view that change was coming in the Soviet 
Union, and that Britain should seek to cultivate the next generation. 
As a result of this, Mikhail Gorbachev was invited to London even 
before he had taken power in Moscow. At an extraordinary small 
meeting with specialists in the Soviet economy and arms control, 
Thatcher was fully briefed on the challenges that Gorbachev would 
42  For a critique of this trend, see Wallace, William (1996) ‘Review: Truth and Power, Monks 
and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations’, Review of International Studies 
22(3), pp. 301–21. Wallace warned against self-indulgence, detachment from political life, 
and refuge in abstractions, theories, and meta-theories. This prompted a lively debate, with 
key figures from Aberystwyth, such as Ken Booth and Steve Smith, arguing for a wider view 
of politics, focused more on civil society.
43  Halliday, Fred (1983) The Making of the Second Cold War, London: Verso.
44  See Pravda, Alex and Peter Duncan (1970) Soviet-British Relations since the 1970s, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
45  The Guardian (2002) ‘Humanities: John Erickson’. Available at: www.theguardian.com/
news/2002/feb/12/guardianobituaries.humanities.
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face and the value of establishing a constructive relationship with 
him. The meeting with Gorbachev ended with Thatcher’s famous 
proclamation that here was a man with whom she could do business.46
While it was hard to complain about the end of the Cold War, as the 
world suddenly seemed a safer place, there was an abrupt obsolescence 
of expertise. Hard-earned knowledge on verification and arms control, 
first strikes, and NATO doctrine appeared irrelevant. Then suddenly 
new types of expertise were required as Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait, followed by its liberation by an American-led coalition, 
and then the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart. In addition to 
a grasp of actual military operations, rather than hypothetical nuclear 
exchanges, it was now necessary to have an understanding of regional 
conflicts, or how weak states could fall apart under pressure. The new 
issues involved questions of intervention in internal conflicts and 
then, later, the challenges of terrorism.
In some ways, the universities found it easier to respond to these 
challenges than the think tanks. This was partly because they were 
growing as the Cold War came to an end, but also because new 
disciplines — such as sociology and anthropology — were now needed 
to deal with the new types of conflict in which ethnicity seemed to 
play a prominent role, and knowledge of areas such as the Middle East 
and the Balkans was required. Although the think tanks soon caught 
up, and were able to use their international networks to develop the 
necessary links with post-communist Europe, at first the necessary 
expertise tended to be more at hand in the universities, where there 
was also a supply of research students and post-doctorates who began 
to take on the weight of hard research. In addition, university-based 
academics, including Bob O’Neill, once at Oxford, engaged directly 
with a new generation of curious students, including young officers 
at the staff colleges.
46  See Brown, Archie (2008) ‘The Change to Engagement in Britain’s Cold War Policy: 
The  Origins of the Thatcher–Gorbachev Relationship‘, Journal of Cold War Studies 10(3). 
The  episode is described also in Moore, Charles (2015) Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized 
Biography, Vol. II: Everything She Wants, London: Allen Lane, pp. 231–2. I was there, but 
played a minor role. My main recollection was that, at the end of the meeting, after formidable 
briefings by Brown, Alec Nove, and Michael Kaser on the travails of the Soviet Union, to which 
she listened intently, Thatcher asked if they still believed in ‘world domination‘.
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V
This was a time of uncertainty and possibilities. My recollection, 
especially after 1985, is of a continuing conversation, conducted in 
the universities and think tanks, together with policy-makers and the 
media, about a world that was straining to escape from the constraints 
of the Cold War. The normal charge made against the strategic 
studies community of this period was that it failed to anticipate the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Looking back, I am unconvinced of this. 
The first half of the 1980s was tough, with an ailing Soviet leadership 
stubbornly clinging to the old ways, and a hawkish American President 
who seemed less interested in a comfortable détente than victory in 
the Cold War. By the second half of the decade, it was evident that 
something was up, and, as we have seen, the astute Soviet-watchers 
of the period knew that the current system was untenable and would 
change when a new leadership took over. How it would change could 
not be known. It depended on decisions to be made, not least in the 
Kremlin. By the last years of the 1980s, few doubted that important 
changes were underway, and much time was spent speculating on how 
far Gorbachev would dare go in reforming the system. 
In addition, security issues in a variety of regions were becoming 
detached from the East–West confrontation. This had become clear 
in the Middle East, where Iran and Iraq were at war for most of the 
decade. A glance at the Adelphi Papers of the 1980s illustrates the 
shift. In these pre-blogging years, there was a lag from commissioning 
to publication, which explains the number of papers on ballistic 
missile defence that came out a few years after Reagan’s ‘star wars’ 
speech of March 1983. But there were also regular papers on regional 
changes, from East Asia to the Mediterranean, and two papers on 
the Iran–Iraq war. The 1988 IISS conference was on changes in the 
strategic landscape, published as Adelphi Papers the next year.
In practice, by the time the Cold War ended, it was less important for 
the management of the generality of international problems than it 
had been when it began. This meant that while the sudden surge of 
warmth between Moscow and Washington, and London, encouraged 
talk of a new era of peace, there were many international conflicts that 
had their own dynamic, independent of the wishes and interests of the 
great powers. Even in Europe, ideas that the collapse of communism 
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could somehow be managed as a sort of controlled explosion, without 
too much disruption, turned out to be too optimistic. Having lost a 
form of international order that appeared stable because of the balance 
of terror, there was a search to describe a new world order that was 
as stable but based on something more positive than a mutual fear 
of nuclear war. The search is still on.
Figure 1: Robert O’Neill receiving a prize from the Governor General, 
Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Scotch College Melbourne Speech Day, 
December 1954.
Figure 2: Captain Robert O’Neill briefing 5 RAR company commanders 
before an operation, Nui Dat, Vietnam, 1966.
Figure 3: Lieut-General Hermann Flörke with Sally, Robert and daughter 
Jenny on a walk near Giessen, Germany, 1 July 1973.
Figure 4: Robert O’Neill with US Secretary of State George P. Shultz, 
Washington DC, 1983.
Figure 5: Robert O’Neill with President Chun Doo Hwan, Seoul, 
Korea, 1984.
Figure 6: IISS/ACA ‘New Faces’ Conference, Bellagio, Italy, July 1984.
Front row, from left to right: Co-organiser William Kincade, Guest Practitioner (Lord) Denis 
Healey, Co-organiser Robert O’Neill, future US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, future 
French Minister for Social Affairs and Health Marisol Touraine. In the back row, behind Denis 
Healey, is John Chipman, future Director General of the IISS .
Figure 7: Robert O’Neill with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, 
Tokyo, 1986. 
Left to right: Mr Masataka Kosaka of the Foreign Ministry; Professor Masashi Nishihara; 
Robert O’Neill; Sir Michael Palliser, IISS Council Chairman; Mr Kiichi Saeki, Council Member .
Figure 8: Robert O’Neill with former US President Jimmy Carter, 
Emory University, Atlanta GA, 1985.
Figure 9: Robert O’Neill with Deputy Premier Li Peng, Beijing, 
September 1986.
Figure 10: Robert O’Neill with former US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, Tokyo, 1986.
Figure 11: Sir Michael Howard responding at a dinner to mark his 
70th birthday, All Souls College, Oxford, December 1992. 
At left is (Sir) Lawrence Freedman . At right is Robert O’Neill .
Figure 12: Robert O’Neill at opening of new offices for the International 
Peace Academy, New York, 1992. 
At left is (Dr) Kate O’Neill . At right is Ambassador Olara Otunnu, President of the IPA .
Figure 13: Robert O’Neill, Honorary Colonel, The 5th Royal Green 
Jackets, Oxford, 1993–1999.
Figure 14: Robert O’Neill speaking at the Salzburg Seminar, 1994.
Figure 15: Robert O’Neill with Prime Minister Paul Keating, Sydney, 
before the first meeting of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination 
of Nuclear Weapons, 1995. 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans at right of second row, former US Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara at right of third row .
Figure 16: Robert O’Neill greeted by Prime Minister John Howard after 
the final meeting of the Canberra Commission, Sydney, 1996. 
Ambassadors Rolf Ekeus and Qian Jiadong are in centre .
Figure 17: At the Fiftieth Anniversary Conference of the IISS, 
Oxford, 1998. 
At left is Dr John Chipman, Director-General of the IISS, Sir Michael Howard, IISS President, 
and Robert O’Neill, Chairman of the IISS Council .
Figure 18: Robert O’Neill speaking to fellow members of the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Lone Pine, Gallipoli, 
June 1999.
Figure 19: Robert O’Neill, Chairman of Trustees of the Imperial War 
Museum, London, speaking at the opening of the Holocaust Exhibition 
in the presence of HM Queen Elizabeth II, HRH Prince Philip, Duke of 




The Uncomfortable Wars 
of the 1990s
John Nagl and Octavian Manea
The Spirit of the 1990s
After the shock and awe of Operation Desert Storm, in which one of us 
participated directly, the remainder of the 1990s confronted the West 
with a series of instabilities of a different nature. The post-Cold War 
security environment reflected less the typical challenges generated 
by strong powers that, for centuries, were at the core of the main 
international rivalries, and more a world of challenges produced by 
weak and failed states. Where the problems of the short twentieth 
century (1914–1991) were caused by states that were too strong and 
wanted to expand their borders, the problems of the decades that 
followed would be caused by states that were too weak to govern 
within their own borders. It was a world shaped not by the classical 
balance of power, as in the past, but increasingly by a balance of 
weakness. The new reality produced two immediate consequences. 
On one side, there was a shifting away from the paradigm of symmetric 
state-to-state conflict toward intrastate wars, where religious and 
ethnic identities, as well as communities and groups, were the key 
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variables shaping the violence cycles.1 Sectarian and ethnic security 
dilemmas, well orchestrated by interested elites, swamped the 
public space by amplifying group fears. It was the moment of cold-
blooded opportunists such as Slobodan Milosevic, Ratko Mladic, and 
Mohamed Farah Aideed, who understood human nature and knew 
that the instinct of resorting to violence ‘has been deeply seated in our 
stock for hundreds of thousands of years’.2 
They just needed to nurture the right conditions and mobilise those 
fears against the right target for their own benefit. As Robert O’Neill 
put it:
The leaders of religious, ethnic and immigrant communities, and of 
political parties or factions thereof, will continue to draw on this source 
of influence and exploit it both for indirect leverage in bargaining and 
for direct effect in conflict when all else seems likely to fail. Thus it is 
more at this level than that of nations that we must aim our policies in 
post-Cold War Europe.3
On the other side, the societal dimension of modern warfare took 
primacy of place. To win back its legitimacy, ‘the government must 
address contentious, long ignored, but popular issues tied to key facets 
of national life (socio-political, economic, educational, juridical)’.4 
In  fact, it was this societal dimension that endangered Europe the 
most, particularly the 
avalanche of chaos falling on the West from the Centre, East and South 
… The causes of such dangers lie primarily in the weak, defective 
political structures of most of the states on Europe’s southern and 
eastern flank … In many of them corruption and maladministration 
are rife. Several are disintegrating.5
1  Snyder, Jack (2007) ‘International Sources of Interstate and Intrastate War’, in Chester A. 
Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds) Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management 
in a Divided World, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. 19.
2  O’Neill, Robert (1998) ‘Europe and the Wider World: The Security Challenge’, in Ken Booth 
(ed.) Statecraft And Security. The Cold War and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 198.
3  Ibid.
4  Galvin, John R. (1986) ‘Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm’, Parameters 26(4), p. 6.
5  O’Neill, Robert (1998) ‘Europe and the Wider World: The Security Challenge’, in Ken Booth 
(ed.) Statecraft And Security. The Cold War and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 198–9.
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This structural reality would ultimately trigger the Western 
interventionism in former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo 
(1999), but it was also instrumental in laying the ground for successive 
NATO and EU enlargements to the east.
Unfortunately, Western military establishments were deeply 
entrenched in the interstate paradigm and resistant to move beyond 
their organisational culture.6 But the new societal dimensions of 
warfare —  requiring roles as diverse as peacekeeping, providing 
humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, post-conflict reconstruction, 
and counterinsurgency — were not amendable to solution by what 
General Anthony Zinni called ‘a Cold-War era military machine’.7 
As Robert O’Neill put it:
Gone are the days when NATO armies could plan around a single 
mission … [T]hey still have to be able to fight, of course, but they 
have to be able to do many other things as well, from re-building 
shattered cities to supervising elections … [T]heir inherited Cold War 
skills, structures and approaches can sometimes be irrelevant or even 
counterproductive. Future development has to address responsibilities 
that will be much more intrinsically political in nature, such as the 
promotion of democratisation, support for human rights, policing of 
international law and the apprehension of war criminals.8 
The struggle between entrenched organisational culture and new 
strategic requirements became the hallmark of the civil–military gap 
that defined the debates inside the Clinton Administration during the 
1990s, and marked the first generation of the next century.
6  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 26.
7  Zinni, Anthony C. (2001) ‘A Military for the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from the Recent 
Past’, Strategic Forum 181. Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/sf181.htm.
8  O’Neill, Robert (1997) ‘The Remaking of Modern Armies Post Cold War’, in Peter Dennis 
and Grey Jeffrey (eds) The Second Fifty Years: The Australian Army 1947–1997, Canberra: 
Australian Defence Force Academy, pp. 3–4.
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Black Hawk Down Meets Assertive 
Multilateralism
Bill Clinton did not run for the Presidency on his foreign policy 
credentials; to the contrary, ‘it’s the economy, stupid’ was the focus 
of his campaign. The theme resonated with the American public, who 
were reluctant to support a muscular role on the global stage after 
victory in the Cold War. Richard Holbrooke, one of the core members 
of the Clinton team, captured well the public mood: 
In the decade before 9/11, Americans had turned away from the 
outside world after 60 years of continuous and expensive international 
involvement, from Pearl Harbor to the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union at the end of 1991. Americans were proud, of course, that their 
sacrifices had succeeded in defeating both fascism and communism 
during that long period, but they were exhausted and ready to turn 
inward.9 
It was the end of history, the time of peace dividends, not of overseas 
interventions in non-strategic internal conflicts.10 The only nation 
building to be done was here at home;11 ‘In the glow of having won 
the cold war, Americans felt that they could rest on the assurance of 
the security its superpower status provided.’12
The US mission in Somalia evolved from a purely humanitarian one 
to fighting local militias and hunting rogue leaders almost without 
Washington noticing the change.13 The end result was the ‘Black Hawk 
Down’ moment on 3 October 1993, when 18 Americans were killed on 
the streets of Mogadishu while the image of angry mobs celebrating 
shocked America and the world. The net effect was an increased 
reluctance in congress to engage internationally, and public opinion 
decided to stay away from foreign entanglements. For  President 
9  Chollet, Derek and Samantha Powers (eds) (2011) The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke 
in the World, Philadelphia: Public Affairs, p. 227.
10  Soderberg, Nancy (2005) The Superpower Myth: The Use And Misuse of American Might, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 18.
11  Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier (2008) America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, 
New York: Public Affairs, p. 57.
12  Soderberg, Nancy (2005) The Superpower Myth: The Use And Misuse of American Might, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 20.
13  Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier (2008) America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, 
New York: Public Affairs, p. 93.
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Clinton, this was an essential learning moment: ‘I know we can 
intervene in these little countries with great ease and the first seventy-
two hours go really well. But I am concerned what happens after that. 
I don’t want to do Haiti unless I’m confident there’s a plan for the day 
after.’14 As Robert O’Neill would emphasise:
There has always been a high correlation between success in war 
and ability to achieve a clean termination — although this has not 
been recognised widely until recently. We now acknowledge the 
importance of the exit strategy. Ideas on what makes a successful 
conclusion and how to disengage after achieving it need to be thought 
through before beginning a war or intervention, and not after it has 
begun to go awry.15
The direct outcome of this heightened sensitivity toward an exit 
strategy was Presidential Decision Directive 25. Adopted in May 1994, 
it focused on clarifying the criteria for US participation in multilateral 
peace operations. The document emphasised the need for clearly 
defined objectives, sufficient forces, and realistic criteria for ending 
American participation in overseas adventures. It was very much a 
product of its times, with Somalia and Vietnam traumas and the Powell 
Doctrine being the main drivers.16 In fact, the combined legacies of the 
two perceived quagmires would greatly impact the American use of 
force in the 1990s, with ‘memories of Mogadishu which hung over our 
deliberations like a dark cloud; and Vietnam, which lay further back, 
in the inner recesses of our minds’, as Richard Holbrooke would later 
say about Dayton.17 
There were two broad camps that shaped the debate inside the White 
House, related to the question of how to use unipolar power to 
respond to the challenges of the new security environment. On one 
side there was a generation shaped by a certain reading of the Vietnam 
quagmire. Against this formative experience, an entire generation of 
14  Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler (2009) In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the 
National Security Advisers and the Presidents they Served: From JFK to George W. Bush, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, p. 232.
15  O’Neill, Robert (1999) ‘Success and Failure in War in the Twentieth Century’, paper at 
the Second Symposium of   War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century: Reflections upon the 
Century of War, Tokyo, October 7–8, 1999, p. 117. Available at: www.nids.go.jp/english/event/
symposium/pdf/1999/sympo_e1999_3.pdf.
16  Davidson, Janine (2010) Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern 
War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 84.
17  Ibid., p. 92.
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officers became the guardians (to use the term of the historian Brian 
McAllister Linn) of a proper use of force, of a betrayed way of war 
that should not have been distracted by nation-building. For them, 
‘Vietnam provided a collective identity’18 symbolising the essence of 
all wrongs and of how not to fight a war. For General Colin Powell, 
it reflected a ‘belief in using all the force necessary to achieve the 
kind of decisive and successful result that we had achieved in the 
invasion of Panama and in Operation Desert Storm’.19 It also expressed 
a promise: ‘Many of my generation, the career captains, majors, and 
lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn 
came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted 
warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not 
understand or support’, as Powell would write in his memoirs.20 In this 
interpretation, incrementalism, the use of force in small progressive 
doses, was a recipe for disaster. It was the equivalent of ‘not being 
allowed to fight to win’.21 Instead, they favoured an overwhelming 
force paradigm, or ‘the  bully’s way of going to war’,22 but only in 
circumstances that displayed realistic achievable political outcomes, 
clear exit strategies, and in the service of direct US vital national 
interests. The Weinberger-Powell doctrine reflected ‘a utilitarian 
realistic yardstick’,23 an ‘intervention test’,24 a set of guidelines that 
should be applied any time America would go to war. There were 
many inside the Clinton administration for whom the Powell Doctrine 
was raising questions — ‘the kind of which we should have asked 
in Vietnam’ as Tony Lake, Clinton’s first national security advisor, 
18  Linn, Brian McAllister (2009) The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, p. 195.
19  Powell, Colin with Tony Koltz (2012) It Worked For Me: In Life and Leadership, ebook 
edition, New York: HarperCollins, loc. 2634.
20  Chollet, Derek and Samantha Powers (eds) (2011) The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke 
in the World, Philadelphia: Public Affairs, p. 214.
21  Davidson, Janine (2004), ‘Giving Peace a Chance: The Modern Military’s Struggle Over 
Peace Operations’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 15(2), p. 176.
22  Buley, Benjamin (2008) The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political 
Utility of Force, New York: Routledge, p. 67.
23  Handel, Michael I. (2001) Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, London: Frank Cass, 
p. 246.
24  Smith, Rupert (2006) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, London: 
Penguin Books, p. 309.
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put it.25 From this perspective, the Bosnia and Somalia entanglements 
were simply a déjà vu of those specific political and military errors, 
a replay of the Vietnam War: 
[W]henever the military had a clear set of objectives … as in Panama, 
the Philippine coup, and Desert Storm, the result has been a success. 
When the nation’s policy was murky or nonexistent —  the Bay of 
Pigs, Vietnam, creating a Marine presence in Lebanon — the result 
has been a disaster. In Bosnia, we were dealing with an ethnic tangle 
with roots reaching back a thousand years.26 
In the 1990s, this reluctance to use force in outlier cases — especially 
in areas considered outside US vital interests — that didn’t fit the very 
strict criteria developed by the Powell doctrine came to be described 
as Vietmalia syndrome.27 In practice, this described ‘the collective 
aversion to both nation building and casualties’.28 At a deeper level, 
it reflected a profound reluctance on behalf of the US military to deal 
with the societal dimension of warfare — the underlying domestic 
political roots of the new wars — that the trends and realities pushed 
towards it at the forefront of the post-Cold War world. In short, 
it was a policy meant to ensure that the military would only fight the 
comfortable, speedy wars that they wanted to fight, on their terms: 
‘win decisively, and come home swiftly with few casualties and to 
great public approval.’29 It was also the embodiment of a specific 
organisational culture, one suited for the political imperatives of the 
industrial war paradigm — for Desert Storm-like operations, but not 
for wars amongst the people ‘where the object is the will of the people, 
where the enemy is operating as guerillas, or where conditions of 
acceptable governance are to be created and maintained’.30
25  Interview with Anthony Lake (2002) Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available at: 
millercenter.org/oralhistory/interview/anthony-lake-2002.
26  Soderberg, Nancy (2005) The Superpower Myth: The Use And Misuse of American Might, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 23.
27  Chollet, Derek and Samantha Powers (eds) (2011) The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke 
In The World, Philadelphia: Public Affairs, p. 215.
28  Davidson, Janine (2010) Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern 
War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 90.
29  Davidson, Janine (2013) ‘Civil–Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: 
Explaining the Broken Dialogue’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 43(1), p. 143.
30  Smith, Rupert (2006) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, London: 
Penguin Books, p. 310.
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On the other side of the Clinton Administration, there was a group 
with a different mindset that had a much more nuanced interpretation 
of what the American role in the post-Cold War world should be. 
They  believed in affirming US leadership and power, including 
through  the limited use of America’s military power, in the service 
of ‘assertive multilateralism’.31 Their lessons were not Vietnam 
related, but reflected the legacies of Munich and the Holocaust as 
‘the benchmark horrors’32 of a previous interwar period that was 
shaped by the absence of America from the world stage. It was a 
generation of policy-makers with Wilsonian tones, for whom human 
rights, democracy, and liberal values should be at the core of US 
foreign policy.33 Its informal leader was Madeleine Albright, a refugee 
from Czechoslovakia and ‘the  hawk of the administration that was 
always pressing for stronger US action against repression, especially 
in Europe’.34 What mattered most for them were the failures of past 
collective security organisations to act when international peace and 
security was threatened. From this perspective, the collapse of former 
Yugoslavia and its ripple effects (between 1991 and 1995 the death 
toll was close to a staggering 300,000) provided a textbook case: it 
was ‘the greatest collective security failure of the West [in Europe] 
since the 1930s’,35 and many in the Clinton Administration were 
determined not to let happen again. This resonated deeply with the 
personal experiences of both Albright and Holbrooke, for whom 
the past European tragedies of communism and Nazism were deeply 
ingrained in the background of their families. In Holbrooke’s case, 
the sense of European history was even more amplified — both of his 
parents were refugees from Nazism, and his wife, Kati Marton, was a 
Jewish refugee from Hungary, a country left within the Iron Curtain’s 
deadly embrace.36 At the same time, they were part of a generation 
that believed that past European tragedies 
31  Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier (2008) America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, 
New York: Public Affairs, p. 69.
32  Ibid.
33  Ibid., p. 82.
34  Soderberg, Nancy (2005) The Superpower Myth: The Use And Misuse of American Might, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 15.
35  Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier (2008) America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, 
New York: Public Affairs, p. 269.
36  Chollet, Derek and Samantha Powers (eds) (2011) The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke 
in the World, Philadelphia: Public Affairs, p. 165.
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demonstrated that the maintenance of stability in Europe is 
a multilateral problem. There is no invisible hand to keep its nations 
from colliding with each other. If all interpretation of state behaviour 
is done on a unilateral basis by other states, suspicions and mistrust 
will accumulate.37
At the time, the philosophical gap between the two schools of thought 
came to be symbolised by the historical exchange between the risk-
averse mindset of General Colin Powell (the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff), and Madeleine Albright (the US Ambassador at the 
UN) who famously asked: ‘What’s the point of having this superb 
military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?’38 
A compromise was ultimately mediated, preparing the ground for the 
coercive diplomacy campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, the hallmarks 
of a new post-Cold War interventionism. It was a prudent embracing 
of those who advocated a humanitarian intervention doctrine, 
a combination between
those who bring a heartfelt passion to the issues but then an essential 
skepticism and moderation as they apply their minds to the issues. 
Because when you move from ideals to ideology you get in trouble. 
That was certainly the great lesson of Vietnam.39
Nobody will better sum up this compromise that captured the logic 
of the Clinton wars, than General Wesley Clark: ‘if you line up 
international law, good diplomacy, and modern military power, you 
can achieve strategically decisive results without decisive force.’40
Over time, the interpretation of threats that the instabilities in the 
Balkans posed to NATO and to US interests gradually changed. 
The  new consensus reflected the conviction that, left unchecked, 
the spilling over effects could challenge regional stability in Europe: 
‘mindful of the fact that seen decades earlier, violence in the region 
had triggered a world war, Clinton recognised that Milosevic’s 
37  O’Neill, Robert (1998) ‘Europe and the Wider World: The Security Challenge’, in Ken Booth 
(ed.) Statecraft And Security. The Cold War and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 196.
38  Buley, Benjamin (2008) The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political 
Utility of Force, New York: Routledge, p. 80.
39  Interview with Anthony Lake (2002) Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available at: 
millercenter.org/oralhistory/interview/anthony-lake-2002.
40  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 258.
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dream of Greater Serbia and his campaign of ethnic cleansing could 
have grave consequences for the rest of Europe’.41 For Tony Lake, 
the National Security Advisor in the first Clinton Administration, 
the danger was clear: ‘the war in Bosnia could have sparked a wider 
conflagration in Europe, affecting some of America’s NATO allies and 
many of the continent’s new democracies.’42 Imagining the result if the 
international community had not intervened: 
[T]he Serbs would have continued their offensive; more than a million 
and a half Kosovars would today be sitting in camps or starving in the 
hills with no hope of return; Milosevic would be strengthened; and 
in a region with many unresolved ethnic tensions, potential dictators 
would have learned the lesson that massive violence will draw no 
response from the international community.43
A Syria avant la lettre at NATO’s doorstep.
In Bosnia and Kosovo, the core signature of the American way of 
war during the 1990s was the use of airpower and precision guided 
munitions (PGMs) to coerce and compel an adversary. In part, the choice 
was rooted in the risk-adverse mindset, or the body bags syndrome, 
displayed by the US military in campaigns that essentially were wars 
of choice that did not reflect American vital national interests (such as 
Lebanon or Somalia). On the other hand, there was a belief that in 
the post-Desert Storm age of PGMs, airpower could make a huge 
difference by providing a clean, surgical strike capability to be used 
in limited coercive diplomacy campaigns designed to compel the other 
side to change behaviour or negotiate. It captured the mindset of the 
senior civilian officials in the Clinton Administration — the so-called 
Surgical Strike School — who assumed a high degree of precision in 
the application of limited force, but also an ability to ‘achieve limited 
political objectives’ without escalating the effort.44 The major flaw of 
this approach was that it fundamentally ignored the human domain, 
those societal forces that make people tick and move communities 
41  Soderberg, Nancy (2005) The Superpower Myth: The Use And Misuse of American Might, 
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, p. 77.
42  Lake, Anthony (2000) Six Nightmares, New York: Hachette Book Group, p. 114.
43  Steinberg, James (1999) ‘A Perfect Polemic: Blind to Reality on Kosovo’, Foreign Affairs 78(6), 
pp. 128–33. Available at: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/kosovo/1999-11-01/perfect-polemic-
blind-reality-kosovo.
44  Zenko, Micah (2010) Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-
Cold War World, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 24.
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at the grass-root level (‘ethnic divisions, traditional relationships, 
ideology, religion, attitudes, nationalism, beliefs, family structure, 
customs, culture’) while the core focus of the US military remained 
on ‘machines, organization, equipment, maximizing firepower, 
reducing casualties, accurate employment of weapons on target’.45 
The combined outcome of the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine and the 
Surgical Strike School was an army unprepared for campaigns ‘more 
politically complicated than Desert Storm … Although the military 
knew how to win battles, it had no sense of how to use American 
power to achieve political objectives — to win wars.’46
Arguably one of the most influential thinkers at the time was John 
Warden, an air force fighter pilot whose ideas about the use of 
airpower were instrumental in developing the Desert Storm’s air 
campaign. He understood the enemy as a system, as a collection 
of multiple centres of gravity, of points ‘where the enemy is most 
vulnerable and where an attack will have the best chance of being 
decisive’.47 The five rings48 that Warden listed — leadership, key 
industrial production, infrastructure, population, and fielded forces 
— would be at the forefront of the coercive acupuncture campaigns of 
the 1990s. For example, during Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia 
(September 1995), NATO disrupted the ability of the Bosnian Serbs 
to move their forces around the battlefield by effectively destroying 
their communications network.49 The emphasis was on cutting the 
communication between ‘the brain’ and ‘the muscles’ — as Adrian 
R. Lewis later put it, ‘the objective of operations was to destroy the 
system of nerves that transmitted orders from the brain to the muscles, 
severing the links between the decision makers and the fighting 
forces’.50 But what added to the coercive leverage of NATO was the 
synergy effect achieved in conjunction with the ground offensives of 
the Muslim and Croat forces that threatened the balance of power on 
45  Lewis, Adrian R. (2007) The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force 
from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, New York: Routledge, p. 391.
46  Nagl, John (2014) Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, New York: 
Penguin Books, p. 46.
47  Quoted in Kagan, Frederick W. (2006) Finding the Target: The Transformation of American 
Military Policy, New York: Encounter Books, p. 114.
48  Ibid., p. 121.
49  Ibid., p. 187.
50  Lewis, Adrian R. (2007) The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force 
from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, New York: Routledge, p. 389.
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the battlefield.51 The altered context played directly into the Bosnian 
Serbs’ fears of being dominated by competitive ethnicities, so rather 
than completely losing their defensive capacity, they decided to 
bargain and negotiate.52 For some in the Clinton Administration, the 
lesson was about the power of technology to compel an adversary 
to alter his behaviour: 
Imagine you were a Bosnian Serb in the 1995, as US troops used 
electronic warfare to find and cripple your radar and anti-aircraft 
missiles, and then hit you with accurate long-range strikes against 
which you had no effective response. No wonder you’d have concluded 
you stood a better chance of survival at the negotiating table than on 
the battlefield.53
The Kosovo campaign was a much more complicated story. 
For  Slobodan Milosevic and NATO, the symbolic stakes were much 
higher. Kosovo was the historical birthplace for the Serbian nation. 
NATO, an alliance in its 50s that year, couldn’t let the bloodshed and 
the ethnic cleansing orchestrated by Milosevic to continue without 
impunity. Its entire relevance in the post-Cold War world as a collective 
security organisation would have been otherwise questioned. The use 
of airpower was again considered as the ideal tool for changing 
Milosevic’s calculus. A Western ground component was excluded 
from the start because of the major political cleavages that might have 
caused the consensus in the Alliance to collapse.54 
There is another reason for which Washington was not fond of the 
idea of a ground option: 
[F]rom the air we had a thousand to one advantage on Milosevic. Once 
we got into those mountains of Yugoslavia where the Germans had 
been savaged — we were on the ground — our advantage was no 
longer a thousand to one. Maybe it was two to one. It would have been 
a daunting prospect to go over the Albanian Alps and send a land force 
into Belgrade … Once the Serbs got us on the ground, the possibility 
51  Byman, Daniel L. and Matthew C. Waxman (2008) ’Kosovo and the Great Air Power 
Debate’, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds) Strategic Studies: A Reader, London: 
Routledge, pp. 169–70. 
52  Kagan, Frederick W. (2006) Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military 
Policy, New York: Encounter Books, p. 187.
53  Lake, Anthony (2000) Six Nightmares, New York: Hachette Book Group, p. 81.
54  Daalder, Ivo H. (1999), ‘U.S. Diplomacy before the Kosovo War’, Brookings Institution, 
28 September. Available at: www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/1999/09/28balkans-daalder.
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for guerrilla attacks, insurgency, there were all these tunnels that had 
been dug in World War II to protect against invasion. It would have 
been a bloody mess.55 
But this gave Milosevic a certain window of opportunity to try to 
divide the Alliance and force the West to accept a different reality on 
the ground — a new ethnic balance. It followed a highly incremental, 
low-intensity, politically micro-managed military campaign, 
‘one  that began small, the antithesis of Colin Powell’s insistence on 
overwhelming force’.56 The focus was very much on the centres of 
gravity highlighted by John Warden, but in reverse priority, starting 
with ‘the outermost ring and gradually worked into the inner rings 
—  critical infrastructure, command and control nodes, and finally, 
just at the end of the campaign, the leadership itself’.57 A fierce 
debate started between General Wesley Clark (at the time NATO’s 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and Lt. Gen. Michael Short 
(at the time in charge of directing the air operations against Serbia). 
Clark wanted the airpower to be used primarily against the Serbian 
forces (tanks and irregular light units) operating in Kosovo against the 
Albanian local population, while for Short ‘the jewel in the crown’ 
was represented by the high-impact, but politically sensitive targets 
in downtown Belgrade.58 Gradually the campaign evolved closer to 
hitting the regime as the factories of Milosevic’s cronies.59 It was not 
until Milosevic understood, however, that NATO had the political 
resolve to wage a ground campaign that he finally capitulated.60 Blair 
and Clinton were publicly talking about all options being on the table. 
There was a larger, highly visible, choreographic effort designed to 
persuade Milosevic that the Alliance was dead serious: elements of 
the 82nd Airborne Division were deployed in the region while 25,000 
55  Interview with Samuel R. Berger (2005) Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available at: 
millercenter.org/oralhistory/interview/samuel-r-berger.
56  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 258.
57  Kagan, Frederick W. (2006) Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military 
Policy, New York: Encounter Books, p. 191.
58  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 264–5.
59  Interview with Samuel R. Berger (2005) Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available at: 
millercenter.org/oralhistory/interview/samuel-r-berger.
60  Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler (2009) In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the 
National Security Advisers and the Presidents they Served: From JFK to George W. Bush, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, p. 243.
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NATO troops were dispatched in Albania and Macedonia.61 Still, the 
Kosovo air campaign was an ugly victory (as Ivo Daalder and Michael 
O’Hanlon would say at the time): 78 days of targeting; 26,600 bombs 
and missiles; 10,000 Kosovar Albanians killed; and more than 863,000 
civilians leaving Kosovo during the campaign.62 The larger lesson to 
be taken at a time when Washington seemed to be again seduced by 
its promises might be that airpower should always be used in synergy 
with other instruments of power, because in Kosovo ‘the air campaign 
by itself had not achieved the desired political and military ends, 
and that the determination to fight an air-only campaign rendered air 
power itself significantly less effective’.63
In retrospect, the legacy of the Clinton interventionism — Haiti, 
Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo — was about establishing a new playbook, re-
writing the old rules of the road, and pushing for redefining the rights 
and obligations of state sovereignty — the building block of the 
international order. ‘Nobody gave us a book when we came in. The old 
way clearly wasn’t working. The world had fundamentally changed. 
The way you do business has to change, but how you do it took a 
while’, reflected Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs.64 It was an imperative for a world where 
the main threats to international peace and security were generated 
from within states, by governments that were knocking out their own 
people. Figuring out and implementing the new rules was a messy 
process, but ultimately ‘he brilliantly moved the United States from 
the Cold War into the post-Cold War, or 21st-century era’.65 By 1999, 
the nature of conversation was fundamentally changed. There was 
an increasing emphasis on a doctrine of international community. 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair captured the new zeitgeist: 
61  Byman, Daniel L. and Matthew C. Waxman (2008) ‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power 
Debate’, in Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo (eds) Strategic Studies: A Reader, London: 
Routledge, p. 167.
62  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 266.
63  Kagan, Frederick W. (2006) Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military 
Policy, New York: Encounter Books, p. 194.
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The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the 
circumstances in which we should get actively involved in other 
people’s conflicts. Non-interference has long been considered an 
important principle of international order … But the principle of non-
interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide 
can never be a purely internal matter.66
This is the spirit that harnessed what was later codified as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm — when national governments 
fail in their fundamental duty to protect their own citizens or are 
the perpetrators of large scale killing against them, it is the right 
of international community to intervene in order to substitute this 
responsibility67 — which, years later, was instrumental in preparing 
the ground for the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011.
The campaigns against Iraq during the 1990s can also be understood 
through the framework of R2P. Saddam Hussein never stopped being 
a focus for the Clinton Administration, but was mainly perceived as a 
containable threat to its own citizens in the south (the Shia population) 
and in the north (the Kurds). It is in this context that ‘the Clinton 
administration contemplated military action against him only to 
uphold the no-fly zones and to contain his ambition to build weapons 
of mass destruction’.68 The No Fly Zones (NFZs) were a reflection of 
the belief that sovereignty didn’t provide local leaders a blank check 
to use force against their own people. Overall, the NFZs established 
in Iraq were highly successful in keeping Iraqi airpower outside 
the northern and southern parts of the country, but were much less 
successful in deterring ground troops from attacking the Shia and 
Kurd populations.69 
During the 1990s, global terrorism was on the rise. The plot to destroy 
the World Trade Center (February 1993) and the attacks against US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998) reflected the new 
trend. Bin Laden himself became a target for the US Government, 
66 PBS Newshour (1999) ‘The Blair Doctrine’, 22 April. Available at: www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/.
67  Rice, Susan E. and Andrew J. Loomis (2007) ‘The Evolution of Humanitarian Intervention 
and the Responsibility to Protect’, in Ivo Daalder (ed.) Beyond Preemption: Force and Legitimacy 
in a Changing World, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, p. 83.
68  Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier (2008) America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, 
New York: Public Affairs, p. 206.
69  Zenko, Micah (2010) Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-
Cold War World, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 29.
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but, absent a 9/11 provocation, nobody was willing to use force on 
an extensive scale against Afghanistan as the state that presumably 
hosted him. Even the offshore strikes against the terrorist training 
camps were criticised on the Hill. However, at the end of Clinton 
Administration, Sandy Berger warned Rice: ‘You’re going to spend 
more time during your four years on terrorism generally and al-Qaeda 
specifically than any other issue.’70
The interventions in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, and Kosovo were 
also instrumental in clarifying ‘a new understanding of America’s 
place in the world’.71 For Albright and Holbrooke, the crises of the 
post-Cold War world showed the need for decisive US leadership, 
and prepared the ground for affirming America as an indispensable 
power in managing the most pressing threats to international peace 
and security:
The world’s richest nation, one that presumes to great moral authority, 
cannot simply make worthy appeals to conscience and call on others 
to carry the burden. The world will look to Washington for more than 
rhetoric the next time we face a challenge to peace.72
From Containment to Enlargement
None of the military interventions launched by the Clinton 
Administration during the 1990s has any meaning outside of the 
enlargement framework that, in the end, captures the essence of his 
terms. In a way, this can be seen as a larger effort of the first truly post-
Cold War presidency to shape the new era and articulate a coherent 
vision of the role of America in a new world.73 From its early days, 
the Clinton Administration made a constant, conscious search for 
developing a substitute to the containment doctrine that provided 
a clear-cut strategic rationale for the Cold War. The White House 
70  Daalder, Ivo H. and I. M. Destler (2009) In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the 
National Security Advisers and the Presidents they Served: From JFK to George W. Bush, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, p. 248.
71  Chollet, Derek and James Goldgeier (2008) America Between the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, 
New York: Public Affairs, p. 206.
72  Zenko, Micah (2010) Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-
Cold War World, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 29.
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needed to come up with a new grand strategy construct, as well as 
a core organising principle, able to set the direction for the US post-
Cold War foreign policy. It is in this context that, in September 1993, 
Anthony Lake, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, proposed a new guiding principle: 
Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market 
democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly 
in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of 
containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the 
world’s free community of market democracies.74 
An important emphasis here was on providing the institutional regional 
framework that was able to stabilise, encourage, and consolidate new 
democracies in key regions. In part, this is the role that NATO played 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the last 20 years. In this 
interpretation, NATO is much more than a traditional political and 
military alliance or standard collective defence organisation. That is 
certainly at its core, but deeply embedded in its historical DNA is a 
transformative power: ‘Even as NATO held the line against the Soviet 
Army, it drew France and Germany together. It helped integrate Italy 
and, eventually Spain, into the community of democracies. It  gave 
shattered economies the confidence to recover.’75 Specifically, in the 
former Warsaw Pact countries, by incentivising the reforming of 
military establishments, the restructuring of civil–military relations 
and playing the role of ‘a magnet to build their democracies, settle their 
border disputes and deal with their minorities issues in an appropriate 
way’,76 NATO would secure the domestic transitions77 under way in a 
highly sensitive region. The CEE countries were disposed in the near 
proximity of the Balkans, which at the time were massively ravaged 
by ethnic wars. The danger of spilling over was very real, especially in 
countries such as Romania and Hungary, where nationalistic impulses 
and zero-sum optics flooded the public space. It was in this sense that 
74  Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, ’From 
Containment to Enlargement’, Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International 
Studies, Washington DC, 21 September 1993.
75  Remarks of James B. Steinberg, Director, Policy Planning Staff, US Department of State, 
‘Advancing NATO’s Adaptation’, Atlantic Council of the United States, 13 June l996.
76  Interview with Samuel R. Berger (2005) Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available at: 
millercenter.org/oralhistory/interview/samuel-r-berger.
77  Ikenberry, G. John (2001) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding 
of Order After Major Wars, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 236–7.
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NATO enlargement acted as an engine for change by transforming 
societal impulses and empowering the reformist forces. Ultimately, 
the NATO expansion secured those countries and incentivised them 
to fix some of those structural weaknesses that plagued the former 
communist countries and were instrumental in the collapse of former 
Yugoslavia. Over time, the success of NATO enlargement prepared the 
ground for the EU expansion. In the end, the Clintonian enlargement 
framework reflected the spirit of the order —  building projects 
designed to stabilise post-1945 international relations.78 It was a way 
to tame the ghosts of the past, the legacies of ‘unresolved and often 
conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and, most dangerous, 
territorial and ethnic disputes’, but at the same time spread the seeds 
of transformative forces, without which ‘these lands remain vulnerable 
to the same problems, often exacerbated by an obsession with righting 
historical wrongs, real or mythical’.79 
It was debates over the Balkan wars that marked John Nagl’s return to 
Oxford to study again under Professor O’Neill in 1995. Having served in 
a cavalry squadron that led the eventual American intervention, Nagl 
was keenly aware of the debates enumerated here, and cognisant of the 
lessons O’Neill taught from his own experience as a young army officer 
in Vietnam. It was the combination of O’Neill’s combat experience in 
that war and Nagl’s own in Operation Desert Storm that convinced 
Nagl, with O’Neill’s support and advice, that counterinsurgency 
would soon return to the forefront of strategic thought. That led to the 
writing of a doctoral dissertation that would eventually be published 
as Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam.80
Redefining the role of NATO for a post-Cold War world has a second 
dimension that was very much at the core of the debates inside the 
Clinton Administration. From its early days, NATO was the main 
instrument designed to contain and deter Soviet power in Europe.81 
But in a world defined less by traditional aggression and more by the 
78  Ikenberry, G. John (2001) ‘What would a New Transatlantic Bargain Look Like?’, in Mark 
D. Ducasse (ed.) The Transatlantic Bargain, Rome: NATO Defense College, p. 83.
79  Chollet, Derek and Samantha Powers (eds) (2011) The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke 
in the World, Philadelphia: Public Affairs, p. 179.
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‘adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious 
economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries 
and territorial disputes’,82 NATO had to respond to new market niches, 
to the out of area instabilities that threatened European security. 
It was in this context that ‘the purpose of NATO was being defined 
in Bosnia and in Kosovo’.83 It was no longer about containing Russian 
power, but about crisis management in an unstable neighbourhood. In 
a way, NATO was still in the business of containment, but the enemy 
was not related to states that were too strong, but the chaos generated 
by states that were too weak.84 In short NATO had to adapt to an 
environment where ‘local conflicts, internal political and economic 
instability, and the return of historical grievances have now replaced 
Soviet expansionism as the greatest threat to peace in Europe’.85 
The  new profile that NATO adopted in the 1990s is very close to 
what Professor Robert O’Neill was proposing at the time, an Alliance 
for Development86 able to respond and remedy to the entrenched 
maladministration and pervasive weakness of the states in the land 
between Western Europe and Russia. He understood immediately 
the need to go beyond the core traditional military competencies 
that were part of the NATO traditional brand. Ultimately, the whole 
NATO adaptation reflected the spirit of the Alliance for Development 
because the entire process ‘aimed at the long-term building of secure, 
prosperous states which ultimately can either take their place as 
members of the EU, or enter into long, close and peaceful association 
with it’.87
But the post-Cold War NATO transformation was not without 
controversy. George Kennan was one of the most visceral critics of that 
decision. He considered the NATO enlargement as ‘the most fateful 
82  NATO (1991) ’The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept’. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/official_texts_23847.htm.
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Penguin Books, pp. 237–8.
85  Chollet, Derek and Samantha Powers (eds) (2011) The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke 
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error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era’,88 a tragic 
mistake that would humiliate and alienate Russia and empower the 
anti-reformist nationalist elites. After the Crimea annexation, that 
entire revisionist school was resurrected. They vindicate Kennan’s 
insight considering NATO expansion as ‘a bad idea with predictable 
bad results’,89 a punitive peace that exploited Russian disarray and 
one that Moscow had little choice but to swallow. But imagine how the 
CEE region would have looked in the absence of a NATO enlargement 
to the east. It would have been a gigantic Ukraine-like grey zone, 
a ring of hollow states with very weak, corrupted structures ripe for 
insidious subversion and intimidation in the proximity of the Russian 
Empire. In short, it would have provided the perfect target, the ideal 
playground for hybrid warfare. As Robert Kaplan pointed out recently, 
‘what the Putin regime likes the most is weak democracies’.90 These 
provide the right societal foundation for orchestrating all kinds of 
intelligence operations, for subversion, for corruption, for buying off 
politicians and influence. Seen in retrospect, NATO was responsible 
for clearing and holding the former Warsaw Pact countries by keeping 
them outside of the Russian influence, while in the successive stages, 
the EU was responsible for building European modernised countries.
Lessons in Post-Cold War Interventionism: 
The 1990s as a Preview of the Post-9/11 
COIN Era
Nobody described better the relevance of the 1990s for the type 
of campaigns that shaped the post-9/11 security environment than US 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In a 2007 speech, he emphasised 
that, after Vietnam,
the Army relegated unconventional war to the margins of training, 
doctrine, and budget priorities … This approach may have seemed 
validated by ultimate victory in the Cold War and the triumph 
of Desert Storm. But it left the service unprepared to deal with the 
88  Kennan, George F. (1997) ‘A Fateful Error’, The New York Times, 5 February.
89  Bremmer, Ian (2015) Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World, Great 
Britain: Portfolio Penguin, p. 14.
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operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and more 
recently Afghanistan and Iraq — the consequences and costs of which 
we are still struggling with today.91
The last decade of the twentieth century reflects a perpetual clash 
between the guardians of the traditional American way of war as 
the antithesis of Vietnam (one focused on ‘a strategy of annihilation’ 
and obsessed by ‘how to secure victory in its desired fullness’92) and 
a  different generation who understood that Desert Storm was not 
the return of the old days, of ‘good, clean soldiering’ in the spirit 
of the Second World War, but an aberration and ‘the final salute of 
the Cold War military’.93 It was just a preview of a new age, where 
campaigning was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife, and 
where the core mission was less about destroying armies and more 
about helping to rebuild nations and societies.
Most of the 1990s interventions (Somalia in particular, but including 
Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo) should have forced America to rethink the 
definition of what success means in the context of the post-Cold War 
battlefields. Winning in the so-called MOOTWs (Military Operations 
Other Than War) was no longer about military success in itself, but 
about the ability to focus on the societal dimensions of warfare, local 
dynamics, and political vacuums. General Rupert Smith, a veteran 
of the Balkans, emphasised that the hallmark of the post-Cold War 
interventionism was about establishing ‘a condition in which the 
political objective can be achieved by other means and in other 
ways’.94 Over time, everything came to depend ‘on progress on local 
parties’ political steps, not on a superpower’s military prowess’.95 
By themselves, military means were hardly enough. They could secure 
the environment and provide a ‘breathing space’, but 
91  Small Wars Journal Editors (2007) ‘SECDEF Robert Gates, 10 Oct 07 AUSA Speech’, 
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the military mission on its own, will not achieve a strategic objective 
… The goal should be broader: the future of society itself. In a strategic 
sense, a peacekeeping operation is more about political progress and 
economic programs than it is about troops in blue berets.96
As a consequence, the expectations for fast exit strategies should have 
been changed as the 1990s interventionism revealed ‘the international 
forces must remain in place, not only until military tasks are completed 
but also until the indigenous political will and structures exist to 
support a stable government and a local security force to keep the 
peace’.97
Haiti perfectly illustrates this point. The Clinton Administration 
‘prematurely declared that our mission had been accomplished’.98 For 
the White House, the return of Jean Bertrand Arstide, the legitimate 
elected leader, was considered the end of the process, when in fact it 
should have been another intermediate step towards building ‘a normal 
country, capable of fending for itself and governing itself decently’.99 
But without a significant US presence on the ground for the long haul, 
to shape the environment, incentivise and pressure the necessary 
reforms, the country ‘slipped back into civil unrest and corrupt, 
incompetent, often violent politics’.100 For some of the decision-makers 
at the time, the lesson was clear: ‘The Clinton Administration should 
not have left Haiti to its own devices and its deeply flawed leadership, 
thereby allowing an initial success to turn into failure.’101 This would 
become a familiar snapshot for the counterinsurgents of the post-9/11 
era. Stability operations are not just about building strong host nation 
institutional capacities, but also legitimacy and good governance. 
Time and time again, whether in Kosovo, Afghanistan, or the post-surge 
Iraq, the host nation leadership will choose to behave as a predatory 
government, operating ‘as a collection of patronage networks that 
systematically extract resources from the population for the benefit of 
those networks and the power brokers who run them’.102 Tony Lake 
96  Lake, Anthony (2000) Six Nightmares, New York: Hachette Book Group, p. 193.
97  Ibid., p. 94.
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99  Ibid., p. 303.
100  Ibid.
101  Ibid.
102  Biddle, Stephen (2014) ‘Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging Lessons of an Ongoing War’, 
The Washington Quarterly 37(2), p. 80.
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summarised his take away from Haiti as: ‘we were to see how much 
easier it is to help a nation build the structures of democracy than it is 
to change a political culture.’103
The 1990s operations also reflected the need to change the roles 
and missions the militaries were expected to perform. At their core, 
they remained fighting machines along the lines of the traditional 
American way of war, but in addition there was an entire new 
spectrum of responsibilities, most of them ‘much more intrinsically 
political in nature’.104 As one of the officers formed during post-
Cold War operations, Tony Zinni discovered that on the MOOTW 
battlefields of the 1990s, he had to deal with ‘political problems, with 
humanitarian problems, with economic reconstruction, with social 
problems’.105 In Somalia, he served on ‘the political, security, judicial 
and police committees … met with women’s groups, schoolteachers’ 
and other professional groups, to hear complaints and get cooperation 
for projects’,106 and he coordinated extensive psyops, civic action, and 
rebuilding projects. And all these from an officer that came from a 
military that regarded the Second World War as ‘the last Good War — 
the last with moral clarity, an easily identified and demonized enemy, 
unprecedented national unity … World War Two was the way you 
fight a war.’107 It was his generation’s legacy, a tradition he was taught 
that must be preserved. It was also the kind of ‘clear-war fighting 
mission’ that the military was comfortable with and constantly 
searching for. Nothing prepared him for the ubiquitous rebuilding 
and reconstruction tasks in a world where peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement and ‘vague, confusing military actions heavily overlaid 
with political, humanitarian and economic considerations’ defined the 
new normal.108
103  Lake, Anthony (2000) Six Nightmares, New York: Hachette Book Group, p. 140.
104  O’Neill, Robert (1997) ‘The Remaking of Modern Armies Post Cold War’, in Peter Dennis 
and Grey Jeffrey (eds) The Second Fifty Years: The Australian Army 1947–1997, Canberra: 
ADFA, p. 4.
105  Remarks by General Anthony C. Zinni (2004) ‘From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: 
Preventing Deadly Conflict’, Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series, University of San Diego, 
15 April.
106  Clancy, Tom with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready, New York: Berkley 
Books, p. 299.
107  Ibid., p. 483.
108  Ibid., p. 498.
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There is another key component emphasised by the MOOTW 
battlefields that will become a common denominator in every post-
9/11 stability operation — the imperative to devise a comprehensive 
approach that will blend and synchronise civil and military efforts 
in recognition of the fact that the military tools are barely enough. 
Analysing the 1990s, Professor Robert O’Neill clearly understood 
that the new security environment called for comprehensive skills 
‘on  a  wide series of fronts, civil and military’,109 bringing together 
specific expertise in democratic practice, law, local government, public 
health, communal relations, religious affairs, urban development, 
economics and business development, policing and military affairs.110 
At the same time, stabilising a country required strategic patience 
for the long haul, being able to plan, correlate sequences and manage 
broadly ‘on several time scales — the long term for economic and 
social  development, the mid term for military force development 
and political reforms, and the short term for peacekeeping, conflict 
resolution or peace enforcement’.111 For a counterinsurgent of the 
1960s, 1970s, or from the post-9/11 era, this would be simply déjà 
vu. He would have understood instantly the primacy of political 
and administrative aspects, but also the need for an integrated 
civil–military framework that ties together the different lines of 
operations ‘diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial 
and military  —  to achieve predominantly political objectives’.112 
The problem is that, in reality, that degree of cohesiveness between 
very different civilian and military cultures is very hard to develop in 
theatre. In Bosnia, for example, there was never a coordinating whole 
of government machinery ‘that brought the civilian, nongovernmental 
and military resources of the United States and Europe together’ 
to force change.113
109  O’Neill, Robert (1998) ‘Europe and the Wider World: The Security Challenge’, in Ken Booth 
(ed.) Statecraft And Security. The Cold War and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 200.
110  Ibid., p. 201.
111  Ibid., p. 207.
112  Nagl, John (2005) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 16.
113  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 256.
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Nonetheless, most of the MOOTWs of the 1990s provided formative 
experiences for an entire generation of officers, immersing them in 
new operational challenges beyond the type to which they were 
accustomed. These challenges proved to be the ultimate harbingers 
of things to come at a highly different intensity, complexity, and scale 
after 9/11. In fact, the generation that would later serve in Afghanistan 
and Iraq ‘cut their teeth on a decade of other than war missions’.114 
For Lieutenant Colonel David Petraeus, the Operations Chief for the 
UN force in Haiti, it was an opportunity to learn 
what nation building is all about: nation building was very prominent 
there, and here is where I got my first experience, actually truly 
conducting a complete comprehensive civil-military campaign: train 
their police units, reform the penitentiary system which was a disaster 
at the time, rebuild rule of law, re-establish basic services (electricity, 
food, shelter, water) in a country that was at the basic level of public 
services imaginable.115 
The American troops dispatched in Kosovo as peacekeepers under 
the NATO umbrella soon discovered the contours of what Dana Priest 
described as an enduring invisible battlefield, an underground world 
of parallel structures and shadowy governance networks — like the 
Ministry of Public Order — controlled by former Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) separatists and their Mafia-like organisations116 that 
‘intimidated, threatened, assaulted and sometimes allegedly killed 
anyone who questioned their rule’.117 It is here in the microcosm of 
Kosovo that the American troops were exposed to the need to protect 
the local communities and population. In the mixed town of Vitina, 
‘they escorted every day Serb children to school, and every week 
they took families to Serbia proper or Macedonia to shop or visit 
relatives’.118 It is in the Balkans that American troops had to build 
relations amongst the people, with the local church and shopkeepers, 
understand the puzzle of local grievances, loyalties, and family 
114  Davidson, Janine (2010) Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern 
War, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p. 95.
115  Manea, Octavian (2013) ‘Reflections on the ‘Counterinsurgency Decade’: Small Wars Journal 
Interview with General David H. Petraeus’, Small Worlds Journal. Available at: smallwarsjournal.
com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-the-counterinsurgency-decade-small-wars-journal-interview-with-
general-david.
116  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 271.
117  Ibid., p. 309.
118  Ibid., p. 317.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
152
connections, while mediating and managing deep communal tensions 
between angry ethnic communities in town hall meetings.119 As the 
post-9/11 veterans would soon discover:
You win these kinds of wars by drinking tea, lots of tea. Ultimately, 
to earn the support of the population, you have to gain their trust and 
the way you gain their trust is by developing personal relationships. 
You must be more than a uniform and it is important for the leaders to 
take their helmets off, take their protective glasses off, body armor off 
and demonstrate that they trust people whose support they are trying 
to earn.120 
Often the top US officer in charge of Vitina had to be ‘mayor, police 
chief, judge and jury’.121 Kosovo was where the American troops had 
to understand and navigate very detailed, grass-root, connect-the-
dots linkages across the human terrain, especially the underground 
administrative hierarchy, in order to dismantle the real spoilers of local 
peace and stability. But this required a different set of skills that were 
closer to ‘old fashioned detective work’.122 Most of these snapshots will 
be familiar to any veteran of the post-9/11 stability operations or to any 
student of counter-insurgency. For example, fighting in Khalidiyah, 
a town lost in the Sunni triangle, was more ‘akin to breaking up a 
Mafia crime ring than dismantling a conventional enemy battalion or 
brigade’.123 Be it Talibans, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Vietcong, or the subversive 
underground networks of former KLA fighters, they all understood 
that first and foremost they are in a competition for governance, and 
what they had to do was to establish ‘a competitive system of control 
over population’. In the end ‘when a country is being subverted it is 
not being outfought; it is being out-administered’.124 
119  Ibid., p. 315.
120  Manea, Octavian (2010) ‘Interview with Dr. John Nagl’, Small Wars Journal. Available at: 
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/interview-with-dr-john-nagl.
121  Priest, Dana (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military, 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 315.
122  Ibid., p. 309.
123  Nagl, John (2005) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 13.
124  Fall, Bernard B. (1998) ‘The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’, Naval 
War College Review, Winter. Available at: www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w98.
htm#rettop.
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Overall, the lessons of the last decade of the twentieth century suggest, 
as Robert O’Neill anticipated, that the imperative — in public policy 
circles, armed services, think tank community, and media — was to 
develop ‘a new science of security which fits the new era, in much the 
same way that military strategy of the pre-nuclear era had to adapt 
to the Cold War’.125
125  O’Neill, Robert (1998) ‘Europe and the Wider World: The Security Challenge’, in Ken Booth 









The history and politics of the Western Alliance in the early years 
of the Cold War provided the backdrop to some of the more specific 
questions that, under the gentle, inspiring, and highly efficient 
supervision of Bob O’Neill, informed my doctoral project at Oxford. 
Benefiting from the release of newly declassified material, I was able to 
concentrate on the day-to-day politics, dynamics, and actual workings 
of the Alliance in greater detail than had previously been possible. 
Bob’s training and experience as an historian proved immensely 
valuable to my efforts.
At some stage in the course of my work, in between time spent in 
various American and European archives, we decided that I ought 
perhaps to consult a body of literature subsumed under the rather 
grand heading of ‘alliance theory’. My thesis, after all, was to be 
submitted in international relations, and some useful propositions 
and hypotheses might be gleaned from the literature. Much of 
this literature reflected and was inspired by the aspiration — still 
very much prevalent in sections of the American political science 
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community — to lend scientific rigour to the study of international 
relations, eschewing what Hedley Bull had famously defined as the 
‘classical approach’ to the subject.1
When it came to the viva voce, one of the examiners asked, in probing 
and typically perceptive fashion, whether the theoretical writings on 
alliances that I had consulted had really added much to my thesis, let 
alone to an understanding of the workings of NATO? The implication 
of the question suggested he thought they had not, and, of course, he 
was right. I was relieved rather than frustrated. My sense at the time 
was that Bob, though a historian by training, was always instinctively 
more comfortable with the classical approach. This approach 
emphasised the critical importance of a historical perspective in the 
study of international politics but, in Bull’s words, was distinguished 
by the ‘explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement and by 
the assumptions that if we confine ourselves to strict standards of 
verification and proof there is little of significance that can be said 
about international relations, [and] that general propositions about the 
subject must therefore derive from a scientifically imperfect process 
of perception and intuition’.2
The approach seemed to me to capture the intellectual temper that 
infused Bob’s reflections on strategy and international politics, as is 
evident from his writings and contributions to the many debates on 
the challenges facing the Western Alliance at the time when he was 
serving as Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS) in the 1980s. It is an approach that remains, especially in its 
emphasis on the importance of historical context and perspective, 
relevant to an understanding of NATO’s post-Cold War history, 
including the record of its difficult, costly, and drawn out involvement 
in Afghanistan.
1  Bull, Hedley (1966) ‘International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach’, World 
Politics 18(3).
2  Ibid., p. 361.
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NATO and Afghanistan: Context, Focus, 
and Argument in Brief 
Created following the International Conference on Afghanistan — 
held in Bonn — and commanded by NATO since August 2003, the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) formally completed 
its mission at the end of 2014. Marking the occasion at a meeting of 
the North Atlantic Council on 17 December 2014, Jens Stoltenberg, 
NATO’s newly appointed Secretary-General, insisted that Afghanistan 
was now  ‘more stable and prosperous than ever’.3 In his annual 
report, issued a few weeks later, the Secretary-General again noted 
how the Alliance had successfully achieved what it had set out to 
do in Afghanistan.4 Given the scale, cost, and longevity of NATO’s 
deployment, an upbeat end of mission report from the chief executive 
was, perhaps, only to be expected. Even as ISAF was preparing to 
lower the flag in Kabul, however, the claim that stability (whatever 
that might mean) had been brought to Afghanistan looked distinctly 
unconvincing. Since then, developments have only reinforced the 
fear — widespread among long-standing observers of Afghan 
history, politics, and society — that few of NATO’s achievements, 
limited as they are, will prove sustainable in the medium to long 
term. Indeed, one year on from ISAF’s withdrawal, there has been 
a sharp decline in the security situation throughout the country. 
A  faltering, aid-dependent economy wrestling with record levels of 
unemployment and corruption, a steep increase in the number of 
people seeking to leave the country, political instability at the centre, 
and no substantive progress in peace and reconciliation talks with the 
Taliban, were all combining to ensure that state collapse remained a 
very real possibility.5 Responding to the deteriorating situation, the 
Obama Administration decided to delay the withdrawal of US forces 
from the country in October 2015.
3  NATO (2014) ‘Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council with Past and Current Non-NATO ISAF Contributing Nations’, 
17 December. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116104.htm?selectedLocale=en.
4  NATO (2015) ‘The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014’, 30 January. Available at: www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116854.htm.
5  Chatham House (2015) ‘Developments in and Prospects for Afghanistan’, Asia Programme 
Meeting Summary, 10 November. See also SIGAR (2015) ‘Report of the Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)’, 30 July, pp. 93–5. Available at: www.sigar.mil/pdf/
quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr.pdf.
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A full and exhaustive discussion of the reasons behind this bleak 
picture is beyond the scope the present chapter, whose focus is 
confined to NATO’s mission, activities, and record. The chapter 
is concerned, in particular, with two issues raised by the history of 
the Alliance’s involvement and the decidedly mixed legacy it leaves 
behind. While these are closely, indeed inextricably linked, they merit 
separate treatment for the purposes of analysis.
The first of these concerns the sources of the failure to meet the 
objective of bringing peace and stability to the country. These are 
necessarily varied and complex, and the trajectory of developments in 
Afghanistan over the past decade and a half plainly cannot be ascribed 
to NATO actions or inactions alone. Chief among NATO’s failures — 
and of special interest here — has been a fundamental inability to 
recognise and engage with the drivers and dynamics of conflict and 
violence within the country, including the ways in which NATO 
contributed to mounting insecurity through its actions and those of 
its member states.
The second issue concerns the politics and functioning of the 
Alliance. While NATO’s long-established planning mechanisms, 
force generation, and staff procedures ‘worked’,6 and while combat 
experience was gained and inter-operability improved, the Alliance’s 
overall effort was deeply fragmented. This was a reflection of underlying 
and never properly reconciled divisions over objectives among allies. 
Put differently, NATO never functioned as an effective coalition of 
allies bound together by a common strategic vision and clarity of 
objectives in Afghanistan; it always remained less than the sum of 
its parts. At one level, this reality reflected differing views about the 
appropriate level of ambition for NATO in Afghanistan, with the US 
consistently sceptical of what was dismissively termed (and not just 
by the Bush Administration) the nation-building ambitions of many 
European allies. Many of those allies, in turn, deplored the dominant 
and overriding influence in US decision-making of a much more 
narrow counter-terrorism perspective, especially within the Pentagon, 
CIA, and the US military. Equally important in terms of explaining 
6  For a perceptive and illuminating discussion of how ‘the system worked’, looking at the 
escalation of international involvement after 2001, and drawing upon Leslie Gelb’s famous 1971 
article tracing America’s deepening involvement in Vietnam, see Suhrke, Astri (2011) When 
More is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 4–5. For Gelb’s 
original article, see Gelb, Leslie H. (1971) ‘Vietnam: The System Worked‘, Foreign Policy 3.
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NATO’s fragmented approach, however, were the domestic political 
pressures and considerations, often extraneous to Afghanistan itself 
and developments there, which shaped the commitments of individual 
allies to NATO’s mission.
The Evolution of NATO’s Afghanistan Mission
In order to explore these issues more fully, it is necessary to start 
by tracing the evolution of NATO’s mission to Afghanistan. This is 
a history of initial engagement, escalating involvement and rapid 
withdrawal, which can usefully be divided into three periods.
2001–2003: Engaging Allies in ‘appropriately 
flexible ways’
NATO only assumed responsibility for ISAF in Kabul in 2003, and 
did not complete the gradual expansion of its mission to cover the 
whole of Afghanistan until October 2006. However, any attempt to 
understand the history of the Afghanistan mission must start with the 
strategic decisions that were taken, and those that were not, by the US 
in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
The shock, scale, and horror of those attacks led to a near universal 
outpouring of sympathy and support for the US. This was exemplified 
by the Security Council’s prompt condemnation of the attacks as 
‘threats to international peace and security’ and its reaffirmation of 
the US’s right of individual and collective self-defence.7 On the very 
same day that the Security Council passed its resolution, the North 
Atlantic Council invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty for the 
first time in its history. The so-called ‘collective defence provision’ 
stipulated that an ‘an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all’.8 Much was made at the time, and since, about this unprecedented 
move on the part of the Alliance. As a demonstration of support and 
solidarity with the US, the symbolism could not have been greater. 
And yet, the military and operational significance of the Article V 
7  UN Security Council Resolution 1368, 12 September 2001.
8  The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Article V.
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invocation soon proved negligible. As preparations for military and 
covert actions in Afghanistan got under way in the weeks following 
the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration had no desire to involve 
NATO directly in operations through its collective assets, or command 
and planning structures. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defence Secretary at 
the time, summed up the administration’s view of NATO and its role 
on the eve of the attack on Afghanistan:
We think we had a collective affirmation of support with what they 
said with Article Five, and if we need collective action we’ll ask for it. 
We don’t anticipate that at the moment … We need cooperation from 
many countries but we need to take it in appropriately flexible ways.9
Wolfowitz’s comments and the subsequent unfolding of the campaign 
in 2001 point to two aspects of US policy that help explain the dynamics 
of Alliance relations for the entire period of NATO’s involvement.
First, in taking the ‘battle to the terrorists, to their networks and 
to those states and organizations that harbor and assist terrorist 
networks’,10 the US did not wish to be constrained. The Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by congress on 14 September 
2001, was open-ended, both in terms of time and geographical scope.11 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), formally launched with the attack 
on Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, was a counter-terrorism mission 
broadly conceived. Indeed, to US decision-makers it was ‘the opening 
salvo in a global war on terror’.12 Following the toppling of the Taliban 
regime and the inauguration of an interim Afghan Government in late 
December 2001, thought gradually turned to how stability might 
be extended throughout the country. Even so, OEF’s central focus 
on ‘disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al-Qaeda and Taliban’ — 
fuelled by the desire for retribution and revenge, especially in the 
early days — remained a dominant strategic priority throughout 
9  Paul Wolfowitz, Press Conference, NATO HQ, 26 September 2001, quoted in Kreps, Sarah E. 
(2011) Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 95–6.
10  Washington Post (2001) ‘Text: Rumsfeld’s Pentagon News Conference’, 18 October. 
Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeld_
text101801.html.
11  The AUMF remains in force.
12  Stapleton, Barbara J. and Michael Keating (2015) Military and Civilian Assistance to 
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the period of NATO’s engagement. The Bush Administration’s aversion 
to nation-building was well known before 9/11, and explains why 
it successfully resisted calls for ISAF to be expanded outside Kabul 
before 2003. Scepticism about ambitious postwar objectives was also 
widely shared, notably by Robert Gates who, upon taking office as 
Secretary of Defence in 2006, was quick to conclude that ‘our efforts 
[in Afghanistan] were being significantly hampered by muddled 
and over-ambitious objectives’.13 Defining the strategic objectives 
for Afghanistan set the US apart from many European NATO allies. 
Gates himself, looking back, felt the divergence of views between 
European approaches ‘that looked a lot like nation-building’ and 
much narrower US objectives remained ‘an important and underlying 
source of friction and frustration’ within NATO.14
Second, Wolfowitz’ remarks made it clear that while the US welcomed 
the support of individual allies in its global and open-ended war on 
terror, NATO as an alliance — with its limited collective assets, well-
established planning procedures, and consultative mechanisms — was 
more likely to complicate, even restrict, US freedom to respond as it 
saw fit. The prevailing view held by American officials of NATO’s 
Kosovo operation in 1999, especially in the Pentagon and within the 
military, reinforced this sentiment. Now, in the post-9/11 world, the 
mission would always ‘determine the coalition’, as Rumsfeld made 
clear from the outset.15
Over time, as security deteriorated and challenges mounted in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, following its invasion by the US and the UK in 
2003, the importance and uses of allies became more apparent: they 
could help legitimise the need for continuing involvement internally 
to congress (which controlled the purse strings) and to an increasingly 
war-weary public; they could assume the burden of nation-building 
tasks; and some allies might even provide useful assets (for example, 
contributing intelligence and special operations forces). At the end of 
the day, however, NATO per se was of limited use and interest, a sense 
13  Gates, Robert (2014) Duty, London: W. H. Allen, p. 203.
14  Ibid.
15  Washington Post (2001) ‘Text: Rumsfeld’s Pentagon News Conference’, 18 October. 
Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeld_
text101801.html.
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captured by Gates’ admission that he struggled to stay awake during 
NATO meetings, finding them ‘excruciatingly boring’, as 28 countries 
rattled through their pre-prepared scripts.16
There is a final aspect to the early phase of operations in Afghanistan 
and the strategic choices then made by the US, which crucially 
shaped the context of NATO’s expanding involvement from 2003 
onwards. What was soon dubbed the ‘Afghan Model’17 of operations 
— a very light conventional footprint, relying instead on special 
operations forces, precision weapons, and local allies, in the form of 
the Northern Alliance, to overthrow the Taliban regime — combined 
with a rejection of nation-building and an unwillingness to invest 
in the search for a broader, more inclusive political settlement 
following the collapse of the Taliban in 2001 had very important 
long-term consequences. The Bush Administration’s postwar plan, as 
one perceptive study would later put it, ‘seems to have been to pass 
control of the country as quickly as possible to local proxies who had 
assisted international forces and thereafter to retain a residual counter-
terrorism mission’.18 In  the process of doing so, US forces entered 
into alliances with local and regional strongmen and warlords, men 
such as Ismail Kahn and Gul Aga Shirzai, many of whom had risen 
to prominence during the horrific civil war that had engulfed the 
country after 1992.19 This development and the dynamic set in motion 
by cultivating relations with venal, predatory, and violent warlords 
set the stage for renewed conflict. As Alex Strick van Linschoten 
and Felix Kuehn concluded when examining developments after the 
fall of the Taliban regime, the ‘strategic mistake of handing over the 
government to former strongmen and warlords … aided the Taliban’s 
return’.20 Crucially, bringing warlords and their tribally based 
16  Gates, Robert (2014) Duty, London: W. H. Allen, p. 194.
17  Biddle, Stephen (2003) ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare’, Foreign Affairs 82(2), 
pp.  31–45. Available at: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2003-03-01/afghanistan-
and-future-warfare.
18  Wilton Park (2015) ‘Capturing the Lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT)’, Wilton Park Report WPR1322, p. 11.
19  On Gul Agha Sherzai and the local impact of his alliance with US forces in their war on 
terror, see Gopal, Anand (2014) No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban and the 
War through Afghan Eyes, New York: Metropolitan Books, pp. 107–10.
20  van Linschoten, Alex Strick and Felix Kuehn (2012) An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the 
Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2011, London: Hurts & Co., p. 254. See also van 
Bijlert, Martine (2009) ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles: Taliban Networks in 
Uruzgan’, in Antonio Giustozzi (ed.), Decoding the New Taliban, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 158–60.
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patronage networks into positions of power at the local and district 
level gave rise to a distinctive political economy of conflict that would 
continue to confound NATO’s attempts, starting in 2003, to stabilise 
the country through aid, reconstruction, and development assistance 
(as discussed more fully below).
2003–2009: Expanding Mission, Growing Insurgency
NATO assumed command of ISAF in August 2003. Soon thereafter 
it was authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII to 
expand ISAF’s presence outside ‘Kabul and its environs’ with the aim 
of establishing security and extending the writ of the government 
to ‘all parts of Afghanistan’.21 By October 2006, following a phased 
anticlockwise expansion — starting in the north in 2004 and ending 
with a surge in the south and east in 2006 — ISAF’s area of responsibility 
covered the whole of the country. Accompanying the process was 
the creation of a complex and top-heavy structure of regional 
command headquarters, contributing to making NATO forces, in the 
words of one senior official, ‘high on tail, low on teeth’.22 Formally 
under ISAF’s command by late 2006 were also some 25 Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating from local bases. These were 
multinational teams, combining civilian and military elements, led 
by individual nations, whose role was to ‘deliver a “stabilisation 
effect”’ by facilitating ‘reconstruction, security, governance, aid and 
development’.23 As  such, the PRTs were critical to NATO’s stated 
ambition of ‘extending the influence of the central government’.24
The expansion of NATO’s role after 2003 requires explanation.25 
After all — and it is an argument that has often been made since — 
the Taliban had been toppled, its foot soldiers had scattered and al-
Qaeda was, if not defeated, weakened and without a safe haven in the 
country.
21  UNSC 1510, 13 October 2003.
22  Interview with NATO Official, June 2015.
23  Wilton Park (2015) ‘Capturing the lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT)’, Wilton Park Report WPR1322, p. 5.
24  Speech at IISS by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 12 February 2004.
25  Numbering some 5,000 and confined to Kabul in September 2003, NATO ISAF troop levels 
grew to 33,000 in 2006, and would eventually peak — following the 2009–11 surge — at more 
than 130,000 in July 2011.
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A combination of three factors drove NATO’s growing involvement. 
The first was a strong, if confused and strategically inchoate, sense 
among allies that the Alliance needed to carve out a more clearly 
defined role for itself in the post-9/11 security landscape. To this end, 
the Prague meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government, held in 
November 2002 and dubbed the ‘transformation summit’, famously 
signalled NATO’s readiness to go out-of-area in order to take on new 
and global challenges.
The second factor was related. With US attention and resources 
increasingly focused on Iraq and, soon after its invasion in 2003, fully 
absorbed by the catastrophic consequences of state collapse in that 
country, pressure mounted for NATO allies to pick up the burden in 
Afghanistan. The readiness to do so was aided by the deep divisions 
that existed over US actions in Iraq (in contrast to the emerging 
narrative of ‘a good war’ in Afghanistan), but also the growing 
realisation among European allies that Afghanistan was not ‘mission 
accomplished’ in late 2001. This was the third factor that drove 
NATO’s deepening involvement: a sense among European allies, that, 
above all, ‘the interveners now had an obligation to deliver more than 
a government of warlords’.26 To meet that obligation, NATO developed 
and regularly updated its Comprehensive Strategic Political Military 
Plan for Afghanistan once it had assumed command of ISAF. Its vision 
and underlying idea, as summarised by Keating and Stapleton, 
remained basically unchanged:
[O]n the basis of reconstruction and development, the Afghan 
government would extend its legitimacy and authority countrywide, 
thereby enabling its international partners to help build a sustainable 
stability that would foster economic development. This ‘end state’ 
would allow a military exit with continued foreign assistance typical 
of other post-conflict fragile states.27 
26  Wilton Park (2015) ‘Capturing the lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT)’, Wilton Park Report WPR1322, p. 11.
27  Stapleton, Barbara J. and Michael Keating (2015) Military and Civilian Assistance 
to Afghanistan 2001–14: An Incoherent Approach, London: Chatham House, p. 4.
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The script did not pan out as envisaged. Instead, the period between 
2006 and 2009 saw NATO confronted with a ‘growing and resilient 
insurgency’.28 Even as troop and aid levels rose, and a comprehensive 
approach that emphasised integrated working between the military 
and civilian arms of NATO’s effort was formally adopted, the much 
vaunted stability effect proved ever more elusive. As combat operations 
intensified, especially in the south of the country, security continued 
to deteriorate. Indeed, it is a striking fact, as Graeme Smith observed, 
and which ought to have given pause for thought, that ‘every increase 
in troop numbers in southern Afghanistan brought a corresponding 
increase in violence’.29
2009–2014: COIN and Transition to ‘Afghan lead 
for security’ 
By early 2009, with a new administration in power in Washington, 
an increasingly war-weary public, and a president intellectually and 
emotionally committed to bringing America’s 9/11 wars to an end, the 
situation in Afghanistan was deemed to ‘demand urgent attention and 
swift action’.30 An immediate increase in US troop numbers (of some 
17,000) was ordered in March 2009, along with a reaffirmation of the 
central aim of US policy: ‘to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either 
country in the future.’31 To this end, the counter-terrorism operations 
emphasising kill and capture were also intensified, as the skills and 
methods developed in Iraq were transferred to Afghanistan. In July 
2009, Stanley McChrystal, shortly after assuming command of NATO 
ISAF, was asked to conduct a multidisciplinary assessment of the 
28  McChrystal, Stanley (2009) ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’, Commander NATO ISAF, 
Afghanistan/US Forces, 30 August. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.
29  Smith, Graeme (2013) The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan, Berkeley: 
Counterpoint, p. 169. Remarkably, even the intensive ‘kill-and-capture’ campaign of 2010–11, 
which saw thousands of night raids and operations aimed at breaking the back of the insurgency, 
did not lead to ‘a significant downturn in violence or insurgent attacks’. van Linschoten, Alex 
Strick and Felix Kuehn (2012) An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger 
in Afghanistan, 1970–2011, London: Hurts & Co., p. 315.
30  ‘Statement by the President on Afghanistan’, 17 February 2009, White House Press Release. 
31 ‘Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, 27 March 2009, 
White House Press Release.
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situation in Afghanistan and present military options.32 Faced with the 
prospect of ‘strategic defeat’, McChrystal concluded that a ‘significant 
change to our strategy and the way we think and operate’ was 
needed.33 He called for a ‘comprehensive counter-insurgency (COIN) 
campaign’ focused on protecting the population, strengthening the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and ‘improving governance 
at all levels’.34 Following a protracted and deeply divisive internal 
debate about the way forward, Obama endorsed the new approach. 
Reflecting his long-term desire to end US combat commitments, and 
conscious of growing war-weariness among the public, he opted for 
a more limited troop surge of 30,000. At the same time, he made it 
clear that the drawdown of US troops and transfer of responsibility for 
security to ANSF would start no later than July 2011. 
Where the US led, NATO allies followed. In support of Obama’s surge, 
NATO ministers pledged to deploy another 7,000 troops.35 The shift 
in focus towards transition and eventual withdrawal was formally 
endorsed by NATO members at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. 
It was agreed that Afghan forces would assume ‘full responsibility 
for security across the whole of Afghanistan’ by the end of 2014.36 
At the time, NATO ministers insisted that the pace of transfer of 
responsibility to Afghan security forces would be ‘conditions-based, 
not calendar-driven’, and that transition would not simply ‘equate to 
withdrawal of ISAF-troops’.37 Domestic political pressures and war 
weariness in NATO countries, however, ensured that the transitional 
process never stood much chance of being truly conditions-based.38 
32  McChrystal, Stanley (2009) ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’, Commander NATO ISAF, 
Afghanistan/US Forces, 30 August. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/21/AR2009092100110.html.
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid. 
35  In 2009, the NATO Training-Mission Afghanistan also activated. It was set up to train and 
help professionalise Afghan security forces in preparation for the transfer of responsibility for 
security. 
36  NATO (2010) ‘Lisbon Summit Declaration’, 20 November. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.
37  Ibid.
38  For the condition of the Afghan army one year on from ISAF’s departure, see Amiri, 
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Indeed,  the  quip that President Obama’s strategy for the Afghan 
endgame was best summed up by ‘surge, bribe and run’39 proved 
uncomfortably close to the mark.
Explaining NATO’s Record in Afghanistan: 
The Sources of Failure
How do we explain the failure on the part of NATO and its partner 
nations to bring stability to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014? 
While a full and detailed answer to this question is beyond the scope of 
the present chapter, the history and pattern of involvement sketched 
above point to three sets of issues which, though closely related, merit 
separate attention:
• the debilitating impact of conflicting and competing objectives on 
Alliance cohesion and unity of purpose, notably between the US 
and its European allies;
• the inability of individual allies operating within their geographic 
areas of responsibility, and of NATO as a whole, to appreciate 
and grapple with underlying sources of violence and conflict in 
Afghanistan; and
• the inherent difficulties of applying NATO’s approach to stabilisation 
and COIN in the case of Afghanistan.
Conflicting and Competing Objectives 
The central fault-line, in terms of the overall political objective for 
the campaign, remained the tension between the US focus on counter-
terrorism, broadly defined, and a more ambitious set of state- and 
peace-building objectives held by coalition partners. This gave rise to 
conflicting priorities on the ground and a fragmentation of effort from 
the outset. The tension was not always easily gleaned from upbeat 
and soothing NATO communiqués that emphasised the Alliance’s 
‘comprehensive approach to crisis management’ and its delivery 
39  Brahma Chellaney quoted in Thakur, Ramesh (2015) ‘With the Benefit of Hindsight: 
Chronicling Afghanistan Errors’, in Jack Cunningham and W. Maley (eds), Australia and Canada 
in Afghanistan: Perspectives on a Mission, Toronto: Dundrun Press, p. 220.
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of ‘stabilisation and reconstruction effects’.40 But it was always 
there. Given the dominant influence of the US in terms of decision-
making power and resources (especially following the surge in 
2009–2010),41 the counter-terrorism perspective would always trump 
other considerations, within the Alliance as well as within internal 
administration debates on Afghan policy. The counter-terrorism 
perspective remained premised on a broad and permissive definition 
of terrorists and insurgents — one that never seriously questioned 
‘the supposedly unbreakable link between the Taliban and al-Qaeda’.42 
As a result, the scope for exploring a wider political settlement to end 
the war, as called for by Richard Holbrooke in the face of internal 
opposition in 2010, and strongly favoured by European allies, was 
always limited and never won through at critical moments.
In terms of operations and activities, the tension between strategic 
priorities gave rise to, and were reflected in, a complicated and 
dysfunctional set of command and control arrangements that included 
multiple and separate chains of command, both within theatre and 
between capitals and theatre. Most obvious in this respect was the 
separation of OEF from NATO’s ISAF mission, though it was evident 
at other levels too, notably in the deployment and activities of US 
Special Operations Forces (elements of which reported directly to 
Tampa, Florida) and, significantly, in workings of the nationally led 
PRTs.43 The variety of models and approaches adopted by different 
PRTs were, to a degree, a function of location, resources, and national 
styles. As a result, they operated with a high degree of autonomy and 
only loose direction from ISAF regional headquarters. Adaptation to 
circumstances is to be valued in many contexts but, as Jackson and 
Gordon perceptively noted in 2007, for NATO states to extoll virtues of 
40  NATO (2010) ‘Lisbon Summit Declaration’, 20 November. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/
en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.
41  In the words of one of NATO’s Senior Civilian Representatives (SCR), as US military 
and civilian assistance efforts increasingly came to dwarf that of others, allies and coalition 
partners were left ‘outside the magic circle comprised of the US ambassador and the US military 
commander in Kabul where the actual decision-making took place’. NATO SCR quoted in 
Stapleton, Barbara J. and Michael Keating (2015) Military and Civilian Assistance to Afghanistan 
2001–14: An Incoherent Approach, London: Chatham House, p. 5.
42  van Linschoten, Alex Strick and Felix Kuehn (2012) An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the 
Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2011, London: Hurts & Co., p. 326.
43  On the subject of command and control, drawing attention also to the striking lack of unity 
within US forces in Afghanistan, see Cowper-Coles, Sherard (2011) Cables from Kabul: The Inside 
Story of the West’s Afghanistan Campaign, London: Harper Press, pp. 163–5.
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diversity was also ‘a ruse for justifying both national agendas and the 
absence of an effective strategic framework in which the PRTs could 
operate’.44 The bilateral provision of aid, reconstruction, and security 
assistance by PRTs within their respective areas of responsibility 
created national bubbles, further undermining attempts at achieving 
strategic coherence overall. 
Ed Butler, who led the British Task Force that deployed to the south 
in 2005 and 2006, would later reflect on the overall consequences: 
[T]he main challenge to the creation of a coherent political–military 
strategy was the existence of multiple missions set by all the different 
stakeholders and nations, all with their own definitions of success 
and failure. In other words, there was a ‘split planning effort’ from 
the start. At the operational level, we used the term ‘duality of 
mission’ to describe this tension: NATO’s objective of nation-building 
and reconstruction vis-à-vis the US objective of counter-terrorism. 
The ends, ways and means of the two missions were diametrically 
opposed.45
Drivers of Violence and Insecurity: Local Context, 
Political Economy, and Nationalism
The contribution of NATO and partner nations to security and 
stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan — collectively and individually 
within their respective sectors of operations — was critically 
undermined from the outset of ISAF’s expansion outside Kabul by 
a persistent failure to properly grasp some key, underlying drivers 
of conflict. This was even more notably so from 2006, when combat 
operations intensified. Two aspects of this deserve special attention. 
The first was the way in which local context and the distinctive 
political economies of conflict within Afghanistan drove violence 
and insecurity throughout the provinces. The latter was shaped by 
complex ethno-tribal grievances, local politics, and power struggles, 
often with deep historical roots, and all set within the patronage-
based and nepotistic post-Taliban political order that emerged in 2001 
and 2002. This reality contrasted sharply with the dominant narrative 
44  Jackson, Matthew and Stuart Gordon (2007) ‘Rewiring Interventions?: UK Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams and “Stabilization”’, International Peacekeeping 14(5), p. 649.
45  Butler, Ed (2015) ‘Setting Ourselves up for a Fall in Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal 160(1), p. 49.
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through which NATO, led by the US (and within the US, led by the 
Pentagon and the military), understood and approached the Afghan 
conflict. Aptly termed the ‘insurgency narrative’46 by Mike Martin, 
this effectively reduced the struggle in Afghanistan to, on the one 
hand, a legitimate government seeking to build the foundations of 
a modern, democratic, and liberal-looking state, supported in that 
endeavour by the West, and, on the other, a retrograde, ideologically-
driven Taliban insurgency, benefiting from sanctuaries in and support 
from Pakistan. While this view was not without some foundation in 
fact, it profoundly and fatally simplified what was actually driving 
dynamics in places where NATO operated. As one study of the British 
experience between 2006 and 2014 in Helmand — though of much 
wider relevance to an understanding of NATO’s overall campaign — 
perceptively emphasised:
The localised nature of the insurgency and the local grievances and 
rivalries that shaped how different local actors aligned and realigned 
themselves in relation to the ‘government’ and ‘Taliban’ figures 
frequently had far less to do with the macro-dynamics of insurgency 
and counter-insurgency than they did with complex local political 
dynamics including the narco-economy and power relations between 
rival social groups.47
This failure to understand the interaction of the conflict’s micro-
dynamics with patronage politics and struggles over power and 
resources at the centre, meant that the actions of NATO allies often 
played into and contributed to the entrenchment of violent and 
exploitative political economies in perverse and unintended ways. 
The most striking, and now well documented, examples of this are 
effects of UK-led counter-narcotics policies. The initial attempts at 
eradication, pursued in Helmand where opium production and the 
narcotics industry was the main source of livelihood to thousands of 
farmers, and of power and profits to officials and strongmen inside 
46  Martin, Mike (2014) An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, London: 
Hurst & Co, p. 195.
47  Wilton Park (2015) ‘Capturing the lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction 
Team (PRT)’, Wilton Park Report WPR1322, p. 4. In fact, as the study concluded, ‘the “Taliban” 
fought for a variety of reasons and while there were certainly “ideological” fighters in Helmand 
who were committed to the Quetta Shura, the majority of insurgents may have fought less out of 
commitment to the Taliban ideology than (as they saw it) on the basis of local issues, including a 
desire to protect their crops or localised grievances relating to access to land and water or more 
provincial level horizontal inequalities’. Ibid., p. 21.
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and outside the province, provide a pertinent example. As discussed 
more fully below, this much more complex picture of the sources 
and dynamics of insecurity fundamentally challenged the premises 
on which NATO’s stabilisation, as well as NATO and American COIN 
efforts, were predicated.
The second aspect, more difficult to pin down and measure, but 
no less important, was the role played by NATO and the Western-
led intervention generally in stimulating Afghan nationalism and 
anti-foreign sentiment, especially in the Pashtun belt in the south.48 
Familiarity with Afghan history should, but never seems to have, 
alerted outsiders to the likely importance of the innate resistance to 
foreign intrusion and control in the country. It was perhaps a failure 
linked, as Anatol Lieven has suggested, to the tendency to treat 
Afghanistan as a ‘landscape of the mind, onto which Westerners 
could project a variety of agendas and fantasies’.49 This said, suspicion 
and resentment towards the international coalition, and certainly the 
intensity it acquired over time, were not given. Taliban’s removal 
in 2001 was generally welcomed, and hope appears to have been 
widespread that an extended period of civil war would finally come to 
an end and a more just political dispensation emerge. Several factors 
soon served to undermine that hope.
One of these was the return to power and influence of the warlords 
and strongmen that had been so prominent during the deeply 
destructive civil war of 1992–1996. The basic attitude taken towards 
these warlords and strongmen by the US was pithily summed up by 
Ahmed Rashid: ‘a cheap and beneficial way to retain US allies in the 
field who might even provide information about al Qaeda.’50 By 2004, 
their abusive, predatory, and corrupt behaviour was fuelling the 
Taliban revival, and feeding into suspicion and conspiracy theories 
about the real motives of NATO’s presence. 
48  On this, see findings of Graeme Smith’s so-called ‘Taliban survey’ based on interviews 
conducted with Taliban fighters in 2007 and 2008 and discussed in Smith, Graeme (2013) 
The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan, Berkeley: Counterpoint, chapter 8.
49  Lieven, Anatol (2010) ‘Insights from the Afghan Field’, OpenDemocracy. Available at: www.
opendemocracy.net/anatol-lieven/insights-from-afghan-field.
50  Rashid, Ahmed (2008) Descent into Chaos, London: Allan Lane, p. 129. See also Gopal, 
Anand (2010) ‘Flash to the Past: Missed Opportunities for Reconciliation’, Afghanistan Analysts 
Network. Available at: www.afghanistan-analysts.org/flash-to-the-past-missed-opportunities-
for-reconciliation/.
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Local nationalisms and anti-foreign resistance were also powerfully 
stimulated by the conduct and fall-out of military operations, 
especially from 2006, when the number of civilian casualties from 
NATO operations began to rise steeply. An authoritative study 
drawing upon surveys in five of Afghanistan’s provinces (Helmand, 
Paktia, Uruzgan, Balkh, and Faryab) conducted between 2008 and 
2010, found that the behaviour of troops, especially in areas where 
levels of insecurity were high, was widely viewed as disrespectful of 
‘Afghan culture, religion, and traditions’, and became an significant 
‘driver of insecurity’.51 As an inevitable result, trust in NATO-ISAF 
declined. In the words of one former provincial governor, interviewed 
in January 2009: ‘people are slowly but surely coming to the conclusion 
that they are an occupied country. As a result of the bombings, house 
searches, being bitten by dogs, people are thinking that the US is 
worse than the Soviets.’52 While the problem was recognised by many, 
attempts to address it remained half-hearted, and the conduct of 
operations continued to cause resentment and ‘push people to join the 
insurgency’.53 Recognising the counterproductive effects of air strikes 
and night raids on efforts to win hearts and minds, General McChrystal 
temporarily tightened restrictions on the use of force by US troops 
soon after assuming command of ISAF. These, however, were soon 
lifted again by General Petraeus who, upon replacing McChrystal in 
mid-2010, ordered a sharp increase in number of night raids by special 
operations forces in an attempt to decapitate the insurgent leadership 
before the drawdown of troops began in earnest. 
It is worth adding here that whatever the diversity of views within 
the Alliance about mission objectives, and whatever degree of 
experimentation took place in individual PRTs, most Afghans, 
key regional actors (and, indeed, much of the wider international 
community) never distinguished clearly between NATO, and the US 
and its broad counter-terrorism focus. This perception was plainly not 
51  Fishstein, Paul and Andrew Wilder (2012) Winning Hearts and Minds?: Examining the 
Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Medford: Feinstein International Centre, 
Tufts University, p. 35. Available at: fic.tufts.edu/assets/WinningHearts-Final.pdf.
52  Quoted in ibid.
53  This was among the more notable findings of Graeme Smith’s aforementioned ‘Taliban 
survey’, see Smith, Graeme (2013) The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan, 
Berkeley: Counterpoint, p. 205. See also Lieven, Anatol (2010) ‘Insights from the Afghan Field’, 
OpenDemocracy. Available at: www.opendemocracy.net /anatol-lieven/insights-from-afghan-field.
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without basis in fact, however much it also concealed a more complex 
picture — there were, for example, differences in behaviour among 
contingents, with some notably more aggressive than others.54
The Assumptions of Stabilisation and COIN
The fundamental, though on closer inspection far from unproblematic, 
assumption that governed NATO’s mission in Afghanistan was 
that aid, development, and reconstruction would progressively 
help stabilise insecure areas. Doing so, like a virtuous cycle, would 
simultaneously serve to strengthen the legitimacy and authority of 
central government.55 The PRTs, focusing resources on development 
projects that would produce quick wins — roads, hospitals, wells, and 
local infrastructure projects of different kinds — were the instruments 
through which the stabilisation effect would be delivered. The belief 
that aid and Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) could help win hearts and 
minds also underpinned the COIN strategy explicitly adopted in 2009, 
and saw astonishing amounts of money injected into local economies 
in support of reconstruction projects (in the US case through the 
so-called Commanders Emergency Response Program).
The assumption was problematic for at least two closely connected 
reasons. In the first instance, it rested on (or seemed to take for granted) 
the view that the government of Hamid Karzai enjoyed political 
legitimacy. In fact, the Karzai Government was widely and increasingly 
seen by many as weak, corrupt, and abusive. Following the toppling of 
the Taliban in 2001, Northern Alliance commanders quickly set about 
consolidating local power bases, using tribal networks, and access 
to central government to seize the state apparatus in local districts 
and provinces. This in turn enabled them to capture and influence 
the distribution of aid and development funding. The upshot was to 
alienate those outside the patronage networks of corrupt and violent 
strongmen, and to further weaken the legitimacy of an already weak 
central government. This helps explain why the aforementioned 
54  On aggressive behaviour of troops, see Smith, Graeme (2013) The Dogs are Eating them Now: 
Our War in Afghanistan, Berkeley: Counterpoint, p. 162, and see Chandrasekaran, Rajiv (2012) 
Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, London: Bloomsbury, p. 277.
55  Indeed, this assumption is central to ‘clear–hold–build’, which in 2009 was NATO’s 
‘preferred operational approach’ to counter-insurgency. See Ucko, David H. (2013) ‘Beyond 
Clear–Hold–Build: Rethinking Counterinsurgency at the Local Level‘, Contemporary Security 
Policy 34(3), p. 526.
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study of aid and reconstruction in five of Afghanistan’s provinces 
found so ‘little concrete evidence … that aid projects were having 
more strategic level stabilisation or security benefits such as winning 
populations away from insurgents, legitimising the government, or 
reducing levels of violent conflict’.56 Quite the opposite was the case, 
with ‘more evidence of the destabilizing rather than the stabilizing 
effects of aid, especially in insecure areas where the pressures to spend 
large amounts of money quickly were greatest’.57
The second factor flowed directly from this. NATO proceeded in 
Afghanistan on the assumption that insecurity and sources of 
instability emanated from a resurgent Taliban, rather than a much 
more complex and multilayered set of sources. Such sources included 
rapacious government officials, and long-standing ethnic, tribal, 
and local grievances, fuelled by an exploitative political economy. 
This  reality doomed a population-centred counterinsurgency 
campaign aimed at drawing the population away from insurgents and 
towards the government. As Karl Eikenberry, American Ambassador 
to Kabul from 2009 and 2011, and with two tours of military duty to 
Afghanistan before that, noted:
‘Protect the population’ makes for a good bumper sticker, but it raises 
the question: Protect it from whom and against what? It certainly meant 
protecting the Afghan people from marauding Taliban insurgents. 
But what about criminal narco-traffickers, venal local police chiefs, 
or predatory government officials?58
Not surprisingly, expressing such views earned him few friends at the 
Pentagon and among senior officers committed to COIN during the 
internal strategy debates. He had nonetheless honed in on a critical 
problem underlying the COIN philosophy as applied to Afghanistan.
Underlying all of this, and much of the discussion above, was the deeper 
failure to appreciate the political nature and drivers of conflict, that is, 
the extent to which violence was driving the competition over power 
56  Fishstein, Paul and Andrew Wilder (2012) Winning Hearts and Minds?: Examining the 
Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Medford: Feinstein International Centre, 
Tufts University, p. 3.
57  Ibid.
58  Eikenberry, Karl W. (2013) ‘The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan’, 
Foreign Affairs 92(5). Available at: www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2013-08-12/
limits-counterinsurgency-doctrine-afghanistan.
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and resources among elites.59 Recognition of this dynamic should have 
encouraged the pursuit, with the same fervour and aggression as the 
military campaign, of a political strategy aimed at reconciliation and 
a more inclusive political settlement.
The Politics and Functioning of the Alliance
The discussion above has focused on why an unprecedented amount 
of resources and effort on the part of NATO and partner countries, 
invested at great human cost over a period of 13 years, produced 
results so much at variance with the declared objectives of bringing 
lasting peace and stability to Afghanistan.60 Addressing that question 
is obviously of the highest priority. The question is not, however, 
precisely the same as asking how NATO functioned as an alliance and 
why the mission unfolded in the way it did. To answer that question, 
two additional drivers of institutional response need to be factored 
into the analysis.
In the first instance, and as noted earlier, NATO’s growing involvement 
in Afghanistan from 2003 was linked to the widespread post-9/11 
perception, shared by NATO capitals, that the Western Alliance needed 
to demonstrate its continuing relevance in the face of new and global 
challenges in the interests of institutional survival, ‘in particular, 
those posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction’.61 No longer held together by the unifying perception of 
a common Cold War threat, and with a more recent patchy record 
of operations in the Balkans to show for its efforts, NATO needed to 
prove its credibility. Assuming a greater role in Afghanistan came 
to be seen as the test of NATO’s transformation in the face of changing 
security threats and risks that transcended the Euro-Atlantic area. 
High-flown summit declarations notwithstanding, deep differences 
59  A point also strongly emphasised in Fishstein, Paul and Andrew Wilder (2012) Winning 
Hearts and Minds?: Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, 
Medford: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, pp. 57–9.
60  As an illustration of the sums involved, by mid-2015 the cumulative appropriations for US 
‘relief and reconstruction’ alone had reached some $110 billion. SIGAR (2015) ‘Report of the 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)’, 30 July, p. 78. Available at: 
www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr.pdf.
61  ‘The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation — A Readers Guide’, NATO, 2003, p. 26.
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between the US and European allies about how best to ‘manage global 
security and risk’ were difficult to conceal, even as NATO decided to 
operate ‘out-of-area’. 
Speaking at the IISS annual conference in September 2007, Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary-General, suggested that consensus 
was in fact emerging within the Alliance about its future direction:
Old terms, such as ‘in-’ and ‘out-of area’ no longer apply. All allies 
acknowledge that, in a globalized world, such definitions have 
become artificial. They all agree that NATO must be prepared to 
address security challenges at their source, whenever and wherever 
they arise.62
It was a heroic effort, even if one allows for the platitudinous style 
demanded by the setting and the occasion. It was not, however, a 
terribly convincing claim, neither at the time nor when the full 
force of NATO’s fragmented approach and decidedly mixed record in 
Afghanistan exposed the shallowness of the consensus on NATO’s global 
role. The Prague summit itself had been held against the backdrop of 
deep rifts among allies about US plans for Iraq. Reaching agreement on 
a strategic vision did not become any easier in the years that followed. 
The manifest difficulties of meeting objectives in Afghanistan, with 
allies increasingly drawn into a full-blown insurgency after 2006, over 
time added to the sense of that NATO might not, after all, be politically 
suited and structurally equipped to take on ‘security challenges at 
their source, whenever and wherever they arise’.63
This realisation also helps to explain the curious mixture of relief and 
apprehension, but also rediscovered sense of purpose, permeating 
NATO’s Brussels headquarters by the time the ISAF mission was 
drawing to a close. Sentiments widely, if not explicitly, articulated 
in NATO capitals included relief at having disengaged from a costly, 
divisive, and failing mission in Afghanistan. This was balanced by 
apprehension and a renewed sense of purpose presented by Russia’s 
forceful assertion of its ‘great power’ credentials, exemplified by 
its transparently illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and 
62  NATO (2007) ‘Managing Global Security and Risk’, speech by NATO Secretary General, 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, at IISS Global Strategic Review, 7–9 September.
63  This is discussed more fully in Berdal, Mats and David Ucko (2009) ‘NATO at 60’, 
Survival 51(2).
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continuing support for pro-Russian separatist forces in eastern 
Ukraine. In terms of Alliance cohesion and dynamics, the Russian 
challenge, while deeply troubling, was also more familiar. Crucially, 
it engages more directly and unequivocally with what are viewed as 
the core national interests of the Alliance’s members, especially in 
Eastern Europe.
The second internal driver of institutional response alluded to above 
was more critical to NATOs actual performance in Afghanistan. This 
was the range of domestic political pressures and interests held by 
Alliance members, which framed their contributions to operations 
in Afghanistan. Unsurprisingly, national interests and perspectives 
on the mission were not merely — in many cases not even primarily 
— driven by developments and realities in Afghanistan itself. For 
European allies, even though they might not share US campaign 
priorities, supporting US efforts and being seen to do so was always an 
important consideration in decision-making regarding Afghanistan. 
This was partly as an act of solidarity but it was also, quite obviously, 
seen as a matter of profound political interest. According to Sherard 
Cowper-Coles, who served as UK Ambassador to Kabul and as Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2007 and 2010, 
‘eagerness to please the Americans’ was one of two ‘institutional 
factors’ that help explain UK policy towards Afghanistan.64 This kind 
of consideration was not unique to the UK, though each individual 
ally had to balance it against a different set of domestic priorities and 
pressures, from electoral cycles and coalition politics, to growing 
war weariness and financial constraints. The choices made by NATO 
countries regarding their deployments to Afghanistan — where to 
deploy, with what resources, and under what caveats — thus reflected 
a complex mix of domestic political considerations and constraints.65 
This in turn contributed to the fragmented nature of mission. Those 
countries deploying to the south in 2006, for example, where fighting 
64  Cowper-Coles, Sherard (2015) ‘Reflections from Afghanistan’, in Rethinking State Fragility, 
London: The British Academy, p. 22. Available at: www.britac.ac.uk/intl/rethinking-state-
fragility.cfm.
65  The other institutional factor singled out by Cowper-Coles was the British military, 
in particular the British Army, which, on the basis of the principle of ‘use them or lose them’, 
saw Afghanistan as ‘a chance not just to engage the Taliban, but also to engage the Treasury, 
the Royal Navy, and the Royal Air Force’. Ibid., p. 23.
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was most intense — Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, UK, and the 
US — soon formed an inner core of allies, which met separately and 
from whose decisions other allies were, and felt, excluded.
Concluding Thoughts
Bob left the IISS for the dreaming spires of Oxford in 1987. Supported 
and encouraged by him, I travelled the other way in 1992, leaving 
Oxford and my pre-occupation with NATO and the Cold War of the 
1950s for a fellowship at the IISS, where I turned to the United Nations 
and the disorder of the post-Cold War era.
One consequence of the UN’s inability to meet the high expectations 
of the organisation in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, was 
to encourage analysts and governments to call for more effective 
multilateral mechanisms and institutions to meet new post-Cold war 
challenges. The search intensified notably following the peacekeeping 
disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia between 1992 
and 1995. Given its capabilities, planning, and tested decision-making 
structures, NATO, which had already lent its capabilities to the UN in 
the Balkans, was seen by many as a natural candidate to take on ‘crisis 
management and peacekeeping’ tasks. The view that NATO could 
step in where the cumbersome, ineffective, and under-resourced UN 
had failed, however, tended to ignore two characteristics common to 
both organisations, and which crucially continue to influence their 
functioning. Although profoundly different in many outwardly 
respects, they are both inter-governmental and deeply political 
institutions. As such, the range of interests held by their member 
states — reflecting different historical perspectives, values, and 
understandings of threats and challenges to international peace and 
security — will always complicate the search for coherence and unity 
of effort. The history of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan has shown that 




Theory and Practice, 
Art and Science in Warfare: 
An Etymological Note
Beatrice Heuser
La théorie est le pied droit et l’expérience le pied gauche,
il faut avoir les deux pieds pour marcher
(Georg Friedrich von Tempelhof)
1
Strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if one prefers,
is nothing if not pragmatic.
(Bernard Brodie)
2
In this Festschrift for Robert O’Neill, my post-doctoral adviser and 
patron during the years when I had to spread my wings and leave the 
safe nest of studenthood, my contribution concerns a subject that we have 
discussed many times as he guided me on my first lectures in the area 
of strategic studies. Both of us had been doctoral students of Michael 
Howard, and both of us read German, so we could discuss Clausewitz 
and his contribution to the field — which one must concede is outstanding, 
however critical one might be of parts of Clausewitz’s writing. When 
I asked him for advice on my earliest teaching in strategic studies, Bob 
once encouraged me to look at definitions of strategy, in theory and 
1  von Tempelhof, Georg Friedrich (1997 [1783]) Geschichte des Sieben-jährigen Krieges, Vol. I, 
Osnabrück: Biblio, p. 203.
2  Brodie, Bernard (1974) War and Politics, London: Cassell, p. 452f.
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practice, art, and science. Here is the ‘homework’ which, a quarter of 
a century on, I would like to present to him, with all my thanks and 
appreciation for the wonderful guidance he has given me over the years.
Etymology
In writings on war, we find the claim made that war is an art. Other 
authors stress the need for a science of war. This article explores these 
claims and the reasoning behind them. It will sketch how these terms 
were used in relation to the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’. 
The difference between theoretical reflection and practical application 
of the results of the reflection is traditionally conveyed by the terms 
‘science’ and ‘art’. A brief reminder of the etymology of both terms 
is useful here, as the current usage of both terms in English is the 
exact opposite of its original use. The French and English word ‘art’ 
hails from the Latin ars, the most important meaning of which, for 
our purposes, is skill, practical ability to do something, a meaning 
reflected in the French and English word ‘artisan’ or skilled craftsman. 
Originally, the ‘Arts’ subjects were thus ones that implied practical 
skills, like the ability to speak a language, or to paint a picture 
(‘fine art’). The equivalent German word, Kunst, was related to Können, 
the ability to do something. 
The French and English word ‘science’, by contrast, originally 
implied  abstract knowledge and reflection upon a subject, the 
theory (as opposed to the practice of art). It is derived from the Latin 
scientia, knowledge or wisdom, and has its equivalent in the German 
Wissenschaft. Abstract logic, mathematics, theoretical reflections upon 
the laws of nature (i.e. physics — still called ‘natural philosophy’ 
at some Scottish universities) were all sciences, and stood in clear 
contrast to applied subjects (i.e. arts) such as engineering, founding 
cannon, building fortifications, or indeed, organising for and waging 
war, the skills expected from a general. 
This does not mean, however, that everybody used these terms 
consistently. A conflation or confusion of the terms can be trace 
back to the late Middle Ages. Dodging the choice between art and 
science, Jean de Bueil in his Jouvencel of 1466 told his readers that 
‘the conduct of war [should be] artful and subtle, which is why it is 
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appropriate to conduct it by art and science [my emphasis]’.
3
 A century 
later, the Englishman John Smythe similarly stated the need for arts 
and sciences of war, without explaining what he meant by either.
4
 
In 1616, Colonel Johann Jacobi von Wallhaussen noted, tautologically: 
‘The art of war is an art or science about how to wage war.’
5
 The French 
marshal Feuquières’ works, written before 1711, were described by 
his posthumous publishers as dealing with ‘l’Art militaire’, while 
Feuquières himself claimed to be dealing with ‘la science de la guerre’, 
which he subdivided into theory and practice.
6
 In the early eighteenth 
century, Maurice of Saxony, Marshall of France, used both terms — 
his ‘dreams’ had the art of war as their subject — but then noted that 
‘[a]ll sciences have principles and rules; war alone has none’.
7
We find a similar muddle of terms in the Reflections on the Art of War, 
originally of 1797, by Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst (1733–1814) 
from Anhalt-Dessau who pursued his very successful military career 
in Prussia. Berenhorst only used the expression ‘tactics’ (and  not 
‘strategy’, the utility of which had apparently not yet dawned on 
him), which he defined as including the choice of weapons, 
the way of combining them; any rule, instructions and exercises for 
the soldier … with regard to the use of his arms, in his posture and the 
movement of his body … I should like to call this elementary tactics. 
Tactics further means: the principles according to which a century, 
a  cohort, a company or a battalion breaks up, moves, reconfigures 
… according to which one deploys cohorts, battalions in the order 
of battle and lets them advance towards the enemy who is within a 
shot’s or a throw’s reach, or lets them retreat: all that pertains to the 
actual fight, all that will decide on a particular day, at a particular 
hour, that which the higher sciences of war and skills of army leadership 
aim for — higher in the sense that they are based on tactics. These 
higher sciences to me are the art of marching with the entire army or 
substantial parts thereof, to advance, to retreat … of establishing … 
strongholds; of choosing campsites; of using the surface of the earth 
3  de Bueil, Jean (1887 [1493]) Le Jouvencel par Jean de Bueil, Paris: Renouard, p. 15. 
4  Smythe, Sir John (1964 [1590]) Certain Discourses Military, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, pp. 3–5.
5  von Wallhaussen, Johann Jacobi (1616) Das heutige Kriegswesen in einer Perfecten 
und absoluten Idea begriffen und vorgestelt, Hanau: Selbstverlag, p. 1.
6  de Pas, Antoine, Marquis de Feuquières (1731) Mémoires sur la Guerre où l’on a rassemblé 
les Maximes les plus nécessaires dans les operations de l’Art Militaire, Amsterdam, Fracois 
Changuion, title page and p. 2.
7  de Saxe, Maurice (1756) Rêveries sur l’Art de la Guerre, The Hague.
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according to its features; of passing streams and rivers: finally, the 
great art of making apposite, reliable plans and to … adapt them 
cleverly to new developments, or to abandon them and to replace 
them by others [my emphasis].
8
 
To add to the terminological confusion, authors writing in Germanic 
languages contributed a further term: Kriegskunde, knowledge of war 
(with the word ‘Kunde’ used much in the sense as the Greek logía).
9
 
We find in Brussels, to this day, a street called rue de la Stratégie in 
French, and Krijgskundestraat — street of the knowledge of war — in 
Flemish. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff in their Dictionary of the U.S. 
Military Terms for Joint Usage of 1964 defined ‘strategy’ as both ‘art and 
science’, in peace and war, in the pursuit of political aims.
10
 Napoleon 
himself had little interest in philosophical clarity. He  confusingly 
stated that ‘[s]trategy is an art’, while noting a few lines further on 
that the great generals of the past had turned ‘warfare into a true 
science’.
11
 US Joint Chiefs of Staff were thus in good company when in 
1964 they issued the following claim in a doctrine manual: 
Strategy is the art and science of developing and using political, 
economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during 
peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to 
increase the probabilities and favourable consequences of victory and 
lessen the chances of defeat [my emphasis].
12
 
The Prussian officer and military author August Rühle von Lilienstern 
(1790–1847) remarked on this terminological confusion in much 
writing on the subject. At the time when Rühle was writing, people 
began to contrast a workman’s skills in performing the same tasks over 
and over, and the creation of something unique with flair, intuition, 
8  von Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich (1978 [1827]) Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst, über ihre 
Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit, Osnabrück, Biblio Verlag, p. 7f.
9  Cancrin, Georg Ludwig Graf (1818) ‘Allgemeine Uebersicht der Kriegskunde zu 
Lande’, in  Rühle von Lilienstern, Aufsätze über Gegenstände und Ereignisse aus dem Gebiete 
des Kriegswesens, Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, pp. 95–101.
10  Luttwak, Edward (2001) Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, pp. 239–41.
11  Foch, Ferdinand (1909) De la Conduite de la Guerre: La manœuvre pour la Bataille, Paris: 
Berger-Levrault, p. 3.
12  Quoted in Handel, Michael (1996) Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, second 
edition, London: Frank Cass, p. 36.
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and genius; the use of word Kunst was already moving towards the 




Nevertheless, what all these writers were in search of were principles 
and rules governing warfare that could be taught and passed on to 
subsequent generations. As we have already noted, two schools can 
be distinguished, those who defined warfare as an art, and those 
who emphasised the reflexive, theoretical (scientific) skills needed to 
underpin the practice of warfare.
Science in Warfare
The quest for a science of war can be traced back to antiquity. 
The  first  century AD Roman author Frontinus, who wrote in Latin 
but used the odd Greek word (such as ‘strategy’) when no Latin word 
existed, wrote about the science of war — rei militaris scientia.
14
In the Middle Ages, the author(s) of the Book of the Order of Chivalry, 
which may have originated in the Spanish-speaking world of the 
thirteenth century, saw ‘the order of knyghthode’ as a ‘scyence’ 
that deserved to be ‘wreton and redde in scoles lyke as the other 
scyences’.
15
 Subsequently, the introduction of fire power, especially 
hand-held arquebuses and muskets, made drilling soldiers very 
important: only thus could the relatively rapid firing of these still 
very unwieldy personal arms be ensured. The resulting movements 
of lines of soldiers, with the man in the front firing and those behind 
him reloading and keeping out of the firing line while successively 
moving forward to take his place, constituted geometrical patterns, 
the filigree of the battlefield, as the French called it. Other features 
of Baroque warfare also invoked geometry: the calculation of firing 
distances and the targeting of cannon, in turn important for the angles 
of the wide and flat fortifications of Vauban and his contemporaries; 
13  von Lilienstern, Rühle (1818) ‘Ueber Theorie und Praxis, über den Unterschied zwischen 
Wissenschaft und Kunst’, in Idem: Aufsätze über Gegenstände und Ereignisse aus dem Gebiete des 
Kriegswesens, Vol. 1, Berlin: Mittler, vol. 1, pp. 41f., 45, 71–4. 
14  Frontinus, Sextus Iulius (1925 [ca. A.D. 84–96]) ‘Stratagematon’ in Charles E. Bennett 
(trans.  and ed.) Frontinus: The Stratagems and the Aqueducts of Rome, London: William 
Heinemann, p. 2f.
15  Anon. (c. 1483) Book of the Order of Chivalry, p. 23.
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the  zig-zagging trenches constructed for sieges to approach the 
adversary’s ramparts without making oneself vulnerable to his 
defensive fire; the movement of troops and their concentration in the 
area of the potential battlefield; and the supply lines and distances 
of depots to the battlefield, all these involved geometric calculations. 
Henry Duke of Rohan thus spoke about the ‘science of the general’, 




In the age of Newton, Euler, and Boyle, military writers sought 
increasingly to find scientific axioms applicable to warfare, just as the 
former had discovered hard and fast rules governing mathematics, 
inanimate nature in general, or gasses in particular. Warfare was thus 
increasingly seen as a subject of academic study and mathematical 
training, and military academies opened their doors. In 1740, Bardet 
de Villeneuve published his 12 volumes on Military Science, in which 
he drew extensively on the works of the Spanish officer and diplomat 
Santa Cruz de Marcenado.
17
 Twenty years later, Paul Gédéon Joly 
de Maizeroy, the translator of Emperor Leo VI’s Taktika, to whom we 
owe the introduction of the term ‘stratégie’ to French and thus into 
the Western vernacular languages, used the term ‘military science’ in 
his Essais militaires.
18
 And after the Napoleonic Wars, an anonymous 
author, writing in Vienna, explained that ‘strategy is the science of 
war’, and it was this subject to which he devoted his three-volume 
study of past wars.
19
 
Despite heavy competition from those who insisted that warfare was 
only an art, not a science, the science school battled on. The Italian 
naval historian and Dominican priest, Alberto Guglielmotti, writing 
between 1856 and 1889, defined strategy as 
The supreme military science which invents the way of guiding the 
forces on the battlefield to victory. [Strategy] is similar to dynamics 
which … studies the laws of movement, space, time in an abstract way, 
16  de Rohan, Henri Duc (1972 [1636]) Le Parfaict Capitaine, Osnabrück, Biblio Verlag, p. 262.
17  de Villeneuve, Bardet (1740) La Science militaire, Vol. 1 : Cours de la science militaire, The 
Hague: Jean van Duren. For a biography and excerpts of Santa Cruz de Marcenado in English 
translation, see Heuser, Beatrice (2010) The Strategy Makers, Santa Monica: ABC-Clio, pp. 124–46.
18  de Maizeroy, Paul Gédéon Joly (1762) Essais militaires, ou l’on traite des armes défensives, 
Amsterdam: Gosses.
19  Anon. (1814) Grundsätze der Strategie erläutert durch die Darstellung des Feldzugs von 1796 
in Deutschland, Vol. 1, Wien: Anton Strauss, pp. vii, 3.
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and then moves to mass, speed, impact, resistance, friction. Strategy 
calculates the axes and dispositions of attack from the basis to the 
objective; it controls the lines of communication and the withdrawal 
routes; it compares, in a solution given to a strategic problem, the 
advantages and disadvantages and resolves in concrete terms, on the 
terrain, the fundamental problem of the movement of forces over faster 
routes, in the shortest time, in order and in a timely manner to win. 
This applies as much to [war on] the land as at sea [my emphasis].
20




The late nineteenth century, with its exponential growth in the 
number and spread of new technological inventions, if anything 
made the scientific even more popular. In the early twentieth century, 
German and British authors wrote about Strategical Sciences and the 
Science of War.
22
 Marxism-Leninism and the individuals, movements, 
and states inspired by it even claimed that history was a science, and 
consequently also saw military science as essential underpinnings of 
warfare. In German parlance to this day, science encompasses both 
‘natural sciences’ and ‘the sciences of the spirit’, what in Britain 
would be called the arts and humanities. The claim that warfare has 
to be studied ‘scientifically’ thus seems to be the oldest, as well as the 
more modern approach. 
Warfare as an Art
Yet the emphasis on the practical side of war studies also has a 
distinguished pedigree that came to the fore especially during the 
Renaissance, and is still going strong. In the early 1400s, the first 
modern strategist, Christine de Pizan, wrote about the ‘art of war’, 
20  Ferrante, Enzio (1993) ‘La pensée navale italienne: II. De Lissa à la Grande Guerre’, in Hervé 
Coutau-Bégarie, L’Evolution de la Pensée navale, Band III, Paris: Economica, p. 106f.
21  Lewal, Général J. L. (1892) Introduction à la Partie positive de la Stratégie, Paris: Librairie 
militaire L. Baudoin, p. 61f.
22  von Caemmerer, Rudolf (1904) Die Entwicklung der Strategischen Wissenschaft im 
19. Jahrhundert, trans. Karl von Donat, Berlin: Baensch; von Caemmerer, Rudolf (1905) 
The  Development of Strategical Science, London: Hugh Rees; Henderson, G. F. R. (1905) The 
Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1892–1903, London: Longmans, Green; 
Fuller, J. F. C. (1925) The Foundations of the Science of War, London: Hutchinson. 
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‘military art’, and the ‘art of chivalry’.
23
 A century later, Berault 
Stuart, one of the captains employed by the King of France, and 
Niccolò Machiavelli in Florence would follow this usage with their 
respective books on the Art of War.
24
 By the seventeenth century, 
it was normal to be referring to the art of war, not only in Italian but 
also in French, English, and German.
25
 
What they all had in common was the quest for transmittable rules 
and principles which could help future practitioners of warfare. 
Yet Jacques François de Chastenet de Puysegur, Marshal of France, who 
between 1693 and 1743 wrote principles and rules on the art of war, 
claimed that he had previously not come across any such principles 
in any areas of the art of war, except in the sub-area of siegecraft.
26
 
At the time of the French Revolution, Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst, 
in trying to establish a set of rules and principles governing warfare, 
followed the precedent of Machiavelli and Puysegur in referring 
to Kriegskunst, the art of war, and for a long time this term would 
dominate writing in German on the subject. Behrenhorst was mainly 
concerned with arguing that there was a body of knowledge and 
insights that can be passed on to younger generations. He noted that 
hitherto, most cultures had mainly passed on lessons learnt empirically 
from experiences of previous wars and battles, rather than trying to 
rise above such empiricism and attempting to approach warfare from 




23  de Pizan, Christine (1997 [1404]) Le Livre des Faits et Bonnes Mœurs du roi Charles V le Sage, 
Eric Hicks & Thérèse Moreau (trans. and ed.), Paris: Stock, p. 158ff; de Pisan, Christine, L’Art de 
la Chevalerie selon Végèce (1488 [1410]), Paris: Antoine Verard.
24  Stuart, Berault, Seigneur d’Aubigny (1976 [1508]) Traité sur l’Art de la Guerre, Elie de 
Comminges (ed.), Den Haag  : Martinus Nijnhoff; Machiavelli, Niccolò (1521) Libro della Arte 
della Guerra, Florence: li Heredi di Philippo di Giunta.
25  Hexham, Henry (1642) The Principles of the Art Militarie, Practised in the Warres of the 
Vnited Netherlands, Part 1, second edition, Delft; Part 2 (1642) Delft: Antony of Heusden; 
à Troupitzen, Laurentius (1638) Kriegs Kunst, Nach Königlich Schwedischer Manier…, Franckfurt: 
Mattheo Merian; de Billon, Jean (1613) Les Principes de l’Art militaire, Lyon: Berthelin; Mallet, 
Allain Manesson (1684) Les travaux de Mars, ou l’art de la guerre, Paris: Denys Thierry.
26  de Chastenet, Jacques François, Marquis de Puységur or Puysegur (1748) Art de la Guerre, 
par principes et par règles, Paris: Charles-Antoine Jombert, p. 3.
27  von Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich (1789) Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst über ihre 
Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und Zuverlässigkeit, Vol. 1, second edition, Leipzig: G. Fleischer 
the Younger.
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Henri Baron de Jomini, the foremost and first great analyst 
of Napoleonic warfare, first published his definitions on the subject 
in 1805 and defined strategy as 
the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole 
theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon 
the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, or bringing 
them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground in 
contradistinction to planning upon a map.
28
 
Elsewhere, Jomini wrote: ‘Strategy … is the art of bringing the 
greatest  part of the forces of an army upon the important point of 
the theater of war or the zone of operations [my emphasis].’
29
 Jomini 
thus came down on the side of those who regarded strategy — and 
waging war — as an art, not a science. Jomini’s definitions would 
dominate the nineteenth century. 
The American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), 
writing at the end of the nineteenth century, provided perhaps the 
most elaborate defence of the concept that warfare should be seen as an 
art. He followed Jomini in many respects, and picked up in particular 
on the Jominian argument about strategy as an art, not a science:
Science is sure of nothing until it is proved … it aims at absolute 
certainties, — dogmas, — towards which, through numerous 
experiments, it keeps moving. Its truths, once established, are fixed, 
rigid, unbending, and the relation between cause and effect are rather 
laws than principles; hard lines incapable of change, rather than living 
seeds. Science discovers and teaches truths which it has no power to 
change; Art, out of materials which it finds about it, creates new forms 
in endless variety. It is not bound down to a mechanical reproduction 
of similar effects, as is inanimate nature, but partakes of the freedom of 
the human mind in which it has its root. Art acknowledges principles 
and even rules; but these are not so much fetters, or bars, which compel 
its movements aright, as guides which warn when it is going wrong. 
In this living sense, the conduct of war is an art, having its spring in 
the mind of man, dealing with very various circumstances, admitting 
certain principles; but, beyond that, manifold in its manifestations, 
according to the genius of the artist and the temper of the materials 
with which he is dealing. To such an effort dogmatic prescription is 
28  Henri, Antoine, Baron de Jomini (1868 [1837]) The Art of War, Capt. G. H. Mendell and Capt. 
W. P. Craighill (trans.), Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, pp. 69–71.
29  Ibid., p. 322.
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unsuited; the best of rules, when applied to it, cannot be rigid, but 
must have that free play which distinguishes a principle from a mere 
rule [my emphasis].
30
Here we see the inversion of the meaning of the two terms that was 
creeping into the English language: increasingly, ‘art’ came to mean 
something done with instinct, intuition and talent (even genius), 
not by rote, reflection, or reasoning.
Other very technical definitions abounded in the later nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, such as that of the Britons Sir Edward 
Hamley, General J. F. Maurice,
31
 his namesake General Frederick Barton 
Maurice,
32
 and G. F. R. Henderson, who by ‘strategy’ understood ‘the 
art of rightly directing the masses of troops towards the objects of the 
campaign’.
33
 At the outset of the twentieth century, Lt. Col. Walter 
James wrote:
The art of war is usually divided into two parts — strategy and tactics. 
Strategy deals with the military considerations which determine the 
choice of the offensive or defensive, the selection of the country 
in which to fight, the objects against which the armies should be 
directed, and embraces the Plan of Campaign or General Idea which 
dominates the conduct of the operations. Broadly speaking, therefore, 
strategy is concerned with the movement of troops before they come 
into actual collision, while tactics deals with the leading of troops in 
battle, or when battle is imminent [my emphasis].
34
Equally, Captain (later Sir) Basil Henry Liddell Hart, whose most 
important works stem from the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, defined 
strategy as ‘[t]he art of distributing and applying military means to 
fulfil the ends of policy [my emphasis]’.
35
 Liddell Hart was pessimistic 
about the existence of a science of war, not because he did not ardently 
30  Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1918) Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles 
and Practice of Military Operations on Land, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., p. 299f.
31  Maurice, J. F. (1891) War, London: Macmillan, p. 7.
32  Maurice, F. B. (1929) British Strategy, London: Constable & Co., p. 3.
33  Henderson, G. F. R. (1905) The Science of War: A Collection of Essays and Lectures, 1892–1903, 
London: Longmans, Green, p. 39.
34  James, W. H. (1904) Modern Strategy, second edition, Edinburgh: William Blackwood 
and Sons, p. 17f.
35  Hart, Basil Liddell (n.d. [1944]) Thoughts on War, London: Faber and Faber, p. 229.
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wish to promote it, but because he did not feel that humanity had 
made much leeway with it. Four years before the outbreak of the 
Second World War, he wrote: 
A study of military history brings ample confirmation of Rebecca 
West’s [bon] mot: ‘Before a war military science seems a real science, 
like astronomy, but after a war it seems more like astrology’ … There 
is, doubtless, a science of war; but we are a long way from discovering 
it. Apart from the mere technique of utilizing weapons, what passes 
for ‘military science’ is hardly more than the interpretation of 
conventions nurtured by tradition and warped by sentiment, patriotic 
and professional.
36
Liddell Hart’s contemporary, the French admiral and Clausewitz-
disciple, Raoul Castex (1878–1968) came down firmly on the ‘art’ side 
of the ‘art-or-science’ debate, with strategy as the ‘art of the general’, 
an art that had its own theory, however, which facilitated its learning 
in the absence of copious personal experiences.
37
A Cold War example of the arts–science debate comes from Belgium, 
where the analyst of strategy, Henri Bernard, emphasised that war and 
conflicts are not physical experiments which can be repeated step by 
step and in all physical conditions — if that were the case, one could 
speak about a science in the modern sense of empirically based on 
repeatable experiments. But the conduct of war pairs material, physical 
forces (which are quantifiable) with moral forces, it is a ‘struggle of 
wills’, and thus has unquantifiable dimensions.
38
 
At the end of the Cold War, the British political scientist Robert Neild 
used a wider definition still: ‘Strategy is the art of pursuing political 
aims by the use or possession of military means [my emphasis].’
39
 
The broadest use of the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘art’ were made by the 
British strategist Lawrence Freedman: ‘strategy is the art of creating 
36  Ibid., p. 45.
37  Castex, Raoul (1937 [1929]) Théories stratégiques, Vol. 1, second edition, Paris: SEGMC, 
p. 20f.
38  Bernard, Henri (1965) Guerre Totale et Guerre Révolutionnaire, Brussels and Paris: Brepols, 
p. 5.
39  Neild, Robert (1990) An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear 
Setting, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 1.




 In the Anglophone countries, the notion that 
strategy is an art still prevails over its Marxist-Leninist designation 
as a science. 
A Science and an Art, or Strategy as one 
and Tactics as the Other?
Authors other than the muddle-headed, such as Jacobi von Wallhausen 
and Berenhorst, saw both science and art as necessary in warfare. 
Some tied them in with the distinction between strategy and tactics.
Those writing in German began to use the terms ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ 
much in the way of Emperor Leo VI, from about the time his work was 
translated into German in five volumes in 1777–1781. We thus find 
‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’ used by the Prussian mathematician Heinrich 
von Bülow (1752–1807), who sought to bring calculable order, logic, 
and clarity to the art (or practice) of war. Around 1800, he wrote:
The science of military movements of two armies at war outside our 
range of view, or, if you prefer, out of the range of the shot of the 
big guns etc. is strategy. The science of the military movement in the 
presence of the enemy, in his full view, or, if you prefer, within the 
firing range of his big guns, is tactics [my emphasis].
From this he derived the not very profound rule of thumb that 
strategy could be divided into ‘two main parts: the march and the 
camp’.
41
 Later he used a second definition, equating ‘science of war’ 
with ‘theory’, and ‘art of war’ with its ‘application’.
42
 
Their contemporary, Archduke Charles (1771–1847), a veteran of the 
Napoleonic Wars, in 1806 defined ‘strategy’ as ‘the science of war: 
it designs the plan, circumscribes and determines the development 
of military operations; it is the particular science of the supreme 
commander [my emphasis]’. ‘Tactics’, by contrast, he defined as ‘the art 
of war. It teaches the way in which strategic designs are to be executed; 
40  Freedman, Lawrence (2004) Deterrence, Cambridge: Polity Press; Freedman, Lawrence (2013) 
Strategy: A History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
41  von Bülow, Dietrich Heinrich Frhr (1799) Geist des neuern Kriegssystems hergeleitet aus dem 
Grundsatze einer Basis der Operationen, Hamburg: Benjamin Gottlieb Hoffmann, pp. 83f., 89.
42  Ibid., p. xiv.
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it is the necessary skill of each leader of troops [my emphasis].’
43
 
We  thus find a correlation between ‘strategy’ and ‘science’, and 
‘tactics’ and ‘art’. Similarly, writing in 1809, August Wagner divided 
warfare into an enduring component — pertaining especially to its 
purpose — which he saw as the subject of the ‘science of war’; and 
a component constantly changing with ‘the shape of weapons and 
encounters’, which he saw as the domain of the ‘art of war’.
44
 
To clarify matters, Rühle von Lilienstern devoted a lecture to the 
question of the difference between art and science, in the context of 
a lecture series on war that he published in 1818.
45
 Honing in on the 
officer’s need for science/reflection and understanding of the issues 
at hand on the one hand, and his need for the capacity for applying 
this through art/action/its practice, Rühle argued that neither was 
enough on its own, and both only made sense if they had each other: 
‘Any practice without theory lacks rules and is vague [unsicher], its 
success lies in the hands of fortune; any theory without a possible 
and without an intended practice remains empty, sterile, pointless 
speculation.’ He introduced a helpful simile: without theory/science 
and reflection, the practitioner would be confronted with the skill 
sets he was taught like an artisan with a large tool kit which was 
thrown at his feet in complete disarray. Only by putting it in order 
and by reflecting systematically and scientifically on the problem at 
hand would he be able to identify the tools that would be needed for 
the operation he planned. Rühle further argued that a survey of the 
history of warfare could lead to two different products: one, a narrative 
or description (historiography), another, a reflection on a higher level, 
addressing the questions whether laws had been at work, and why 
and for what purpose things had been done (what today one might 
expect to find in the social sciences).
46
43  Archduke Charles (1882 [1838]) ‘Das Kriegswesen in Folge der franzöischen 
Revolutionskriege’, in Freiherr von Waldtstätten (ed.), Erzherzog Karl: Ausgewählte militärische 
Schriften, Berlin: Richard Wilhelmi, p. 57; Archduke Charles (1882) Ausgewählte militärische 
Schriften, Berlin: R. Wilhelmi, pp. vii, 3.
44  Wagner, August (1809) Grundzüge der reinen Strategie, Amsterdam: Kunst- und Industrie-
Comptoir, pp. vii ff.; see also Anon. (1814) Grundsätze der Strategie erläutert durch die Darstellung 
des Feldzugs von 1796 in Deutschland, Vol. 1, Wien: Anton Strauss, p. vii.
45  von Lilienstern, Rühle (1818) ‘Ueber Theorie und Praxis, über den Unterschied zwischen 
Wissenschaft und Kunst’, in Idem: Aufsätze über Gegenstände und Ereignisse aus dem Gebiete des 
Kriegswesens, Vol. 1, Berlin: Mittler, vol. 1, pp. 56, 37–75. 
46  Ibid., pp. 46–8.
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At the same time, Rühle was convinced that practice nourished 
reflection, and that reflection would inspire action, so that to be 
fruitful, both would ideally have to interact; but, crucially, one could 
complement one’s practical experience and theoretical reflection with 
that of others through the medium of lecture and literature. Theory 
was thus, for him, a distillation from experience — the essence of 
experience. (Rühle’s metaphor evokes the process whereby a salt is 
distilled from its liquid solution.) This essence, this elixir, would be 
so strong that no lesser mind would be able to digest it, and for that 
reason some might reject theory as they simply could not get their 
heads around it. On the one hand, any theory that was not rooted in 
experience (i.e. in empirical knowledge), which was the mere figment 
of the imagination of an armchair strategist (Stubengelehrter), would 
easily shatter when it clashed with hard facts. It would be useless as a 
directive for action. On the other hand, one’s understanding of one’s 
own experience could not fail to be enriched by good theory, and 
would allow analysis on a higher level, and at once more insightfully. 
Rühle’s advice was thus to approach both theory and supposed lessons 
drawn from one’s own experiences critically, and to check theory 
against reality. He advised his readers to compare one’s own limited 
experiences with those of others (and with examples recorded in 
literature), as exceptions exist for all rules, and chance deviations from 
the norm will occur, and no one person can amass sufficiently large 
experience to come to (what we would now call statistically relevant, 
large-n) conclusions. Moreover, even if 99 experiences confirm one 
rule, in war there is no certainty that the hundredth case will would 
be dominated by another. Bottom line, Rühle argued, nothing would 
replace the individual office’s analytical skills, his good critical 
judgment, informed by both practical experience and by theory.
47
Another logically coherent attempt to define the roles of science and 
art in warfare can be found a century later, when French General 
Jean Colin tackled the subject in his Transformations of War of 1911. 
To  him,  war was the object both of a science and an art. Science, 
he  wrote, ‘seeks laws, identifies and classifies facts; art chooses, 
combines and produces’.
47  Ibid., pp. 53–7, 62f.
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There is a science of war which studies the means of action and the 
elements of war, analyses the events of past wars, compares them, 
and  draws conclusions about the relations of cause and effect, 
sometimes succeeding in establishing general laws. Art, more or 
less using the results produced by science, at the moment of action 
chooses the procedures that seem suitable to diverse particular cases. 
[Art] is the application to action of the actor’s natural gifts and of 
assimilated knowledge. Depending on each individual instance, the 
latter will play a more or less important role. Science finds in art a more 
or less direct application … sometimes art can do without science, 
sometimes it is reduced to the [pure] application of scientific findings 
[my emphasis].
48
Interestingly, we also find the inversion of this relationship in French 
literature. General Bonnal, lecturing at the Paris Ecole de Guerre in 
1892–1893, told his students that ‘[s]trategy is the art of conceiving; 
tactics the science of execution [my emphasis]’.
49
 Creating further 
terminological confusion, in the late Russian Empire, General Mikhail 
Ivanovich Dragomirov dismissed the concept of a ‘science’ of war out 
of hand, instead endorsing the concept of a ‘theory of war’.
50
But the debate was by no means settled. Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922) 
commented on the art–science debate:
[T]he classical strategists insist again and again on the danger 
of  seeking from [their so-called science] what it cannot give. They 
even repudiate the very name of ‘Science’. They prefer the older term 
‘Art’. They will permit no laws or rules. Such laws, they say, can only 
mislead in practice, for the friction to which they are subject from the 
incalculable human factors alone is such that the friction is stronger 
than the law.
51
Corbett wrote that ‘the mistrust of theory’ that is so characteristic 
of the British, 
arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. 
It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims 
no more than to increase the effective power of conduct. Its  main 
48  Colin, Jean (1989 [1911]) Les transformations de la guerre, Paris: Economica, p. 4.
49  Castex, Raoul (1937 [1929]) Théories stratégiques, Vol. 1, second edition, Paris: SEGMC, p. 6.
50  Quoted in Foch, Ferdinand (1918 [1900]) Principes de la Guerre: Conférences faites en 1900 
à l’École supérieure de Guerre, fifth edition, Paris: Berger-Levrault, p. 8.
51  Corbett, Sir Julian S. (1988 [1911]) Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Annapolis, MD: 
US Naval Institute Press, p. 8.
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practical value is that it can assist a capable man to acquire a broad 
outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the 
ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and certainty seize 
all the factors of a sudden situation.
52
It was impossible, however, to ignore the debate. Corbett for one, like 
Mahan before him, emphasised the need for a common vocabulary to 




In Russia’s communist era, Marxist-Leninist definitions continued 
to follow narrow definitions of strategy and tactics, adding the 
intermediary level of operation. They described strategy as the 
preparation and conduct of war in general, operations the conduct of 
war on a theatre level, while tactics was the organisation and conduct 
of battle in detail. The essence of both was the same: armed conflict. 
In parallel, they used the terms ‘military art’ referring to ‘the theory 
and practice of preparing and conducting military operations’, and 
‘military science’ referring to ‘the system of knowledge about the 
character and laws of war’. Strategic, operational and tactical level 
warfare were all part of military art, taught through military doctrine, 
subject to the rules identified (objectively) by military science.
54
 
The Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshal Nikolaj Orgakov (1917–
1994) wrote as late as in 1979: ‘War strategy’ (voyennaya strategiya) 
is ‘that part of military art which determines the principles of the 
preparation [of war] and the conduct of war and the campaign in its 
entirety [my emphasis]’. Echoing Clausewitz, he continued: ‘Strategic 
military actions are the fundamental means for the achievement of the 
purposes of the war.’
55
 
Other reflections on the importance of theory and its relation to 
practice could be found in the West. The American Clausewitz-scholar 
Bernard Brodie wrote at the end of the Vietnam War:
52  Ibid., p. 3f.
53  Ibid., pp. 6–8.
54  Quoted in Leebaert, Derek (ed.) (1981) Soviet Military Thinking, London: George Allen and 
Unwin, p. 14f.
55  Quoted in Backerra, Manfred (1983) ‘Zur sowjetischen Militärdoktrin seit 1945’, Beiträge 
zur Konfliktforschung 1, p. 48. This definition is still very close to that supplied by Clausewitz. 
In book two of On War, he defined ‘strategy’ merely as ‘the use of engagements for the object of 
the war’ — a very technical approach. See von Clausewitz, Carl (1976 [1832]) On War, Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret (trans. and ed.), Princeton University Press, pp. 128, 177.
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Strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if one prefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. 
Strategy is a ‘how to do it’ study, a guide to accomplishing something 
and doing it efficiently. As in many other branches of politics, 
the question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? More 
important, will it be likely to work under the special circumstances 
under which it will next be tested? These circumstances are not likely 
to be known or knowable much in advance of the moment of testing, 
though the uncertainty is itself a factor to be reckoned with in one’s 
strategic doctrine. Above all, strategic theory is a theory for action.
56
From this, the Anglo-American strategist Colin S. Gray developed 
his term ‘strategic theory’ in a didactic context, defined as follows: 
‘Strategic theory helps educate the strategist so that he can conceive 
of, plan, and execute strategy by his command performance.’
57
 
The Invention of the Social Sciences
It is a testimony to the genius of the Prussian philosopher-general 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) that he overcame this confusion 
of terminology and these semantic quarrels by cutting the Gordian 
knot. In his great On War, Clausewitz simply concluded that neither 
term was satisfactory, speaking out against this separation between 
arts and sciences: ‘No matter how obvious and palpable the difference 
between knowledge [science] and ability [art] may be … it is still 
extremely difficult to separate them entirely in the individual … [I]f it 
is impossible to imagine a human being capable of perception but not 
of judgment or vice versa, it is likewise impossible to separate art and 
knowledge altogether.’ He conceded, 
creation and production lie in the realm of art; science will dominate 
where the object is inquiry and knowledge. It follows that the term 
‘art of war’ is more suitable than ‘science of war’ … But we must go 
on to say that strictly speaking war is neither an art nor a science … 
[W]ar … is part of man’s social existence. War is a clash between 
major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed — that is the only 
way in which it differs from other conflicts. Rather than comparing 
it to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is 
also a conflict of human interests and activities, and it is still closer to 
56  Brodie, Bernard (1973) War and Politics, London: Cassell, p. 452f.
57  Gray, Colin S. (2010) The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on 
a larger scale. Politics, moreover, is the womb in which war develops 
… [my emphasis].
This is where we encounter the idea about the relationship between 
politics and war for which Clausewitz is most famous.
58
One might thus argue that Clausewitz was one of the fathers of the 
social sciences, which sought to come out of the impasse of seeing 
human endeavours as either something to be studied scientifically, or 
as something for which only the quest for practical prescriptions made 
sense. In a different way, Clausewitz thus brought Rühle’s dialectic 
between empirical knowledge and theory-based analysis to a new 
synthesis, thereby laying great parts of the foundations of strategic 
studies as we have come to know them.
58  Clausewitz, Carl (1976 [1832]) On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans. and ed.), 
Princeton University Press, p. 128. For a draft version of this passage, see Hahlweg, Werner 
(ed.) (1990) Carl von Clausewitz: Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe, Vol. 2, Part 2, Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek & Rupprecht, pp. 668–70.
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A Pivotal Moment for 
Global Nuclear Arms 
Control and Disarmament 




As a strategist and leading academic in the field of security studies, 
Robert O’Neill was at the forefront of the re-imagining of the role of 
nuclear weapons, a re-imagining which has gathered strength since 
the 1990s, and which has shaped the current aspirations (if not yet the 
full practice) of leaders of the nuclear weapon states. Robert O’Neill’s 
standing in the international strategic studies community and his 
willingness to reconsider prevailing assumptions about the utility of 
nuclear weapons have been instrumental in urging the nuclear weapons 
debate away a focus on Cold War deterrence thinking, and towards 
envisaging a nuclear weapon free world. Through his membership of 
the 1995–1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons and the 1998 Tokyo Forum for Facing Nuclear Dangers, and 
his position on the Advisory Board of the 2008–2010 joint Australia–
Japan International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and 
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Disarmament, Robert O’Neill has played a key role in articulating how 
the changing nature of international security urgently requires us to 
re-think the role of nuclear weapons. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that his scholarly research and 
commission activities have been highly influential in creating the 
climate where today, the leaders in almost every state have firmly 
declared their intention to seek a world without nuclear weapons. 
This aspiration is no longer something that is seen as naïve, radical, 
or strategically unwise (although there certainly are some die-hards 
who do retain a faith in nuclear weapons, and there is a long way to 
go before we reach a nuclear free world). The need to eliminate all 
nuclear weapons is a policy now firmly pursued even by hawks such 
as Henry Kissinger,1 numerous military leaders,2 various serving and 
former US national security advisers, secretaries of state and defense, 
and prominent world figures.3 It was a position made most evident by 
President Obama’s clear call, in Prague in 2009, for a world without 
nuclear weapons,4 a most extraordinary statement made possible by 
the preceding years of debate and study on the role of nuclear weapons 
conducted by Robert O’Neill and others like him.
Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War
Like most strategists in the Cold War era concerned with the tension 
between the US and USSR and their allies, and the accompanying 
reliance on nuclear deterrence, Robert O’Neill’s work focused very 
much on elements of arms control and nuclear postures. This is not to 
say, of course, that such strategists who saw value in nuclear deterrence 
were entirely happy about its logic or its potential dangers. Nuclear 
deterrence was never an entirely uncontroversial issue. But in a time 
of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons —  where at its height 
1  Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn (2007) ‘A World 
Free of Nuclear Weapons’, Wall Street Journal, 2 January. Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/
SB116787515251566636.
2  Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (1996) ‘Statement by Generals and Admirals 
of the World Against Nuclear Weapons’, 5 December. Available at: www.ccnr.org/generals.html. 
3  As evidenced by the membership of Global Zero: www.globalzero.org/.
4  Obama, Barack (2009) ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague’, Whitehouse Press 
Release, April 5. Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-
obama-prague-delivered.
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in the mid-1980s, the number of such weapons on the planet grew 
to around 70,000, with the vast majority of them being held by the 
US and the USSR5 — it was imperative to understand the dynamics 
of nuclear acquisition, deployment, and postures practised by those 
states which possessed nuclear weapons. These tens of thousands of 
weapons had a destructive power hundreds of times greater than the 
bombs used against Japan in 1945. And although the chief tension 
was that between the two superpowers, the addition of Britain (1952), 
France (1960) and China (1964) into the nuclear club during the Cold 
War added to the complexity of strategic thinking and calculation. 
In effect, one could not be a scholar of international security during 
the Cold War without considering the key role that nuclear weapons, 
or at least the threat of using nuclear weapons, played in that conflict.
These weapons were central to the security policies of the nuclear 
weapon states, which came to dominate strategic thinking and 
international affairs in a way that no other weapon has done. The Cold 
War became synonymous with the ever-present threat of catastrophic 
nuclear war, and planning to prevent it (and sometimes even to wage it 
— with nuclear war-fighting strategies, limited nuclear war, and even 
the idea of a winnable nuclear war all deliberated) occupied the minds 
of military thinkers and practitioners for decades. Their analyses 
and calculations ranged over notions such as deterrence, extended 
deterrence, flexible response, massive retaliation, counter-force and 
counter-value strategies, second-strike capabilities, and other elements 
that came with the onset of the atomic age, against a backdrop of the 
massive upward spiral in the numbers of nuclear weapons.
The core element was, of course, the idea of nuclear deterrence, 
the threat to use nuclear weapons against an adversary to dissuade 
that adversary from taking any undesired action, and especially to 
deter it from attacking one’s own state or allies.6 Deterrence rested 
on a delicate psychological balance and, if it failed, would bring 
unparalleled disaster not only to the states concerned, but also to 
the wider world. As recognised by fellow Australian, Hedley  Bull, 
5  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2015) Nuclear Notebooks: Nuclear Arsenals of the World. 
Available at: thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia.
6  Classic works on nuclear deterrence include Schelling, Thomas (1966) Arms and Influence, 
New Haven: Yale University Press; Schelling, Thomas and Morton Halperin (1961) Strategy 
and Arms Control, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund; and Freedman, Lawrence (2004) 
Deterrence, New York: Polity Press.
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with whom Robert O’Neill was to work at the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London and The Australian National 
University, and whose insightful work on arms control Robert O’Neill 
would masterfully survey and re-present in 1986,7 the ‘most important 
immediate goal of arms control’ was to ‘stabilise the relationship of 
mutual deterrence between the superpowers’.8 Preventing nuclear war 
was the overwhelming objective, even if this meant exploring how 
to convince one’s opponent that nuclear attack would be unleashed 
if one was duly provoked. 
At its core, nuclear deterrence and its accompanying strategies relied 
on the promise of mutually assured destruction, or what came to be 
known as the MAD doctrine. Deterrence required, if it was going to 
be effective, clear communication between adversaries, a capacity 
to inflict the damage promised — that is, the actual nuclear weapon 
capability — and the credibility that such punishment would indeed 
be undertaken. The price to be paid for relying on deterrence was 
a robust stockpile, one which could withstand, if necessary, a first 
strike from one’s adversary, and still be able to deliver a second strike 
in retaliation. This threat to use nuclear weapons (even in response 
to a nuclear attack) was always contentious, but for Bull, as O’Neill 
notes,9 there was ‘clearly a distinction between nuclear weapons 
intended for deterrence and nuclear weapons for use in combat’. 
The first category, Bull believed, had merit as an essential component 
of stability between the superpowers; in the absence of a durable peace 
between the US and the USSR, the pursuit of nuclear arsenals was 
a rational, if precarious, strategy. Deterrence also required that each 
state was to remain vulnerable to attack from the other if strategic 
stability was to be maintained; in this sense, and as Bull had noted, 
anti-missile defences were ‘subversive of the real purpose of nuclear 
weapons’, that purpose being to provide stable deterrence.10
7  O’Neill, Robert (ed.) (1986) Power and Policy: Doctrine, the Alliance, and Arms Control, 
London: Macmillan.
8  Bull, Hedley (1961) The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the 
Missile Age, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 8.
9  O’Neill, Robert (ed.) (1986) Power and Policy: Doctrine, the Alliance, and Arms Control, 
London: Macmillan, p. 5.
10  Ibid.
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There remains no consensus among practitioners or scholars about 
the usefulness, workability, or moral standing of the policy of nuclear 
deterrence. Whether it was the determining factor that prevented 
war between the great powers, or whether it was ever truly reliable 
as a strategy, remain contentious questions.11 Nevertheless, any 
serious engagement with international relations during the Cold 
War could not avoid a focus on the complex and high-stakes issue 
of nuclear deterrence. As one of the most prominent and respected 
figures in strategic studies, Robert O’Neill’s notable contributions at 
the time to these questions included The Strategic Nuclear Balance: 
An Australian Perspective,12 the first comprehensive examination 
conducted in Australia of American, Soviet, and Chinese nuclear 
capabilities and policies, and their impact on nuclear arms control and 
non-proliferation; New Directions in Strategic Thinking;13 The Conduct 
of East–West Relations in the 1980s;14 Power and Policy: Doctrine, the 
Alliance and Arms Control;15 the aforementioned work, Hedley Bull on 
Arms Control;16 and numerous chapters and special lectures.
The 1970s and 1980s also saw the emergence of formal attempts to 
reduce the likelihood of nuclear war between the nuclear powers, 
and to prevent nuclear proliferation. The bilateral Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks had resulted in the SALT Treaties of 1972 and 1979, 
both aimed at regulating the nuclear arms race between the US and 
the Soviet Union. For its part, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
11  Useful critiques of the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War include those made by 
McGwire, Michael (1985) ‘Deterrence: The Problem — Not the Solution’, International Affairs 
62(1), pp. 55–70; Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein (1995) ‘Deterrence and the Cold 
War’, Political Science Quarterly 110(2), pp. 157–81; and Price, Richard and Nina Tannenwald 
(1996) ‘Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos’, in Peter J. 
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New 
York: Columbia University Press. Some have even pointed to what has been called the essential 
‘irrelevance’ of nuclear weapons as a determining factor in whether or not the superpowers went 
to war with each other. Mueller, John (1988) ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: 
Stability in the Postwar World’, International Security 13(2), pp. 55–79.
12  O’Neill, Robert (ed.) (1975) The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Australian Perspective, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
13  O’Neill, Robert and D. M. Horner (eds) (1981) New Directions in Strategic Thinking, London: 
Allen & Unwin.
14  O’Neill, Robert (1985) The Conduct of East–West Relations in the 1980s, Hamden, 
Connecticut: Shoestring Press.
15  O’Neill, Robert (ed.) (1986) Power and Policy: Doctrine, the Alliance, and Arms Control, 
London: Macmillan.
16  O’Neill, Robert and David Schwartz (eds) (1987) Hedley Bull on Arms Control, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
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(NPT) of 1970 committed member states — other than the existing 
five nuclear powers, often referred to as the P5 because these are the 
same states which enjoy the right of permanent membership and veto 
power in the UN Security Council — to refrain from pursuing nuclear 
weapons. The Stockholm Conference in 1986 on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures, conducted by the OSCE (Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe) was instrumental in forging 
processes of trust and verification between the Western and Eastern 
blocs, and led to the very important 1989 Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty, bringing a long-overdue focus on the need to 
address conventional weapons and forces held by the opposing blocs. 
Between the Stockholm and CFE Treaties was the very important 
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which agreed to 
eliminate completely the intermediate-range nuclear missiles held by 
the US and USSR. 
While the CFE Treaty was clearly important as part of Gorbachev’s 
focus on ending the Cold War, and the INF Treaty was a landmark 
agreement,17 the other treaties, at least in some ways, seemed to fall 
short of expectations. The SALT treaties did not bring about real 
reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers (although 
the successor Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaties 
which commenced in 1991 have done so). While it is true that the 
NPT has successfully limited the number of nuclear weapon states 
in the world (only four states —  Israel, India, Pakistan and North 
Korea —  have joined the nuclear ranks) it did nothing to curb the 
vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, which reached a staggering 
peak of around 70,000 some 15 years after the NPT had been agreed. 
Nor has the NPT been able to bring the P5 nuclear weapon states to 
eliminate all of their weapons, something which they are obliged to 
do under Article VI of that treaty and by other legal decisions. It is 
this particular failure —  the nuclear weapon states, despite their 
numerous pledges, are clearly not moving to zero (even though their 
17  Unfortunately, even the successes of the CFE and the INF Treaties have stalled recently, as 
tensions between the US and Russia rise. These developments cannot be examined here, but 
useful summaries are provided by Collina, Tom Z. (2012) The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet. Available 
at legacy.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe; Collina, Tom Z. (2014) ‘Russia Breaches INF Treaty, US 
Says’, Arms Control Today, September. Available at: legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_09/News/
Russia-Breaches-INF-Treaty-US-Says.
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arsenals have shrunk considerably), and there are thousands of nuclear 
weapons, even 25 years after the end of the Cold War — which has 
produced a renewed focus on nuclear weapons for Robert O’Neill.
Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons
When the Cold War ended — unexpectedly, almost abruptly, but with 
much celebration — there arose the opportunity to take stock of the 
position in which the world now found itself, and to reconsider those 
assumptions and policies that had prevailed in international relations 
for the previous 40-odd years. This profound change in the structure 
of world politics allowed us the opportunity to reflect seriously on 
what kind of a world we now wished to live in, and what steps would 
be necessary to sustain and increase the peace brought by the ending 
of the superpower confrontation. In reality, however, this did not 
happen — at least not in any systematic or meaningful way. Many 
of the troubled issues that existed during the Cold War — such as 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the simmering resentment against 
Western, and especially US, policies and presence in the Middle East 
more broadly, the grave inequalities between states and people of the 
world where extreme poverty and vulnerability existed for many and 
immense wealth and political influence prevailed for some — did not 
receive the attention they deserved, now that the threat of global 
annihilation seemed to have passed. This was especially true in two 
key and interrelated areas: Russia was more or less isolated after the 
Cold War, as NATO and the EU expanded eastwards at an unwise pace, 
and nuclear weapons continued to remain the central component of 
security policy for the nuclear weapon states, even though the very 
raison d’etre for these arsenals was now a thing of the past. 
We had seen, however, the glimmer of an alternative nuclear future 
during the negotiations for the INF Treaty between Ronald Reagan 
and Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 1986. There, both leaders had 
advanced the idea that it was not only possible, but indeed feasible 
and desirable, to seek full nuclear disarmament. Disagreements over 
various issues, especially Reagan’s plans for missile defence, resulted 
in a more modest achievement — the elimination of intermediate range 
forces — but, as Nikolai Sokov notes, the meeting at Reykjavik had 
‘become a symbol of sorts — an example that nuclear disarmament 
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is within reach as long as political leaders have courage to make such 
a  decision and break through bureaucratic politics and the maze 
of arcane nuclear balance theories’.18 Reykjavik came to represent 
a tantalising opening for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, 
led by the two superpowers,19 but it was an opening that was not 
taken seriously or pursued at the time; nor was it revived by the 
nuclear weapon states, even when the Berlin Wall fell and the East–
West confrontation came to an end a few years later. 
Nevertheless, the idea was kept alive by some: the Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs produced a seminal work 
examining the desirability and feasibility of a nuclear free world,20 
while the Henry L. Stimson Center, established in Washington DC in 
1989, launched a substantial project on this same idea. The centre, 
as its website states, is geared toward ‘providing policy alternatives, 
solving problems, and overcoming obstacles to a more peaceful and 
secure world’. In 1994, it began to examine the conditions under 
which the world might move toward the balanced and progressive 
elimination of nuclear weapons. Its Steering Committee brought out 
three reports.21 Among those on this Steering Committee were Robert 
McNamara, US Secretary of Defense from 1961–1968, and General 
Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 
from 1969–1974. The presence of such individuals from the policy and 
military fields was an important element in this new process. 
18  Sokov, Nikolai (2007) ‘Reykjavik Summit: The Legacy and a Lesson for the Future’, Nuclear 
Threat Initiative. Available at: www.nti.org/analysis/articles/reykjavik-summit-legacy/.
19  For useful accounts of these negotiations, see Bunn, George and John B. Rhinelander (2007) 
Reykjavik Revisited: Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, World Security Institute and 
Lawyers Alliance for World Security. Available at: cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Bunn-
Rhinelander-Reykjavik_Sept07.pdf; Goodby, James E. (2007) ‘Looking Back: The 1986 Reykjavik 
Summit’, Arms Control Today, September. Available at: legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/
Lookingback.
20  Rotblat, Joseph et al. (1993) A Nuclear Weapon Free World: Desirable? Feasible? Oxford, 
Westview Press.
21  Stimson Center (1995) Beyond the Nuclear Peril: The Year in Review and the Years Ahead, 
Stimson Report 15, Steering Committee of the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Available at: www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Report15.pdf; 
Stimson Center (1995) An Evolving US Nuclear Posture, Stimson Report 19, Steering Committee 
of the Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction. Available at: www.stimson.org/
images/uploads/research-pdfs/Report19.pdf; Stimson Center (1997) An American Legacy: Building 
a Nuclear Weapon Free World. Available at www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/
Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=93672.
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The Canberra Commission Report
In turn, it appears that these studies came to influence the thinking 
of Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating and his Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Gareth Evans. Their creation of the Canberra Commission 
reflected a sense of optimism that nuclear elimination was possible. 
The NPT had been extended indefinitely in 1995, and Australia had 
helped to bring about a treaty to eliminate another kind of weapon 
of mass destruction, the Chemical Weapons Convention, in 1993. 
The  Labor Government saw Australia as an activist middle-power, 
a  ‘good international citizen’. But the event that most led to the 
creation of the Canberra Commission was the resumption of French 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific. Keating noted:
No image in the twentieth century has seared our collective 
consciousness like that of the mushroom cloud. And in our minds that 
image of the bomb defined the Cold War … We assumed that because 
the Cold War was over, the weapons that defined it had miraculously 
disappeared as well … the realisation that this was not so came with 
the announcement by President Chirac, on 13 June 1995, that France 
would conduct a series of eight underground nuclear tests at Muroroa 
atoll in French Polynesia.22
Keating gathered a group of prominent, informed thinkers and 
practitioners into an independent commission and tasked them with 
assessing the options for a nuclear free world. He conceded that 
over the years, various anti-nuclear groups had campaigned for this, 
and had prepared many reports on nuclear dangers (and, indeed, 
civil society groups continue to be highly active in this field), but 
importantly, up until that time, no government had ever put its name 
to a report backing elimination. He stated: 
I wanted to put the authority of a sovereign government behind 
the push to rid the world of nuclear weapons … I thought we had 
an unprecedented and possible unrepeatable opportunity to begin 
to move to a new strategic environment which offered not just a 
reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, but their elimination.23
22  Keating, Paul (1998) ‘Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: A Survival Guide for the Twenty-First 
Century’, Public Lecture, University of New South Wales, 25 November. Available at: www.
keating.org.au/shop/item/eliminating-nuclear-weapons---25-november-1998.
23  Ibid.
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Robert O’Neill, then Chichele Professor of the History of War at All 
Souls College, Oxford, was an obvious choice for membership of the 
Canberra Commission. Not only was he a gifted Australian scholar 
in international relations, holding prestigious positions at Oxford, 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and The Australian 
National University, but he was also an experienced soldier and 
strategist. He had first-hand knowledge of arms control, nuclear non-
proliferation, nuclear strategy, and nuclear policy. In 2007, looking 
back on the Canberra Commission initiative, Robert O’Neill was to 
state: ‘it was clear to me that the role of nuclear weapons had changed 
since the end of the Cold War and it was high time to re-examine their 
utility. Proliferation had become a greater danger and the possibility 
of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists was another 
new factor to be addressed.’24 
Others among the 17 commissioners were former prime ministers, 
ambassadors, eminent scientists, and civilian and military leaders. 
Two  of the commissioners had been part of the US military 
establishment: Robert McNamara, and General Lee Butler, former 
Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Air Command. Former Chief 
of the Defence Staff and head of British Armed Forces, Field Marshal 
Lord Carver, was an additional military voice. Their appointment was 
deliberate. The Keating Government recognised that the report would 
need to demonstrate its credibility to the security and defence policy 
communities if it was to be taken seriously.
Over the course of several months, the commissioners met to consider 
ways to reduce the dangers posed by the ongoing retention of nuclear 
weapons. It should be noted that at the outset, there was no clear 
consensus among the commissioners about the nature or extent of 
the problem, or about the steps which should be taken. But after 
several meetings, intense deliberation, and review of the technical 
and political issues canvassed by an extensive range of background 
papers, the commissioners’ unanimous view presented in their report 
was that a balanced, phased, and verified elimination process was 
clearly necessary.
24  O’Neill, Robert (2007) ‘World Order Under Stress: Issues and Initiatives for the Twenty-
First Century’, Cunningham Lecture, The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
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The report’s essential message was as follows: as long as any one state 
has nuclear weapons, other states will want them also; as long as 
nuclear weapons exist, there is a chance that they will be used, either 
deliberately or by accident; and, that any use of nuclear weapons would 
be catastrophic.25 The report examined the strategic, technological, 
and political arguments usually put forward in support of retaining 
nuclear weapons, and made a comprehensive and persuasive case 
against them. It argued that without elimination, the world faced 
increased threats of proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear use. 
As part of the growing debate on the issue of elimination, the report 
consolidated and extended the view that the utility of nuclear 
weapons —  an issue that was never wholly or logically resolved, 
even during the Cold War — was even less convincing today.26 After 
all, despite their possession of vast nuclear arsenals, states have 
accepted stalemate or even defeat (the US in Vietnam, Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan, and France in Indo-China, when strategic and moral 
calculations ruled out any use of nuclear weapons in these conflicts) 
and have suffered calamitous assaults upon their territory (for instance, 
in September 2001 in the US, when the presence of a vast nuclear 
arsenal did nothing to deter terrorism and was utterly unhelpful in 
responding to it). Moreover, the new kinds of security threat faced by 
the world meant that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence were 
at best redundant, and at worst, obstacles to international security.27 
The only utility accorded to nuclear weapons was that they possibly 
deterred against a nuclear attack by another nuclear state. But even in 
this case, the elimination of these weapons would be a positive gain. 
If nuclear weapons served no useful purpose, then retaining them 
would be costly, would invite further proliferation, and would sooner 
or later result in them being used. 
25  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1996) Report of the Canberra Commission on the 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra.
26  For detailed examinations of the commission’s origin, arguments, and impact, see Hanson, 
Marianne and Carl J. Ungerer (1998) ‘Promoting an Agenda for Nuclear Weapons Elimination: The 
Canberra Commission and Dilemmas of Disarmament’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 
44(4), pp. 533–51; Hanson, Marianne and Carl J. Ungerer (1999) ‘The Canberra Commission: 
Paths Followed, Paths Ahead’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 53(1), pp. 5–17.
27  Hanson, Marianne (2002) ‘Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to Security’, International 
Relations 16(3), pp. 361–79.
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While urging that as strategic circumstances change, so too must 
strategic thinking, the Canberra Commission report laid out a series of 
practical immediate, reinforcing, and final steps which could be taken to 
move towards a nuclear weapon free world. Immediate steps — such as 
devaluing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, taking nuclear 
forces off alert, removing warheads from delivery vehicles, hastening 
reductions between the US and Russia, negotiating a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and providing 
mutual no-first-use pledges, were all things that the nuclear weapon 
states could do without damaging their security prospects.28 
The commissioners agreed that while nuclear weapons could not be 
dis-invented, we could certainly devalue, phase-out, eliminate, and 
outlaw their possession and use. In the same way that prohibition 
regimes have been put in place for other weapons of mass destruction 
—  chemical and biological weapons —  prohibitions adhered to 
even by the most powerful states in the international system, so too 
could nuclear weapons be stigmatised and relegated to the annals of 
history. The fundamental thinking behind this concept, which has 
carried through to the present day, was that humans have the power 
to determine their future and to seek a world in which security can 
be achieved without recourse to inhumane weapons, which in any 
case are bound to have disastrous global impacts if they are ever used. 
We cannot dis-invent chemical or biological weapons, nor indeed the 
gas ovens used by the Nazis, but human sensibility and condemnation 
can produce legal constraints against what are increasingly seen to 
be inhumane, abhorrent, and unacceptable practices. Indeed it is this 
key idea which has led to the Humanitarian Initiative against nuclear 
weapons (discussed below). And in any case, as the commissioners 
pointed out, the sophisticated level of modern conventional weaponry 
is more than adequate to make it the first choice for military action: 
deterrence can be achieved with conventional weapons, as can any 
response to aggression and/or any instance of a state which seeks to 
develop nuclear weapons after a nuclear free world has been achieved.29
28  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1996) Report of the Canberra Commission on the 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra.
29  For more detailed analysis of the utility of nuclear weapons and how this in turn shaped 
the commissioners’ findings, see Hanson, Marianne (2002) ‘Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to 
Security’, International Relations 16(3); Hanson, Marianne (2005) ‘Regulating the Possession and 
Use of Nuclear Weapons: Ideas, Commissions, and Agency in International Security Politics: The 
Case of the Canberra Commission’, in Ramesh Thakur, Andrew F. Cooper and John English (eds), 
International Commissions and the Power of Ideas, Tokyo: Nations University Press.
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The Australian Government had changed during the course of the 
Canberra Commission’s deliberations, and Keating and Evans were no 
longer in power. The new conservative Liberal Government, which 
had sought to distance itself from its Labor predecessor, was lukewarm 
in its promotion of the report. Notwithstanding this, analysts from 
around the world recognised the value of the report as an independent 
analysis of the nuclear issue by distinguished and hard-headed 
experts.30 
The Tokyo Forum on Facing Nuclear Dangers
The Canberra Commission had made the point that a world that was 
divided into states that had nuclear weapons and those that did not 
was unsustainable. In other words, while we had been successful in 
limiting the number of states that possessed nuclear weapons, we 
should not assume that this could be contained indefinitely. The five 
acknowledged nuclear weapon states under the NPT could not reserve 
to themselves the unique security benefits that nuclear weapons 
allegedly brought, while at the same time denying these same benefits 
to other states. The bargain of the NPT had been that non-nuclear 
states would promise never to acquire nuclear weapons, in exchange 
for the nuclear weapon states giving up their nuclear arsenals (albeit 
at some unnamed point). The nuclear states were to move to nuclear 
disarmament, and also assist non-nuclear weapon states wanting to 
utilise nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The extension of the NPT 
in 1995 had been a reassertion of this bargain. Although some states 
were reluctant to extend the regime indefinitely — because extension 
clearly favoured the nuclear weapon states — they ultimately agreed 
to the extension, inter alia, on the basis that the nuclear armed states 
would fulfil their promise to disarm.
Yet this promise remains unfulfilled, even 25 years after the Cold 
War ended. Certainly the nuclear states have reduced their stockpiles 
considerably during this time — we now have ‘only’ around 16,000 
30  Indicative was the assessment in the Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences which labelled the report 
as a ‘no-nonsense road map’. Moore, Mike (1996) ‘A Boost for Abolition’, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Sciences 52(6).
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nuclear weapons in existence31 — but the pace of reductions has been 
slow. Moreover, most of the practical steps (suggested by the Canberra 
Commission and subsequent reports) have not been taken by the 
nuclear weapon states. Nuclear forces remain on high alert; all these 
states continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals, still touting the 
alleged benefits of their nuclear weapons in their security policies; the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not entered into force; 
and we have no Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The disillusion felt by 
many non-nuclear states has been palpable, and the vast majority of 
these have now given up hope that disarmament can be reached via 
the promises of the NPT. 
India had long denounced the unequal nature of the NPT and a 
system that allowed the P5 to retain their arsenals while denying 
nuclear weapons to any other states. This sense of injustice, together 
with the rise to power of the hard-line Bharatiya Janata Party, led 
to India conducting nuclear tests in mid-May 1998, an event which 
propelled Pakistan to follow suit later that month. The proliferation 
of nuclear weapons to the South Asian continent (Israel had also 
developed a  nuclear weapons capability, but refused to confirm or 
deny this) raised concerns throughout the world. It was denounced 
by most states, including by the nuclear weapon states, and prompted 
the then Prime Minister of Japan, Ryutaro Hashimoto, to establish a 
new commission, the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament, in August 1998. The forum met four times and produced 
its report in July 1999, Reducing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for 
the Twenty-First Century.32 
Once again, Robert O’Neill was asked to contribute his experience and 
advice, although most members of the Tokyo Forum were newcomers 
to this kind of disarmament diplomacy and had not participated in 
the Canberra Commission. There were disagreements between some 
of the forum’s members, but all subscribed to the general thrust of 
the report, namely, that the proliferation recently seen in South Asia 
was a harbinger of future dangers and that renewed attention had to 
be given to the issue of nuclear weapons. The forum differed from the 
31  Arms Control Association (2015) Nuclear Weapons: Who has What at a Glance. Available at: 
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
32  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1999) Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for 
the Twenty-First Century: The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 
Disarmament. Available at: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/forum/tokyo9907/.
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Canberra Commission in that it was a direct response to proliferation, 
and focused more on the dangers of proliferation, but essentially it 
reiterated what the Canberra Commission had painstakingly pointed 
out less than three years earlier. If the Canberra Commission appeared 
at a time of substantial optimism in world politics, the forum was 
a response to a deteriorated security landscape. The forum noted 
that ‘much has changed since the Canberra Commission issued its 
important report in 1996’, and that ‘troubling signs are now evident 
on many fronts’.33 
Its first key recommendation was that the world must ‘[s]top and 
reverse the unravelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime 
by reaffirming the treaty’s central bargain’. To do this, the nuclear 
weapon states were urged to demonstrate ‘tangible progress in nuclear 
disarmament’, and non-nuclear states pressed to work actively to 
discourage any further nuclear proliferation. The practical steps 
outlined in the Canberra Commission report were again urged, but there 
was an additional focus on stopping and reversing the proliferation in 
South Asia (Recommendation 11) and specific attention was paid to the 
dangers of missile proliferation and missile defence. In sum, this forum 
essentially amplified the Canberra Commission’s message further; it too 
drew positive acclaim from various organisations and analysts. 
Ultimately, however, and despite the best efforts of Canberra 
Commissioners and Tokyo Forum members, the nuclear weapon 
states paid little heed to their recommendations. Security conditions 
worsened in subsequent years, with the rise of jihadi-driven terrorism 
against the West and accompanying turmoil within the Middle East, 
the decision taken by North Korea in 2006 to join the ranks of the 
nuclear weapon states (and its four sets of nuclear tests, the most 
recent conducted on 6 January 2016), and an ongoing deterioration in 
US–Russian relations. Unfortunately, none of these developments help 
to persuade the leaders of the nuclear weapon states to take seriously 
the need for nuclear elimination, even though none of them could be 
addressed effectively by the use of nuclear weapons. The possession of 
an all-purpose nuclear security blanket — no matter how unsuitable 
such weapons are for preventing or responding to crises — continued 
to dictate the policies of these states. 
33  Ibid.
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While modest reductions continued by the US and Russia (especially 
via the New START Treaty), none of the relatively cost-free practical 
steps have been taken, much to the dismay of most of the world’s states. 
A number of other studies reiterated the points first made prominent 
by the Canberra Commission,34 and the important arguments in favour 
of elimination first made in 2007 by the highly authoritative American 
figures, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam 
Nunn, drew considerably on the groundbreaking work which O’Neill 
and others had done earlier.
A Renewed Emphasis on the Elimination 
of Nuclear Weapons: The Joint Australia–
Japan International Commission on Nuclear 
Non-proliferation and Disarmament
The election of a new Labor Government in Australia in 2007 saw 
a further attempt to address these issues. Former Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans (who had overseen the Canberra Commission and served 
on the Blix Commission) was supported by new Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd in reasserting Australian leadership in nuclear elimination by 
establishing the Joint Australia–Japan International Commission 
on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). Eminent 
individuals invited to the Commission’s Advisory Board included 
Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and George Shultz, as well as George 
Robertson (former British Secretary of Defence and Secretary-General 
of NATO). Again, Robert O’Neill was enlisted to join this group, 
bringing with him his long years of scholarship in the field, and his 
positions on the Canberra Commission and Tokyo Forum. It is testament 
to O’Neill’s esteemed standing that he has played such an important 
role right from the beginning of these endeavours, via the Canberra 
Commission, through to the most recent and extremely comprehensive 
34  These included the Canadian Parliamentary Report, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: 
Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century, which had appeared 
in December 1998, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Report: Weapons of Terror: 
Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms (commonly known as the Blix Report) 
of July 2006.
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approach taken by the ICNND. Its report35 bears the hallmarks of the 
careful consideration given to these matters by Robert O’Neill, and his 
contributions constitute a very important thread linking these works 
from 1995 through to the 2010 report, and beyond. His published 
work in this field after the Cold War, especially Alternative Nuclear 
Futures36 and World Order Under Stress,37 add to his authoritative 
contributions to these crucial questions.
Clearly, these various reports have been instrumental in bringing 
about a re-thinking of the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold 
War era, and have resulted in the affirmation of the goal of a nuclear 
weapon free world by state leaders, military personnel, and notable 
others, including some unlikely sources. What we continue to see, 
however, is that even as the idea of zero nuclear weapons is becoming 
normalised, as leaders pledge their willingness to disarm, we are still a 
long way from the realisation of a nuclear free world. As a result, the 
2015 Review Conference of the nuclear NPT saw a record number of 
states and organisations express their dismay and disappointment with 
the nuclear weapon states. O’Neill had pointed out in his Cunningham 
Lecture that ‘the double standard built into the NPT is likely to prove 
fatal to the current regime’.38 And so it appears to be the case. Many 
states have now lost hope that the NPT can bring about disarmament, 
as the P5 states seem unwilling even to adopt the practical steps 
long urged upon them. In response, 121 states have now signed the 
international pledge to ban nuclear weapons, an initiative that arose 
as the result of three important conferences held to examine the 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. This Humanitarian 
Initiative is likely to result in a nuclear weapon ban-treaty within a 
few years.
The nuclear weapon states will not support such a move. But this 
is an important development. While the nuclear states will not 
sign such a treaty, they are likely to be increasingly constrained by 
35  International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (2010) Eliminating 
Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers. Available at: icnnd.org/Pages/
default.aspx.
36  Baylis, John and Robert O’Neill (eds) (2000) Alternative Nuclear Futures: The Role of Nuclear 
Weapons in the Post-Cold War World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
37  O’Neill, Robert (2007) ‘World Order Under Stress: Issues and Initiatives for the Twenty-First 
Century’, Cunningham Lecture, The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
38  O’Neill, Robert (2007) ‘World Order Under Stress: Issues and Initiatives for the Twenty-First 
Century’, Cunningham Lecture, The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
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a  legal provision formally outlawing nuclear weapons. And while a 
ban-treaty will not, of course, lead automatically or immediately to 
elimination, it will assist in the process of further stigmatising and 
eventually outlawing the possession and use of nuclear weapons. 
In the past, the establishment of a legal prohibition has preceded the 
eventual elimination of a particular weapon (this has been the case 
with landmines, cluster munitions, biological and chemical weapons) 
and this is also likely to be a watershed development in the moves 
towards a nuclear free world.
Ultimately, of course, it is only the leaders of the nuclear weapon states 
who can take these steps, and commissioners and scholars can do no 
more than advocate for what they see as the most prudent course of 
action. But this does not mean that we should disregard the effects of 
these activities. They have been vital in raising public consciousness 
and keeping this issue alive, and in providing clear and achievable 
goals for the steady phasing-out of all nuclear arsenals. The activities 
of Robert O’Neill and others like him, and the works they have 
produced, remain an important body of knowledge which continues 
to inform current debates and decisions taken by advocacy groups, 
individuals and, increasingly, by states who are keen to see advances 
in disarmament. 
Conclusion
One of the problems that has become evident over the years is that 
governments appear not to take seriously what expert security 
specialists have to say, even though these experts have decades of 
experience behind them, can point to the lessons of history, and are 
often able to take a detached and dispassionate view of issues. This 
was observed by Robert O’Neill with reference to the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003.39 He noted that there was widespread opposition to the 
Iraq War, and that he and the majority of his colleagues opposed that 
action on a number of grounds. Unfortunately, ‘[t]he US and allied 
governments simply put their fingers into their ears and took no 
notice of what experts had to say, while their soldiers and others … 
have borne the fearful cost of this disregard’. He argues that there has 
39  O’Neill, Robert (2007) ‘World Order Under Stress: Issues and Initiatives for the Twenty-First 
Century’, Cunningham Lecture, The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.
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been, ‘a propensity of the leading Western governments participating, 
including our own [Australian Government] to ignore sound advice 
at the outset and then, when in trouble, to pretend that everything 
is going much better than it is’.
The same can be said of the nuclear elimination issue: nuclear states 
appear to believe that the nuclear status quo can be maintained 
indefinitely, and that the risks are low. In this sense, those who 
continue to rely on nuclear weapons to keep the peace, and who 
appear not to be worried by the prospect of accidental or terrorist 
use, are surely not realists, but might be better described as idealists. 
Such idealism is misplaced; we have been immensely fortunate that 
nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Hedley Bull made 
the point as early as 1961 that ‘the danger of nuclear war by accident 
is more serious than that of deliberate and premeditated attack’.40 
This  thought has also clearly influenced Robert O’Neill. Numerous 
close calls have occurred,41 and it beggars belief to suggest that 
continuing with sanguine policies will save us from disaster. Robert 
Oppenheimer noted in 1946: ‘It would seem to me visionary in the 
extreme, and not practical, to hope that methods which have so sadly 
failed in the past to avert war will succeed in the face of this far greater 
[nuclear] peril.’ It is vital, as a fellow Canberra Commissioner, Richard 
Butler noted, to ‘reverse history’s greatest accident’ by outlawing and 
eliminating nuclear weapons.42 
But the reluctance to take the advice of experts who have closely studied 
these issues continues. Even the repeated calls for elimination made by 
Kissinger and his colleagues appear to have fallen on deaf ears. If these 
weapons — which might or might not have played a role in stabilising 
relations during the Cold War — are of little or no use today, and if their 
retention will lead to further proliferation, possible terrorist acquisition, 
and mistaken or deliberate use, and if today’s security concerns 
require and can be met by a robust conventional capability — which 
40  Bull, Hedley (1961) The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the 
Missile Age, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 207.
41  Highly recommended are Schlosser, Eric (2013) Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the 
Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, New York: Penguin; and Lewis, Patricia et al. (2014) 
Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, London: Chatham House. 
Available at: www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199200.
42  Butler, Richard (1996) The Elimination Of Nuclear Weapons: Reversing History’s Greatest 
Accident, The Sir Robert Madgwick Lecture, delivered at the University of New England, 
Armidale, 1 May.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
216
it is abundantly clear the great powers do possess — then there is no 
strategic need to maintain costly, imprecise, clumsy (in terms of military 
utility), dangerous and manifestly inhumane nuclear weapons.
Robert O’Neill and David Schwarz reminded us that Hedley Bull’s 
contribution to the debate on arms control ‘was based on a deep 
scepticism not only about those who urged rearmament, but also about 
those who advocated arms control and disarmament measures’.43 It is 
quite clear that this approach has also informed Robert O’Neill’s own 
work. For him, it has not been enough simply to accept prevailing 
practices, or to acquiesce to any fashion of the times and leave 
unexamined those things which deserve to be re-examined. By being 
willing to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in a changed strategic 
landscape, he has given us a prudent assessment and a clear course to 
follow. He noted that Bull ‘emphasized the need to re-examine the 
analytic assumptions underlying’ various theories and practices, and 
it is clear that he has done the same thing when he reappraised the role 
of nuclear weapons. Reversing his previous thinking on the utility of 
these weapons required some courage, and a willingness to risk the ire 
of peers who continued to hold fast to the old doctrines. 
There were many who were fortunate to study under the guidance 
of Robert O’Neill over the years, and who benefitted greatly from his 
intellectual energy and critical abilities. And we can continue to draw 
inspiration and strength from his post-academic activities. In 1981 
he wrote that ‘all who are professionally concerned with strategic 
thinking, particularly those who work in universities and the media’ 
are obliged to ‘make a major effort to stimulate wider discussion’ of 
the security problems that beset the world.44 Robert O’Neill has done 
this most admirably in alerting the world to the nuclear dangers which 
continue to exist long after the Cold War has ended, and his efforts 
have paved the way for the acceptance, at least at a declaratory level, 
of the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons. We can seek to follow his 
example and hope that one day, his and our prescriptions for a safer 
world might be heeded.
43  O’Neill, Robert and David Schwartz (eds) (1987) Hedley Bull on Arms Control, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan.




Robert O’Neill’s Institutional 
Leadership: The End of the 
Cold War and the Re-emergence 
of a Global World Order
John Hillen
International affairs are influenced by many factors, not the least 
of them Harold McMillan’s warning, ‘events, dear boy, events’. 
Statesmen, political leaders, military commanders, theorists, and 
influential writers on the topic play their role in the unfolding shape 
of the international arena. So too institutions — empires, states, 
militaries, government ministries, universities at times, international 
organisations, sub-state organisations, religious groups, and other 
popular movements — might all wield a geopolitical agenda and 
purpose that forms and sculpts history. But the role of the private 
institution — the so-called think tank — is a relatively new 
phenomenon, perhaps some 60–70 years old
The role of the private research institution in helping shape 
international affairs, rather than simply analysing their passing 
after the facts, is less well known. However, when one turns to look 
at the career of Robert (Bob) O’Neill AO, and considers his decade at 
the helm, as Director and then Chairman of the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS), one can see how a think tank —  and 
its leader —  can play a very outsized role in actually determining 
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global affairs; or, at the very least, laying the intellectual and policy 
groundwork for tremendous shifts in geopolitics, and by doing so, 
helping these shifts come about.
During the time that Bob O’Neill was Director of IISS (1982–1987) 
he uniquely positioned the institute to accommodate a reasoned but 
passionate set of debates and deliberations about a very different grand 
strategy pursued by President Ronald Reagan and the United States 
— strategic questions that were at the time driving the European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance and some in the US further and 
further apart. O’Neill did not let the institute become fractured by 
this challenge, but rather led IISS to make intellectual space for fairly 
examining the new elements of Reagan’s strategy and US actions, even 
while subjecting them to rigorous strategic analysis. His leadership 
paid dividends, keeping IISS not only relevant but, indeed, still central 
to questions of superpower rivalry and potential nuclear conflict; the 
Reagan grand strategy was able to unfold to good effect — pushed, 
questioned, and shaped by the work of IISS.
At almost the same time, recognising the likely erosion of the criticality 
of the institute’s founding raison d’etre (managing the nuclear balance 
between rival superpowers), O’Neill also positioned IISS for influence 
and access elsewhere in the strategic world — displaying the foresight 
to anticipate a more multipolar world in the near future. He expanded 
and built the institute’s finances, research agenda, membership base, 
and governance structure to make the narrowly focused Atlantic 
Alliance think tank become the most influential and truly global 
public policy research institute in international affairs. Any one of 
these feats would have been notable, but to do both in tandem sets the 
bar for visionary institutional leadership and influence. 
By the end of his tenure as director, the IISS research agenda, 
conference schedules, complexion of IISS membership, and governance 
were all changing to encompass much of the strategic world that did 
not represent only the competition between US and Soviet blocs of 
influence. In his term as Chairman of the IISS Council (1996–2001), 
O’Neill expanded on this diversification of IISS’s traditional NATO-
based and nuclear issues-oriented membership, research expertise, 
and convening authority. Working with the director at the time, 
O’Neill helped create the para-diplomatic regional dialogues in Asia 
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and the Middle East for which IISS is so well known today, and made 
the institute the preeminent global strategic research institutes of 
its time. 
However, in 1982, when Bob O’Neill arrived to take over IISS, none 
of that was assured, let alone in the cards. It would be a formidable 
leadership challenge just to keep the institute from being riven by the 
strategic upheavals of that time.
IISS and the Advent of the Reagan Doctrine
Sir Michael Howard, one of IISS’s founders, has described the purpose 
of the institute at its inception and the events that led to its founding.1 
IISS would study the military problems and strategies of the world 
— especially those the nuclear age, exclusively a European issue at 
the time of IISS’s founding in 1958. The institute’s quarterly journal 
was tellingly named Survival, and its premier research publication, 
The Military Balance, was the indispensable public accounting of the 
world’s military forces. The philosophical heritage of the institution was 
hard-headed and realistic (they knew disarmament was impractical), 
but the research agenda was ultimately interested in avoiding war — 
especially nuclear war. For the 24 years between IISS’s founding and 
the arrival of Australian infantry veteran Bob O’Neill as its director, 
it was one of the world’s preeminent research institutions that had 
global membership, but a Western European outlook on issues of the 
nuclear arms race, strategies of deterrence, and superpower rivalry.
The rise to power of President Ronald Reagan in 1980–1981 posed 
a challenge to the intelligent, hotly debated, but likely near-consensus 
among IISS members in 1980 about the suitability of the various 
permutations of détente tried by all American administrations since 
Eisenhower. President Reagan promised the end of détente and 
a strategy of confrontation. His predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had offered 
a softer version of détente than his predecessors, saying in 1977 
that the US should be ‘free of that inordinate fear of communism’.2 
1  Howard, Michael (2006) Captain Professor: A Life in War and Peace, London: Continuum, 
pp. 153–65. 
2  Carter, Jimmy (1977) Speech at Notre Dame University, University of South California 
Santa-Barbara American Presidency project records, 21 May.
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Reagan  accused Carter of accommodating the Soviet Union’s worst 
behaviours and resisting the connection between Marxist and 
communist movements around the world and the USSR. Mainstream 
Republicans did not escape Reagan’s criticisms. His conservative 
allies, a political insurgency of sorts within the Republican Party, 
made much of President Ford declaring in a debate with Carter that 
Eastern Europe was not under Soviet domination and insisting in the 
follow up that Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia were free from Soviet 
interference.
The impression of weakness inherent in Carter’s version of détente, 
exacerbated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the taking 
of American hostages in Iran in 1979, doomed Carter’s re-election 
chances in the opinion of many historians. In 1980, Ronald Reagan 
stormed to a huge victory over President Carter, promising to return 
America to strength and greatness again — in large part by vigorously 
resisting the USSR, Soviet-inspired movements, and supporting anti-
communist movements the world over. Reagan noted:
As the foundation of my foreign policy, I decided we had to send as 
powerful a message as we could to the Russians that we weren’t going 
to stand by anymore while they armed and financed terrorists and 
subverted democratic governments. Our policy was to be one based 
on strength and realism. I wanted peace through strength, not peace 
through a piece of paper.3
To an institution such as IISS, enjoying a highly intelligent and now 
somewhat rehearsed existence as a centre of strategic thinking about 
arms control, the nuclear balance, and theories of deterrence, this 
aggressive rhetoric and the implicit Reagan policy of confrontation 
was a challenge to absorb. As IISS veteran Sir Lawrence Freedman has 
written: 
The status of the Institute depended on its ability to pay attention 
to its core business, which had always been focused on transatlantic 
relations and the conduct of the Cold War. The context was a sharp 
discontinuity in American policy. During the 1970s the Institute had 
worked naturally within the mainstream transatlantic consensus, 
which was focused on the appropriate mix of détente and defence, 
which led to a concentration on the conduct of arms control. 
3  Reagan, Ronald (1990) An American Life: The Autobiography, Kindle edition, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, loc. 3778–80.
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Yet during the Jimmy Carter years (in which many IISS alumni served) 
this consensus began to be challenged. Key figures in the membership 
were taking an increasingly sceptical view of both Soviet intentions 
and in consequence the role of arms control and the durability of 
deterrence (notably Albert Wohlstetter among the senior figures and 
Colin Gray, who was briefly on the staff, among the Young Turks). 
The debate became increasingly polarised, and by the early 1980s this 
polarisation had spread to transatlantic relations. In Ronald Reagan’s 
Washington the new mainstream view was to doubt Soviet motives, 
question the value of arms control and prepare for a period of intensive 
arms racing. Only Margaret Thatcher’s government showed any 
sympathy, yet even in Britain the official line remained pro-détente 
and pro-deterrence.
This created real political difficulties for IISS. It needed to work with 
the US government, which was wary of consorting with organisations 
which were perceived to be promoting erroneous visions, and the 
major charitable foundations, which were often more attached to the 
policies of the 1970s and who saw their role as being to challenge and 
rein in the provocations of the Reaganauts. On the streets there was 
an increasingly vocal movement protesting against nuclear weapons 
and claiming that official policies were propelling the world to 
disaster. There were many pitfalls in this situation for an international 
institute, which had to be sensitive to the political and intellectual 
currents in a range of countries if it was to satisfy an increasingly 
diverse membership, without losing its way and purpose.4 
The first few years of the Reagan Administration did not do much 
to settle nerves or smooth over varying opinion, and a National 
Intelligence Council report of the time acknowledged, with 
understatement, substantial ‘differences between the United States 
and our West European allies’.5 By 1982, as O’Neill was being recruited 
to be IISS’s first non-European Director of the IISS, Cold War tensions 
were at their height as the American administration drove hard to 
reverse what it saw as Soviet ascendency and American decline. 
Reagan’s new Secretary of State George Schultz described the attitude 
of the administration and conflict with Europe thusly: 
4  Freedman, Lawrence (2006) ‘Bob O’Neill and The Art of Academic Leadership’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 60(1), pp. 13–17.
5  Brands, Hal (2014) What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft 
from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 115. 
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Throughout the cold war era, America’s responsibilities as a 
superpower  had been fulfilled with impressive success. But fear 
of flagging will or failure had become pervasive. The American 
presidency had become a story of successive agonies: the assassination 
of John F. Kennedy; the anguished departure of Lyndon Johnson at 
the nadir of the Vietnam War; Richard Nixon’s de facto impeachment; 
Gerald Ford’s healing but brief stewardship; and Jimmy Carter’s 
miseries, which, with a weak smile, he spread across the American 
and international scene. In June 1980, I had said in a speech to the 
Business Roundtable, ‘All around us, and plain for all the world to see, 
is confusion about our aims, deterioration in our world position, and 
deep concern, perhaps fear, that we are no longer able to establish a 
tough-minded sense of direction and stick to it.’ Now, in mid-1982, 
we were still besieged by problems and buffeted by events. Ronald 
Reagan’s program, off to a strong start at home, was struggling abroad. 
President Reagan had set out to restore America’s strength, optimism, 
and ‘can do’ spirit. He  was strengthening our defence capabilities, 
invigorating the morale of our men and women in uniform, and 
carrying the message of political and economic freedom around the 
world. But the president’s foreign policy refused to lift off and soar. 
I felt the United States held the winning hand, but it was proving 
a difficult hand to play. Bitterness marked the discord between the 
United States and our European allies over the proposed construction 
of a gigantic 3,500-mile pipeline running from Siberia through rugged 
terrain to carry gas, Soviet gas, into Europe. The American and 
European economies were in a recession, and the pipeline contract 
meant good jobs during a time when they were hard to get.6
Yet the upcoming year, 1983, would be critical for nuclear arms 
negotiations: close U.S.–European coordination would be essential. 
New Soviet missiles, SS-20s, had been deployed and, since the 1970s, 
explicitly and directly targeted on Europe. These intermediate-range 
missiles could not reach the United States. Their purpose was to 
intimidate West Europeans as part of an ongoing Soviet effort to drive 
a wedge between the United States and our NATO allies. U.S. missiles, 
as  agreed by all NATO members, were scheduled to be deployed 
beginning in late 1983 on European soil as a counter to these Soviet 
deployments. Crucial negotiations would determine whether the 
arms race would be speeded up or scaled back. The pressing need for 
coherence and unity in the alliance would be practically impossible to 
manage, I knew, unless we could dissipate the acrimonious atmosphere 
6  Shultz, George P. (2010) Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, Kindle edition, 
New York: Scribner, loc. 128–35.
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with the Europeans created by the pipeline dispute. U.S.–Soviet 
relations had gone into the deep freeze when the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan just after Christmas of 1979. Now the Soviet-backed 
crackdown in Poland further deepened the cold. Relations between 
the two superpowers were not simply bad; they were virtually 
non-existent. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said to me 
in May  1982, ‘The superpowers are not in touch with each other’s 
reality. The Soviets can’t read you. More human contact is needed.’ 
‘The Soviet system is incompetent and cannot survive,’ I had said in a 
speech at Stanford in 1979. ‘In the struggle with communism freedom 
is the ideological victor in the world.’ Now, three years later, in 1982, 
I had not changed my mind. The Soviets had to be made to realise 
that they could not succeed with aggression, nor could they win an 
arms race. But we did not want to spark conflict through fear or miss 
opportunities to resolve outstanding problems. President Reagan 
recognised the Soviet Union for what it was: aggressive, repressive, 
and economically bankrupt, but militarily powerful, with an arsenal 
of strategic nuclear weapons able to devastate us in thirty minutes. We 
must recognise that reality, I knew, but we should also be ready to deal 
with the Soviets more constructively if the opportunity arose. We had 
to gather support for this approach: from Congress, the press, and the 
public. Global stability depended on how we dealt with the Soviets.7
It was into this cauldron that Bob O’Neill was thrown in 1982 — 
plucked out of the antipodes and moved to the centre of the Cold War 
as director of the preeminent European think tank, studying its nuclear 
and military ramifications. His appointment was not unanimously 
supported, some perhaps thinking that if the aggressiveness of the 
Reagan doctrine threatened to riven the European-based membership, 
then it would take an insider to prevent such an outcome. But, O’Neill 
had notable bonafides as a Cold War scholar and strategist,8 and he 
would need those to cement his position as a determined director, 
even while preparing to change and expand the focus of the institute 
to other military and strategic matters. 
7  Ibid., loc. 148–54.
8  Bob was the editor or co-editor of a number of books on nuclear arms and Cold War strategy 
issues, including O’Neill (ed.) (1974) The Strategic Nuclear Balance: An Australian Perspective, 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University; and 
O’Neill, Robert and David Schwartz (eds) (1987) Hedley Bull on Arms Control, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
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O’Neill inherited an IISS membership that was largely resistant to 
the Reagan administration approach, which contrasted sharply to the 
carefully created strategic, military, and technical framework of 
détente that IISS had been a key player in constructing over the past 
decades. Even so, in the institute’s research agenda and conference 
presentations, O’Neill made space for a rigorous and serious discussion 
of the new and highly controversial American strategy that was two 
years underway when he took charge. Too smart a leader to ever show 
anything but an even hand (to this day, I don’t know how Bob really 
felt about it in his strategic heart at the time), he prepared the way for 
discussions that were scrupulously fair, and by doing so, the institute 
was able to show more openness to the new American strategy than 
others did at the time.9 
It cannot be stressed how different the Reagan approach was to 
the consensus of the time. Reagan described his thinking in his 
autobiography. It was not considered a sophisticated view — especially 
by foreign policy sophisticates. 
The Soviet Union we faced during my first winter in office was guided 
by a policy of immoral and unbridled expansionism. During that first 
year, we embarked on a broad program of military renewal to upgrade 
our land, sea, and air forces and adopted a foreign policy aimed at 
making it clear to the Soviets that we now viewed them through a 
prism of reality: We knew what they were up to, we were not going 
to accept subversion of democratic governments, and we would never 
accept second place in the arms race. At the same time, recognising 
the futility of the arms race and the hair-trigger risk of annihilation 
it posed to the world, I tried to send signals to Moscow indicating we 
were prepared to negotiate a winding down of the arms race if the 
Soviets were also sincere about it — and proved it with deeds. These 
policies were linked: Because we now viewed the Soviets through the 
prism of reality, we knew we would never get anywhere with them 
9  Bob later became a forceful and leading voice for the abolition of nuclear weapons on the 
Canberra Commission of 2006, so I don’t think he’ll ever be accused of being overly sympathetic 
to the hard line of Reagan’s policies. But he was scrupulously fair. Ironically, Reagan made much 
of his own nuclear weapon abolitionist ambitions, including to Gorbachev during their first 
meetings. See Lettow, Paul (2006) Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 
New York: Random House.
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at the arms control table if we went there in a position of military 
inferiority; if we were going to get them to sue for peace, we had to do 
it from a position of strength.10
The European-led near-consensus reflected in most IISS work at the 
time11 maintained that the American position was strong enough — 
and improving it military or technologically would only upset the 
balance of power that the institute had so carefully analysed. O’Neill 
noted in his 1984 conference summary that IISS member Albert 
Carnesale ‘summed up the European argument thus: “Western Europe 
objects to any change in a security system that seems to be working 
well enough as it is, therefore the burden of proof is on those who 
propose change.”’12
However, fundamental to accepting the legitimacy of Reagan strategy 
and providing the beginnings of such ‘a burden of proof’ was that 
one had to accept that the Soviet Union had been measurably in the 
military ascendancy during the 1970’s. As Hal Brands has written:
Reagan was prepared to enter into arms-control negotiations on these 
and other weapons, but in the meantime he deemed it imperative to 
restore the leverage that came with military power. ‘A sound East-
West military balance is absolutely essential,’ he stated; strength was 
the indispensable precondition to everything Reagan hoped to do.13 
IISS, of course, was the premier independent measuring stick of 
the balance of military power. With the deployment of Soviet SS-20 
missiles in Europe in the early 1980s, and the USSR’s involvement in 
conflicts from Central America through to Afghanistan, that might 
not be so hard to prove in theory — but the Reagan response to it still 
powerfully challenged the mainstream consensus. For the most part, 
IISS members could live with the current balance of power as being 
balance. O’Neill, in guiding the work, research agenda, membership 
10  Reagan, Ronald (1990) An American Life: The Autobiography, Kindle edition, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, loc. 7998–8006.
11  There has never been a true consensus on any issue in IISS — made up as it is of individual 
staff researchers and thousands of members. But on the nuclear balance question, détente, and 
deterrence, there was — as Lawrence Freedman referred to — as close to near-consensus as IISS 
members could get when compared with the Reagan approach.
12  O’Neill, Robert (1985) ‘Conference Report’, in New Technology and Western Security Policy, 
Part III: Papers from the IISS 26th Annual Conference in 1984, Adelphi Paper 189, London: IISS.
13  Brands, Hal (2014) What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft 
from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 111. 
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contributions, and conferences of the institute that would address the 
Reagan strategy, did not give voice to the idea that Reagan and Shultz 
were crying wolf or over-inflating Soviet ascendancy for political 
purposes (although many in Europe thought exactly that). As O’Neill 
noted at the 1983 annual conference in his report: ‘Whatever their 
political significance, Soviet advances are real and, from an American 
perspective, the “balance” had altered unfavourably. Should the 
United States aim at superiority and not merely maintenance of parity 
remains the most important, albeit unresolved question.’14
Overall, and perhaps due to his strategic upbringing on the other 
side of the world, O’Neill exhibited more scholarly detachment from 
the transatlantic consensus and therefore ended up, in retrospect, 
appearing to enjoy more foresight or open-mindedness than most IISS 
experts or conferees in these mid-1980s gatherings. Summing up the 
attitude of annual conferees in 1983, O’Neill wrote: ‘Little optimism 
was felt in the committee for the possibility of inducing change in 
Eastern Europe. At best the fruits for such Western policies (i.e. Reagan 
pressure) would be marginal although, of course, over a long time, 
the margins would accumulate.’ Still, O’Neill opened the door to the 
Reagan line and its proponents, noting in the same proceedings: 
Yet the future may hold revolutionary changes in and for Eastern 
Europe rather than evolutionary ones. The Soviet Union’s likely 
response to such changes is essentially unpredictable. She might 
simply muddle through or down, sensing inevitable decline in her 
empire she might consider alternatives.15
Although the IISS debates were heated at the time, and definitely 
unsettled well into the late 1980s, O’Neill’s even-handed approach 
made space for the Reagan strategy to be examined seriously, and 
for IISS to be used as a critical sounding board. I see no evidence 
that the majority of the members, especially those European members 
who came of age forging the transatlantic mainstream consensus 
that Reagan so powerfully challenged, were ever convinced that the 
Reagan approach would be anything but disruptive to a well-thought 
out strategic near-consensus about how to resist Soviet aggression 
14  O’Neill, Robert (1984) ‘Conference Report’, in The Conduct of East–West Relations in 
the 1980s, Part III: Papers from the IISS 25th Annual Conference in 1983, Adelphi Paper 189, 
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
15  Ibid. 
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without the confrontation Reagan appeared to promise. But, in the 
end, O’Neill’s approach allowed for the institute’s analysis and work to 
be part of what was indeed a coherent, if controversial, grand strategy 
from the administration — and one that ultimately was successful. 
As Hal Brand’s recent archival examination of the administration has 
shown: 
These sources (NSC documents from the early 1980s) illustrate that 
there was a Reagan grand strategy — a comprehensive, long-term 
vision for U.S. policy toward Moscow. This strategy drew heavily 
on Reagan’s own ideas and involvement, and utilized all elements of 
national power. It was premised on the idea that the Soviet Union was 
far weaker than it had looked in the late 1970s, and that the United 
States could take advantage of that weakness by exerting pressure in 
the military, economic, political, and ideological realms. This was the 
unifying rationale behind the major elements of Reagan’s statecraft, 
from his enormous military buildup, to his eponymous doctrine of 
supporting anti-Soviet insurgents in the Third World, to his strident 
rhetorical condemnations of Moscow and other measures. The primary 
goal of these initiatives was not to force the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(as some hard-liners advocated), but to provide diplomatic leverage 
that could be used to moderate Soviet behavior and reduce Cold War 
tensions on terms favorable to the United States. In essence, Reagan’s 
grand strategy — spelled out in presidential decision directives issued 
in 1982 and 1983 — was meant to capitalize on America’s competitive 
advantages vis-à-vis Moscow, to reverse the tide of the Cold War, 
and then to begin the process of forging a more stable superpower 
relationship.16
SDI and IISS
The Reagan military build up, especially the deployment of Pershing 
intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, was controversial 
in IISS and the world over, but the administration’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) elicited even more emotion and aggravation among 
those who thought the nuclear balance was carefully and responsibly 
16  See Brands, Hal (2014) What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American 
Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 103. 
I view this work as one of the few neutral treatments of Reagan’s strategy and the end of the 
Cold War, positioned as it is between the hagiographies by Reagan’s allies and the still spiteful 
analysis of his critics, who cannot bring themselves to acknowledge even a slight contribution 
of his strategy to the peaceful end of the Cold War. 
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understood by both super powers. SDI was as important to Reagan’s 
strategy as it was disruptive to the nuclear balance consensus. Reagan 
later wrote: ‘some people may take a different view, but if I had to 
choose the single most important reason, on the United States’ side, 
for the historic breakthroughs that were to occur during the next five 
years in the quest for peace and a better relationship with the Soviet 
Union, I would say it was the Strategic Defense Initiative, along with 
the overall modernisation of our military forces’.17
However, in 1983–1984, even the perception of a technological 
advantage on one side of the Cold War, which could upend several 
decades of game theory and nuclear strategy, was an overwhelmingly 
unwelcome development for those who had built the existing 
transatlantic nuclear consensus. Many, including much of the IISS 
membership, channelled their disapproval into scepticism about the 
technological potential itself. Bob O’Neill took the issue head on — 
neither promoting the technology or the strategic changes it might 
portend, but also not resisting a mature discussion of its potentiality. 
It was no mean feat to walk this political tightrope. As Lawrence 
Freedman recalled: 
To some extent coming from Australia helped Bob establish his 
authority as Director of IISS. This nationality carried paid-up 
membership of the Western alliance but a degree of distance from 
the immediate transatlantic rows. Yet his effectiveness went beyond 
nationality, or even his natural diplomatic skills, to an understanding 
of the role of the Institute as a forum for debate and research. This was 
different to the stance taken during the IISS’s pioneering years of the 
1960s when it failed to address in its publications the most divisive 
issue of the time, the continuing war in Vietnam. A good example 
of Bob’s approach, with which I happened to get involved, was the 
response to President Reagan’s strategic defense initiative (SDI), better 
known as ‘star wars’, which as widely seen to be both foolhardy and 
provocative. Rather than refuse to take the issue seriously, which 
was for a time the inclination of European governments, Bob raised 
the money for an extensive, almost smothering program, of analysis, 
which eventually came to be published in a series of Adelphi Papers. 
Some of these contributed to moving the debate along, addressing 
the technical questions of missile defences as well as the more overtly 
17  Reagan, Ronald (1990) An American Life: The Autobiography, Kindle edition, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, loc. 7994–7.
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political and doctrinal. By the time this program was complete 
(which was never the case with the SDI itself) the world had moved 
on and East/West relations were moving into a more constructive 
phase. The key point was that nobody felt excluded, the important 
issues had been ventilated and the credibility of the Institute as a 
forum where these matters were addressed was enhanced. At the 1984 
annual conference, for example, American policy-makers first began 
to engage with the anxieties of their allies over the implications of this 
particular policy.18
Bob O’Neill’s willingness to take on SDI instead of deriding it 
technologically and strategically, or dismissing it as fantasy unworthy 
of strategic consideration, as many institutes of the time did, is a good 
example of his subtle but strong institutional leadership. He did not 
take sides, but rather gave numerous perspectives their day in the 
sun — and subjected each to analysis and critique. In the end, this 
approach not only helped IISS successfully navigate the challenge to 
it from the Reagan doctrine and the heightened Cold War tensions 
when Bob became director, but kept the institute coherent enough for 
Bob to implement his second great example of international strategic 
leadership during his time as IISS Director and later Chairman.
Preparing IISS for the Re-emergence of a 
Global World Order 
Bob O’Neill’s second major institutional move was to revitalise 
and build the infrastructure of the institute — financial resources, 
information technology, research staff, publications, and membership 
— by expanding and revitalising the core purpose and expertise of 
IISS. Starting as he did in the mid-1980s, and gaining momentum as 
Reagan and Gorbachev began to thaw the superpower tensions of the 
early 1980s, Bob repositioned the institute as a truly global body 
— in research expertise and membership — while still focusing on 
military issues and problems of strategy. 
18  Freedman, Lawrence (2006) ‘Bob O’Neill and The Art of Academic Leadership’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 60(1), pp. 13–17.
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Financially, the institute had not lived exactly hand to mouth in its 
first 25 years before O’Neill became director, but was close to it at 
times. And what resources it did enjoy — research grants, publications 
income, and membership fees — were related to the institute’s core 
expertise in European security, the Atlantic Alliance, the nuclear 
balance of power, and the superpower rivalry. 
O’Neill set about trying to draw in money to match a large challenge 
grant from the Ford Foundation that would give IISS its first true 
capital fund, and thereby control over the direction of its research 
agenda and the possibility of expanding the expertise of the institute 
beyond its core area. O’Neill succeeded in raising the funds, and hired 
a research staff to reinforce the expanded agenda of the institute, and 
build up competencies in other areas of strategy and military affairs. 
In particular, he raised funds from the Rockefeller Foundation for a 
regional security program, including an assistant director for regional 
security. He set about expanding the annual conference agenda, which 
had a long lead time (see below), but in the meantime he commissioned 
Adelphi Papers on Security in East Asia, the two Koreas, South African 
and other African security issues, and the Middle East — among other 
non-nuclear balance of power in Europe topics. 
O’Neill also set out to improve other elements of the infrastructure at 
IISS beyond its financial base. When he arrived at IISS there were no 
computers, and so information technology as an important component 
of public policy research was introduced by O’Neill. He also took steps 
to widen the appeal and distribution of research and publications — 
many of which had been styled in the 1960s and were not part of an 
updated sales and distribution network. 
Knowing that ultimately he was leading a membership based 
organisation, O’Neill launched a drive to add more IISS members 
from East Asia and the Middle East. Over some objections, he pushed 
for Chinese members and contributions, starting in the mid-1980s. 
He also worked to diversify the IISS Council, which along with the 
Trustees of IISS was the body of foreign policy notables who acted as 
the governing and advisory body for the institute. Council members 
were added from Asia and the Arab countries of the Middle East.
One of the most telling and profound expressions of IISS focus and 
activity — of its leadership, research staff, and membership interests 
— was the annual conference. Habitually held in Europe and almost 
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always focused on some aspect of the nuclear arms race or super-power 
rivalry, the annual conference appropriately captured the intellectual 
energy of IISS and its members. 
Bob inherited this Euro-nuclear-superpower focus. Prior to his arrival, 
as part of the usual pattern, in 1978, the topic of the conference was 
‘Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s’. In 1979, the institute met in 
Switzerland to discuss ‘The Future of Strategic Deterrence’. The 1980 
annual conference in Italy marked a bit of a departure from the usual 
nuclear balance issues, looking at conflict in the Third World, but 
through the lens of super power rivalry. A 1981 conference in the 
US explored America’s security. The 1982 conference in The Hague 
looked at ‘Defense and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western 
Security’. The 1983 annual conference, Bob’s first as director, was 
held in Ottawa and focused on ‘The Conduct of East–West Relations 
in the 1980s’. With annual conferences some three years in the making 
and planning, at this time Bob started plans to re-orient the annual 
conference and the institute in general. 1984 saw the institute meet in 
Avignon to consider ‘New Technology and Western Security Policy’,19 
and 1985 saw the last of the classic cold war nuclear-balance IISS 
European conferences in Berlin, with a focus on ‘Power and Policy: 
Doctrine, the Alliance, and Arms Control’.
In 1986, the O’Neill agenda for expanding and revitalising IISS’s 
institutional reach and infrastructure came visibly onto the scene 
with the annual conference held in Kyoto, Japan, and featured many 
new (non-European) faces. ‘East Asia, the West, and International 
Security’ featured Henry Kissinger and speakers from Japan, China, 
Australia, and elsewhere. In O’Neill’s summing up of that landmark 
conference, he departed from the standard nuclear balance language 
of IISS over the previous 28 years and referred to different strategic 
shaping factors, such as ‘economic and social factors’ that would 
‘dramatically’ affect the relative standing of states and their security 
in Asia. He had a nuanced look at alliance structures, technology, 
economics, reform, ‘the market revolution in China’, and development 
19  Read ‘East–West’ here in IISS patois of the time as ‘Soviet Bloc–Western Bloc’. A few years 
later, Bob would be at pains in his 1986 conference write up to redefine ‘East’ for the institute as 
what was classically known as the Far East/Asia.
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in the region. His approach foreshadowed a more subtle geopolitical 
and grand strategic approach to analysis than the more scientific 
nuclear throw-weight formulas of the European balance of power.20 
The following year IISS was back in Europe with a conference in 
Barcelona — but one that strategically looked south, not east across 
central Europe. The focus of that 1987 conference (Bob’s last as 
director) was security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and 
featured Israeli and Arab speakers, among others. O’Neill still allowed 
for some committee examination of Soviet–US–Europe Cold War 
issues, as they were still central to global security during this time of 
new IISS expansion. But O’Neill’s push to have IISS expand its scope 
of research, its intellectual aperture, and its membership perspective 
paid dividends, even in its historically core area of expertise. The new 
global perspective pushed by O’Neill ironically allowed the institute 
to perhaps to lift its focus from the nuclear balance ledger book if 
you will, and see more broadly the whole of the strategic enterprise 
and the global arena. The work on the military dimensions of the 
super power rivalry presented at the southern-focused Mediterranean 
conference proved to be prescient — or at least Bob O’Neill was able 
to present it that way in the proceedings. Although an unexpectedly 
quick and dramatic beginning-of-the-end to the Cold War was still 
two years away, O’Neill remarked in his conference summing up 
that in reference to the US–Soviet conflict, ‘we may well be at one of 
history’s hinge points’.21
As the Cold War ended, a few subsequent IISS conferences sensibly 
returned to focus on the end of the superpower rivalry, but Bob had set 
the stage — a world stage — for IISS, and there would be no looking back. 
The funding of this expansion and revitalisation, the research staffing 
and scholarship that bolstered it, the new scope of the membership and 
governance that he had put into place made it a truly global think tank, 
just at the time the end of the Cold War brought about a diffusion of 
power and strategic challenge in the world. In the mid to late 1980s not 
everyone could see this, and many thought IISS need not change its 
research and membership focus. Critics of Bob’s moves claimed that IISS 
was not the UN, and should not expand its focus. 
20  See O’Neill, Robert (1987) ‘Concluding Remarks’, in East Asia, The West, and International 
Security, Adelphi Paper 212, London: IISS.
21  O’Neill, Robert (1998) ‘Conclusion’ in Prospects for Security in The Mediterranean, Adelphi 
Paper 231, London: IISS.
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Bob’s foresight was rewarded, of course, with the end of the Cold War 
and the rise of multiple centres of power and strategic challenge in 
the world. During his time as Chairman of the Council (1996–2001), 
many intelligent voices were doubting the relevance of military-
centred research institutes due to the sheer unlikelihood of major 
power conflict.22 O’Neill, together with energetic new Director John 
Chipman, conceived the idea for using the IISS’s global convening 
power he had built as director a decade prior, in order to sponsor 
ministerial-level regional security conferences — starting in Asia. 
The marquee events on the international security calendar and of the 
institute are now those conferences — the Shangri-La Dialogue for 
Asian/Pacific security issues and the Manama Dialogue for Persian 
Gulf and Middle East security issues.
Institutional leadership is difficult. Especially of membership based 
institutes that largely operate by committee and a type of informal 
near-consensus. Any scholar can forcefully express an opinion in 
a book, a journal article, or a conference paper — coherence lends 
itself to individual efforts. But to lead multifaceted and complex 
institutions composed of thousands of opinionated members and 
donors in a coherent direction, all the while building and broadening 
the institution’s infrastructure, appeal, membership, and influence, 
is a real feat. 
For Bob O’Neill to have kept IISS as intact as he did during the challenge 
to the transatlantic consensus presented by the early Reagan years is 
something that should be recognised and saluted. It was difficult, and 
yet he did it elegantly. For him to not only keep the institute whole 
but to also accommodate a fair and rigorous treatment of the heretical 
strategies of the Reagan doctrine such that they could actually be 
improved by the analysis and debate of IISS is a marvel of leadership 
— both strong and subtle. And, finally, for him to simultaneously 
expand the institute’s reach and appeal in such a way that it was 
ideally prepared for the multipolar world that was to emerge soon 
after his directorship ended was a final transcendent act of intuitional 
leadership at its finest. 
22  See, for example, Friedman, Thomas (2005) The World is Flat, New York: Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux; and Fukuyama, Francis (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, New York: 
Free Press. A better guide to the fleeting nature of the peace dividend phenomenon is Howard, 




Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan
Carter Malkasian and Daniel Marston
Robert O’Neill did not take part in the Iraq or Afghan wars. Yet he has 
had an abiding influence over how the United States and the West have 
approached the past 15 years of war. His experiences, books (Vietnam 
Task and General Giap), and most importantly, his teaching guided a 
cadre of scholar-practitioners involved in the Iraq and Afghan wars. 
His teachings lay at the root of many of the reforms that took place. 
Without him, the United States and the West would have been far less 
able to meet the challenges of the recent wars. Through six decades, 
O’Neill has been a father of strategic thinking on insurgency, carefully 
teaching and guiding from behind.
We met Professor O’Neill in the late 1990s as young graduate students 
coming to Oxford to work under his supervision. We were two of 
his last students. By that time, he had served in Vietnam, taught at 
The Australian National University, run the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), and taken the Chair of the Chichele Professor 
of War at Oxford. As Americans, we had been exposed to Vietnam in 
our earlier studies, but our first true instruction in insurgency and 
counter-insurgency came from Professor O’Neill. With that in mind, 
this chapter will trace the development of his thinking and chart his 
influence on strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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Vietnam
O’Neill’s deployment to Vietnam as an infantry officer from 1966 to 
1967 forms the starting point of his thinking on insurgency. He was 
there for a year with the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment 
(5RAR). O’Neill chronicled the deployment in Vietnam Task, published 
shortly after the battalion returned to Australia. As noted in Tony 
White’s chapter, O’Neill wrote most of the book while on active duty 
in Vietnam; his account documents his attempt to steer an objective 
path through a campaign in which he was deeply involved. Vietnam 
Task was never intended to be definitive. O’Neill wrote it intending 
that it would serve as a record of a moment in the war, in one part of 
the campaign and in one unit’s experience of which he was part. 
Vietnam Task has had a significant impact on our thinking and 
research, during work on our degrees and beyond.1 In the late 1990s, 
the Vietnam War was still a divisive topic for many in the United States. 
Having grown up in the shadow of the war, we had heard the often 
contentious discussions taking place in families and neighbourhoods, 
as well as in academe. We have read and re-read Vietnam Task and 
learned different things from it each time, as the context of our own 
experiences working in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed, as well 
as when we have carried out our own research into the Vietnam War.
Vietnam Task is an important addition to the larger body of work on 
Vietnam and has stood the test of time, not only as a personal memoir, 
but as a study of insurgency, counter-insurgency, and adaptation. 
O’Neill laid out several key concepts in Vietnam Task, especially 
regarding analysis and the need for constant learning and adaptation 
in the midst of war.2 There is one particular chapter that we consider 
timeless, Chapter 13 ‘A re-evaluation of strategy’, which has helped 
shape our thinking on numerous issues over the past two decades.
Context 
A key theme of Chapter 13 is the need to understand context. In his 
discussion of the main effort of a campaign, O’Neill stressed that:
1  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task, Melbourne: Cassell.
2  Ibid.
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the most fundamental question seemed to be the determination of our 
aim. Was it to kill Viet Cong [VC], to bring the main force to battle, to 
isolate the main force from the people, to assist in civil reconstruction, 
to restore Government control to villages or to cut VC supply lines? 
As strategy can be most effectively applied only with knowledge of 
the opponent’s aim, it was important to consider exactly what the VC 
were attempting to do in order to achieve a victory.3 
He then described how, in Vietnam, the allied coalition had to contend 
with an enemy that could field guerrilla forces as well as main forces, 
and how ‘[VC] main force regiments … [w]ere not to win the support 
of the people, but to throw back the forces of the Government and 
by a process of continued expansion and amalgamation to inflict final 
crushing defeat on the Government Army’.4 
In making these points, O’Neill articulates the complexity of the war in 
Vietnam and the need for a multilayered approach to the campaign: ‘the 
most direct means of winning the war lies in eliminating the Viet Cong 
cadres from the villages, positive Government action to administer the 
population cannot be put into effect until the main force Viet Cong 
regiments in a particular locality have been neutralised and are kept 
from interfering with the restoration of Government control.’5 (We will 
come back to this last important point.) This could be construed to 
align with the mantra repeated for much of the Iraq and Afghanistan 
campaigns: ‘clear, hold, build’. We would agree, but only to a point; 
O’Neill is always clear that issues in Vietnam are specific to that time, 
place, and campaign, and care is necessary in applying lessons from 
one campaign to another.
Adaptation
Adaptation and creative thinking is another major theme of Chapter 
13 in Vietnam Task. In presenting this theme, O’Neill placed it 
within the context of his battalion’s culture of debate, declaring that 
‘[Lt Colonel John Warr, commanding officer] had been stimulating 
discussion of our methods ever since the battalion had been raised 
and scarcely a week passed in which he did not ask me what our aim 
3  Ibid., p. 182.
4  Ibid., p. 183.
5  Ibid., p. 184.
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in Phuoc Tuy was and then debate the matter’.6 Halfway through the 
tour, Lt Colonel Warr asked O’Neill to write a paper outlining the aims 
of the campaign, then used it to frame a debate among all the platoon 
and company commanders in the battalion.
That paper also served as a framework for how the battalion could 
succeed. In his 2006 address to the IISS, O’Neill recounted how he 
crafted five points to guide the strategy of his battalion over the 
second half of their deployment:
1. Our principal challenge was not the Viet Cong main force and 
the North Vietnamese Army but the political cadres which the 
Viet Cong had inserted into towns and villages.
2. Our prime task had to be the removal of enemy political cadres 
from the towns and villages.
3. Our second priority was to help with reconstruction and 
development so that the local people’s needs would be met 
effectively and they might come to feel that a non-communist 
government would give them a better chance of a good life than 
a communist one.
4. Major offensive operations in or near populated areas were highly 
counter-productive in terms of winning popular support.
5. Other kinds of operations, especially those aimed at eliminating 
Viet Cong cadres and winning popular support, were much 
less costly to ourselves in casualties and therefore much more 
sustainable politically by our own and allied governments.
Within these five points lie concerns about overly conventional 
operations, unpopular governments, and avoiding harm to civilians 
that we would both later hear in O’Neill’s lectures at Oxford.
In later years, O’Neill argued that the American public stopped 
supporting the war in Vietnam from 1968 onward because too little 
had been achieved at too great a cost. In his view, the five points 
above offered ways to conduct operations and achieve successes 
at a reasonable cost.7 In sum, O’Neill left Vietnam with a strong 
6  Ibid., p. 182.
7  O’Neill, Robert (2006) ‘World Order and the War on Terror: Prospects and Perspectives’, 
lecture at International Institute for Strategic Studies, 29 November.
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appreciation for context (especially its political and social aspects), 
adaptation, and a set of five operational guidelines that might have 
helped get to a happier outcome. 
After Vietnam and the publication of Vietnam Task, O’Neill wrote 
a book on the North Vietnamese military leader, Vo Nguyen Giap, 
and won a teaching position at The Australian National University.8 
He next turned his focus to the Korean War, but he continued to refine 
his thinking on Vietnam and insurgency. 
Oxford
In 1987, O’Neill became the Chichele Professor of War at All Souls 
College, Oxford University. A major theme in his lectures and 
seminars was the difficulty of handling insurgencies and their 
prominence in modern warfare. What cannot be overstated is that in 
the 1990s O’Neill was one of the few professors in history, political 
science, or  strategic studies teaching about insurgency. Indeed, 
before September 2001, it  was not uncommon to hear top scholars 
dismiss the idea that the United States would ever face an insurgency 
again. This was the era of the revolution in military affairs and ‘shock 
and awe’. Too many generals, policy-makers, and scholars lived in 
the afterglow of the impressive US success in the 1991 Gulf War. 
In contrast, O’Neill believed that, because great powers find it too 
expensive and counterproductive to fight each other, insurgency and 
terrorism had become the dominant form of warfare. With foresight, 
he argued that insurgency and terrorism were at the cutting edge of 
international politics and would not go away for decades. Therefore, 
students needed to understand insurgency and be thoroughly familiar 
with the most important recent historical examples.
Wary of generalisation, O’Neill used historical cases to ground his 
thoughts. In his class on the history of modern war, Malaya and Vietnam 
were the subject of multiple lectures. For the Americans studying 
under O’Neill, Malaya was a largely unknown conflict. Vietnam, of 
course, was not. O’Neill was always clear that issues in Vietnam are 
specific to their time and place, and that care is necessary in applying 
lessons from one campaign to another. Context is everything: war is 
8  O’Neill, Robert J. (1969) General Giap: Politician and Strategist, Melbourne: Cassell.
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ever-changing and the experiences of the various forces would change 
based upon which province and which year they served in Vietnam. 
War is grey and always will be; there are no hard and fast rules.9 
That said, at Oxford, O’Neill did not shy away from sharing his 
insights and thinking with his students. In line with his own prior 
experiences, O’Neill discussed the virtues of light tactics in counter-
insurgency: patrolling, gathering intelligence, and working with the 
people. For Vietnam, he lauded the Marine Corps’ combined action 
platoons that embedded into local forces and lived with them in the 
village.10 In contrast, he strongly criticised the conventionally minded 
US search and destroy operations, and the use of mechanised vehicles 
in Vietnam. From his point of view, it was tough to substitute for 
the light infantryman. (While at Oxford, O’Neill was also Honorary 
Colonel of the 5th Battalion, Royal Green Jackets, a descendant of the 
60th Royal American Regiment, one of the first light infantry units 
in the British Army; designed specially to fight in another irregular 
war — the French and Indian War, 1754–1763.) And he was deeply 
critical of heavy-handed behaviour on the part of Western troops. 
For him, indiscriminate use of firepower — as demonstrated in the 
My Lai massacre, the killings of the Phoenix program, and other 
tragic events — oppressed the local people and turned them against 
the government. Publics would not accept such behaviour, especially 
in the media age. 
With 30 years of contemplation behind him, O’Neill did not merely 
talk about tactics. On the controversial question of whether the 
United States could have won the Vietnam War, he was pessimistic. 
In his assessment, the best chance would have been for the South 
Vietnamese government (with US support) to have adopted better 
counter-insurgency tactics pre-1965, before the main force war. Doing 
so might have given politicians the breathing space to support a long 
war. Nevertheless, for O’Neill, the key factor was the South Vietnamese 
Government. It would have had to improve its policies and solidify for 
success to have been possible. Overlooking the possibility that the South 
Vietnamese Government was illegitimate in the eyes of the common 
9  Discussion between Daniel Marston and Robert O’Neill, 2005.
10  See Hennessey, Michael (1997) Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare 
in I Corps, Westport, CT: Praeger.
241
15 . LESSONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
people was one of the fundamental flaws of the Vietnam campaign.11 
In correspondence with Carter, O’Neill explained: ‘Westmoreland’s 
plan of mid-1965 ignored the domestic political struggle in Vietnam. 
It would not have mattered how effective his military operations were 
if the South Vietnamese Government continued to be ineffective in 
addressing the state of popular welfare, and failed to compete more 
strongly with the Communists in this area.’12
Above all, in his teachings at Oxford, O’Neill offered a strategic 
viewpoint on insurgency and counter-insurgency that has strongly 
influenced us and his other students, specifically three larger points 
that had not appeared in Vietnam Task. They are harshly realistic and 
sober. 
First, successful counter-insurgency may demand a long commitment 
and possibly also a large number of troops. 
Second, such a commitment must be politically sustainable, which 
means that early successes are essential. The foreign forces ‘must be 
able to win at an acceptable cost in a reasonable amount of time’, he said 
in a 2000 lecture. ‘Lives of the intervening forces and time are the two 
most precious commodities.’13 A democratic politician may not be able 
to gather the necessary support if under political fire over setbacks or 
atrocities in the field. For this reason, a military insufficiently sensitive 
to the local population can torpedo the whole effort. 
Third, the host government needs political cohesion. A government 
that is too divided or broken by sectarianism, feuds, or cycles of 
revenge is unlikely to defeat an insurgency, no matter how many 
troops are poured in. He told his students: ‘wars for other people’s 
futures require their support. Security of all states rests ultimately on 
their own shoulders.’14 Ultimately, even if the interventionist power 
could clear enough space to permit a host nation to attempt to restore 
governance, the host nation still needs to decide how this government 
should look — and govern. The interventionist can provide support 
in terms of advisors, but must accept the possibility that the solution 
may not look anything like our own governance structures in the 
11  Discussion between Daniel Marston and Robert O’Neill, 2005.
12  Correspondence between Robert O’Neill and Carter Malkasian, 26 May 2003.
13  O’Neill, Robert (2000) lecture on ‘Vietnam, 1968–1975’, Oxford University, 4 March.
14  Ibid.
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West. We cannot make a host nation into little America or Britain, 
yet we must remember and maintain the idea that without a cohesive 
government, counter-insurgency is likely to fail.15 This strategic 
realism would later define his assessment of the chances for success in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Beyond his lectures, O’Neill pressured his graduate students to 
understand the dynamics of insurgencies and how to address them. 
He directed graduate students writing on general strategy or land 
war in the twentieth century to be familiar with relevant history in 
insurgency and counter-insurgency. John Hillen, a US Army officer, 
wrote a dissertation on peacekeeping and the United Nations that 
captured O’Neill’s cautious guidance, that intervention is often long 
and difficult, but is also an unavoidable feature of the international 
system. Carter’s dissertation on wars of attrition contained material 
on counter-insurgency and Vietnam because O’Neill felt he needed 
to compare attrition and counter-insurgency. Dan’s dissertation on 
the Indian Army in the Burma campaign focused on how fostering a 
culture of learning and adaptation is a key aspect of both developing 
professionalism within the military and improving performance in 
combat. 
O’Neill’s most important student in this field was John Nagl, a US 
Army officer who was convinced that the United States would face 
more insurgencies than conventional wars in its future. Nagl first came 
to Oxford in 1988 as a master’s student. He returned in 1995 to earn 
his doctorate under O’Neill’s tutelage.16 His dissertation compared 
the British effort in Malaya to the United States’ effort in Vietnam. 
His argument strongly mirrored O’Neill’s own emphasis on adaptation. 
Nagl found that organisational culture had prevented the United States 
from adopting good counter-insurgency tactics. The dissertation was 
eventually published as Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife,17 one of the 
most widely read books on counter-insurgency. O’Neill was pleased, 
both with the dissertation and with Nagl’s courage in questioning the 
doctrines of the army in which he was a serving officer. As graduate 
15  Discussion between Daniel Marston and Robert O’Neill, 2005.
16  Nagl, John (2014) Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice, New York: 
Penguin, pp. 38–9.
17  Nagl, John (2005) Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
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students, we were assigned Nagl’s dissertation right off O’Neill’s 
All Souls office shelf, long before the published version ever hit the 
bookstores.
Iraq and Afghanistan
When 11 September 2001 struck, O’Neill was completing his tenure at 
Oxford, soon to move back to Australia. As the wars in Afghanistan and 
Iraq unfolded, O’Neill’s own thoughts were characteristically sober. 
He advocated good counter-insurgency tactics, but was circumspect 
about how much could actually be achieved.
Students at War
O’Neill found his students heavily involved in the war effort. John 
Hillen became Assistant Secretary of State for Political–Military 
Affairs. Dan started teaching at Sandhurst, made repeated trips to 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and later took a chair at the US Army Command 
and Staff College. He brought O’Neill’s emphasis on learning and 
adaptation into the strategic discussions in which he was involved 
with British and American commanders in the UK, the US, Iraq, 
and  Afghanistan. Carter spent 18 months as a civilian advisor to 
the Marines in Al  Anbar province, and then nearly four years in 
Afghanistan, two in a district of Helmand and another two as the 
political advisor to the top US commander, General Joseph Dunford. 
Nagl was perhaps the most involved of all. He served as the operations 
officer of a battalion in Iraq and then became one of the leading and 
most well-known reformers calling for a new, better approach. 
At a time when most US officers and policy-makers found themselves 
ill-prepared to deal with the problem of insurgency, O’Neill’s 
students were ready to make recommendations from a solid academic 
grounding. He had given them a framework to examine the problem. 
He continued to be a mentor and sounding board for us as we worked 
to address various tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of 
the wars. 
Unlike Vietnam, the US military instituted a dramatic attempt to 
adapt itself to fight an insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within 
the military, General David Petraeus, General James Mattis, Dr David 
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Kilcullen, and John Nagl spearheaded the creation of a new counter-
insurgency doctrine and its implementation. Nagl’s Learning to Eat 
Soup with a Knife was standard fare for officers. The reform effort 
culminated in the publication of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 
for which Nagl wrote the introduction. O’Neill’s influence can be seen 
in the introduction’s emphasis on knowledge of history, the length 
and difficulty of counter-insurgency campaigns, the limited utility of 
massed operational manoeuvre and heavy firepower, and the dominance 
of insurgency in modern warfare. The passage ‘most enemies either do 
not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or 
do not limit themselves to purely military means’ especially echoes 
O’Neill’s views.18
The counter-insurgency manual eventually came under heavy criticism 
for two things. First, critics on the right claimed the manual de-
emphasised killing and had soldiers and marines concern themselves 
too much with building relations with local population. Second, critics 
on the left claimed that the manual was overly optimistic about the 
ability of a heavy, lengthy, and expensive troop commitment to defeat 
an insurgency. O’Neill never directly weighed in on these debates, 
but we can guess at his thoughts. He would have outright rejected the 
first criticism. For him, building relationships lessens resistance and 
gives democratic politicians political space to support a war effort. For 
the second criticism, he would have been partly sympathetic about the 
dangers of over-optimism, especially given his own emphasis on the 
precedence of politics and a cohesive government. Yet he would not 
have backed away from a long and possibly substantial commitment as 
a necessary condition for success. In O’Neill’s opinion, if a democratic 
state wants to defeat an insurgency, it may have to confront that 
burden. 
O’Neill’s other students have also contributed to US and allied 
strategy. Now Assistant Secretary of State for Political–Military Affairs 
within the US Department of State, John Hillen worked to coordinate 
guidelines for counter-insurgency across the entire US Government. 
18  (2007) The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, pp. li–liv.
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He shared O’Neill’s idea that dealing with insurgent and terrorist 
adversaries is as much political as military, and that therefore diplomats 
and development experts had to be involved.19 
On the more academic side of things, in 2008 we put together 
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, an edited collection of case 
studies of the major counter-insurgency campaigns. Though far less 
influential than the counter-insurgency manual, it followed O’Neill’s 
model of using historical cases to inform understanding. We asked a 
range of academics and practitioners to write specific chapters to provide 
a variety of perspectives, and avoided listing any specific lessons for 
people to walk away with. We hewed closely to O’Neill’s thoughts on 
the key role of context and how it inhibits drawing out specific lessons 
for future campaigns.20 We considered that the proper role of the book 
was to act as a catalyst for debate and discussion; it would be left 
to the reader to draw their own conclusions. Consequently, the book 
has no conclusion and foreswears any general theory — for which we 
were sometimes criticised in reviews. A few points in the introduction 
show O’Neill’s influence, particularly where it highlights the dangers 
of overly militarised strategies and the role of politics and society, 
stating ‘tactical brilliance at counter-insurgency translates into very 
little when political and social context is ignored or misinterpreted’.21 
As usual, O’Neill was involved in developing the book; he read several 
chapters and provided important critical feedback. 
Carter later wrote War Comes to Garmser. Published in 2013, the book 
is a 30-year history of conflict in one district of war-torn Helmand 
province. The book’s commentary on the need to build relationships 
with local leaders and do no harm owes something to O’Neill’s teachings 
a decade before. Carter and O’Neill corresponded heavily during the 
book’s revision process, especially about how local dynamics can 
shape the course of a conflict as much as foreign intervention, which is 
a theme of the book. In correspondence, O’Neill noted: ‘Armies come, 
19  Hodge, Nathan (2011) Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation Builders, New York: 
Bloomsbury Publishing, pp. 155–60.
20  Malkasian, Carter and Daniel Marston (eds) (2008) Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, 
Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
21  Ibid., p. 16.
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armies go, but the people of Afghanistan continue to move along 
their own path through the history of the region in which they live. 
What more can one say?’22
Wisdom
Throughout the Iraq and Afghan wars, O’Neill developed his own 
assessment of the situation, which he delivered in lectures and 
talks on Iraq and Afghanistan. He kept his eye firmly on the overall 
strategic situation. When Dan sent in reports from his various trips, 
highlighting the reform and apparent progress that he was witnessing 
on the battlefields, O’Neill would always ask the same question: 
‘To what end?’ He had been right to ask. At times, all of us students 
had been guilty of losing sight of the bigger picture, focusing on 
tactical progress and assuming larger strategic problems could be 
fixed later. 
On Iraq, O’Neill always doubted the odds of success. He never bought 
into the idea of a short, quick war. Unlike many other experts, 
including ourselves, O’Neill expected an insurgency to break out after 
the 2003 US invasion. Though no fan of the invasion, he believed the 
United States and its allies needed to be ready to face an insurgency.23 
As the Iraqi insurgency gained speed, O’Neill criticised US tactics as 
overly conventional. In 2006, he told IISS: ‘Although some US and 
allied soldiers have by now developed good ideas on what to do to win 
the support of the civilian population, the Coalition lacks the strength 
to put them into effect.’24 
For O’Neill, the central problem in Iraq was not tactics, but the 
absence of a government that could control the country. He thought it 
would be impossible to build one: ‘I cannot see the Iraqi government 
retaining the political cohesion and authority which is necessary for 
an army to function well in counter insurgency … [T]he only way to 
keep the country together is by dictatorial rule and massive occasional 
applications of force.’25 On the face of it, O’Neill appears overly 
22  Correspondence between Robert O’Neill and Carter Malkasian, 17 February 2012.
23  O’Neill, Robert (2006) ‘World Order and the War on Terror: Prospects and Perspectives’, 
lecture at International Institute for Strategic Studies, 29 November.
24  Ibid.
25  Correspondence between Robert O’Neill and Carter Malkasian, 13 December 2006.
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pessimistic, given that within a year the surge would win dramatic 
successes. Over the longer term, he appears prescient. He wrote to 
Carter in early 2004: 
The insurgency in Iraq is much more complex than that in Vietnam, 
and much more difficult to handle. I shall be very surprised if, a few 
years after the US pulls out of Iraq, there is a stable, democratic 
government there. The society is just too divided—so many factions, 
so many different loyalties, so much history, so little trust, so much 
vengeance to be taken — both on rival factions and on the US.26 
This, it seems, is exactly what has come to pass. The United States 
indeed was not interested in a protracted commitment, and in 
June 2014 the Iraqi Government suffered a devastating defeat at the 
hands of the Islamic State, the progeny of the original Iraqi insurgents. 
O’Neill was similarly pessimistic about Afghanistan. Although he 
supported the US and allied commitment, he found Afghanistan to be 
just as complex as Iraq: ‘the whole country is deeply marked by very 
complex historical experience—the waves of migration, the proximity 
of India, the Durand line, the Pashtun problem, and the five or six wars 
that the region was been through in the past thirty odd years … these 
are peculiarly difficult people for intervention forces to control and 
work with.’27 Even more than Iraq, O’Neill doubted that his critical 
component of counter-insurgency — a cohesive government — could 
be built. He wrote to Carter in 2012: 
The final outcome … will depend on the leadership capacities of 
the men in Kabul … Of course there is a deeper question here: can 
foreigners ever hope to implant a government in Afghanistan and 
then watch it take root successfully? We have an awful lot of history 
which says that the answer to this question is No. There is too much 
history of foreign attempts at domination, local resistance of many 
kinds and at many levels, offered with such perseverance so that it 
was ultimately successful.28 
26  Ibid., 17 January 2004.
27  Ibid., 8 February 2012.
28  Ibid., 12 March 2012.
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Because of the stakes, O’Neill never called for abandoning 
Afghanistan.  He also never thought that the West could solve the 
country’s problems. There was almost a sense of inevitability in his 
view of the West’s intervention and then defeat, a tragedy bound to 
play itself out.
For O’Neill, Iraq and Afghanistan epitomised the difficulties and 
tragedies of facing insurgencies — wars that cannot be wished away. 
Often, in his opinion, the United States and its allies would have to get 
involved. In 2015, he advised that, strategically, there are two choices: 
[E]ither stay out or (and preferably in my view) intervene very 
judiciously, building support for the local good guys, not undercutting 
them. It takes years, but so be it … The US armed forces are not 
going to be able to avoid this kind of intervention — but I stress the 
word ‘judiciously’. And here is the mission for the new generation 
of leading military thinkers and practitioners.29
Conclusion
We have tried to trace an evolution in Professor O’Neill’s thoughts from 
Vietnam to the present. As a young officer in Vietnam, his experiences 
gave him a framework for what he believed counter-insurgency 
should look like on the ground. His experiences highlighted for him 
the dangers of certain approaches, especially mistreating the people, 
or using too much firepower. As a professor, tactics gave way to strategy. 
A long commitment, early successes, and a cohesive government 
were necessary conditions for success, if a Western democracy chose 
to intervene. By the time of Iraq and Afghanistan, this final point 
— placed within the surrounding political and cultural context — 
became a critical factor in his thinking. Throughout, he asserted 
that insurgency is now the dominant form of war and, in spite of its 
difficulties, cannot always be avoided. 
Today, counter-insurgency has fallen into ill repute because of 
America’s difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. After 2011, US 
policy-makers deemed its successes too small to be worth the cost. 
Meanwhile, new counter-terrorist tactics that offer a different way to 
29  Ibid., 4 January 2015.
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fight have gained credence, and the United States has tried to work 
through partners in order to avoid a substantial deployment of troops. 
These methods may succeed. If so, a substantial troop deployment 
may be less important than O’Neill believed. Nevertheless, these new 
approaches are only under consideration because O’Neill’s points on 
a long commitment, a cohesive government, and the inevitability of 
insurgency have proven all too true.
Ultimately, more than a decade into both the Afghanistan and Iraq 
campaigns, we must acknowledge that we have not put these points 
into practice to the extent required. As a Western coalition we can 
rightly claim that we have undertaken tactical reform, and grown to 
understand the changing character of the war, but we have not truly 
integrated these points, especially regarding a cohesive government, 
sufficiently to articulate and seek a realistic end state that would 
constitute a true victory for the host nation.
For us, Professor O’Neill is a realistic and far-thinking scholar who 
shaped the modern understanding of insurgency and counter-
insurgency through teaching and mentoring. He put in place a cadre of 
scholar-practitioners with a solid grounding in insurgency. He forced 
his students to learn about insurgency and counter-insurgency 
during more peaceful times, when their study was too often deemed 
unnecessary. We would have lacked the wisdom to study them on our 
own. Whatever successes we have had over this past 15 years of small 




Robert O’Neill and the 
Birth of ASPI
Hugh White
On 29 August 2001, a group of people gathered in a pleasant but 
nondescript conference room in a pleasant but nondescript office 
building in the inner Canberra suburb of Barton to launch the 
operations of a new, government-funded but independent think tank, 
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). This was the first 
meeting of ASPI’s Board of Directors, or Council as it was decided 
they should be called. They were a moderately diverse and distinctly 
talented group of people, including several former cabinet ministers 
and other senior politicians, two currently serving heads of major 
Commonwealth departments, a former senior public servant, a retired 
major general, and a distinguished senior international businessman. 
At the head of the table sat Professor Robert J. O’Neill AO, who thus 
began his time as Chairman of the ASPI Council and guiding hand for 
this new venture, a position in which he was to serve until 2005.
For some people, the duties of a position like that might be taken 
rather lightly, as an agreeable and not too onerous way to keep busy 
in retirement. Bob O’Neill is not one of those people. As chairman, 
Bob brought all the energy, acumen, tact and organising ability that 
he has shown throughout his remarkable career. These capacities were 
certainly needed, because the task of establishing ASPI was, in its 
own small way, quite formidable, and one to which Bob’s capacities 
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and experience were ideally matched. Indeed, Bob’s engagement 
with this task began several years before that first council meeting. 
To understand the nature of the challenge — and Bob’s contribution 
to it — we need to go back to the origins of the idea that became ASPI 
and see how it developed.
Those origins can be traced to late March 1996, a few weeks after 
the installation of the first Howard Government following the 
general election that month. Howard’s first defence minister was Ian 
McLachlan, who came to the portfolio with strong ideas about the 
importance of contestability in policy advice. He had been influenced 
especially by the quite radical experiments in contestability that 
had been undertaken in New Zealand by both Labour and National 
governments over the preceding decade, which he had got to know 
well in his earlier roles as a leader of farmer’s organisations. These views 
were shared by many of his ministerial colleagues, but McLachlan, 
as a committed activist and Canberra outsider, was more inclined than 
most to push to see them implemented.
Thus it was that during one of the many introductory discussions 
on policy questions with senior military and civilian defence officials 
— conducted in this case on a government VIP plane over central 
Australia — McLachlan taxed his advisers to suggest alternative 
sources of advice on the big defence policy questions he was going 
to face as minister. It was explained to him that defence remained 
one of the dwindling number of bastions of non-contestability in 
public policy in Australia. While many individuals and institutions 
studied international relations and the diplomatic aspects of strategic 
policy — especially in relation to alliances — very few did detailed or 
authoritative work on core questions of defence and strategic policy in 
ways that could contribute to informing and contesting official policy 
advice. ‘Well’, said the minister, ‘we will have to fix that. Prepare me 
some advice about how that can be done.’ 
It would take a careful study of defence records not yet open 
to the public  to track the progress of this task over the years that 
followed, but by the time McLachlan left the portfolio following the 
1998 election he had decided that the best way to enhance defence 
policy contestability was to establish a small, stand-alone institute. 
This body was to be funded from the defence budget while operating 
quite independently of it, with the mission to provide ministers with 
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alternative advice on the full range of high-level defence and strategic 
policy decisions. He  was succeeded as minister by  John  Moore, 
who shared McLachlan’s interest in policy contestability and 
enthusiastically took up the task of establishing the new institute. 
Work on establishing the new institute proceeded over the next 
couple of years, though perhaps inevitably it had to jostle for high 
level attention with major issues like the unfolding East Timor crisis of 
1999 and the preparation of the Defence White Paper in 2000. A series 
of decisions by the minister based on submissions from defence began 
to lay out the broad outlines of the proposed institute.
Perhaps most importantly, the institute’s roles and functions were 
established and, flowing from that, the basic organisational structure 
was determined. At a fairly early stage it was decided that the institute 
would have four main functions. The first three of these were clearly 
set out in 2001 in the charter letter sent by the then minister to 
council members on the occasion of that first council meeting in 2001. 
He wrote:
The Government has three key underlying purposes in setting up an 
independent strategic policy institute.
• First, to provide alternative sources of input to Government 
decision-making processes on major strategic and defence policy 
issues. The Government believes that contestability of advice is 
an important contributor to good public policy, and is concerned 
that in the strategic and defence policy arena the range of 
alternative views on which the government can draw is not well 
developed. ASPI is intended to help remedy this, both directly 
through its own work and indirectly by encouraging others 
into the field. An  independent policy institute structured along 
the lines envisaged has the potential to be a valuable source of 
alternative views on a wide range of issues. By doing so it should 
also encourage other organisations and individuals to seek to 
contribute in more concrete and realistic ways to addressing our 
strategic and defence challenges.
• Second, ASPI is intended to help nourish public debate and 
understanding. The Government believes that improved public 
understanding of strategic and defence issues is an important 
long-term investment in Australia’s security. Good policy must be 
informed by a well-informed public debate, and be supported by 
a sophisticated public understanding of the choices that need to 
be made.
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• Third, the Government believes that Australia needs to invest in 
nurturing a body of men and women, working both inside and 
outside Government, who are expert in the strategic policy issues 
faced by Government. The Government therefore hopes that 
ASPI, in fulfilling the first two objectives outlined above, will 
also contribute to the development of professional strategic policy 
expertise in Australia.1
The fourth purpose was reflected in the words the minister quoted 
from ASPI’s corporate constitution, which cast additional light on the 
other roles, as follows:
The company’s object is to function as a strategic policy research 
centre, independent of Government, providing policy-relevant 
research and analysis to better inform Government decisions and 
public understanding of strategic and defence issues, by:
• Conducting and publishing research on issues related to Australia’s 
strategic and defence policy choices.
• Preparing policy inputs on strategic and defence issues to 
Government, as requested by Government, subject to funding.
• Conducting a program of activities to increase understanding 
of strategic and defence policy issues among Australians, and 
to encourage the development of expertise in topics relevant 
to Australia’s strategic and defence policy choices.
• Promoting international understanding of Australia’s strategic 
and defence policy perspectives.2
The differences in these formulations are intriguing, but the key 
elements are very plain. Most importantly, it is very clear that the 
government’s original key aim in establishing ASPI was to provide 
alternative sources of policy advice to the government itself on 
specific defence policy decisions. This reflected not just the somewhat 
doctrinaire commitment to policy contestability which McLachlan, 
Moore, and others had brought into government in 1996, but their 
experience of dealing with defence policy questions since then. 
For reasons that would be hard to pin down, and although relations 
between ministers, individual officers, and officials were professional, 
respectful, and even at times warm, it might be said that the Howard 
Government never established an easy relationship with the defence 
1  ASPI (2001) ‘ASPI Charter’. Available at: www.aspi.org.au/about-aspi/charter. 
2  Ibid.
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organisation. A few specific issues, especially on questions of defence 
material and acquisition, and most particularly the troubles of the 
Collins-class submarine, led ministers to be impatient and even 
suspicious of defence advice, and thus increasingly eager to find 
alternative ideas and arguments to test that advice against.
The second major role — very important, but clearly subordinate 
to the first — was to ‘nourish public debate and understanding’ of 
defence issues. Ministers clearly felt that building and sustaining 
support for good defence policy was made harder by the relatively 
unsophisticated way that defence issues were seen and debated 
by the  public. The  contrast was drawn here with the way public 
understanding of and debate about economic policy issues had evolved 
over recent decades, and how important that has been to building 
public support for major economic reforms of the kind that had been 
carried out in the 1980s. It was intended that ASPI would provide 
a source of well-informed, professional, impartial, and non-partisan 
commentary that would help Australians understand the real nature 
of defence policy choices facing the country.
The third major role was to help build professional strategic policy 
expertise, both in government and in the wider community. Ministers 
had become aware that the pool of such expertise seemed to be 
shrinking as the group of people who had lived and worked through 
the major defence policy revolutions of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 
1980s began to retire. Shifts in attitudes and expectations after the Cold 
War especially seemed to reduce interest in the rather demanding and 
often arcane disciples of defence policy, especially those related to the 
complex interconnections between high strategy on the one hand and 
specific choices about capability and operations on the other. It was 
never intended that ASPI should run educational courses of its own, 
but it was expected that its work would support and contribute to 
courses run by others, and that it would provide career development 
opportunities for people committed to working in the field.
The fourth role was to help promote international understanding of 
Australian strategic and defence policies. This reflected ministers’ 
awareness that the 1990s had seen something of a boom in the 
development of non-official and semi-official — ‘Second Track’ and 
‘One and a Half Track’ — security dialogues in Asia. They had become 
a key element of the slow, tentative, but nonetheless important 
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process of development of regional multilateral security institutions 
and architectures in the post-Cold War Asia; such exchanges were 
favoured in a region still very wary of anything that smacked of formal 
alliances or defence groupings. They had also become important in 
the development of a number of key bilateral security relationships 
between Australia and Asian countries — especially those major 
powers beyond Southeast Asia, with which we had previously had 
little contact on strategic and defence questions. When the end of the 
Cold War began to raise new questions about the future strategic order 
in Asia and the roles of these major powers in it, Canberra was keen 
to build these relations and dialogues in a low-key way. Second Track 
and One and a Half Track exchanges were seen as a very effective 
way of doing so. Australia had already taken a big part in these 
exchanges and dialogues through institutions such as ANU Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, but the ministers saw merit in broadening 
and deepening the range of participants available from Australia. 
In  particular, it was thought that the new institute might evolve 
into a fitting counterpart for the government-funded institutes of 
strategic studies that had been established in most ASEAN countries, 
and which played a central role in these dialogues.
Once these functions had been broadly agreed, attention turned 
to the structure and organisation of the institute intended to fulfil 
them. Clearly this was something that had to be approached very 
carefully. To achieve the first of its goals — independent policy advice 
to government — the new institute would need to be independent 
of defence, and some consideration was given to it being established 
within or attached to another department, such as finance. But to 
achieve its second goal — to contribute to public debate — it was 
clearly essential that it should be, and be seen to be, independent of 
government as a whole. At the same time, the government needed to be 
sure that the institute would fulfil the functions for which it was being 
established and funded. Some initial consideration was given to the 
idea of establishing it within an existing university, but preliminary 
exchanges with potential hosts clearly indicated that it would be 
hard to strike the right balance between independence of output and 
fulfilment of broad purposes under that kind of arrangement. 
An extensive survey was undertaken by defence into different 
organisational models for the institute. It examined the institutional 
structures of government-funded but independent policy research 
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institutes and think tanks in the strategic and defence policy field 
and more broadly in Australia and overseas. The conclusion was 
reached that the best approach would be to establish the institute as 
a company limited by guarantee under the Corporations Act. The key 
features of this model were that the Commonwealth would be the sole 
member — shareholder and owner — of the company with the right 
to appoint members of the board or council, while the council would 
be independently responsible for fulfilling the purposes for which it 
had been established. The government could fund the institute via a 
straightforward contract between itself (in this case, defence) and the 
company. In order to absolutely clarify the government’s intentions 
to the council, a charter letter could be issued from the minister, 
as shareholder, setting out these intentions — including its intentions 
in regard to independence. The key passage on this issue in the charter 
letter addressing this issue is as follows: 
[T]he Government places high priority on the development of ASPI as 
a centre of excellence in strategic thinking which both is, and is seen 
to be, independent of Government. At the same time, the Government 
will want to ensure that its significant investment in the establishment 
of ASPI is being used effectively to achieve the aims outlined in this 
letter. The Government will therefore seek, through the mechanisms 
outlined earlier in this letter, to have a regular input into the setting 
of ASPI’s research agenda.
The Government’s aim through those mechanisms will be to ensure 
that the Institute’s research program generally addresses the kinds 
of strategic issues that confront Australian policymakers, and that 
specific issues of high interest are addressed. It will not seek to exercise 
a veto over the study of any particular topic, nor will it seek to direct 
the conclusions that might be published on any topic.3
Though this could hardly have been expressed more clearly, it was 
nonetheless very evident, as it had been from the time the idea for 
the institute had first been put forward, that the job of leading and 
steering the institute would fall very heavily on the chairman of the 
council. The chairman would have to be able both to guide the work 
of the institute in the fulfilment of its roles, and to steer it through 
the inherent complexities of its relationships with government and 
a wide range of key stakeholders. This was going to demand a rare 
3  Ibid.
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combination of skills and attributes. First, the chair would need to 
have real expertise and standing in Australian defence and strategic 
policy issues. Second, the chair would need experience in the 
leadership and management of centres of research and think tanks 
working in the strategic and defence fields. Third, the chair would 
need a strong public reputation, both in Australia and internationally, 
and a network of contacts around the world to establish the new 
institute’s standing and help it build connections within Australia and 
beyond. And, finally, the chair would need high order political and 
diplomatic skills to manage the delicate balancing of the institute’s 
unusual position and status.
It is immediately clear from this list of attributes why Bob O’Neill was 
not just the most obvious and best possible candidate for the role of 
chairman, but in a very real sense was the only possible candidate. 
There is no need here to elaborate on just how perfectly Bob met 
the demands of the position. His credentials as an army officer, an 
official historian, a major contributor to debates on defence policy, 
and a noted pubic intellectual; his leadership of SDSC, and later of 
IISS, both as director and chairman; his contribution to international 
strategic debates in these roles and at Oxford; his phenomenal 
international standing and network; and his renowned skill in the 
delicate and principled management of complex personal relations 
and organisational politics — all of these made him the ideal person 
to become Chairman of the ASPI Council. By great good fortune the 
timing worked well with Bob’s plans to return to Australia after his 
retirement from the chair at Oxford. 
All this was clear long before the final arrangements for the 
establishment of ASPI had taken shape. Bob was first approached 
about taking on the chair over dinner in the Berkeley Hotel, London, 
by John Moore during a visit to the UK in November 1999, and a 
public announcement was made about his willingness to take up the 
position soon after. The ensuing delays in getting the institute up and 
running were a little frustrating, but they did mean that by the time of 
the first council meeting, Bob had finished at Oxford and had returned 
to Australia, having in the meantime built his remarkable house at 
Long Gully. The final cabinet considerations regarding the structure, 
organisation, and funding of ASPI were concluded in August 2000, 
and it remained only for the defence minister — now Peter Reith, 
following Moore’s resignation in January 2001 — to nominate and 
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appoint the remaining council members before the work of creating 
the institute could commence. This final step took far longer than 
anyone expected, and it was not until the middle of 2001 that the 
minister, in close consultation with the prime minister, settled on a list 
of names.
The group that assembled for the first council meeting were, as we 
have seen, an interesting and impressive body. The Deputy Chairman 
was Major General (Retd) Adrian Clunies-Ross, former Deputy Chief 
of Army. The prime minister’s nominee was former senior minister Jim 
Carlton, and the leader of the opposition’s nominee was former Senator 
Stephen Loosely. Alan Hawke and Ashton Calvert were members 
ex officio as secretaries of defence and foreign affairs. Other members 
included former cabinet minister and shadow defence spokesperson, 
Jocelyn Newman; Roland Williams, a leading businessman and former 
senior Shell executive; and former Treasury Deputy Secretary and 
prominent economics commentator, Des Moore. Over the next few 
years this proved to be a capable and generally harmonious group, 
though the task of chairing it was not always a simple one, and there 
were occasions in which Bob’s formidable skills as chairman were 
needed to keep things moving forward. 
At that first meeting, the council confirmed the appointment of ASPI’s 
first director — that was me — and approved initial plans, which had 
been developed under Bob’s guidance, for the establishment of the 
institute, including its organisational structure, staffing, recruitment, 
premises, and financing. Following that meeting, a contract was signed 
with defence for funding of around $2.7 million per year over seven 
years. The institute was to consist of three major research programs — 
strategic and international, capability and operations, and resources 
and management — reflecting ASPI’s remit to work across the whole 
range of defence policy questions. Each program would be headed by 
a program director. The permanent staff would be kept quite small, 
with a lot of research work to be contracted out. Total staff would 
number about 12, and recruitment would get underway immediately, 
with a view to the office opening for business and commencing work 
in early 2002. After some consideration of whether the institute 
should be located somewhere other than Canberra, it was confirmed 
that it would operate from the office suite which defence had leased 
in Arts House, Braddon. This location was chosen because it was 
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close to Parliament House, the Press Gallery, and major departments, 
and it was convenient to, but symbolically across the lake from the 
Department of Defence on Russell Hill.
While all this work was underway, of course, the world moved on. 
Within a few weeks of the first council meeting, and before ASPI 
had begun operations, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
transformed many aspects of strategic and defence debates in Australia 
and around the world. Moreover, a federal election in November 2001 
returned the Howard Government, and immediately thereafter Robert 
Hill replaced Peter Reith as defence minister. These changes had 
complex implications for ASPI’s early years, and for Bob’s role at the 
helm. On the one hand, the 9/11 attacks and all that followed ensured 
that defence and security questions would loom large in public and 
policy debates over the following years, and thus provided a very 
receptive environment for ASPI’s launch and early work. On the other 
hand, the highly contested nature of some of those debates made the 
task of locating ASPI’s role, and navigating bureaucratic, political, 
and ideological currents, more demanding than it might otherwise 
have been. Minister Robert Hill in many ways proved less receptive 
to ASPI’s role and potential then his predecessors. While not in any 
sense hostile to the new institute, it would be fair to say that he was 
less interested in policy contestability and alternative sources of 
advice than his predecessors. This did nothing to prevent ASPI from 
flourishing, but it did mean that the nature of its role soon diverged 
somewhat from that envisaged at its original conception.
By the end of 2001, almost all the staff had been appointed. The three 
program directors were Dr Ellie Wainwright in the Strategic and 
International Program, Mr Aldo Borgu in the Capability and Operations 
Program, and Dr Mark Thomson in the Budget and Management 
Program. Mr Brendan McRandle, who had laid the organisational 
foundations for the institute as project manager for the establishment 
of ASPI in defence, became company secretary and outreach manager. 
Janis Johnston, recruited as librarian and publications officer, took on 
the major task of developing the look and feel of ASPI’s publications 
and the creation of its website. From mid-January 2002, the staff 
began to assemble at the Arts House office, and ASPI was officially 
launched at a gala dinner, hosted by Bob, held at the Australian War 
Memorial on 13 March 2002. The keynote speech was delivered by the 
new Defence Minister, Robert Hill, who spoke warmly of ASPI’s role. 
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‘ASPI’s success will depend on its ability to make a real contribution 
to the Government’s thinking and to public understanding on the 
questions and choices that confront Australia in the defence and 
strategic area’, Senator Hill said. ‘It is an important and exciting task. 
I wish Chairman Bob O’Neill and his council and Hugh White and his 
staff success with their mission.’4
Well before this formal launch, the staff had begun work on ASPI’s 
first publications. The first was released on 20 May 2002, the day 
East Timor’s independence from Indonesia was formalised after the 
crisis of 1999. The report, New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia 
and the Security of East Timor, was prepared by Ellie Wainwright.5 
It explored the security challenges that East Timor would face as 
an independent state, and the role Australia might have to play in 
supporting it, including specific recommendations. It was launched 
by the Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer, and was very positively 
received in Canberra, Dili, and elsewhere. ASPI’s second publication 
was released just a few days later. It was a highly ambitious attempt to 
analyse and explain the government’s annual defence budget as it was 
presented on budget night in terms that laypersons could understand.6 
The official presentation of the defence budget had always been 
notoriously opaque and incomprehensible, even to people within 
government and defence. ASPI believed that it would be impossible to 
foster a more rational and better-informed debate on defence priorities 
without a clear understanding of how the money was being spent and 
what things cost. Moreover, it was decided that, for maximum impact 
and benefit, this analysis should be published in time to help inform 
the senate committee budget hearings which begin just a few weeks 
after the budget is brought down in early May. After an astonishing 
marathon effort, Mark Thomson duly produced the first of what has 
become an annual series of ASPI defence budget briefs, which was 
launched in Parliament House in late May. This laid out in clear terms 
just what the defence budget was being spent on, and how well the 
4  Hill, Robert, Minister for Defence (2002) ‘Launch of the Australia Strategic Policy Institute’, 
Media Release, 13 March. Available at: pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/33784/20030619-0000/www.
minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl73be.html?CurrentId=1322. 
5  Wainwright, Elsina (2002) New Neighbour, New Challenge: Australia and the Security of 
East Timor, Canberra: ASPI. Available at: www.aspi.org.au/publications/new-neighbour,-new-
challenge-australia-and-the-security-of-east-timor/aspi-east-timor-book.pdf.
6  ASPI (2002) The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2002–2003, Canberra: Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute.
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numbers added up, as well as including clear recommendations for 
what could be done better. This immediately established ASPI as the 
authoritative source of information on and analysis of the hard nuts 
and bolts of defence policy.
Many more reports were to follow, each reflecting some basic principles 
that Bob had helped establish: that ASPI would only write on issues 
that had a clear Australian dimension, that it would focus on issues 
which were predominantly strategic in nature — in the narrower sense 
of that word — and that it would aim always to engage directly in 
policy debates by addressing questions on which Australia was facing 
clear choices and would not shy away from giving a well-reasoned, 
evidence-based view of what choice should be made. In these exciting 
early days, Bob played a crucial role in shaping the broad direction 
and tone of our research and publication program, and in scrutinising 
each publication as it evolved. He read everything in draft and offered 
invaluable guidance on matters large and small. More broadly, he was 
closely engaged in every aspect of the setting to work of ASPI as a live 
operation.
This was not all he had to do in those early days. ASPI quickly found 
itself drawn into some quite difficult and contentious issues. Over 
those first few months, while ASPI’s first reports were being prepared 
and launched, Australians — like others around the world — were 
starting to debate an issue which became unquestionably the most 
divisive question of national strategic policy since Vietnam — the 
proposal to invade Iraq. There was no way that ASPI staff could or 
should have avoided participating in that debate, but it naturally raised 
serious challenges as the new institute was looking to establish its 
position and role as a government owned and funded but independent 
policy player. The potential for ASPI to find itself embroiled in 
intense and difficult public debates had, of course, been recognised 
and accepted from the outset, and some important principles had 
been established and embodied in ASPI’s charter: that ASPI as an 
institution would hold no view, but present the views of staff and 
others who contributed to its work, and that it would seek to publish 
a range of views on contentious issues. These principles served ASPI 
well, but it was nonetheless a stern test to find that, within a few 
months of its launch, ASPI staff were among those arguing against 
an invasion of Iraq for which the government was doing all it could 
to build support. It is worth noting that John Howard never, at least 
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to my knowledge, made any criticism of the role ASPI staff played in 
the debates over Iraq, which is a telling testament to his commitment 
to the concept on which it was established. Bob’s steadying hand no 
doubt played a big part in that. Bob played an enormously important 
role — including within the ASPI Council — in ensuring that these 
waves did not swamp the little ASPI craft so early in its voyage. 
In all this, Bob showed perfect judgment in calibrating his role with 
mine as director. It helped enormously, of course, that in earlier times 
he had served on both sides of that line with great distinction, as 
Director and then Chairman of IISS. He always insisted scrupulously 
on the director’s responsibilities for running the institute day to day, 
and was quite firm in resisting any attempt by other council members 
to intrude on the director’s role. On the other hand, he was extremely 
generous with advice, encouragement, and support, and took very 
seriously his responsibilities, with his council colleagues, to set the 
parameters within which the institute should operate. No one could 
have brought as much experience, expertise, gracious generosity, and 
strength of character to the task of establishing ASPI as Bob. And it 
perhaps goes without saying that his standing as a major international 
figure in the world of strategic studies, his high public profile here in 
Australia, and the respect in which he was held by senior figures in 
the government did perhaps more than anything to establish ASPI’s 
credibility in those early days, as it did throughout his five years as 




The Rumble of Think Tanks: 
National Security and Public 
Policy Contestability in Australia
Allan Gyngell
Introduction
Australia was late in developing a foreign policy separate from British 
imperial policy. Legislation to implement the Statute of Westminster 
establishing Australia’s full sovereign identity was not passed until 
1942. Partly because of this, engaged individuals and institutions 
outside government have always played a role in shaping ideas about, 
and public attitudes towards, the way Australia protects and advances 
its international interests. 
This chapter looks at one comparatively recent dimension of that non-
government involvement in Australian public policy, the role of think 
tanks in Australian defence and foreign policy. It examines the reason 
for their emergence around the turn of the twenty-first century against 
the background of earlier efforts to shape public policy, assesses the 
contribution they have made, and explores their future. 
From the 1970s onwards, Robert O’Neill played an important part in 
the development of some of most important of these institutions. From 
1971–1982 he was head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
(SDSC) at The Australian National University. Then, after his return 
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from London and Oxford, he was involved in the formation of  the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra, the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy in Sydney, and the United States 
Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. 
In his 2006 Lowy Lecture, ‘Problems and Perspectives on International 
Security’, O’Neill described the qualities Australian think tanks 
needed to bring to the task of assisting policy-makers deal with 
contemporary security challenges:
[W]e need good ideas, dialogue with government and a relationship 
which tolerates free expression of views, especially on differences 
with existing policies. None of these essentials comes easily. 
We,  the  analysts, need experience in practical work — diplomacy, 
war, business and politics — as well as intellectual quality before we 
have any notion as to what is a good idea. Once we develop some ideas 
we need to be able to discuss them with senior people in government 
so that our views are taken into account in the mix that goes into 
decision-making. Our colleagues in government will not bother to 
listen to us if they do not respect the relevance and quality of our 
work. It is up to us to win their attention and hold it.1 
What is a Think Tank?
The concept of a think tank is, as Thomas Medvetz writes, ‘fuzzy, 
mutable and contentious’.2 A broadly accepted definition used in the 
development of the most prominent think tank rating system is that 
they are
public-policy research, analysis and engagement organizations that 
generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic 
and international issues, thereby enabling policymakers and the 
public to make informed decisions about public policy. Think tanks 
may be affiliated or independent institutions that are structured as 
permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions. These institutions often 
act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities 
and between states and civil society, serving in the public interest.3 
1  O’Neill, Robert (2006) ‘Problems and Perspectives on International Security’, The Lowy 
Lecture on Australia in the World, 27 November, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
2  Medvetz, Thomas (2012) Think Tanks in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
3  McGann, James G. (2013) 2013 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania.
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Think tanks differ from the much larger group of non-government 
organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, industry associations, online 
communities, and university research centres which are also trying 
to influence public debate and the direction of public policy, in that 
think tanks:
• exist for the primary purpose of undertaking applied research 
in public policy and shaping policy outcomes;
• are not-for-profit institutions;
• have a breadth of focus which can be broader or more limited, 
but which extends beyond a single narrow cause — oceans, 
for example, but not highly migratory tuna; and
• contribute to the public debate; that is, they conduct their principal 
work in the public realm. 
Some think tanks look across many dimensions of public policy 
(e.g.  Brookings). Others, look more narrowly at a particular area 
(e.g.  Peterson Institute for International Economics, the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies). 
Some emphasise the independence of view of individual researchers 
and their broad and non-partisan approach (e.g. Brookings, the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies). Others, such as Heritage, 
Cato, or the Center for American Progress in Washington bring to the 
job a particular philosophical approach. In Australia, the Centre for 
Independent Studies describes itself as ‘engaged in support of a free 
enterprise economy and a free society under limited government’,4 
while the Australia Institute pursues what it terms a progressive 
agenda.
The term ‘think tank’ is now used to describe institutions ranging in 
size from the RAND Corporation, with its 1800 staff and revenue of 
US$269 million, to a couple of part-time bloggers with some strong 
views. An estimated 6,828 think tanks operate internationally, with 
nearly 400 of them in Washington DC.5 Australian numbers are much 
4  www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/06/precis2012-web.pdf.
5  Ibid.
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smaller and depend on definitions. One recent estimate puts the 
number of ‘main think tanks’ in Australia at 12, but acknowledges 
that definitions are fluid and the number is always in flux.6 
Some scholars adopt a more theoretical approach to think tanks. 
Medvetz defines them as occupying ‘a distinct subspace of knowledge 
production which has arisen over time at the point of intersection 
between the  academic, political, economic and media fields’.7 They 
have emerged, he argues, through the very process of practically 
differentiating themselves from their surrounding fields of universities, 
lobby groups, and media outlets, increasingly orientating themselves 
towards each other, until they have come to constitute ‘a semi distinct 
social universe with its own logic, history, and interior structures, not 
to mention its own agents’.8 
It is certainly true that strict typologies of think tanks fail to account 
for the regular changes and adaptations to new pressures and demands 
which we see even in the much smaller field of Australian think 
tanks. Nor do they adequately represent the fluid spectrum between 
university-based centres such as SDSC which undertake some public 
policy research and outreach and the work of stand-alone institutions 
undertaking applied research in public policy. (One clear difference in 
Australia is that Australian Research Council funding is available only 
to researchers within the university system.) 
Even the origin of think tanks is disputed. Some scholars point to 
the Duke of Wellington’s establishment of the forerunner of the Royal 
United Services in 1831; others to the formation of the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs (Chatham House) in 1920.9 But in the broad 
sense in which think tanks are currently defined, a critical step came 
in 1916 when Robert S. Brookings and others formed the Institute 
for Government Research in Washington DC, the first private institute 
devoted to the ‘fact-based study of national public policy issues’.10 
Eleven years later, this became the Brookings Institution. 
6  Milliken, Robert (2105) ‘An Incisive Guide to Australia’s Think Tanks’, Anne Summers 
Reports 11, pp. 35–45.
7  Medvetz, Thomas (2012) Think Tanks in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
8  Ibid.
9  For an excellent contemporary survey of this history, see Roberts, Priscilla (2015) ‘A Century 
of International Affairs Think Tanks in Historical Perspective‘, International Journal 70(4). 
10  www.brookings.edu/about/history.
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After the Second World War, as governments faced new strategic and 
economic challenges which demanded fresh technocratic solutions, 
the  growth of think tanks blossomed and their forms multiplied. 
The  term came into wider use with its current meaning during 
the 1970s.11
However they are defined, think tanks help structure the public 
debate, shaping public understanding of the world by providing 
an alternative source of views about it. The views from think tanks 
are typically different from those generated in other areas of the 
public debate: less cautious than from the public service; less short-
term than most media commentary; but more immediate than most 
academic work.
Because the coinage of think tanks is the production of new ideas, 
think tanks need to be alert to developments in the world. Successful 
think tank staff demonstrate a combination of attributes which are 
often very different from those required in the fields from which many 
of them come, such as the public service or academia. In addition 
to subject knowledge, they need to know how governments and 
businesses operate in the real world, to understand and utilise the link 
between knowledge and power, and to be skilful advocates.
Think tanks can float ideas that are too risky for governments. They 
can more easily bring together groups with different interests to work 
through problems and they can facilitate second track diplomacy 
— more informal and indirect channels of communication between 
countries.
The Role of Non-government Institutions in 
the Development of Australian International 
Policy
Efforts by members of the public to define and deepen the debate in 
Australia about international policy began early in the life of the new 
Commonwealth. Groups such as the Round Table and Chatham House, 
11  Medvetz, Thomas (2012) Think Tanks in America, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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and later the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), began 
the process of arguing for the development of an Australian role in the 
formulation of imperial policy. 
If the establishment of Chatham House marks one step in the appearance 
of the modern think tank, it is important to note that Australians were 
present at the inaugural meetings in May 1919 in Paris — John Latham 
was charged with preparing the summary of the proceedings. John 
Latham, Frederic Eggleston and Robert Garran returned from Paris 
as members of the emerging institution; local branches of Chatham 
House were established in 1924–1925 and the Australian Institute 
of International Affairs was reorganised as a national body in 1933. 
Meanwhile, a local manifestation of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
— the first genuinely regional (in this case, trans-Pacific) think tank 
— was established in 1925, eventually working as part of the AIIA. 
From the first, the individuals concerned (scholars, practitioners, and 
commentators were all participants) were devoted to promoting public 
enlightenment on issues of foreign affairs, to sponsoring and authoring 
studies of contemporary international issues of particular relevance to 
Australia (the first in 1928), and in particular to exploring options 
for policy. Membership of the Chatham House, the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation 
(established in 1926) networks brought Australian commentators and 
scholars into contact with advanced analysis in the new discipline of 
international relations, while also opening the way to the first funding 
of work in Australia by international foundations, notably Rockefeller 
and Carnegie. The first time the phrase ‘Australian Foreign Policy’ was 
used as a book title was in an AIIA symposium volume, Australian 
Foreign Policy 1934;12 the most comprehensive study of Australia’s 
perceptions of regional security to that date was in the AIIA work 
Security Problems in the Pacific Region.13 Until the 1960s, the AIIA, 
especially through its journal Australian Outlook (founded in 1947), 
was unrivalled as a focus for analysis and debate in the fields of foreign 
and security policy.14
12  Dinner, Hector and J. G. Holmes (eds) (1935) Australian Foreign Policy 1934, Queensland: 
Australian Institute for International Affairs.
13  Buesst, Tristan, W. Macmahon Ball and Gerald Packer (1949) Security Problems in the Pacific 
Region, Melbourne: Robertson & Mullens.
14  I am indebted to James Cotton for his contribution to this section.
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The establishment of The Australian National University in 1946 
was linked to ideas of national development and to the requirements 
of public policy. In 1966, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
was established under Dr T. B. Millar, separate from the work of the 
International Relations Department, to advance the study of Australian, 
regional and global strategic and defence issues as the country came to 
terms with dramatic changes in Asia and the beginning of the Vietnam 
War. The centre was also seen as a way of attracting external funding 
to the university, first from the Ford Foundation and later from the 
Australian Defence Department.15 O’Neill became the centre’s second 
director in 1971 and stayed until 1982, strengthening its position 
within the university, securing its finances, and cementing its role as 
a proto-think tank, engaging directly with the policy-advising and 
policy-making community. 
Outside the university system, the AIIA continued its essentially 
educational role, its constitution preventing it from expressing 
particular opinions on any aspect of international affairs, although 
its precise objectives continued to be the subject of debate within 
the organisation.16 A private, not-for-profit Pacific Security Research 
Institute focused on foreign and defence policy was established in 
Sydney in April 1989, with Owen Harries as president, and former 
diplomat, David Anderson, as executive director. It was short-lived, 
but published several papers and held two conferences.17 
At the same time, groups such the Institute for Public Affairs in 
Melbourne and the Sydney-based Centre for Independent Studies 
were pursuing free-market, liberal, and libertarian philosophies 
largely in the areas of economic and social policy. 
15  Thatcher, Meredith and Desmond Ball (2006) A National Asset: Essays Commemorating the 
40th Anniversary of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
16  Legge, John D. (1999) Australian Outlook: A History of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
17  Thatcher, Meredith and Desmond Ball (2006) A National Asset: Essays Commemorating the 
40th Anniversary of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University.
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The Turn of the Century Expansion 
of Think Tanks
It was not until the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, 
that think tanks became a more established feature of policy 
development in Australia. This section examines the reasons for 
this sudden expansion. Elements of chance were involved (the 50th 
anniversary of the arrival in Australia of a prominent businessman), 
but more important were the changes taking place in each of the three 
domains within which think tanks operated — government, research, 
and media. 
Government
From the mid-1990s onwards, but most notably between the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the Al Qaeda attacks on the World 
Trade Centre in 2001, the implications of the revolution in information 
technology — digital communications, personal computing, and 
mobile telephony — which underpinned economic globalisation 
became fully apparent to policy-makers.
As the cost of transferring information around the world was reduced 
to near zero, the relative power in the international system of state 
and non-state actors shifted. Groups ranging from transnational 
corporations, through internationally networked NGOs, to terrorists 
and transnational criminals, were empowered and found new and 
more effective ways of acting together. 
One consequence for Australian governments, as for others, was to 
erode the barriers between domestic and international policy. By 1997, 
the Howard Government’s foreign and trade policy White Paper, In the 
National Interest, was calling for a ‘whole-of-nation approach which 
emphasises the linkages between domestic policies and foreign and 
trade policies’.18 New transnational issues on the international agenda, 
such as climate change, involved many different departments and 
agencies.
18  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1997) In the National Interest, Canberra: Australian 
Government Public Service.
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In particular, ideas about national security — what it was, who was 
responsible for it, and how it was delivered — changed fundamentally 
after 9/11. Governments faced a range of difficult new questions. 
Were the intelligence agencies, the defence forces, and the police 
adequate to deal with the new challenges of terrorism and asymmetric 
warfare? How should they work together? How could non-state actors 
be deterred? More aspects of public policy, from transport to social 
policy, were becoming securitised. Just as the earlier generation of 
think tanks, notably the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS), which O’Neill had led, had been a response to the complex 
strategic challenges thrown up by the arrival of the nuclear age, 
so new thinking was now required about these difficult questions. 
In a parallel process, the expansion of neoliberal thinking through 
the 1980s and 1990s had led to a normative change in public 
administration in favour of contestable policy advice and competitive 
project delivery.19 Think tanks and commercial consultancies were 
beneficiaries as governments began deliberately to seek advice outside 
the regular channels of the public service. 
Research
Universities were also changing, driven by a more demanding and 
competitive market for students, and the need to prove their relevance 
to governments. One response was the establishment of new centres, 
such as SDSC, which combined teaching, research and public 
outreach. The Centre for International Security Studies at Sydney 
University (established in 2006) and the National Security Institute 
at the University of Canberra (founded in 2007) were examples. 
At the same time, however, the academic reward system — based 
on student numbers and driven by publication in peer-reviewed 
academic journals — was fundamentally different from that required 
to succeed as a think tank, where the key measurements of success 
were entrepreneurial skills, and access to and influence upon policy-
makers. Universities struggled as think tanks.
19  Keating, M. (2000) ‘The Pressures for Change’, in G. Davis and M. Keating (eds), The Future 
of Governance: Policy Choices, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
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Media
It was becoming clear from the early years of the century that the 
business model for newspapers in Australia, especially broadsheet 
newspapers, which depended heavily on classified advertising, was 
being fundamentally threatened by the rise of the internet. Circulation 
fell, advertising dropped, and the number of specialist correspondents 
in areas such as defence and foreign affairs was reduced. As senior 
Australian journalist, Laura Tingle, reflected: ‘forced to generate 
24-hour-a-day news, and under intense financial pressure, the media 
struggle to retain their own memory of what has gone before, and — 
if they do to keep it — the capacity to tell a story in any longer-term 
context.’20 Meanwhile, online access, first through desktop computers, 
then tablets and smart phones, was changing the way the Australian 
public received information about the world. Opportunities were 
opened up for think tanks, with electronic publications, blogs, and 
later social media in a market which had escaped from the traditional 
editorial gatekeepers of the mainstream media and the 800-word op-ed.
All these changes were important in preparing the ground for the 
arrival, at the beginning of the 2000s, of three new internationally-
focused institutions, each with the characteristics of think tanks, to 
varying degrees, and each well-funded enough to make a contribution 
from its inception. O’Neill had a founding role in all of them. On his 
retirement from Oxford in 2001, he returned to Australia to chair the 
Council of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, until 
2005. He joined the board of the Lowy Institute for International 
Policy and in 2006–2007, and became Planning Director for the new 
United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. 
ASPI
John Howard had come to office as prime minister in 1996 with no 
great background or focus on defence and foreign policy. By 1999, 
however, following the successful intervention in East Timor, he had 
20  Tingle, Laura (2015) Political Amnesia: How We Forgot to Govern, Quarterly Essay 60, 
Melbourne: Black Inc.
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begun to think of himself as a national security leader. The National 
Security Committee of Cabinet, a Howard Government innovation, 
had become a central part of the machinery of government.
Howard’s first Defence Minister, Ian McLaughlin, brought to the job 
a  strong belief that policy advice needed to be contestable. Public 
policy reforms in New Zealand had had an impact on his thinking. 
At  his request, the Defence Department began examining the role 
of think tanks and what might be done in Australia. McLaughlin’s 
successor as minister after the 1998 election, John Moore, shared that 
interest.
It took until 2000 for Howard to agree formally with the idea that the 
government should fund, initially at least, a think tank to be called 
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute which would encourage and 
inform public debate and understanding of Australia’s strategic and 
defence policy choices; provide an alternative source of policy ideas to 
government; nurture expertise in defence and strategic policy across 
and outside government; and promote international understanding 
of Australia’s strategic and defence policy perspectives.21 O’Neill had 
already been approached to chair such a body.
The third of Howard’s five defence ministers, Peter Reith, oversaw 
the relevant legislation and signed the charter letter establishing the 
principle of independence. By the time ASPI became operational 
under Robert Hill, however, the terrorist attacks of September 2001 
had brought about fundamental changes to the debate about national 
security policy.
ASPI was funded largely by the government which appointed its 
council, but it was to be independent in its views. By 2015, ASPI had 
32 staff and a $6 million budget. Most of the core budget still came from 
the Department of Defence, but as the institute’s role expanded into 
other areas of national security policy, including border security and 
cyber security, other departments and agencies, as well as industry 
sponsors, made growing contributions to its budget.
21  Australian Security Policy Institute (2015) Annual Report 2014–15, Canberra: Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute.
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Lowy Institute for International Policy 
In 2002, the founder of the Westfield retail and property business, 
Frank Lowy, was looking for a way of marking the 50th anniversary 
of his arrival in Australia with a gift to the nation. An early interest 
in establishing an institute to look at immigration issues gradually 
widened, partly at the instigation of his son, Peter Lowy, who had 
been resident in the United States for 15 years, into the idea of an 
international policy think tank based in Australia.
A member of the Holocaust generation, Lowy was deeply conscious 
of the importance of paying alert attention to changes in the 
international system. As a businessman with global interests, he also 
believed that Australia’s successes needed to be projected better onto 
the international stage.22
Lowy commissioned a scoping study from Michael Fullilove, who 
would later become executive director of the institute, and began 
discussing the idea with a number of people, including Ian McFarlane, 
the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (on the board of which 
Lowy sat), and Robert O’Neill.23 Another prominent former Australian, 
Dr Martin Indyk, a think tank entrepreneur in his own right, and by 
then at Brookings, also provided advice. 
The institute which — after some initial caution on Lowy’s part — 
carried the family name, was formally announced in September 2002, 
and opened in April 2003 in a heritage building close to the centre of 
the Sydney business district. Lowy pledged $30 million in funding. 
The decision to base it in Sydney rather than Canberra was never in 
doubt: Lowy intended to be a hands-on chairman. But the Sydney base 
also had an important effect in shifting and expanding the specialist 
international policy debate in Australia outside Canberra. 
The institute had a broad mandate, covering economic as well as 
political and strategic issues. Its mission was to: 
• produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s 
international policy and to contribute to the wider international 
debate; and
22  Margo, Jill (2015) Frank Lowy: A Second Life, Sydney: HarperCollins.
23  Ibid.
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• promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing 
an accessible and high quality forum for discussion of Australian 
international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, 
dialogues and conferences. 
The institute was to be independent, non-partisan, and empirically 
driven. There would be no Lowy Institute view of the world — apart 
from a general disposition to support an open Australia which was 
internationally engaged. This was an important commitment in the 
light of Lowy’s own deep support for Israel, where he had first arrived 
from Europe after the war, and in whose war of independence he had 
fought. 
The board brought together a group of people with formidable 
experience. It included O’Neill; McFarlane; the former senior banker, 
Rob Ferguson; the distinguished Australian economist and former 
ambassador to China, Ross Garnaut; the former Ambassador to the 
United States, Michael Thawley; and Peter and Stephen Lowy.
The writer was appointed as executive director, from a background 
largely in government policy advising and intelligence analysis. That 
appointment itself signalled that the institute would seek to influence 
practical public policy.
United States Studies Centre
One of the first major initiatives of the Lowy Institute was to commission 
an annual poll of Australian views of international affairs. The initial 
survey had revealed considerable concern about the role of the United 
States in the world. This helped to generate momentum from business 
and government supporters of the alliance for the establishment of 
a new centre to support understanding of the United States.
A number of earlier attempts to promote American studies in 
Australia had foundered through lack of resources, but in 2006 Prime 
Minister Howard announced the creation of a $25 million endowment 
to establish a United States Studies Centre. A national competition 
was held, and O’Neill was asked to be the strategic advisor for the 
University of Sydney’s bid. Sydney was successful and the centre was 
established there in partnership with the New York-based American 
Australian Association (AAA), with funding coming from the federal 
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and state governments, the AAA, and various individuals, foundations 
and corporate sponsors. O’Neill was the first CEO until a permanent 
appointment was made.
The centre was a hybrid academic and research centre, although it 
described itself as a think tank. Its mission was ‘to increase awareness 
and understanding about the United States in Australia’.24
During this period, established institutions responded to the 
same external demands. The venerable community-based AIIA 
strengthened its think tank dimensions, while the well-established 
Centre for Independent Studies expanded the range of its work in the 
international area.
A second round of internationally focused think tanks emerged a few 
years later in response to the growing policy focus on China. As with 
the first group, a parallel set of university centres — ANU Centre for 
China in the World, established in 2010, and Sydney University’s China 
Studies Centre, which started operations in 2011 — also appeared.
The Australia–China Relations Institute (ACRI), headed by former 
Foreign Minister Bob Carr, was established in December 2013 at the 
University of Technology, Sydney, with financial assistance from a 
prominent Chinese Australian businessman, Xiangmo Huang. In some 
ways an analogue of the United States Studies Centre, ACRI defined 
its role, in the words of its Director, the former Foreign Minister Bob 
Carr, as ‘leading and shaping the public debate in Australia through 
accessible and interactive public engagement, real time insights and 
a research agenda with impact’.25 
Another China focused think tank, the not-for-profit China Matters, 
followed in 2014 as a personal initiative of a leading China scholar, 
Linda Jakobson, formerly at the Lowy Institute, and in Beijing 
with the China and Global Security Programme of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). China Matters was a 
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was to ‘stimulate a realistic and nuanced discussion of China among 
Australian business, government and the security establishment, 
and advance sound policy’.26 
Of course, the expansion of international political and security think 
tanks was replicated in other areas. The Climate Institute (founded in 
2005), the Mitchell Institute (established in 2013) and, most notably 
in terms of size and influence, the Grattan Institute, in Melbourne 
(which began in 2008), were established in the fields of economic and 
social policy. 
What Differences Have Think Tanks Made?
All think tanks collect metrics to demonstrate the extent of their 
influence and reach to funders and supporters. Some of these metrics 
are simple: records of the number of events held and people present, 
research papers published, media coverage (including quotes from 
and appearances by scholars), and measures of the audience reach of 
websites, blogs, and social media feeds. 
Another important measurement of success is finance: fund-raising 
in all its forms — endowments, philanthropic donations, foundation 
funding, corporate or individual membership, and sponsorship 
for specific purposes, whether from government or industry. 
The  dependence on funding has generated increasing pressure in 
recent years for greater transparency in think tanks’ declaration of 
their financial support.27 
It is more difficult to measure the convening power of think tanks, 
that is, the quality and reputation that draws the public, policy- 
makers and the media to think tanks and in order to introduce 
their ideas and research. This depends in part on their capacity to 
attract and maintain the interest and loyalty of a diverse group of 
high calibre supporters and partners, and to recruit the best scholars 
and researchers. In  recent years, as with universities, international 
rankings have become another way for think tanks to define success.28 
26  chinamatters.org.au.
27  www.transparify.org.
28  McGann, James G. (2015) 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.
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Hardest of all to evaluate, however, is whether a think tank has made 
a difference; whether decision-makers were influenced by its ideas. 
Ideas are intangible and infinitely fungible. It is very difficult to 
ascribe a single cause to a policy change. In any case, one of the larger 
roles of think tanks is not simply to propose actions but to reframe the 
way in which issues are seen. 
Over the past 15 years, think tanks have changed Australian national 
security policy in five particular ways: by injecting new data into the 
public debate; by reframing some of the ways in which Australians 
think about the world; by suggesting specific policy ideas; by 
amplifying Australian voices in the international debate, including 
through second track processes; and by providing a new career path 
for Australians interested in working on international policy.
New Data
The annual Lowy Institute poll, described by the former Prime 
Minister, John Howard, as ‘invaluable’,29 has provided a deeper 
and more consistent set of empirical data on the changing views of 
Australians about international policy questions. It has helped change 
the terms of the public debate on issues such as climate change, the 
United States alliance, and attitudes of young Australians towards 
democracy, and has provided a much more solid foundation for debate 
about community views and a way of tracing changes in them. 
Similarly, ASPI’s work through Mark Thomson in clarifying, 
analysing, and parsing the defence budget30 has helped transform the 
way in which the Australian defence budget is debated, and even 
the way in which it is publicly presented. 
Framing Ideas
A second way in which think tanks have influenced Australian 
policy has been by helping to reframe familiar debates in new ways. 
For example, Rory Medcalf’s work at the Lowy Institute encouraged 
29  Howard, John (2015), speech at launch of Jill Margo’s Frank Lowy: A Second Life, Art Gallery 
of NSW, 7 October.
30  Thomson, Mark (2015) The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2015–2016, Canberra: 
ASPI.
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policy-makers from Labor and the Coalition to reconceptualise the 
country’s strategic environment in Indo-Pacific rather than Asia-
Pacific terms.31 Alan Dupont’s and Graeme Pearman’s research on 
climate change and international security for the Lowy Institute32 
helped reframe the debate about what constituted international 
security in Australia. Hugh White’s extensive writing on Australia’s 
‘China choice’ from SDSC and the Lowy Institute33 has been another 
influential example of framing.
Policy Proposals
It is often hard to point to specific policy changes implemented as 
a result of recommendations by think tanks. Nevertheless, several 
examples from Australian policy in the Pacific are clear. The 2003 
ASPI report by Elsina Wainwright on Solomon Islands, Our Failing 
Neighbour,34 provided a background to and argument for a change 
in government policy to support Australia’s military and police 
intervention in Solomon Islands. Jenny Hayward-Jones’s work on the 
role of labour mobility in Pacific development,35 and later on the need 
for Australia to reengage with Fiji36 was acknowledged to have been 
influential. 
In a different area, Linda Jakobson’s 2012 Lowy Institute paper on the 
need for a strategic dialogue with China37 played a direct role in the 
eventual creation of that dialogue according to government sources. 
31  Medcalf, Rory (2013) ‘The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?’, The American Interest 9(2). 
Available at: www.the-american-interest.com/2013/10/10/the-indo-pacific-whats-in-a-name/.
32  Dupont, Alan and Graham Pearman (2006) Heating up the Planet: Climate Change and 
Security, Canberra: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
33  White, Hugh (2012) The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Melbourne: Black 
Inc.
34  Wainwright, Elsina (2003) Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon 
Islands, Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
35  Hayward-Jones, Jenny (2008) Labour Mobility: An Australian Seasonal Work Visa Scheme 
for Pacific Islands Labour, Canberra: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
36  Hayward-Jones, Jenny (2014) Fiji’s Election and Australia: The Terms of Re-engagement, 
Canberra: Lowy Institute for International Policy.
37  Jakobson, Linda (2012) Australia-China Ties: In Search of Political Trust, Canberra: Lowy 
Institute for International Policy.
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Projecting Australian Voices
As a result of the shifts in global power noted earlier, governments 
and diplomats in the early twenty-first century found themselves 
seeking to influence a much greater range of international actors 
beyond their familiar interlocutors in other foreign ministries. Issues 
as diverse as the deterrence of people smuggling and the promotion 
of an Australian brand abroad required new forms of diplomacy with 
communities beyond governments. This opened up opportunities for 
think tanks in areas of second track diplomacy and media exchanges. 
Leadership dialogues proliferated and the government supported 
new forms of civil society engagement such as the Lowy Institute’s 
Australia PNG Network. 
Career Paths
Given the small number of Australians working on international 
policy, the reluctance of public servants to engage in public debate, 
and the speed with which a Canberra consensus develops around most 
international issues, one significant result of the development of think 
tanks was the creation of a new career path — outside the public service 
and universities — for a group of people interested in international 
policy. This has helped bring new voices, many of them with public 
service experience, into an otherwise cautious public debate. It has 
also facilitated greater movement into and out of the national security 
areas of government. Although Coral Bell (and Bob O’Neill) were early 
pioneers of this route, by 2015, policy analysts such as Hugh White, 
Peter Jennings, Michael Wesley, and Rory Medcalf had operated 
effectively across the three distinct areas of academia, government, 
and think tanks. Strong internship programs also developed at the key 
think tanks, offering students and new graduates a taste of the work.
In weighing up the influence of Australian international security think 
tanks, it is less clear that they have offered fundamental challenges to 
existing defence, foreign, and national security policies. Indeed, they 
seem to have been less prepared to do so than their counterparts in social 
and economic policy. The reasons for this are unclear. Nevertheless, 
the intrinsic bipartisanship of Australian foreign policy, the need for 
think tankers to retain access to decision-makers, the influence of 
funding sources, including the government, and a common cultural 
283
17 . THE RUMBLE OF THINK TANKS
background  among  participants, all impose a subtle levelling effect 
on debate. Any deeper or more radical enquiry about  international 
policy is still more likely to come from independent academic research 
in universities. 
Future Outlook
The systemic pressures which favoured the emergence of think tanks 
in the early twenty-first century — the normative changes which led 
governments to seek contestable policy advice, and the inscription 
on the international agenda of issues that demanded fresh strategic 
approaches — seem unlikely to abate. Most economic observers believe 
that Australian Government expenditure will be constrained for the 
foreseeable future, so think tanks will continue to offer potentially 
cost-effective ways of developing and delivering policy objectives. 
Any reader of speeches by Australian defence and foreign policy-
makers over the past 80 years soon tires of the repetitious claims that 
the country is poised to enter new, more fluid and complex times. 
Still, it is certainly true that the challenges to the regional and global 
strategic order that Australia faces as a result of the rise of China will 
be more testing than most. Three responses have been woven through 
the policies every Australian government since the Second World 
War has used to address the nation’s strategic vulnerabilities: alliance 
with a more powerful partner, efforts to influence the rules-based 
international order, and engagement with Asian neighbours to try to 
shape the regional environment. Each is clearly becoming harder to 
manage.
Bob O’Neill’s 2006 prescription for think tanks: ‘good ideas, dialogue 
with government and a relationship which tolerates free expression 
of views, especially on differences with existing policies’,38 remains 
relevant 10 years later. 
38  O’Neill, Robert (2006) ‘Problems and Perspectives on International Security’, The Lowy 




Australian Thinking About Asia
Michael Wesley
Like some of the other great scholars of the late twentieth century, 
it was war that introduced Bob O’Neill to Asia.1 Already a well-
credentialed strategist and military historian, Bob was posted to 
Vietnam with the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), in 
May 1966, where from the start he began a diary which would become 
his second book, Vietnam Task.2 Tellingly, Bob titled the first chapter 
‘The Problem’, and used it to inform the reader (initially his wife, Sally, 
to whom he posted instalments of his diary) about the terrain, politics, 
and military situation in South Vietnam. The chapter (like the rest of 
the book) shows a thorough-going strategist at work. ‘The Problem’ 
refers not self-indulgently to the plight of a young academic who has 
left his bride to enter a war zone, nor ideologically to the scourge of 
rampant Asian communism, but to a strategic challenge, to be thought 
about with the cold, dry logic of Liddell-Hart and Clausewitz, and 
addressed with the attitude that there can be a solution. Never one to 
think things half through, Bob didn’t leave the Vietnam War behind 
when he shipped out in 1967, or when Vietnam Task was published in 
1  Others who immediately come to mind include Clifford Geertz, Chalmers Johnson, 
and Stephan Haggard.
2  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) Vietnam Task, Melbourne: Cassell.
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1968. In quick succession, Bob published an analysis of the Vietnam 
conflict3 and a biography of General Giap,4 the strategist behind the 
forces against which Bob had been fighting.
In these early books, along with his monumental official history, 
Australia in the Korean War 1950–1953,5 Bob studied Vietnam and 
Korea closely, and thought about the contexts of these two conflicts 
deeply. His biography of General Giap, and his introductory chapter 
on the historical antecedents of the Korean War are testament to a 
scholar who read widely and thought profoundly about the local 
conditions and dynamics underpinning the two wars. His tenure as 
Head of ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) and then 
as Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 
saw his attention return again and again to the strategic challenges 
of Asia. The conception of Asia that emerges from his writings is of 
a complicated and dynamic realm, less stable than any other region 
with the possible exception of the Middle East, and scantly covered 
by alliances, institutions, or other stabilising mechanisms. Asia is a 
region of intense competition within and between four layers of 
contention: the superpowers, the larger regional powers, the lesser 
regional powers, and various sub-national and transnational forces.6 
It is a realm where some of the Cold War’s strict divisions began to 
unravel, while others remained stubbornly militarised; a realm that 
delivers puzzling variations to Bob’s enduring strategic interests, 
including nuclear strategy and insurgency.7 
Bob’s writings on Asia’s strategic dynamics are a significant contribution 
to evolving Australian thinking on the security challenges it faced 
after the end of the Vietnam War. Although Australians have been 
pondering and writing about Asia since at least the mid-nineteenth 
century,8 the final quarter of the twentieth century became an 
3  O’Neill, Robert J. (1968) The Indo China Tragedy, Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire.
4  O’Neill, Robert J. (1969) General Giap: Politician and Strategist, North Melbourne: Cassell.
5  O’Neill, Robert J. (1981) Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, Volume 1: Strategy and 
Diplomacy, Canberra: The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing 
Service.
6  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1984) Security in East Asia, Adelphi Library 9, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, p. vii.
7  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1987) East Asia, the West and International Security, London: 
Macmillan.
8  Walker, David (1999) Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850–1939, St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press.
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extremely fertile period of intellectual inquiry and policy development 
about Asia’s evolving order and how Australia should relate to 
and, perhaps help shape, this order. Alongside the strategists were 
economists charting the beginnings of an era of explosive economic 
growth and its pervasive gravitational effects on the Australian 
economy. Political scientists delved into the sources of stability and 
instability within Australia’s neighbours, charting the correlation 
of stable, if authoritarian, political settlements with sustained and 
remarkable equitable economic growth. Australian Government policy 
became closely entwined with these developments; initiatives such 
as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and Australia’s initially 
isolated quest to find peace in Indochina saw academics and officials 
working closely together to address challenges and opportunities 
identified by both. The burst of policy innovation (the Defence of 
Australia) and institution building (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 
Forum (ARF)) in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the culmination 
of Australian academics’ and officials’ long, entwined intellectual 
engagement with Asia.
And yet the founding of the ARF in 1994 can be seen as the conclusion 
of an era of Australian academic and official thinking about Asia. 
Many of the seeming verities that Australians had studied deeply in 
Asia seemed to have unravelled. For the strategists, with the end of the 
Cold War and the war in Indochina, there were new concerns: North 
Korea’s nuclear program, China’s assertiveness over the 1996 Taiwanese 
elections and the South China Sea, India’s and Pakistan’s breakout 
nuclear tests, and the fight to dislodge the Taliban and al Qaeda from 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The economists were celebrating the arrival 
of the next rank of Asia’s miracle — China, Thailand, and Indonesia 
— but, troublingly, the original miracle economy, Japan, had hit 
a wall from which it wouldn’t recover. Then, in 1997, a financial crisis 
rippled across the region, rapidly reversing the miracle trade gains 
and casting doubt on the viability of state-directed approaches to 
economic development. The institutions created to great fanfare failed 
to live up to expectations; not only did they not galvanise in the face 
of security or financial crises,9 by the end of the century it was clear 
9  Wesley, Michael (1999) ‘The Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(1), pp. 54–73; Acharya, Amitav (1999) ‘Realism, Institutionalism 
and the Asian Economic Crisis’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(1), pp. 1–29.
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that they had not been able to socialise a rising China to the region’s 
norms and standards of behaviour. The political scientists saw their 
attention shift from authoritarian stability to democratic transition, 
instability, and increasing extremism.10
The quantum of Australian thinking about Asia did not abate after the 
mid-1990s; if anything, a greater range and diversity of voices joined 
the discussion. With the advent of the Howard Government in 1996, the 
close interaction between academics and officials on Australian policy 
towards the region frayed and at times became adversarial. Many of the 
themes and approaches to understanding Asia and Australia’s relation 
to the region pioneered since the end of Vietnam War continued, but, 
perhaps reflecting the rate of change in the region itself, these were 
joined by new lines of inquiry and critique. In reviewing Australian 
thinking on Asia over the past two decades, I am going to separate 
Australian thinking about Asia from Australian thinking about how to 
relate to Asia. This is a somewhat artificial distinction, because there 
is an organic connection between a perspective on the region and 
a consequent attitude to how Australia should relate to the region. 
I try to rectify this distinction in the conclusion by identifying some 
of the continuities between understandings and prescriptions in the 
Australian conversation on Asia.
What is Asia?
‘Asia’ is a word heavily used in Australian political discourse, but its 
meanings are much less stable than those of other continents. Australian 
definitions of Asia have fluctuated according to the dynamics of wealth 
and power. In 1946, in mandating that its new national university 
in Canberra should devote one of four Research Schools to ‘Pacific 
Studies’, the Australian Government assumed all would know that 
this geographic designation was intended to include a large part of the 
Asian continent, on the verge of independence, and thus presenting 
a pressing imperative upon Australian government and society to 
understand the region.11 Soon after, under the terms of the 1948 
10  Robison, Richard and Vedi R. Hadiz (2004) Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of 
Oligarchy in an Age of Markets, London: Routledge Curzon.
11  Australian National University Act 1946. Available at: www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2004C02218.
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UKUSA signals intelligence agreement (between the United States, 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), Australia 
was given responsibility for collecting and sharing intelligence on 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific — thus drawing much tighter 
boundaries on Australia’s Asian area of interest and expertise.12 Later, 
in 1951, Australia was a key player in the development of the Colombo 
Plan, which focused development assistance efforts on South and 
Southeast Asia.13 Also in 1951, Australia signed the ANZUS Treaty 
with the United States and New Zealand, which returned to a broader 
geographic scope of alliance obligations:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any 
of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes.14
As we will see, the vagueness of the ‘Pacific’ definition of Asia — 
so clear to those who had just lived through the Pacific War — would 
cause real misunderstandings and tensions in the Australia–US alliance 
after the turn of the twenty-first century.
Involvement in the Korean War, and the signing of a Commerce 
Agreement with Japan in 1957 and the subsequent boom in Australian 
trade with Northeast Asia broadened Australia’s Asia interests beyond 
Southeast Asia and focused them from a diffuse Pacific area.15 At the 
same time, the communist victory in China, and Beijing’s subsequent 
sponsorship of militant communist insurgencies throughout Southeast 
Asia, drew Australia’s attention to Northeast and Southeast Asia as 
regions of primary security concern.16 This coincidence of Australia’s 
economic and security interests in East Asia would endure past the end 
of the Vietnam War, the deep enmeshment of the Australian economy 
with Asia, and the end of the Cold War. The dismantling of the 
White Australia Policy in the early 1970s, followed by the large-scale 
12  Ball, Desmond and Jeffery T. Richelson (1990) The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation 
Between the UKUSA Countries, Boston: Unwin Hyman.
13  Oakman, Daniel (2004) Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan, Canberra: Pandanus 
Books.
14  Commonwealth of Australia (1951) ANZUS Treaty. Available at: australianpolitics.com/
topics/foreign-policy/anzus-treaty-text.
15  Tweedie, Sandra (1994) Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790–1993, Sydney: UNSW 
Press, pp. 154–6.
16  Millar, T. B. (1965) Australia’s Defence, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
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acceptance of Vietnamese refugees under the Fraser Government, 
brought a demographic dimension to Australia’s new enmeshment with 
East Asia. In the Australian vernacular, the term ‘Asian’ was used to 
refer to people of East Asian ethnicity, unlike in Britain, where ‘Asians’ 
were universally taken to be South Asians. So embedded had East Asia 
become in Australian definitions of Asia that Foreign Minister Gareth 
Evans felt comfortable enough to propose an ‘East Asian Hemisphere’ 
in 1995, complete with cartographic illustrations showing Australia as 
part of this hemisphere.17
Following the turn of the century, three events combined to disturb 
this comfortable truncation of Asia in the Australian mind. The first 
was the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, which 
saw Australian Prime Minister John Howard invoke the ANZUS Treaty 
for the first time in its history, and commit Australian forces to the 
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The second was 
increasing evidence that the post-1991 economic reforms in India were 
translating into rapid economic growth in the world’s other billion-
plus people economy — which, in turn, were beginning to manifest 
in trade, investment and migration flows to Australia. Third was a 
rediscovery of geopolitical interest in the Indian Ocean, a part of the 
world that had not evinced much interest since the collapse of Soviet 
naval ambitions in the mid-1980s.18 It wasn’t long before Australia’s 
commitments in the Middle East and South Asia were causing tensions 
in its relations with some Southeast Asian countries, while forging 
new operational military partnerships with countries such as Japan 
in Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, concerns over China’s assertiveness in 
the South and East China Seas gave rise to hopes that India would 
soon begin to play a credible balancing role to China’s growing 
power, and a series of growing security relations between New Delhi 
and countries such as Japan and Vietnam.19 As a result, Australian 
commentators began to resurrect an older and largely forgotten term, 
the ‘Indo-Pacific’, as an explicit replacement of the term ‘Asia Pacific’ 
17  Evans, Gareth (1995) ‘Australia, ASEAN and the East Asian Hemisphere’, Statement by the 
Australian Foreign Minister to the ASEAN PMC 7+1, Bandar Seri Bagawan, 2 August. Available 
at: www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1995/020895_australia_asean_eahemisphere.pdf.
18  Kaplan, Robert D. (2010) Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Battle for Supremacy in the 
Twenty-First Century, Melbourne: Black Inc Books.
19  Brewster, David (2012) India as an Asia Pacific Power, Abingdon: Routledge.
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to define the part of Asia of most relevance to Australia.20 The terms 
soon began to be picked up by policy-makers in Australia and the 
United States.
There is a case to be made that, despite this recent widening, the 
subdivision of Asia into segments that are of most interest to Australia 
makes little sense. The growing economic interdependence across Asia’s 
subregions — in energy flows, investment, distributed manufacturing, 
and increasingly services — means that there is no one sub-region 
that is important on its own terms and independent of its relations 
with others. The growth in Asian powers’ military capabilities and 
rivalries, and the recession of American strategic primacy means that 
drawing geopolitical boundaries around Asia’s sub-regions makes little 
sense. The growth of institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation, the One Belt-One Road and Eurasian Union initiatives, 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Banks shows that Asia’s 
powers are not thinking in terms of Asia’s subdivisions, but rather 
in terms of its possibilities and unities. Increasingly, I argue in my 
recent book, it will only make sense to think of Asia as a geographic 
whole — from the Pacific to the Mediterranean, from the Arctic to the 
Indian Ocean.21
Quite apart from the geographic definition of Asia, Australians have 
long discussed Asia as a cultural challenge to a Western society moored 
a long way from its cultural kin in Europe and North America. Primary 
among the newly independent Commonwealth’s impulses towards 
the societies to its north west was a desire to assert the superiority of 
Australia’s ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture and institutions, and a desire to keep 
out the polluting influence of what were assumed to be ‘lesser’ Asian 
races.22 The first piece of legislation issued by the Commonwealth 
Parliament in 1901 was the Immigration Restriction Act, which 
established the White Australia Policy, which would endure for over 
70 years. Yet, at the same time as these fearful, exclusionary impulses 
were dominant, there was a constant sub-theme of Australians 
20  Wesley, Michael (2011) There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 
Sydney: NewSouth Books; Medcalf, Rory (2013) ‘Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?’, in Michael 
Fullilove and Anthony Bubalo (eds), Reports From a Turbulent Decade, Melbourne: Viking.
21  Wesley, Michael (2015) Restless Continent: Wealth, Rivalry and Asia’s New Geopolitics, 
Melbourne: Black Inc Books.
22  Reynolds, Henry and Marylin Lake (2008) Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s 
Countries and the Question of Racial Equality, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
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fascinated by the antiquity and sophistication of Asian cultures and 
religions. The study of Asian thought and society, and increasingly 
tourism to Asia became a significant current in Australian society from 
the late nineteenth century.23
With the end of the Second World War and the coming of independence 
to the countries of Asia, Australian writers began to question the 
compatibility of the White Australia Policy with the imperative 
of building close relations with the new states to our north.24 The 
growing assertiveness of post-colonial states in the United Nations 
over racial questions during the 1960s saw the Australian Government 
begin to quietly dismantle the White Australia Policy. And as security 
and economic trends drew Australia’s attention ever more insistently 
towards Asia, there was a surge in Australian research and writing on 
the impact of cultural and values differences on international relations 
and foreign policy.25 The Australian debates and discussions at the time 
were affected by two external factors: the worldwide resurgence of 
regionalism at the end of the Cold War, and the surge of debate around 
the impact of culture on world politics following the publication of 
Samuel Huntington’s essay, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’.26 Huntington 
explicitly drew Australia into his provocative argument, labelling it a 
‘torn country in reverse’ whose ‘current leaders are in effect proposing 
that it defect from the West, redefine itself as an Asian country and 
cultivate close ties with its neighbours’.27 Huntington’s intervention 
had the effect of further politicising Australia’s policy of enmeshment 
with the Asian region, with opposition leader John Howard accusing 
23  Walker, David (1999) Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850–1939, St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press; Strahan, Lachlan (1996) Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions 
from the 1930s to the 1990s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; McFarlane, Jenny (2006) 
A Sacred Space: Theosophy and Alternative Modernism in Australia, 1890–1934, PhD Thesis, 
The Australian National University. 
24  Levi, Walter (1947) American-Australian Relations, Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press; Borrie, W. D. (1950) ‘Australian Population and its Relation to Asia’, Australian Outlook 
4(3), pp. 162–9; Crocker, Walter R. (1956) The Racial Factor in International Relations, Canberra: 
Australian National University Press.
25  Viviani, Nancy (1993) ‘The Politics of Nationalism and Regionalism in Australia’, Asian 
Journal of Political Science 1(2), pp. 39–56; Milner, Anthony and Mary Quilty (1995) Comparing 
Cultures, Melbourne: Oxford University Press; FitzGerald, Stephen (1997) Is Australia an Asian 
Country? Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
26  Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72(3), pp. 22–49.
27  Ibid., p. 45
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the government of selling out Australia’s identity, and Prime Minister 
Paul Keating vehemently rejecting Huntington’s and Howard’s 
characterisations.28
The imperative of post-Cold War regionalism also added intensity 
to the debate within Australia. Being so dependent on the region 
for economic and security reasons, Canberra sensed the danger of 
being left on the outer if an exclusionary bloc were to form in East 
Asia. This was heightened by Malaysia’s combative Prime Minister 
Mahathir, who championed Asian regionalism in explicitly cultural 
terms (while conveniently glossing over the differences among Asian 
societies by promoting the idea of common Asian values). Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans argued that cultural differences were becoming 
less and less relevant in the age of globalisation, while his successor 
Alexander Downer argued that Australia’s cultural differences with 
Asian societies mattered little given the wide cultural and values 
differences among Asian societies. In the end, Mahathir’s vision of an 
exclusionary, Asianist regional grouping was rejected in favour of the 
open regionalism embodied by APEC, the ARF, and eventually the East 
Asia Summit. The intensity of discussions about Australia’s cultural 
differences with East Asian societies were themselves superseded by 
a post-9/11 anxiety about asylum seekers from South and West Asia 
and a growing debate about how Australian society should relate to 
Muslim communities within and beyond its borders.29
A third theme in Australian thinking about Asia has been a repeated 
return to using Asia as a mirror in which Australian society appraises 
itself. Australian society’s comfortable sense of superiority to the 
societies to its north began to be unsettled in the 1960s as the Japanese 
economy boomed, soon to be followed by the economies of South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and a procession of Asian tigers. The 
period of Asia’s economic boom coincided with the end of Australia’s 
own postwar long boom. After 1974, Australia’s economy succumbed 
to over a decade of sluggish growth, high inflation and unemployment, 
and collapsing consumer and export demand, while a succession of 
Asian economies industrialised and grew at the fastest rates ever seen. 
28  Keating, Paul (2000) Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia Pacific, Sydney: Pan Macmillan; 
Wesley, Michael (2007) The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996–2006, Sydney: 
ABC Books.
29  Burke, Anthony (2008) Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press.
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Australians could no longer look to Europe and America for solutions, 
because these regions were suffering as severe economic recessions 
as Australia. Inevitably, comparisons began to be made between 
a struggling Australian economy and the booming fortunes of its 
neighbours.30 These anxieties were only stoked by Asian leaders, such 
as Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, who warned Australians that unless they 
changed they would become the ‘poor white trash of Asia’. Treasurer 
Paul Keating seemed to echo Lee’s warning when he famously said in 
1986 that Australia risked becoming a ‘banana republic’ if it did not 
deregulate and diversify its economy.
Partly against the background of Australia’s lagging performance 
compared to Asia’s, a broad suite of liberalising economic reforms 
were undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s.31 By the mid-1990s, the 
Australian economy had entered a period of expansion and prosperity 
that was to survive three global and regional slowdowns, coming to be 
seen as a miracle economy. It was in this state of economic buoyancy 
that Australia watched the tiger economies to its north stumble — 
first Japan’s long recession, then the collapse of the Thai, Korean, 
Philippines, Malaysian, and Indonesian economies in the 1997–1998 
Asian Financial Crisis. Suddenly the logic of comparison had flipped. 
Foreign Minister Downer couldn’t resist providing some helpful 
inspiration to the struggling economies in Asia: ‘we have through 
our own strong [economic] performance shown the region … what 
commitment to openness and transparency in economic and political 
affairs can achieve’.32 
Asia also provided a mirror to those Australians who worried about 
the country’s alliance relationship with the United States. The alliance 
has been controversial for decades among those who worry that it 
makes Australia vulnerable as collateral damage in a possible nuclear 
exchange33 or that Australia risks being dragged into American 
strategic mistakes.34 For many commentators of this view, the countries 
30  Castles, Francis G. (1988) Australian Public Policy and Economic Vulnerability, Sydney: 
Allen & Unwin; Drysdale, Peter (1988) International Economic Pluralism: Economic Policy in East 
Asia and the Pacific, Canberra: Australian National University Press.
31  Kelly, Paul (1992) The End of Certainty, Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
32  Quoted in Wesley, Michael (2011) There Goes the Neighbourhood: Australia and the Rise 
of Asia, Sydney: NewSouth Books, p. 310.
33  Camilleri, Joseph A. (1987) ANZUS: Australia’s Predicament in the Nuclear Age, Melbourne: 
Macmillan.
34  Wilkie, Andrew (2004) Axis of Deceit, Melbourne: Black Inc Agenda.
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of Asia that refused to align with either side of the Cold War divide, or 
those that did ally but in a low key, ambiguous way, provided a clear 
example of how a country in Australia’s neighbourhood could maintain 
its security without compromising its foreign policy independence.35 
In some iterations of this argument, Australia’s close alignment with 
the United States was a major factor that prevented it from playing a 
genuine insider’s role in Asia.36 On the other side of this debate were 
those who argued that rather than diminishing Australia’s influence in 
Asia, the US alliance actually enhances it.37
The rise of China as Australia’s most important economic partner 
emerged as a major complication in managing a bifurcation of 
Australia’s economic and security interests. Like many regional 
countries, Australia has tightened its security relationship with the 
United States as it has been drawn ever more powerfully into China’s 
economic orbit. The thickening economic relationship with China has 
repeatedly raised questions over whether, if China and the United 
States were to come to blows, Australia would support its ally or 
remain aloof in the interests of preserving its economic relationship 
with China. Here, the ambiguity of the ANZUS Treaty’s wording has 
not helped. While some Australian leaders, such as Kevin Rudd, have 
been clear in their intention to side with Washington, others, such as 
Alexander Downer and Defence Minister David Johnston, have been 
much more equivocal. The changing structure of forces in the Pacific 
has led some scholars to argue that the balance of risks within the 
alliance has shifted, as the United States has moved from being at risk 
of entrapment to a risk of abandonment by its smaller ally.38 
Another Asian mirror shed light on Australian values for many 
commentators. After promising democratic starts, many of Asia’s 
countries lurched towards semi-authoritarian one-party rule in the 
decades after independence.39 At times this led to bitter divisions among 
35  Fraser, Malcolm, (2014) Dangerous Allies, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
36  Broinowski, Alison (2003) About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, Melbourne: Scribe 
Publications.
37  Sheridan, Greg (2006) The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US–Australian Alliance Under 
Bush and Howard, Sydney: UNSW Press.
38  Green, Michael J., Peter J. Dean, Brendan Taylor and Zack Cooper (2015) The ANZUS 
Alliance in an Ascending Asia, Centre of Gravity Paper, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, The Australian National University.
39  Dressel, Bjeorn and Michael Wesley (2014) ‘Asian States in Crisis’, Strategic Analysis 38(4), 
pp. 452–3.
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Australia’s Asianist scholars, some of whom advocated continuing to 
study and engage with Australia’s authoritarian neighbours, while 
others adopted a much more critical attitude to shortfalls in democracy, 
the rule of law, and human rights.40 Writers such as Pierre Ryckmans 
urged Australians not to be duped by superficial enthusiasm for 
countries such as the People’s Republic of China, where vicious regimes 
were tearing societies apart.41 Ryckmans was particularly cutting 
about Australia jettisoning its moral compass in pursuit of material 
gains, arguing that admiration for Deng Xiaoping was the result of 
an eagerness for ‘signing fat business deals with China’.42 Some 
Indonesianists were highly critical of Canberra’s close relationship 
with the authoritarian, corrupt Suharto regime in Indonesia, directing 
particular criticism towards the Australian Defence  Force’s intimate 
embrace of the Indonesian Armed Forces, the cutting edge of repression 
and human rights abuses. Others argued that as Australia had become 
more integrated into Asian regional institutions, it had adopted a more 
Asian foreign policy stance in its increasing reluctance to criticise the 
internal practices of its co-members.
Australia and Asia
Of course, these different manifestations of Asia in the Australian 
imagination have often been related in some way to distinct 
opinions about how Australia should relate to the huge continent 
and archipelagos to its north. Perhaps the longest running theme 
on how Asia affects Australia centres around the several iterations 
of ‘Asiapessimism’ versus ‘Asiaphoria’. Asiapessimists have come in 
several varieties. At  the end of the Second World War, there were 
many Australians who were fearful of the prospect of a region of 
newly independent countries, believing that the new nations of the 
region would soon become prey to resurgent Japanese militarism or 
the march of Asian communism.43 The response was to pursue an 
alliance with the United States, push for a development assistance plan 
40  See Kelly, David and Anthony Reid (eds) (1998) Asian Freedoms, Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press.
41  Leys, Simon (1977) Chinese Shadows, New York: Viking Press.
42  Quoted in Strahan, Lachlan (1996) Australia’s China: Changing Perceptions from the 1930s 
to the 1990s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 302.
43  Fitzgerald, C. P. (1957) ‘Australia in Asia’, in Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (eds), 
Australia in World Affairs 1950–1955, Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, p. 201.
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at Colombo to bolster resilience in new states, and adopt a forward 
defence strategy.44 More recent forms of Asiapessimism focus on the 
persistent or new causes of instability in Asia, from corruption and 
crime to environmental degradation, with several scholars pointing 
out the role of Australia’s energy exports in Asia’s mounting challenge 
to the global environment.45
On the other side were the Asiaphoric commentators who tended to 
see Asia’s future as bright and therefore viewed Australia’s future 
as clearly wedded to the booming countries to the north. Many saw 
the economic rise of Asia as a re-emergence of Asian societies to a 
place of global pre-eminence after the long night of colonialism, and 
celebrated the political and cultural decolonisation that was occurring 
as a consequence as Asian societies gained the confidence to stand 
up to Western dominance.46 Some could see the dawn of a new age 
in Asia’s rise, a post-Western economic and security order to which 
Australia would have to adjust in order to secure its future.47 The logic 
was that Asia’s rise was an opportunity for Australia, if only Australia 
could prove itself nimble and protean enough to make the most of this 
millennial activity.48 Others, particularly on the conservative side of 
politics, rejected the notion that Australia had to adjust to succeed in 
Asia; in Prime Minister John Howard’s terms, Australia could make its 
way just by being ourselves.49
One interesting aspect of this debate is the extent to which the 
Asiapessimists are speaking a different language — that of strategy — 
to that of the Asiaphorists — who speak the language of economics. 
This is particularly stark in relation to the rise of China and its likely 
impact on Australia. Strategists tend to see in China’s rise the prospects 
of deepening rivalry with the United States and other Asian powers, 
44  Lowe, David (1999) Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War 1948–54, 
Sydney: UNSW Press; Edwards, Peter (2014) Australia and the Vietnam War, Sydney: NewSouth 
Books.
45  Dupont, Alan (1999) East Asia Imperilled, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press; Beeson, 
Mark (2011) ‘Can Australia Save the World?: The Limits and Possibilities of Middle Power 
Diplomacy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 65 (5), pp. 563–77.
46  FitzGerald, Stephen (1997) Is Australia an Asian Country? Sydney: Allen & Unwin, p. 42.
47  Garnaut, Ross (1989) Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, Canberra: Australian 
Government Public Service.
48  Australian Government (2012) Australia and the Asian Century, White Paper, Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia.
49  Wesley, Michael (2007) The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996–2006, 
Sydney: ABC Books.
WAR, STRATEGy AND HISTORy
298
leading to the realistic prospect of war, including nuclear exchange.50 
The prescription for Australia is, then, greater independence and 
activism, playing a role in coaxing the great powers towards some 
sort of mutual accommodation. The Asiaphorists see in China’s rise a 
new phase of the global economy, in which Australia is particularly 
well placed to benefit from the remarkable complementarities 
between its own economy and the soon to be world’s largest economy. 
The imperative of this school of thought is that Australia should get 
over its suspicions of China’s different political and cultural system, 
and make the most of the demand and investment generated by its 
giant economy.
Another strand of thinking on Australia and its relation to Asia is the 
Engagement Project. Believers in the Engagement Project detected in 
the 1970s and 1980s that one consequence of the rise of Asia would 
be a challenge to the dominance of Western orders and norms as they 
applied to Australia’s region. The end of the Vietnam War and the 
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine quickened Australia’s search for 
an alternative defence doctrine to Forward Defence, and a decisive 
move towards the Defence of Australia Doctrine.51 Key government 
messaging around the new doctrine was that in the future, Australia 
would seek its security ‘in Asia, not from Asia’. This new mantra 
coincided with the rise of the new regionalism around the world, as 
the Cold War came to an end. Eager to secure a founding membership 
of any Asian institutions that emerged, Australia became an active 
regionalist, promoting what were eventually to become APEC and 
the ARF, and campaigning against exclusivist cultural bloc proposals 
such as Dr Mahathir’s East Asia Economic Caucus. Asian engagement 
became a defining foreign policy project for Australia and a significant 
issue in the country’s domestic politics. The rhetoric of engagement 
was redolent with the implications of an apprenticeship: while other 
countries in the region were automatically assumed to be members, 
Australia needed to demonstrate its credentials and commitment to 
50  White, Hugh (2012) The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power, Melbourne: Black 
Inc Books.
51  Dibb, Paul (1986) Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, Canberra: Australian 
Government Public Service. Available at: www.defence.gov.au/se/publications/defreview/1986/
Review-of-Australias-Defence-Capabilities -1986.pdf.
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the Asian project — whatever that was. This attracted great attention 
among Australian scholars and policy-makers to the bounds and rules 
of the club that we were seeking to join.52
The engagement project became a significant issue in domestic politics. 
Whether Australia was a member of regional groupings (such as APEC 
and the ARF) or not (such as the Asia–Europe Meeting) became an 
issue of some controversy. Australian foreign policy actions, and even 
domestic political developments such as the rise of the xenophobic 
One Nation party, were appraised according to whether they advanced 
or hindered the engagement project. For some commentators, 
participation in the Iraq War or the failure to condemn racism in 
Australia meant that the ‘dowry price just keeps rising’.53 On the 
other hand, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer argued 
that Australia wasn’t interested in joining all regional clubs — it was 
interested in ‘practical regionalism’, not ‘emotional regionalism’.54 
The engagement project seemed to lose cache after Australia signed 
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and joined the East Asia 
Summit in 2005. One scholar challenged Australia’s foreign policy 
community to move on from the engagement era and find a new 
paradigm for dealing with the region as an acknowledged insider.55
Conclusion
Reviews of one nation’s thinking about a particular subject are 
inevitably partial and reflective of the author’s experiences and 
interests. I am aware also that the thinking about Asia I have set out 
seems very logically and clearly divided into different approaches 
and streams. The reality is that the Australian conversation about 
Asia has been ongoing and varied for close to two centuries. Themes 
merge and coincide; debates rage and die; and what appear to be 
52  FitzGerald, Stephen (1997) Is Australia an Asian Country? Sydney: Allen & Unwin; 
Ravenhill, John (2001) APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Wesley, Michael (1997) ‘The Politics of Exclusion: Australia, 
Turkey, and Definitions of Regionalism’, The Pacific Review 10(4), pp. 523–55.
53  Broinowski, Alison (2003) About Face: Asian Accounts of Australia, Melbourne: Scribe 
Publications.
54  Wesley, Michael (2007) The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996–2006, 
Sydney: ABC Books, p. 155.
55  Carr, Andrew (2015) Winning the Peace: Australia’s Campaign to Change the Asia Pacific, 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
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new ideas turn out to have long historical antecedents. There have 
always been important connections between Australians’ geographic 
definition of Asia and their thinking about the quest for membership 
and belonging. The irony is, of course, that in defining themselves 
into the region, the East Asian Hemispherists are at the same time 
defining out most of the societies that occupy that continent. Another 
intimate connection has been between currents of Asiaphoria and 
Asiapessimism, and discussions of whether the rise of Asia represents 
a challenge or alternative to Australia’s Western identity. As observers 
have sometimes noted, Australian debates about the meaning of Asia’s 
rise often say more about the people engaging in debate than the region 
they are debating. The same can be said about the various discussions 
that use Asia as a mirror to reflect on Australia’s worth and values.
All of this was grist to Bob O’Neill’s mill as he reflected on and wrote 
about the strategic dynamics of his time. When one reads Bob’s 
writings, one can see the impact of Australia’s rich debates about how 
it defines and relates to the culturally and developmentally different 
countries to its north. Even while Bob was in the UK, he kept abreast 
of the developments and debates in his native country, and his own 
intellectual projects returned regularly to the security dynamics of 
Asia.56 Bob’s writings are and will remain part of the deep and dynamic 
conversation in Australia about Asia.
56  O’Neill, Robert J. (ed.) (1984) Security in East Asia, Adelphi Library 9, London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies; O’Neill, Robert J. (1992) Security Challenges for Southeast Asia 
After the Cold War, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
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